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THE

WORKS OF PLATO.

A NEW AND LITERAL VERSION,

CHIEFLY FROM THE TEXT OF STALLBAUM.

VOL. V.

CONTAINING THE LAWS.

BY GEORGE BURGES, M. A.

TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

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PREFACE.

In this volume, which completes the Works of Plato, generally admitted to be genuine, will be found the only English translation of the Laws, hitherto made directly from the Greek. For although they form part of Taylor's publication, it is not too much to say that he can scarcely have looked at the original, but must have depended on the Latin version of Ficinus; and this too not the genuine one, but the refiction of it which was made by Symon Grynæus to suit the printed text.

Of the grounds on which this suspicion rests, numerous proofs will be found in the notes. Not only has Taylor tacitly followed Ficinus in his omissions and insertions, but in numerous instances, where the genuine version had preserved the sense of the original, he has neglected it, in accordance with the revised version by Grynæus.

For this dereliction of the first duty of a translator, Taylor would perhaps have pleaded, that, as he never presumed to rival Ficinus in his knowledge of Plato, whose writings the Italian scholar had studied from his earliest years, he conceived it far more advisable to follow the Latin version than to attempt to unravel the original Greek; where so numerous are the difficulties and so unaccountable the corruptions, as to render it frequently impossible to give even a readable, much less an elegant, rendering. And so too, it would seem, thought the French translator Grou; who, as remarked by Cousin, has frequently followed Ficinus; and even the German translator Schulthess seems to have found it easier to translate from the French than the Greek. Cousin has himself been content

to adopt Grou's translation, as a basis, rather than make a new one from the original; which he says is full of novelties of syntax, or rather of the want of all syntax, differing in this respect from the other dialogues of Plato—a discrepancy, he thinks, owing to the fact, that the Laws had not received the last touches of the author's hand.

That the Laws have come down to us in a very unsatisfactory state, is well known, and was long since ably shown by Boeckh; and it was doubtless owing in part to this conviction that, after penning some first-rate remarks on the three opening books, he gave up the task in despair; he saw that the nine remaining presented a series of obstacles, which it was useless to encounter and hopeless to overcome.

The labour, however, that Boeckh was unwilling to undergo was subsequently undertaken by Ast; to whose exertions the reader will find I have been not a little indebted. Since his day, although the Greek text has been edited and improved partially with the aid of MSS. by Bekker,—for those, which were collated for Stalbaum's edition, have afforded nothing new or valuable,—yet little has been done in the way of conjectural criticism, either by those scholars, or by the united efforts of Orelli, Baiter, and Winckelmann, in their two Zurich editions. Now though Porson said, as we learn from Kidd, in the Pref. p. xlv. to "Porson's Miscellaneous Criticisms," that in depth of thought Plato was without a rival; still the stream of his ideas generally flows as clear as if it were the shallowest of rills; and hence Porson was led to remark, that if the text had not been obscured by numerous interpolations, it had lost a portion of its original transparency.

Equally barren of results has been the search amongst the few Academic Dissertations, written by the scholars of Germany, nearly all of which have passed through my hands. I consider it a fortunate circumstance that my attention has been recently directed to the Notes of Sydenham, published by Matthias, at the end of his edition of the works of Thomas Gray, the poet; where are anticipated some of the better emendations of subsequent critics. And in the Remarks of Gray himself, it will be seen that, although they are less critical than those of Sydenham, he has forestalled some of

the objections brought forward by the more recent impugners of the genuineness of the Letters.

On arriving at the 11th Book, I learnt, for the first time, that there existed in MS. (Harl. 3261) a hitherto unedited version of the Laws and Epinomis, by Gregorius, or, as it should be written, Georgius Trapezuntius. It is not however so much a version as a full abridgment of those two treatises. But it exhibits this remarkable phenomenon, that not only does it agree almost verbatim with the translation of Ficinus, where the latter is at variance with the Greek; but it differs likewise in other passages to such an extent as to show that the MS. he used was the same as, or the counterpart of, the one that fell into the hands of Ficinus. Now as the two translators were contemporary, and the version of Ficinus was not put to press till 1483, and did not appear till 1484, two years before the death of Georgius Trapezuntius at a very advanced age, according to the authority, quoted by Leo Allatius de Georgiis, p. 375, it was scarcely possible for Trapezuntius to have made use of the version of Ficinus. Nor, on the other hand, was it likely that Ficinus would have inserted in his own translation, passages taken from the version of Trapezuntius, not found in the Greek MS. before him; even if we admit that he, who considered Plato to be almost an inspired writer, would have condescended to look into a translation made by the very individual, who had done all in his power to throw down Plato from his former pedestal of honour, and to place Aristotle, Plato's great opponent, in his stead.

As the MS. used by the two translators was either one and the same, or of the same character, it is fair to infer that the variations from the usual text are derived from a MS. far superior to any since discovered; and hence in the case of the other dialogues, where there is no opportunity of testing the version of Ficinus with that of a contemporary translator, there can be no sufficient reason for doubting his good faith in neither adding nor omitting any thing but upon MS. authority.

Had the Epinomis not been confessedly a spurious treatise, it would have been added to the present volume. As it is, it will find a more fitting place in the next, which will contain six other dialogues, all presumed to be spurious; but which are usually given in the more complete editions of the Greek text. To these will be

added the Definitions, attributed to Speusippus, and also what has hitherto passed under the name of Timæus Locrus; none of which, with the exception of the Epinomis, has hitherto appeared in an English dress. And that nothing may be wanting in this translation, relating to the Platonic writings, there will be subjoined the three existing Greek Lives of the philosopher, and the Introduction of Alcinous, all for the first time translated into English.

INTRODUCTION.

Plato, having in his imaginary Republic delineated what he conceived to be the best form of government, and prescribed the course of instruction, by which the people living under such a polity, might be brought up and fitted for it, has in the Laws detailed some of the leading enactments, which such a constitution would require.

To carry out this idea, he supposes that three elderly statesmen come together, belonging respectively to Athens, Crete, and Lacedæmon; and that the first is requested by the second to lay down a code of laws, which the Cretan is desirous of submitting to his countrymen, previous to their re-establishment of a city which had been depopulated. For Clinias had been appointed as one of the ten Commissioners of Cnossus, authorized to draw up a code, such as they might think of themselves, or obtain from any other quarter.

For the preference thus shown to the statesmen of Crete and Lacedæmon, as being the parties who could best appreciate the best code of laws, Plato has furnished the clue in Protagoras, § 80. For he there states distinctly, that in those very cities a most beautiful philosophy was to be found, which had been handed down from ancient times; although it was designedly concealed, with the view of preventing other nations from profiting by the knowledge of it. So too in Hipp. Maj. § 8, Lacedæmon is represented as a city well regulated by laws; doubtless because the masses, who were the masters at Athens, possessed only a little power at Lacedæmon.

So plainly indeed had Plato, according to Aristotle in Polit. ii. 2, 3, exhibited his feelings in favour of a mixed form of government, as recommended in the Republic, that the Stageirite insinuates that the philosopher of Athens had imagined merely, what was actually realized at Lacedæmon. But if that were the case, Plato would surely never have wasted his time in writing two elaborate treatises on matters already well known, when it would have been sufficient to point out, in the Statesman especially, the institutions of Lycurgus, as the pattern, if not of a faultless government, at least of one, that approached the nearest to perfection. Hence we may fairly suspect that Aristotle merely meant to infer that Plato's notions were not original; a charge to which the philosopher might have replied by saying, that they were all the better on that very account; for it was thus shown that, as some of them were practicable—since they

had been really put in practice—the rest, which were a reform rather of existing institutions, than the construction of a code perfectly novel, would be equally practicable, if they were submitted to the same test.

Of the persons of the dialogue, Clinias the Cretan, and Megillus the Lacedæmonian, are supposed by Boeckh to be fictitious characters merely. But as in all the other dialogues of Plato, whenever a speaker is mentioned by a specific name, there is no reason for believing that he is a mere coinage of the author's brain, but every reason for a contrary supposition, it is surely fair to infer that two persons of those names were really living in the time of Plato, although not the least mention of them is to be found, it would seem, elsewhere. Far better founded is the suspicion of the Scholiast, that by the anonymous Athenian Plato himself was intended; and so too thought Cicero, as may be inferred from the language adopted De Legg. i. 5, and Plutarch after him, De Isid. et Osirid. ii. p. 370, E., as Boeckh was the first to remark.

With regard to the time when the Laws were written, Bentley and Boeckh refer it to Ol. cvi. 1, when Plato had passed his seventy-fourth year; while according to a tradition, mentioned by Diogenes Laert. iii. 37, it was not published by Plato himself, but by a friend and disciple, Philip the Opuntian. Hence Wolf in Prolegomen. Homer, p. cliii., and Cousin after him, were led to believe that the treatise never received the author's last touches. Similar too are the sentiments of Schneider in Prefat. Xenophont. Cyrop. p. xiv.; who conceives however, that although the greater part exhibits only a sketch of what the Philosopher intended to say, yet to some passages he had given the last polish. Now if this were the fact, it would be a work of supererogation to attempt even to correct the numerous passages, where errors of every kind are to be met with. But on this point I confess myself to be rather sceptical. For I cannot understand what could induce an author like Plato, who said that writing was the grave of thought, to scribble down his first and crude ideas upon parchment, when a little time and reflection would have furnished him with matter far more fit to be read. How much more reasonable is it to suppose, that all the faults are to be referred to some other source than the author himself. For as he lived to the advanced age of eighty-one years, and died, as we learn from Cicero, De Senect. § 5, in the very act of writing, he had plenty of time during a period of seven years to re-touch, what he had written at first only imperfectly. And hence I have every where been led to adopt in the text or notes, whatever has been furnished by the collations of MSS. and the conjectures of critics, in harmony with the genius of the language and the flow of thought. And hence too the argument against the genuineness of the Laws, which Ast has drawn from the imperfection of the style, will only then be considered of the least value, when it shall be shown that

the imperfection is to be referred to the author alone, and not to the bad faith of interpolators and the carelessness of transcribers.

So far, however, does Ast appear to have been aware of this reasonable solution of the difficulties of the construction, that he has thought proper to startle the learned world with a paradox; and to assert that it is sufficient to read only a page of the Laws to be convinced that the treatise was never written by Plato. But as Aristotle distinctly acknowledges the Republic and Laws to be the production of the same writer, it seems quite futile to fancy that the Stageirite was the dupe of a personated Plato; and still more to draw any inference, but the reverse of what has been drawn by Ast, from the anecdote recorded by Stobæus, in xiii. p. 147; for it proves that Plato did really employ himself in writing Laws, after the publication of the Republic. The story is that—"Diogenes once inquired of Plato, whether he was writing Laws? He was, said the other. But what, have you not written the Republic? Certainly. What then, had not the Republic laws? It had. Why then was it requisite to write laws again?"—To this, says Cousin, Plato might have given a ready reply, by stating that in the Republic the enactments were purely of a moral kind; but in the Laws, of a penal character likewise. For in the former treatise, the whole superstructure of a state is supposed to rest on the basis of moral habits, resulting from a correct education; in the latter, the arm of the law is called upon to restrain by punishment the deviations from a correct moral conduct.

And a similar answer may be given to the arguments deduced from the discrepancies to be found in the Republic and Laws; on which Ast appears to have laid no little stress, as affording a convincing proof that the two treatises could not have emanated from the same head and hand. For Apuleius, quoted by Dilthey, in his dissertation published at Gottingen, in 1820, under the title of "Platonicorum Librorum de Legibus Examen," and written in refutation of the theory of Ast, observed long ago, that "in a polity, such as Plato has feigned, there would be no need of any laws whatever;" for their place would be supplied by a virtuous education. Now as the Laws are supposed to be laid down for a state not merely ideal, but one to be put into practice, we need not be surprised at finding that specific enactments are suggested, relating to covenants and dealings in trade, which are rejected in the Republic, as being useless in a well-regulated state; for there persons would be uninfluenced by that pursuit of gain, which leads mankind to evade the spirit, and sometimes to defy the letter, of the law, and to run the risk of a punishment uncertain and remote.

To meet, on the other hand, the arguments drawn in favour of the genuineness of the Laws, from the similarity in sentiment with the ideas promulgated in the Dialogues, which Ast himself acknowledges to be genuine, he is compelled to have recourse to a theory,

for which there is not even the shadow of proof. For he supposes that the author of the Laws was some moral philosopher of the school of Socrates; who, not understanding the spirit of the Republic, amused himself with drawing up a treatise, which was to be rendered of a more practical character, by the rejection of what he considered to be objectionable in the Republic; and that it is to this cause we must attribute the absence of all reference to the doctrines, promulgated in the Republic, relating to a community of goods, women, and children. But surely it is far more reasonable to suppose that such doctrines were not touched upon by Plato, from his perceiving that they could not be carried out, unless the whole frame of society was remodelled; and that he was therefore content to select, what he considered to be the wisest enactments in the existing codes of different states, and to add to them others, against which there would be no prejudice in favour of any prescriptive ideas of right or wrong. Now that Plato did in all probability make such a selection, may be inferred from the facts brought forward by C. F. Hermann, in his two Academic Dissertations, published at Marburg, in 1836, under the titles respectively of "De Vestigiis Institutorum Veterum, imprimis Atticorum, per Platonis de Legibus libros indagandis"—and "Juris domestici et familiaris apud Platonem in Legibus cum veteris Græciæ inque primis Athenarum institutis comparatio."

With regard to the matter of the treatise, it is to be regretted that Plato did not, what he might have done very easily, treat it in a more formal manner, by detailing the duties which men owe to the gods, to themselves, and their fellow-creatures; and by mentioning what rewards and punishments ought to be assigned for deeds of a virtuous and contrary character. Instead, however, of adopting so obvious and almost necessary a plan, he has thought proper to imitate the desultory conversation of a garrulous old age, and to make one third of the treatise little more than an Introduction to the remainder; where, while some laws are introduced with an elaborate preface, others are dismissed without any; and instead of the rights of persons and things being defined within strongly marked limits, they seem to be discussed just as his fancy led the writer to touch upon each question, no matter how important, or the reverse.

Of this inattention to the natural order, in which the subjects should have been taken, no better proof can be furnished than by referring to the passage in ix. § 13, where it is stated that—"It is necessary to lay down laws for men, and for them to live according to law, or else to differ in no respect from animals in the wildest state of nature;"—a sentiment, which ought to have been prominently brought forward at the very commencement of the treatise, and made the basis of all legislation; and an additional support would have been thus given to the doctrine, broached in the Protagoras, that laws are required to check the weakness and

the depravity of human nature. Instead, however, of assuming a broad basis like this, on which to build the superstructure of his code, Plato commences with an inquiry of a very limited kind—although well suited to the institutions of Crete and Lacedæmon, which appear to have had a great affinity with each other—whether the fortitude exhibited in war is any and what part of virtue; an inquiry that ought rather to have found a place, where laws are laid down relating to the duties of soldiers, who should have been urged to take as their rule of conduct, the sentiment expressed by Bias, and subsequently by Horace,

Oderunt peccare boni virtutis amore.

The good, through love of virtue, hate to sin.

In defence, however, of this want of method, Cousin has boldly stept forward, and asserted that, despite an appearance to the contrary, there is to be found in the Laws a perfect regularity, which reveals itself to those, who study that treatise attentively; while they, who are not sufficiently versed in the philosophy of Plato, will doubtless be unable to follow the thread of the discourse, when it seems to be broken by numerous digressions; for the art, which reigns through the whole treatise, is a kind of snare for a reader of modern times, or a labyrinth with its thousand intricacies, totally unlike the regular and easy road laid down by modern writers on jurisprudence.

What credence this assertion of Cousin may gain with others, I know not; but to myself it is far less satisfactory than his defence of the prefaces to the different Laws, with which Seneca found such fault. For, as Cousin remarks correctly, Plato adopted them, to show that the law-giver ought to treat men, as creatures of reason, and possessing free-will; and that he should employ persuasion as well as force; and explain the moral intention of the laws he introduces; and found the obedience to them rather on the light of reason than the dread of punishment. This very doctrine had indeed, according to Cicero, De Legg. ii. 6, been inculcated by Charondas and Zaleucus; but it was left for Plato to enforce it with greater power, and to put it in a clearer light.

Although there are not a few subjects, dispersed through the whole treatise, that can scarcely fail to excite the surprise of a modern reader, the one most conspicuous perhaps is that relating to the importance attached to the cultivation of music and dancing, as something beyond a mere amusement and accomplishment, as they are deemed at present. For though it may be true, that certain kinds of music, even without words, have a tendency to elevate and purify the soul, and to prevent it from seeking a gratification in grovelling and gross pursuits, yet it may be fairly doubted whether any one was ever corrupted by music alone; although he might be by witnessing the dancing, which travellers tell us is to be seen

even at this day in Spain and other countries on the shores of the Mediterranean, and which is evidently only the still surviving remnant of the Satyric dance of the olden time.

The last point to which it is requisite to draw the reader's attention, is the diminutive size of the state, for which Plato has framed his elaborate code of laws. For though it is true, as remarked by Cousin, that it faithfully represents the spirit of the times, when persons legislated for small republics, yet Plato must have known, from what he had seen or heard of, that it would be impossible to preserve his chosen number of 5040 families and the lands assigned to them, even should the increase of births be remedied by emigration, or the population suddenly diminished by pestilence or famine; and it was therefore not without reason, that at the close of the treatise he looks forward to some power to preserve, what he felt, no doubt, carried within itself the germs of future decay, which the largest empires in the East and the smallest republics elsewhere have been destined to feel alike.

As the work of Cousin is not likely to be readily accessible to the readers of this translation, I have transcribed from his note on v. § 8, p. 171, the list of the 59 divisors of 5040, which is more correct and full than the one given by Cornarius.

1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 14, 15, 16, 18, 20, 21, 24, 28, 30, 35, 36, 40, 42, 45, 48, 56, 60, 63, 70, 72, 80, 84, 90, 105, 112, 120, 126, 140, 144, 168, 180, 210, 240, 252, 280, 315, 336, 360, 420, 504, 560, 630, 720, 840, 1008, 1260, 1680, 2520.

For a similar reason I have extracted the parallelisms between the Laws of Plato and Holy Writ, as they are noticed in "Luxdorphiana e Platone," which Olaus Wormius edited at Copenhagen in 1790, although some of them might be omitted, as being irrelevant; while in lieu of the pages of ed. Lugd. 1590, I have substituted those of ed. Steph.

Legg. i. p. 626, E. = Proverb. xvi. 32; p. 636, C. = Roman. i. 26; p. 637, E. = Coloss. iii. 11; iv. 6.

Legg. iv. p. 716, A. = S. James iv. 6; p. 717, D. = S. Matth. xii. 36.

Legg. v. p. 728, A. = S. Matth. xvi. 26; p. 732, A. = Roman. i. 22; p. 738, E. = S. Matth. vi. 22; p. 742, C. = Levit. xxv. 35.

Legg. vi. p. 777, E., and vii. p. 793, E. = Ephes. vi. 4—9.

Legg. vii. p. 823, E. = Jerem. xvi. 16.

Legg. viii. p. 839, A. = S. Luke viii. 13.

Legg. ix. p. 856, C. = Deut. xxiv. 16; p. 873, D. = Exod. xxi. 28.

Legg. x. p. 886, A. = Rom. i. 20; Psal. xix. 1—4; p. 904, C. = S. Matth. vi. 22; 905, B. = Psal. cxxxix. 2—10.

Legg. xi. p. 924, E. = Deuter. xxv. 5.

Legg. xii. p. 958, E. = S. Matth. xxvii. 7; Genes. xxiii. 11.

THE LAWS.

BOOK I.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

AN ATHENIAN GUEST, CLINIAS OF CRETE, AND MEGILLUS OF LACEDÆMON.

[1.] HAS a god, or some man, obtained from you, O guests, (the fame of being) the cause of the laying down of laws?

Clin. A god, O guest, a god, to say what is most just; with us indeed, Zeus; but amongst the Lacedæmonians, from whose country is this person here, I think, they mention Apollo.[1] Is it not so?

Megil. It is.

Athen. Say you then, according to Homer,[2] that Minos did constantly on the ninth year[3] go to a conference with his father, and according to the oracular responses given by him, lay down the laws found in your states?

Clin. It is so said by us; and, likewise, that his brother Rhadamanthus—for you have heard the name—was the most just [of men]. Now we Cretans would say that he obtained this praise from his distributing at that time things pertaining to justice in an upright manner.

[1] There is not a little difficulty in *φάναι τούτους*. For *τούτους* could hardly follow *παρὰ Λακεδαιμονίους*. Ficinus has "Apollinem dicturos istos existimo." Taylor, "I think Apollo dictated the laws."

[2] Od. xix. 178, *Μίνως Ἐννέωρος βασίλευε Διὸς μεγάλου ὀαριστής*.

[3] Ficinus, "semper per novennium," as if he had found in his MSS. *συνουσίαν ἑκάστοτε δι' ἐνάτου ἔτους*. This interpretation is adopted by Boeckh on Pseudo-Platon. Minos, § 13. But Ast prefers the account given by Valerius Maxim. i. 2, "Minos—nono quoque anno—a Jove —traditas sibi leges prærogabat."

Athen. And honourable is the renown, and very becoming to the son of Zeus. But since both you and this person here have been brought up in legal institutions of this kind, I expect it will not be unpleasant for us at present to have a dissertation, by speaking and hearing respecting a form of government and laws, and at the same time to be taking a walk. Now the way from Cnossus to the cavern and temple of Jupiter is, as we hear, altogether sufficient,[1] and the resting-places along the road are, as is proper, during the present sultry weather, shady amongst lofty trees; and it will be suited to our age to rest in them frequently, and by relieving each other during the conversation, to go in this way through the whole walk with ease.

Clin. There are indeed, O guest, to a person as he goes on, in the groves cypress-trees of wondrous height and beauty, and meadows, in which while we rest, we may discourse.

[2.] *Athen.* Speak you correctly?

Clin. Entirely so; and we shall say so more, on seeing them. But let us go with a good fortune.

Athen. Be it so. But tell me, why has the law ordained for your joint-feasts gymnastic exercises and the handling of arms?

Clin. I conceive, O guest, that it is easy [2]even for every one[2] to apprehend these customs of ours. For you see that the nature of the whole country of Crete is not a plain, like that of Thessaly. On this account, they make use of horses more; but we of running. [3] Now as this irregular [ground][3] is more adapted to the exercise of foot-races, it is necessary for a person in such a case to have light arms, and not to run [4]holding what has a weight.[4] Now the lightness of bows and arrows seems to be fitted (for this). All these therefore have been adopted by us in war; and all this has the legislator, as it appears to me, looking to this point, ordained; especially

[1] In lieu of *ἱκανὴ*, I should prefer *οὐ κακὴ* "not bad—"

[2—2] Ficinus, finding probably a difficulty in the words *καὶ παντὶ*, has neglected them; and so after him has Taylor. The sense requires either the omission of *καὶ*, or the reading *καὶ παιδὶ* "even to a child." On the loss or confusion of *παῖς* in this formula, see at Phileb. § 32.

[3—3] The Greek is *ἥδε γὰρ ἀνώμαλος αὖ*, where *γὰρ* and *αὖ* are equally unintelligible. They are omitted by Ficinus, who has "hæc inæqualis est."

[4—4] Ficinus has, what the sense requires, "ne pondere suo cursum impediat." At all events *μὴ βάρος ἔχοντα* are superfluous after *ἐλαφρὰ—*

since he nearly seems to have instituted the joint feasts, through perceiving how all persons, when engaged in war, are then compelled by the thing itself, for the sake of their own defence, to feast [1] at that time together.[1] In truth, he appears to me to have condemned the multitude of stupidity, for their not learning that there is constantly through life a war to all with all states. Now if during the time of war it was necessary to feast in common for the sake of defence, and for certain persons, both rulers and ruled, to be drawn up as their defenders, this should be done in the time of peace likewise. For that, which most men call peace, is only a name; but in reality there is a war, not proclaimed by a herald, according to nature, to all [2] against all states. For by thus considering, you will almost discover, that the Cretan legislator has, looking to war, ordained for us all institutions both public and private, and ordered us to guard the laws in such a manner, as if nothing else were useful, either of possessions or pursuits, unless one became victorious in war, and all the goods of the vanquished became the property of the victors.

[3.] *Athen.* You appear to me, O guest, to have been well practised in seeing through the laws of Crete. But tell me still more clearly this. For [3]by the definition you have laid down[3] of a well-regulated state, you seem to me to say that one ought to administer it, so arranged in order, as to be victorious over the rest of states in war. Is it not so?

Clin. Just so; and I think it will seem so to this person here.

Megil. For how can any Lacedæmonian whatever, O thou divine man, answer otherwise?

Athen. Whether, then, is this right in the case of states towards states, but otherwise in the case of one village towards another?

Clin. By no means otherwise.

Athen. But it is the same?

Clin. Yes.

[1]—[1] The words τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον are perfectly unnecessary after the preceding τότε.

[2] Instead of πάσαις the train of ideas leads to πᾶσι, as shown by the preceding πᾶσι πρὸς ἁπάσας τὰς πόλεις.

[3]—[3] The words within brackets, in Greek, ὃν γὰρ ὅρον ἔθου, are omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor; who here, as elsewhere, has paid no attention to the original.

Athen. What then, is it the same in the case of one family towards another family, and in the case of one man towards another?

Clin. The same.

Athen. But in the case of a person towards himself, shall we consider him in that of an enemy towards an enemy? Or, how shall we say?

Clin. O Athenian guest,—for I am not willing to call you Attic, because you appear to me rather to deserve to be called after the name of the goddess Minerva,[1]—you have, by correctly carrying back the reasoning to its principle, made it clearer; so that you will more easily discover that it has just now been rightly said, that all persons are enemies to all, both publicly and privately, and[2] each individual to himself.

Athen. How hast thou, O wonderful man, said this?

Clin. [3]And these, too,[3] O guest; it is the first and best of all victories for a man to conquer himself; but to be vanquished by himself is of all things the most shameful and vile. For these words[4] signify that there is a war in each of us against ourselves.

Athen. Let us then turn back our discourse. For, since each of us is [5]one better and another[5] worse than himself, shall we say that a family, and a village, and a state, have this same thing in them, or not?

Clin. Do you mean that (one)[6] is better than itself in some things, and the other worse?

Athen. Yes.

Clin. Concerning this too you have rightly inquired. [7]For

[1] Namely, Athéné. Plato meant to say that the guest was Athéné-like, not merely born in Attica, where there were many persons not at all like Athéné, the goddess of wisdom.

[2] Ficinus has "et," answering to *καὶ* in MS. Voss. alone.

[3—3] Ast explains *καὶ ἐνταῦθα* by "in the latter case," viz. of an individual. But *ἐνταῦθα* could hardly be thus applied. There is doubtless some error here.

[4] Namely, "to conquer and be conquered." Ast.

[5—5] Instead of *ὁ μὲν—ὁ δὲ*, which could scarcely thus follow *εἷς ἕκαστος ἡμῶν*, one would prefer *τὸ μὲν—τὸ δὲ*, similar to *κρείττω—τινα* in the next speech of Clinias.

[6] Ast says that *τὴν μὲν* is to be supplied in the first clause, answering to *τὴν δὲ* in the second, and refers to Heusde Specim. Crit. p. 76, Heind. on Gorg. § 24, and Hermann on Viger. p. 699.

[7—7] Ficinus has, "non enim minus civitatibus id contingit; immo

a thing of this kind occurs very and much, not the least in states.[7] For, in the case of those, in which the better conquer the multitude and the worse, such a city would be correctly said to be better than itself, and be most justly praised for such a victory. But the contrary where the contrary (occurs).

Athen. Now the question, whether the worse is at any time more excellent than the better, let us lay aside; for it would be a long discussion; but for the present I understand what is asserted by you; that sometimes citizens of the same family and of the same city, being unjust and numerous, will, by coming together, forcibly attack the just, fewer in number, and enslave them; and that, when they conquer, the city may be justly said to be inferior to itself, and at the same time depraved; but, when they are conquered, better than itself, and good.

Clin. What is now said, guest, is very strange; but yet it is most necessary to confess it.

[4.] *Athen.* Hold then, and let us again consider this. Many brothers may surely be born from one man and from one (woman).[1] Nor is it at all wonderful that the greater[2] part of them should be unjust, and the lesser just.

Clin. It is not.

Athen. Nor will it be proper for me and you to investigate this, that, when the base vanquish, both the family and every kind of relationship may be called inferior to themselves, but better than themselves, when the base are vanquished. For we do not investigate these things at present for the sake of some elegance or inelegance in words, according to the discourse of many, but for the sake of discovering what is a natural rectitude and error in the case of laws.

Clin. You speak most truly, O guest.

Megil. To me too so much appears to be well said.

Athen. Let us look into this likewise. Can any one become a judge of the brothers just spoken of?

Clin. Doubtless.

Athen. Which then will be the better judge? He, who cuts off such of them as are bad, and orders the good to

maxime in eis perspicuum," which is far more intelligible than the Greek, *πάνυ γὰρ ἔστι καὶ σφόδρα τὸ τοιοῦτον οὐχ ἥκιστα ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν.*

[1] On the omission of *γυναικὸς*, Ast refers to Schæfer on Bos Ellips. p. 93.

[2] Instead of *πλείστους*, two MSS. *πλείους*, similar to "plures" in Ficin.

govern themselves? or he, who causes the good to govern, but suffers the bad to live, being willing to be governed? But let us mention a third judge, if such there be, with respect to virtue; who, receiving a single clan at difference with itself, will not destroy any person; but, after having reconciled the parties, will lay down for them laws relating to each other, and be able so to guard them, that they may be on friendly terms.

Clin. Such a judge and legislator would be the better by far.

Athen. And he would frame laws for them, looking to a purpose contrary to war.

Clin. This indeed is true.

Athen. But what is he, who brings a state together? Would he, by looking to external war, better put in order its life than (by looking) to the wars produced constantly within itself, which is called sedition? which every one would particularly wish not to occur in his own state; and when it has occurred, to be released from it as quickly as possible?

Clin. (By looking), it is evident, to this (the latter).

Athen. Whether would any one choose that peace should result from sedition, through one party being destroyed, and the other[1] victorious, or that, by peace and friendship resulting from a reconciliation, they should necessarily[2] direct their attention to external wars?

Clin. Every one would rather wish it to happen to his own state in this way than in that.

Athen. Would not a legislator too in a similar manner?

Clin. How not?

Athen. Would not every one lay down all laws for the sake of that which is best?

Clin. How not?

Athen. But neither war nor sedition is the best of things, [3]—for to be in want of these is a thing to be prayed for—[3] but

[1] Ficinus has "cum altera pars victoria potita sit," which led Stephens to alter *τῶν ποτέρων*, hitherto found in all the MSS., into *τῶν ἑτέρων*, as the sense evidently requires.

[2] This "necessarily" seems rather strange, instead of "more readily."

[3—3] Ficinus, unable to understand *ἀπευκτὸν δὲ τὸ δεηθῆναι τούτων*, renders these words, "omnes enim deprecantur ne quid horum sibi ineundum sit." Taylor's version, "for to be in want of these is execrable," shows by its closeness the absurdity of the original. Plato wrote *ἐπευκτὸν*, as I have translated.

peace with, and kindly feelings towards, each other. Moreover, for a state to vanquish itself, is not, it seems, one of the best, but of necessary things; just as if[1] any one should think a body in sickness would, when meeting with medicinal cleansing, be then doing the best, but should pay no attention to the body, which needed (the cleansing) not at all. Should any one in like manner have his thoughts directed to the happiness of a state or an individual, he will never become correctly[2] a statesman, while looking only and primarily to external war; nor will he be an accurate legislator, unless he lays down laws respecting war for the sake of peace, rather than laws respecting peace, for the sake of war.

[5.] *Clin.* This reasoning, O guest, appears somehow to have been stated correctly. But still, I wonder whether the institutions existing with us, and still more those relating to Lacedæmon, have not given rise to all care for the sake of those things.

Athen. This may perhaps be the case. We ought not, however, to contest the matter at present in a harsh manner; but quietly to ask questions, as both we and they have especially an interest in things of this kind. Do ye then keep pace with my discourse. In the first place, we will place before you Tyrtæus[3]—who was by birth an Athenian, but afterwards a fellow-citizen with these persons here; and who has the most of all men been engaged on these points—where he says, "I would not bear in recollection the man, nor hold him in any account, not though he were the most wealthy of men, and possessed many good things,"—and he enumerates nearly all,—"who is not always the best in the affairs of war." For you have surely heard of his poetry. For this person here is, I think, saturated with them.

[1] Before "just as if," in Greek ὅμοιον ὡς εἰ, Ficinus inserts "putare autem optimum civitatis statum in pugnando et vincendo consistere," adopted tacitly, as usual, by Taylor.

[2] Instead of ὀρθῶς, Boeckh suggested, and Ast approved of, ὀρθὸς, so that πολιτικὸς ὀρθὸς might correspond to νομοθέτης ἀκριβής. Stalbaum is, however, content with ὀρθῶς, which he would perhaps translate, with Ficinus, "revera." But such is not the meaning of the word.

[3] Tyrtæus was an elegiac poet, lame, and despised by the Athenians. The oracle of Apollo, however, ordered the Lacedæmonians to use him as their general, in the war in which they were then engaged with the Messenians. Arriving at Lacedæmon, he did by his poetry so animate the Lacedæmonians, that they vanquished the Messenians. He flourished B. C. 684. T.

Megil. Entirely so.

Clin. And they have reached us likewise, having been brought from Lacedæmon.

Athen. Come then, let us interrogate in common this poet somehow in this fashion. Thou, most divine poet, Tyrtæus,—for you appear to us to be wise and good, because you have celebrated excellently well those, who excel in war,—and as myself, and this person here, and Clinias the Cnossian, happen, as we seem, to agree very much with you in this particular,—we wish to know clearly, whether we are speaking about the same men or not,—do tell us, whether you too think, as we do, that there are two kinds of war? Or how (say you)? To this I think that a man, much inferior to Tyrtæus, would say the truth, that there are two kinds; one, which we now call sedition, which is the most grievous of all wars, as we just now asserted; but the other kind of war, which we employ in our differences with those out of the state, and of a different tribe, we will lay down, as being milder than the other.

Clin. How not?

Athen. Come now, (inform us) what men, and for what kind of war, have you so transcendently praised (some)[1] and blamed others. For you appear to have praised [2]those (engaged) in a foreign (war).[2] For you have said in your poems thus—that you by no means endure those,

> Who dare not upon gory slaughter look,
> Nor with the hand, close standing, clutch the foe.

Hence, as an inference, we should say that you, Tyrtæus, are praising, it seems, those, who have been eminently conspicuous in a foreign and external war. Surely he would say this and confess it.

Clin. How not?

Athen. But we, although these are good, assert that those are far better, who are conspicuously the best in the greatest war. We have too the poet Theognis as a witness, a citizen of Megara in Sicily, who says,

[1] On the omission of τοὺς μὲν in the first clause, to be supplied from τοὺς δὲ in the second, see above, § 3, n. 6.

[2]—[2] In lieu of πρὸς τοὺς ἐκτὸς, Boeckh was the first to suggest, what the context requires, τοὺς πρὸς τὸν ἐκτὸς—

> The man, who, when the strife of party 's high,
> Is faithful, is in gold and silver worth
> His weight.

Now, such a one we say is in a more difficult war altogether superior to the other, by nearly as much as justice, temperance, and prudence, when coming to the same point, are superior [1] to fortitude (by itself alone).[1] For no one can be found faithful and sound in seditions, without the whole of virtue. But, as Tyrtæus says, there are a great number of mercenaries who fight [2] standing firmly with their legs apart,[2] and die willingly in battle—among whom are the most [3] bold, and unjust, and insulting,[3] and nearly[4] the most thoughtless of all (men) except some very few. But to what does this story tend? And what did he wish to render clear, when he said this? It was evidently this above all; that both he, who laid down laws here from Zeus, and every one else, from whom there is even a little advantage, will lay down his laws, while always looking for the most part to nothing else than the greatest virtue. But it is, as Theognis says, a faithfulness in things of dread, which a person may denominate perfect justice; but that, which Tyrtæus has praised so highly, is indeed beautiful, and opportunely celebrated by the poet, yet it may most rightly be called the fourth in number and in the power of being in honour.

[6.] *Clin.* Shall we, O guest, throw[5] our legislator away amongst the remote legislators?

Athen. Not (him)[6] indeed, most excellent man, but ourselves, should we imagine, that both Lycurgus and Minos laid down their laws in Lacedæmon and here, looking especially to war.

[1]—[1] In lieu of *μετ' ἀνδρίας*, Proclus on Rep. p. 402, has preserved *αὐτῆς μόνης τῆς ἀνδρίας*, first pointed out by Boeckh, whom Ast has followed. Stalbaum is content with the common reading.

[2]—[2] On this gesture of a man fighting see Homer, Il. xii. 458.

[3]—[3] In confirmation of the character given here to mercenary soldiers, it is sufficient to refer to Thucydides, vii. 29.

[4] Clemens Alexandr. correctly omits *σχεδὸν ἁπάντων*, words quite superfluous, when followed by *ἐκτὸς δή τινων μάλα ὀλίγων*.

[5] Ficinus has "rejiciemus"—which leads to *ἀποβαλοῦμεν* in lieu of *ἀποβάλλομεν*.

[6] Ficinus has, "Non illum—sed nos ipsos—" as if he had read in MS. *Οὐχ ἡμεῖς γ' ἐκεῖνον*, what the antithesis requires.

Clin. What then, (and) how ought we to say?

Athen. [1]As truth and justice, I think, require those to speak, who discourse about a divine (republic).[1] Not looking to some part of virtue, and that the most trifling, but to the whole of virtue, [2]he laid down, and according to their species to seek the laws, not what those seek who place species before those now[2]—for that, of which each person is in want, does he laying aside[3] seek; one, the laws about inheritances; [4]another, those about sole heiresses;[4] another, those about an assault; and others, about ten thousand other matters of a similar kind. But we assert that the inquiry about laws is the business of those, who properly inquire, as we have just now begun (to do). And I am in every way delighted with your attempt to give an explanation on the subject of laws. For it is right to begin from virtue, by asserting that for its sake a person has laid down laws. But when you said that the legislator had laid down all (laws) with reference to a part of virtue, and this too the least, you did not appear to me to speak correctly any longer; and on this account did I speak all this subsequent speech. Do you, then, wish me to say in what

[1]—[1] Such is Taylor's translation of the Latin of Ficinus; who seems to have found in his MS. the Scholium, discovered in other MSS. also, where it is stated that *πολιτείας* is to be supplied after *θείας*. But as such an ellipse would be inadmissible, Stephens suspected that something was wanting in the Greek—*Ὥσπερ τό τ' ἀληθὲς, οἶμαι, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ὑπέρ γε θείας διαλεγομένους λέγειν*, literally, "As (it is meet) for those, I think, who converse about a divine, to say what is true and just"—for *χρῆν* might be supplied from the preceding speech of Clinias.

[2]—[2] Such is the literal translation of the Greek text, given by Bekker and Stalbaum. Ficinus has, what is not quite so unintelligible—"ipsos respexisse putandum, et per singulas earum species leges quæsisse, nec eas species investigasse, quas multi modo proponentes quærunt." From whence Stephens was led to read *ἐζήτει*, found subsequently in one MS., and to suggest the insertion of *πολλοὶ* before *τῶν νῦν*— Ast however would supply *πολιτειῶν* after *τῶν νῦν*, and alter *ζητεῖν αὐτῶν* into *ζητεῖν αὐτὸν* (the lawgiver), so that there may be a change from a direct to an indirect form of speech. What Plato really wrote it is difficult to state positively, but it is easy to see what is required by the natural connexion of ideas.

[3] Ficinus, unable, I suspect, to understand *παραθέμενος*, has omitted it in his version, "id enim quisque maxime quærere solet, quo maxime indiget.

[4]—[4] The Greek words *καὶ ἐπικλήρων* are omitted by Ficinus.

manner [1] I am still willing for you to speak in detail, and myself to hear.[1]

Clin. Entirely so, O guest.

Athen. It is proper to assert that the laws of the Cretans are not vainly held in very great esteem by all the Greeks. For they are in a correct state by their making those, who use them, happy; for they impart every good. Now there are two kinds of good; one human, and the other divine; and the former hangs upon the divine; and if any state receives the greater, it possesses likewise the lesser; but if not, it is deprived of both. But the lesser are those, of which [2] health is the leader, beauty the second in order, and strength for running, and all other movements of the body, the third; but the fourth is, Plutus, (wealth,)[2] not blind indeed,[3] but seeing acutely, if it follows prudence. Now that which is the first [4] good (and)[4] the leader of the divine, is prudence; but the second, after intellect,[5] is a temperate habit of the soul; from these (two) mixed up with fortitude,[6] the third in order will be justice; and the fourth, fortitude. Now all these are naturally arranged before those, and so must they be arranged by the lawgiver; [7] and after these he must enjoin upon the citizens the other ordinances that look to these.[7]

[1]—[1] The version of Ficinus—"te nobis distinguere voluissem," is followed implicitly by Taylor.

[2]—[2] The same order is repeated in the Laws, ii. § 6, and in Gorg. p. 451, E. § 14, where it is assigned to a Scolion preserved by Athenæus, xv. p. 694.

[3] On the blindness of Plutus see Aristophanes in the play of that name, and Plato Rep. viii. p. 554, B. § 8. Theophrastus, says the Scholiast, observed, that if Wealth had life, it would come only to the good; but now, since it is without life, it falls to the bad likewise.

[4]—[4] Instead of *αὖ*, which has no meaning here, and is omitted by Theodoretus, the sense requires *καὶ*—while *ἀγαθῶν* in two MSS., in lieu of *ἀγαθὸν*, answers to "bonorum," in Ficinus.

[5] Since *νοῦς* seems to be here the same as *φρόνησις*, it is not easy to understand why Plato made use of two different words instead of repeating the same one. MS. Voss. and Theodoretus read *μετὰ νοῦ*, similar to the subsequent *μετ' ἀνδρείας*.

[6] In the enumeration of the four cardinal virtues, each is generally considered to stand alone, not, as here, one to be mixed up with another one.

[7]—[7] The Greek is *μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τὰς ἄλλας προστάξεις τοῖς πολίταις εἰς ταῦτα βλεπούσας αὐτοῖς εἶναι διακελευστέον*—where I cannot make out either syntax or sense; nor could, I think, Ficinus; whose version is—

But of these the human look to the divine, and all the divine to their leader intellect. [1]And he ought to have a care respecting marriages contracted by each other, and after these in the procreation and education of children,[1] such as are male and female, and likewise of those still young, and of those advancing in years to old age, and to hold correctly in honour and dishonour;[2] directing, in all the intercourse of these persons, his attention to their pains, and pleasures, and desires, and eagerness in all matters of love; and acting as a guard over them to blame and praise correctly through the laws themselves. In the case of anger and fear, and what perturbations soever in the soul arise through misfortune, and whatever escapes from them exist in prosperity; and whatever sufferings happen to men through disease, or wars, or poverty, or the contraries to these, in all such occasions he must teach and define what is beautiful, or not, in the arrangement of each. And after this, it is necessary for the legislator to watch over the property and expenditure of the citizens, in whatever way it may take place, and the unions with and separations from each other in all persons (acting) with their free will or without it; and to have an eye to what is just or not, and in what things it exists or is wanting, and to distribute honours to those who obey the laws, but to inflict upon those, who do not obey, punishments ordained (by law); until, having reached the end of all polity, he shall perceive in what manner it is meet for the burial of the dead to take place, and what honours to pay to them. And after perceiv-

" et mandet omnibus ut semper ad hæc ipsa respicientes in singulis operentur "—thus translated by Taylor, " and should command the citizens to look to these divine goods in all their actions."

[1]—[1] This passage, says Boeckh, is most difficult and corrupt. Viger on Eusebius, Præp. Ev. xii. p. 589, wished to transpose *μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα*— and to place those words before *περί τε γάμους*— For he found in Ficinus —" curet præterea oportet nuptias inter cives et generationes—"

[2] After " dishonour " there is evidently something wanting, supplied by Ficinus; whose version is, " et eos, qui recte in hisce se gerunt, ut decet, honoret "—adopted, as usual, by Taylor; who has in the sentences following been content, without looking at the Greek, to translate the Latin translation of Ficinus, as altered by Grynæus; for the genuine one has, " contra vero dolores, voluptates, cupiditates in omni conversatione vituperet: considerabit etiam diligenter, ad quæ studia quemque raptat amor; rectaque officia per leges laudabit, vituperabit contraria."

ing, he who has laid down the laws shall place over them all, as guardians, some persons on account of their prudence, and some who have gone through a truthful reputation; so that intellect, binding all these together, may exhibit them as following temperance and justice, and not riches or ambition. In this manner, O guests, I did wish, and still do wish now, that you would explain how all these particulars exist in the laws said to be from Zeus, and in those of the Pythian Apollo, which both Minos and Lycurgus laid down; and how, after they have assumed a certain order, they become evident to a person skilled in the business of law, either through art or certain customs; while to us, the rest of mankind, they are by no means apparent.

[7.] *Clin.* How then, O guest, ought we to speak of what comes after these?

Athen. It appears to me that we ought to go through again from the beginning, as we have begun (in part), in the first place, the pursuits of fortitude; and afterwards we will go through another species of virtue, and again another, if you are willing; and that we may go through the first subject, we will endeavour, by laying down a pattern, and conversing about the others in this way, to make for ourselves a beguilement of the road; and afterwards we will show, if god is willing, that the things relating to the whole of virtue look thitherward.

Clin. You speak well. Endeavour then, in the first place, to sift for us this praiser of Zeus.

Athen. I will endeavour likewise (to sift) both you and myself. For the discourse is common. Speak therefore. Shall we say that the joint-feasts and gymnastic exercises were invented by the lawgiver for the purposes of war?

Megil.[1] Yes.

Athen. And that a third or fourth thing (was invented)? [2]For perhaps it is necessary for a person thus to make an enumeration respecting those of the rest of virtue, whether it is right to call them of parts, or any thing whatever, only showing clearly what he means.[2]

[1] Boeckh was the first to substitute Megil. for Clin.

[2—2] Such is the literal version of the Greek text, which, I confess, I cannot understand. Ficinus has "Forte enim ita dinumerare oportet,

Megil. The third thing, as I and any Lacedæmonian whatever likewise would say, he discovered was hunting. [1]And a fourth, and even a fifth,[2] thing let us try, if we can, to mention.[1] I then would endeavour to mention the fourth thing, namely, that which takes place to a great extent with us, in the endurance of pain, which occurs constantly in fighting with hands against each other, and [3]in certain snatchings in the midst of many blows.[3] There is, moreover, what is called a concealment,[4] wonderfully laborious as regards endurance (of pain); and the being in winter without shoes and without a bed, and waiting without servants upon themselves, while wandering night and day through the whole country. Still further, in the exercises of naked persons,[5] there is a severe endurance amongst us when contending with the violence of intense heat; and there

tum in hoc virtutis genere, tum in cæterarum virtutum sive parte, sive quomodocunque aliter, declarationis duntaxat gratia, nominare deceat." From which it is evident that either his MS. was more complete than any subsequently collated, or that he supplied, from conjecture, what he considered to be necessary for the sense. What Plato really wrote, only a bold conjecturist will be able, I suspect, to restore.

[1]—[1] The words within the numerals Stephens says have been assigned to the Athenian Guest; an arrangement of which both Ast and Baiter approve. Winckelmann however considers the whole sentence to be spurious; but he does not state why, when, or by whom it was interpolated.

[2] The Greek is ἢ πέμπτον. But Ficinus has "et quintum:" which leads to ἢ καὶ πέμπτον.

[3]—[3] Ast explains this by saying that the boys at Sparta were taught to steal; but that, if they were detected, they were beaten, not for the theft, but for doing it clumsily; and he refers to Xenophon Laconic. i. 8.

[4] Respecting the Spartan κρύπτεια Ast refers to Plutarch in Lycurg. p. 56, E.; who says that such of the young men as were supposed to be of a superior mind were sent through the country with small swords and the necessaries of life, but nothing else; and that during the day they concealed themselves, and took their rest in retired spots; but at night they went to the public roads, and murdered such of the Helots as they could lay hold of. A similar account is given in a fragment of Heraclides Ponticus. According to the Scholiast, it was a form of exercise suited for war. For the young men were stript naked, and ordered to wander for a whole year out of the city, among the mountains, and to support themselves by theft, and other stratagems, but in such a manner that no one might detect them. Hence this was called κρύπτεια, a concealment: for they were punished if they were at any time discovered.

[5] These "naked exercises" took place at the summer solstice; and hence the allusion to the intense heat, to which those, engaged in them, were exposed.

are very many other things [1](of this kind),[1] in detailing which a person would [2]nearly never cease.[2]

Athen. You speak well, O Lacedæmonian guest. But come, whether shall we put down fortitude as a contest merely with fears and pains? or with desires likewise and pleasures, and certain vehement fawnings of flattery, which soften[3] the minds of those, who deem themselves objects of worship, and mould them like wax?[4]

Megil. [5]I think thus,[5] (that it is) a contest with all these.

Athen. If then we call to mind the previous discourse, this person here said, that both a state is inferior in some things to itself, and [6]a man (to himself).[6] Was it not so, Cnossian guest?

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. Now then, whether shall we call him the inferior,[7] who is subdued by pain, or him rather, who is subdued by pleasure?

Clin. Him, it appears to me, who is subdued by pleasure. And surely we all much rather say that he, who is vanquished by pleasures, is disgracefully inferior to himself, than he, who (is vanquished) by pains.

Athen. Surely the legislator through Zeus and he through Apollo did not lay down by law that fortitude is lame, and able to march against things only on its left hand, but unable (to do so) against elegancies and flatteries on its right hand? or (is it able to march against) both?

Clin. Against both, I think.

Athen. Let us, then, mention again what those pursuits are, in both of your states, which give a taste of pleasures, and do not avoid them in the same manner, as they do not avoid

[1]—[1] Ficinus has "multa hujusmodi," as if his MS. read ἕτερα τοιαῦτα.

[2]—[2] Ficinus, conceiving perhaps that σχεδὸν—οὐκ—ἑκάστοτε could not be united, has "quæ non facile quispiam enumeraret," adopted by Taylor.

[3] All the MSS. omit μαλάττουσαι, and some too κηρίνους. Ficinus has "animos flectunt, et quasi cereos faciunt," which leads to κάμπτουσιν, οἷον κηρίνους πλάττουσαι; as in vii. 2, p. 789, E., πλάττειν, οἷον κήρινον.

[4] Ast quotes opportunely from Horace, "Cereus in vitium flecti."

[5]—[5] The words Οἶμαι μὲν οὕτω are omitted by Ficinus, and the MS. Ξ, from which Aldus printed the ed. pr.

[6]—[6] Ficinus alone has "et virum aliquem inferiorem se ipso," thus supplying what is requisite to preserve the balance of the sentence.

[7] Instead of κακὸν Boeckh would read κακίον', from "inferiorem" in Ficinus.

pain, but bring persons into the midst of them, (pleasures,) and induce them, partly by force, and partly by honours, to vanquish them. Now where is the same thing ordained in your laws respecting pleasures (as respecting pains)? Let it be stated, what is that, which in your case causes the same persons to be similarly brave, both with respect to pain and pleasures, while they are victorious over those things, in which they ought to be victorious, and to be by no means inferior to enemies the nearest to them and the most difficult (to contend with).

Megil. In the same manner, O guest, as I had the power to mention many laws opposed to pains, I should not thus perhaps possess the means of speaking about pleasures according to their great and conspicuous parts; but according to their small I might perhaps have the means.

Clin. Nor should I be able myself to do any thing of this kind clearly in the case of the laws of Crete.

Athen. This, O ye best of guests, is by no means wonderful. But should any one of us, who is desirous of seeing what is true, and at the same time the best, find fault with any thing in the laws of our respective countries, let us receive (the words)[1] from each other not harshly, but with mildness.

Clin. You speak well, O Athenian guest; and we must obey you.

Athen. [2]For no other conduct than this[2] would become men of our age.

Clin. Certainly.

Athen. Whether then a person finds fault rightly or not with the Laconian and Cretan polity, is another question. But perhaps I can better tell what is said by the multitude than either of you can. For although the laws are regulated even moderately well, yet there would be with you one law the most beautiful, not to permit any youth to inquire which laws are well or ill established, but (to ordain) all to proclaim, with one voice, and with one mouth, that they are all beautifully laid down, since the gods were the parties who gave them; and that, if any one says otherwise, persons should not endure

[1] Both the syntax and sense require *τὰ ἔπη δεχώμεθα*, in lieu of *ἀποδεχώμεθα*, similar to *τὰ λεγόμενα—δεχομένω* shortly afterwards.

[2]—[2] The Greek is *Οὐ γὰρ ἂν—πρέποι τὸ τοιοῦτον.* But Ficinus has "Profecto non aliter—facere decet," which leads to *Οὐ γὰρ ἄλλ' ἂν—πρέποι ἢ τὸ τοιοῦτον.*

to hearken to him: and that if any old man has any thoughts respecting them, he shall place his reasons before a ruler and his equals in age, but not in the presence of a young man.

Clin. You speak most properly, O guest: and, like a seer, although you were absent from the then thoughts of the party who laid them down, yet you appear to me to have made a conjecture reasonably correct, and to have spoken what is very true.

Athen. There is then a freedom now from the presence of young men; but we, on account of our old age, are permitted by the lawgiver to speak about the laws among ourselves, without doing any wrong.

Clin. Such is the case. Do not then be remiss at all in reproving our laws. For it is not dishonourable to know aught of what is not beautiful; but by this means it happens that a remedy exists to a party receiving what is said with not an envious feeling, but with a good will.

[8.] *Athen.* (You speak) correctly. I shall not however speak in reprehension of the laws before diligently considering them to the utmost of my power; or rather, (I shall speak) doubtingly. For upon you alone of all the Greeks and Barbarians, of whom we hear, the legislator has enjoined to abstain from the greatest pleasures and sports, and not to taste them; but on the question of pains and fears, which we have lately discussed, he was of opinion, that if any one should avoid them thoroughly from his infancy, he would, when he came to endure necessary labours, and fears, and pains, avoid those, who are exercised in them, and would become their slave. The same lawgiver ought, I think, to have thought the same respecting pleasures, and to have said to himself that, if the citizens shall from childhood be inexperienced in the greatest pleasures, and be unpractised in bearing up against pleasures, so as[1] not to be compelled to do any thing base for the sake of the sweetness arising from pleasure, they would suffer the same as those, who are vanquished by fear, and become the slaves in a different and still baser manner to those, who are able to bear up against pleasures, and are the masters of what relate to pleasures, although they are sometimes the worst of men; and they would have their soul partly a slave, and partly free, and

[1] Instead of *και* the sense requires *ὥστε καὶ*—as I have translated.

be unworthy to be called wholly brave and free. Consider therefore whether aught of what has been now said appears to you to be according to reason.

Clin. It appears so [1]to us somehow, on the speech being spoken.[1] But immediately (and) readily to be confident about questions of such moment would be the act rather of young and senseless persons.

Athen. But if, O Clinias and Lacedæmonian guest, we discuss some one point of those,[2] which we proposed—for after fortitude let us speak of temperance—what difference shall we find between these polities and those, which are laid down at random, [3]as the things relating to war just now?[3]

Megil. It is nearly not easy.[4] But it seems that the joint-feasts and gymnastic exercises have been well invented for both.[5]

Athen. It appears then, O guest, to be a difficult thing for what is incontestable[6] on the question of polities to exist in deed as well as in word. For it seems almost that, as in the case of bodies, it is not possible to order any one regimen for any one body, because[7] the very same thing would be seen to do

[1]—[1] All the words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, either because they were wanting in his MS., or because he thought them unnecessary; and he is followed tacitly, as usual, by Taylor.

[2] I have translated as if the Greek were Ἀλλ' εἰ μετὰ ταῦτα διεξίοιμέν τι ὧν—not Ἀλλ' εἰ τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα διεξίοιμεν ὧν—where τὸ is at variance with the sense, and ὧν with the syntax. Ficinus, "quemadmodum," as if he found in his MS. ὡς in lieu of ὧν—

[3]—[3] Such is the literal translation of the words ὥσπερ τὰ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον νῦν δή. Taylor has, "in the same manner as we have now spoken about war." Perhaps Plato wrote ὥσπερ εἴρηται περὶ—For νῦν δὴ are perpetually united to a past tense.

[4] After Σχεδὸν οὐ ῥᾴδιον Ast would supply εἰπεῖν. But he says nothing about σχεδὸν, which could hardly be thus united to οὐ ῥᾴδιον.

[5] Ast refers ἀμφοτέρας to ἀνδρίαν and σωφροσύνην. But in that case Plato would, I think, have written ἀμφοτέρας ἀρετάς: and so perhaps he did.

[6] Instead of ἀναμφισβητήτως, Ficinus seems to have found in his MS. ἀναμφισβήτητον. For his version is "tutum aliquid certumque." Ast, however, says that the adverb is put for the adjective, and refers to his note on μετρίως γίγνεται, in Rep. vi. p. 504, C.

[7] The Greek is ἐν ᾧ οὐκ ἂν—where Ast was the first to object to ᾧ, which he says must be referred to ἐπιτήδευμα, to the detriment of the sense. But his correction ὃ οὐκ ἂν—I confess, I cannot understand. I have translated, as if the text were ὀθούνεκ' ἂν—for the negative particle is at variance with the train of reasoning, and is properly omitted by Taylor;

an[1] injury to some of our bodies, and a benefit to others, [2](so too in a state);[2] since these gymnastic exercises and joint-feasts are on many other grounds now beneficial to states, but in seditions are hurtful. This do the children of the [3]Milesians and Bœotians and Thurians[3] make evident. And in truth this very institution, [4]legalized of old, appears to have perverted the natural[4] pleasures of Venus, not only in the case of men, but of beasts.[5] And of such things a person may accuse your cities the first, and such others, as have chiefly adopted gymnastic exercises. And whether one ought to consider things of this kind in a jocose or serious manner, still we must consider that, to the male and female sex, proceeding to a participation in production, the pleasure arising from the act seems to have been imparted according to nature; but, that the copulation of males with males, or of females with females, is contrary to nature; and that the daring attempt of those who first did so, arose from the non-mastery over pleasure. We all of us indeed bring an accusation against the Cretans, as having invented the story respecting the fable of Ganymede. (For), since their laws are believed by them to have been from Zeus, they have put together this fable against Zeus, in order that they may enjoy this pleasure, by following forsooth the example of the god. But let us bid farewell to

although it is acknowledged by Ficinus, "quod aliis prodesse, aliis obesse eidem corpori non videatur," a version that plainly proves his inability to make any sense out of the Greek words before him.

[1] The MSS. read *βλάπτον τὰ ἡμῶν*, which leads to *βλάπτον τι ἡμῶν*, for the article could not be repeated after *τὰ μὲν*—

[2—2] The words between the numerals, absolutely requisite to complete the sense, are found only in the version of Ficinus, "sic et in civitate."

[3—3] On the seditions that took place at Thurii and Miletus, Boeckh and Ast refer to Diodor. Sic. xii. 11, and xiii. 104; but for those that occurred in Bœotia they do not produce any authority, observing merely that many happened there: alluding perhaps to the frequent differences between Thebes and Platæa for example, as detailed by Thucydides; for Thebes itself is stated by Plato, in Criton, § 15, to have been a well-regulated city; and consequently not exposed to seditions.

[4—4] I have adopted Boeckh's conjectures, *πάλαι ὂν νόμιμον*, in lieu of *παλαιὸν νόμιμον*, and *τὰς κατὰ φύσιν* instead of *καὶ κατὰ τὰς*—to which last he was led by finding in Ficinus "naturales Venereorum voluptates."

[5] This mention of beasts seems rather strange; for they have not naturally, as men have by law or custom, *γυμνάσια* and *συσσίτια*. Boeckh says that the word *θηρίων* is introduced hyperbolically, and refers to Legg. xii. p. 942, D. Rep. viii. p. 562, E., 563, C. But an hyperbole would be here out of place. In *θηρίων* lies hid, I suspect, *θεῶν θ' ἡρώων τε*—

the fable; but of those, who direct their attention to laws, nearly the whole consideration is with regard to pleasure and pain, in the case of states and the morals of individuals. For these two fountains are permitted to flow by nature; from which he who draws at what place and at what time and what quantity he ought, is happy; and so is a state, and an individual, and every animal: but he, (who draws) unskilfully and at an improper time, will live in a manner the contrary to that person.

[9.] *Megil.* This, O guest, is surely said beautifully. Nevertheless a want of speech does not lay hold of me as to what I ought to say against it. Still to me at least it seems correct that the Lacedæmonian lawgiver exhorted persons to fly from pleasures. But with respect to the Cnossian laws, this person here will, if he pleases, assist us. But those at Sparta relating to pleasures seem to me to be laid down most beautifully of all.[1] For that, by which men chiefly fall into the greatest pleasures and insulting conduct and all kinds of folly, the law casts out from the whole of our country; nor would you see in the fields or in the cities, over which there is to the Spartans a care, banquets or such things as attend upon them, and excite, according to their power, every kind of gratification. Nor is there one, who, meeting with a person revelling from intoxication, would not immediately inflict on him the greatest punishment; nor would he let the party go free, pleading as an excuse a Dionysiac festival, as I once saw was the case with your people when (riding) in carts;[2] and at Tarentum, amongst our colonists, I have seen the whole city intoxicated during the Dionysiac festival; but with us there is nothing of the kind.

Athen. O Lacedæmonian guest, all such things are to be praised, where there are certain endurances of pain; but, where there is a remission of the latter, the former are rather of a stupid kind. For some one, defending our institutions, would very quickly lay hold of you by showing the free manners of your

[1] Ficinus has "optime omnium," in Greek *κάλλιστα πάντων*, which is far superior to the unintelligible *κάλλιστ' ἀνθρώπων*.

[2] Plato alludes to the custom of persons riding in carts to and from the places where revelry was going on during the festivals devoted to Dionysus, the god of wine, and cutting their saucy and ribald jokes on the passers-by. Ast refers to Demosth. on the Crown, p. 268; the Scholia on Aristoph. Plut. 1015; Harpocration in *Πομπειάς*, and other authors.

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women. Now in all these cases, occurring at Tarentum, and with us, and with you, one answer appears to free them, so that they are not in a bad state, but in a correct one. For every one may answer and say to a stranger, expressing wonder on his beholding what is unusual in his own country—Wonder not, O guest. This law exists amongst us; but with you perhaps there is upon the same points a different one. At present however our discourse is not, O friends, about different men, but about the vice and virtue of the lawgivers themselves. But let us speak more fully about all kind of intoxication. For it is not a thing of a trifling nature; nor to know it thoroughly is it the province of an inferior lawgiver. I am not speaking about drinking wine or not, in general, but about intoxication itself, whether it is to be adopted, as the Scythians and Persians use it, and still more the Carthaginians, and Celts, and Iberians, and Thracians, all of whom are warlike nations; or, as you use it; for you, as you say, abstain from it entirely. But the Scythians and Thracians use it entirely unmixed with water, both women and men, and pour it on their garments, and imagine they are engaged in a beautiful and blessed occupation. But the Persians make much use of other luxuries, which you reject, yet, O thou best of men, in a more orderly manner than these.

Megil. All these, however, we pursue[1] when we take arms into our hands.

Athen. Do not, thou best of men, say this. For many flights and pursuings have been, and will be, without a proof; on which account, we cannot at any time give a clear definition, but (rather) a doubtful one, about occupations honourable or not, when we speak of victory and defeat in battle; especially since the greater states, when fighting, overcome and enslave the lesser; as the Syracusans did the Locrians,[2] who were thought to be regulated by the best laws of all those around that district; and as the Athenians did the Ceans;[3] and we could find numberless other instances of a similar kind. But let us endeavour by speaking to persuade ourselves

[1] Ficinus has "fundimus atque fugamus," as if his MS. read *διώκομεν δὲ φυγῇ* instead of *διώκομεν δέ γε*—

[2, 3] Respecting the well-regulated city of the Locrians, whose lawgiver was said to be Zaleucus, Boeckh refers to Bentley on Phalaris; and respecting the Ceans, to Heraclides Polit. § 9.

of each pursuit taken by itself; and let us for the present put out of the account victories and defeats, and let us state how a pursuit of this kind is honourable, but of that kind not honourable. But first hear from me, how we ought to consider what is useful or not as regards those very things.

Megil. How then say you?

[10.] *Athen.* All those, who in talking lay hold upon any pursuit and propose to praise or blame it immediately it is enunciated, appear to me to act by no means according to reason; but to do just the same, as if, while one person is praising wheat[1] as good, another should immediately blame it, without having heard either its operation or utility, (and) in what manner, and for what, and with what [2]and how it has itself, and to persons how having themselves, it is useful.[2] The very same thing do we seem to do now in the case of our discourses. For after merely hearing about drunkenness, some of us immediately blame, [3]and others praise[3] it, and very absurdly too; for making use of witnesses and those who praise, we each of us praise,[4] and some of us think we say something decisive, because we adduce many (witnesses); but others, because we see that those, who do not make use of it (wine), are victorious when fighting. But this too has been considered doubtful by us. If then we go through in this manner each of the other laws, it will not be to me at least according to sound sense. But [5]I am desirous of speaking in the manner, which it seems we ought, by endeavouring, if I can, about this very matter[5] [drunkenness],[6] to point out the right road for us in all such cases; since ten thousands upon ten thou-

[1] Instead of *πυροὺς* Cornarius suggested *τυροὺς*, "cheeses." For this illustration of Plato was obtained from Hippocrates, who says, *μὴ ἁπλῶς οὕτω δοκέειν ὅτι πονηρὸν βρῶμα τυρός———ἀλλὰ τίνα τε πόνον, καὶ διὰ τί, καὶ τίνι τῶν ἀνθρώπῳ ἐνεόντων ἀνεπιτήδειον.*

[2] The Greek is *καὶ ὅπως ἔχοντα καὶ ὅπως προσφέρειν ἔχουσι*—which Ficinus, whom Taylor follows, as usual, to the letter, thus translates, "quomodo præparantes et quomodo affectis corporibus offerri debeat."

[3—3] Megillus, the Lacedæmonian, had blamed, but the Athenian had praised, the use of wine.

[4] Instead of *ἐπαινοῦμεν* Ficinus seems to have found in his MS. *αὐτὸ ποιοῦμεν*: for his version is "id facimus." Boeckh would however omit *ἐπαινοῦμεν*.

[5—5] Such is the literal translation of the Greek text. Taylor has merely, "But adducing intoxication as an instance."

[6] The words *τῆς μέθης* are evidently an interpretation of *αὐτοῦ τούτου*.

sands of nations are in doubt upon these points, and would contend in a discourse with your two states.

Megil. If indeed we possess any correct method of inquiry touching these matters, we must not shrink from hearing it.

Athen. Let us then consider somehow in this way. Come now, should one person praise the rearing of goats, and the animal itself, as a beautiful possession, but some other person blame it, from having seen goats feeding apart from the goatherd, in cultivated grounds, [1]and doing mischief,[1] and from seeing that every kind of cattle is either without a ruler, or under bad rulers, [2]should thus find fault,[2] should we hold that the blame of such a person has blamed any thing whatever soundly?

Megil. How should we?

Athen. But is a commander in ships,[3] who possesses merely nautical skill, useful, should he be troubled with sickness or not? or how shall we say?

Megil. [4]By no means (useful); should he have in addition to his skill the suffering you mention.[4]

Athen. And what is the commander of armies? Is he competent to command, if he possesses the science of war, although he may be timid in danger, and be sick with [5]the drunkenness of fear.[5]

Megil. How can he?

Athen. But what if he does not possess the art, and is timid?

Megil. You are speaking of a person, who is in every respect vile, and by no means [6]a ruler of men, but of some very women.[6]

[1]—[1] The words within the numerals are omitted by Taylor, although found in the version of Ficinus—"damnumque facere—"

[2]—[2] Ficinus, whom Taylor follows, omits the words between the numerals. Perhaps Plato wrote *ἰδὼν δρῶν ταὐτὸ*, not *ἰδὼν οὕτω*, i. e. "seeing every animal doing the same thing."

[3] As the same commander cannot be in two ships at the same time, one would prefer *ἐν πλοῖς*, "in sailings," unless it be said that *πλοίοις* means here "a fleet of many ships" under one commander.

[4]—[4] Such is the literal version of the Greek. Taylor's translation is, "This passion, which you speak of, is not in any respect connected with the nautical art."

[5]—[5] Although Ast endeavours with some learning to defend this violent expression, yet one would wish that MSS. had given *ὑπὸ μέθης, ὥς τοῦ φόβου ναυτιᾷ*, i. e. "be sick with fear, as with drunkenness."

[6]—[6] As the whole train of argument has a reference to a commander merely, and not to the persons, over whom he has the command, there is probably some error here, which it would not be difficult to correct.

Athen. But what (say you) of him, who praises or blames a community, over which is naturally a ruler, and which with him (the ruler) is useful? [1]But he, who has never seen it in communion with a ruler over itself, but always without a ruler, or in communion with bad rulers, [2]can we imagine that such inspectors of such communities[2] will blame or praise any thing usefully?

Megil. [3]How can those, who have never seen or been connected with any one of such-like communities rightly constituted?[3]

Athen. Attend then. Out of many communities, shall we not lay down, that fellow-drinkers and fellow-drinkings are a certain single association?

Megil. Yes, very much so.

Athen. Has any one then ever seen this existing in a proper manner? Now it is easy for you to answer, that no one has ever (seen it) at any time; for it is neither according to your country nor laws. But I have met with many, and in many places; and moreover I have diligently inquired, as I may say, about all; and I have seen or heard of scarcely one whole (community) existing correctly. And though (there are) a few and small portions, [4]yet the whole together, so to say, are for the most part in error.[4]

Clin. How say you, guest, this? Speak still more clearly. For we, as you say, through our inexperience in such matters, would perhaps, even when meeting with them, not immediately know what in them is right or not.

Athen. You say what is reasonable; but, while I am speaking, do you endeavour to learn. Do you then acknowledge, that, in all associations and communions of any doings whatever, it is proper every where for each to have a commander?

Clin. How not?

[1] Before ὁ δὲ μήθ' ἑωρακὼς there seems to be something wanting.

[2—2] The words between the numerals Taylor has omitted after Ficinus; who saw that τοὺς τοιούτους θεωροὺς could not be said of persons, who had not seen at all. Hence we must insert οὐ before θεωροὺς, i. e. "non-inspectors." Compare τὰς οὐ πολιτείας in viii. § 3, p. 832, B.

[3—3] Here again Taylor follows to the letter the abbreviated version of Ficinus. "Quo pacto id faciet, qui nunquam societatem recte gubernatam perspexerit?

[4—4] Or we may render the Greek, τὰ πολλὰ δὲ ξύμπανθ', ὡς εἰπεῖν, διηρτημένα, "the majority are entirely, so to say, in error."

Athen. But we have just now said, that the commander of persons fighting ought to be brave.

Clin. How not?

Athen. Now the brave man is less disturbed by fears than cowards are.

Clin. And this too is so.

Athen. If there were any plan of placing a general over an army, who was not at all timid, nor confused, should we not have done so by all means?

Clin. Most certainly.

Athen. But we are now speaking not of a person about to command an army amongst associations of men, the foes of foes during a war, but of friends, sharing during a peace in the kind feelings of friends.

Clin. Right.

Athen. But an association of this kind, if it is attended with drunkenness, will not be without confusion. Is it not so?

Clin. How should it be (without)? [1]Nay, I imagine quite the contrary.[1]

Athen. In the first place then they have a need of a ruler.

Clin. How not, as for any thing else?

Athen. Must one then furnish a ruler, if possible, not confused?

Clin. How not?

Athen. And he ought, it seems, to be thoughtful with respect to associations. For he is the guardian of existing friendship, and has the care of it still becoming greater, through the previous association.

Clin. Most true.

Athen. It is proper, therefore, to place over the drunken a sober and wise ruler, and not the contrary. For, if the ruler of the drunken is himself drunk, young, and not wise, he must have great good luck indeed, if he does not perpetrate some mighty mischief.

Clin. Very great indeed.

Athen. Should then any one blame such associations, when existing as correctly as possible in states, while he is finding fault with the thing itself, he will perhaps properly blame it. But if a person blames a pursuit through seeing it erring as

[1]—[1] The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and after him, by Taylor.

much as it can,[1] it is evident, in the first place, that he is ignorant that this existed not correctly; and, in the next place, that every thing will in this manner appear improper, when it is done apart from a sober master and ruler. Or, do you not understand, that when a pilot, and each ruler of each thing, is drunk, he will overturn every thing, whether ships, or chariots, or an army, or whatever else is ruled by him?

[11.] *Clin.* You have said, O guest, this at least what is altogether true. But tell me moreover [2]what good would it do us, should this regulation respecting drinking be correct?[2] just as what we lately stated, that should an army meet with a correct leading, there would be victory in war, a no small good to those who followed; and so as regards the rest. But what great advantage will accrue either to individuals or states from a drinking association being placed properly under an instructor?

Athen. What great advantage can we say would arise to a state from one boy, or one chorus,[3] being properly instructed? Or shall we not say, when asked this question, that the state derives very little advantage from the education of one person? But if you inquire universally about the education of youth, how does it profit greatly the state, it is not difficult to say, that persons well educated will become good men; and becoming such will act in other respects in an honourable manner; and still further, that they will conquer their enemies in battle. Discipline therefore brings with it even victory; but victory sometimes produces a want of instruction. For many become more insolent through victory in war, and through their insolence are replete with a thousand other ills. Now discipline indeed has never at any time been Cadmeian;[4] but there have been, and will be, many victories of this kind among men.

[1] Ficinus alone adds here, "proptereaque omnem compotationem vituperet," which certainly seem required to complete the chain of reasoning.

[2]—[2] Here again Taylor has translated not the Greek, but the Latin of Ficinus—"quid nobis compotationes istæ, si recte aguntur, conferent."

[3] In the word "chorus" is an allusion to the chorus in musical and dramatical performances, on whose education both money and time was expended to a great amount at Athens.

[4] Here is an allusion to the proverb of a "Cadmean victory," which was said of those, who, like the Theban brothers, Eteocles and

Clin. You seem to say, friend, that the passing the time in common over wine, if it be done properly, tends in a great part to instruction.

Athen. How not?

Clin. Shall you after this be able to state that, what has been just now asserted, is true?

Athen. To assert positively for truth, O guest, that such is the case, while many persons are in doubt, is the province of a god; but, if it be requisite to state what seems to me, there will be no grudging; since we have rushed onwards to make for ourselves a discourse about laws and a polity.

Clin. Let us then endeavour to learn what is your opinion upon these doubtful points.

Athen. It is proper to do so; and that you for the purpose of learning, and myself for that of teaching, should endeavour by some means to lengthen out our discourse. But first of all, hear from me some such thing as this.

All the Greeks consider this city of ours as fond of talking and of many words; but that Lacedæmon and Crete practise, the former a brevity in speech,[1] but the latter, an abundance in thought rather than in words. But I am considering lest I shall give you an idea of my speaking much about a trifling matter, [2]while cleansing a very long speech[2] about drunkenness. [3]But the rectification of it according to nature would not be able, without musical rectitude, to take off in discourses either clear or sufficient; and on the other hand, music would not be able without the whole of education.[3] Now

Polynices, the sons of Œdipus, gained a victory over each other, as destructive as a defeat.

[1] To the Spartan brevity of speech the earliest allusion is in Æsch. Suppl. 265. Other passages from more recent authors are quoted by Ast.

[2—2] Such is the literal translation of the Greek — *παμμήκη λόγον ἀνακαθαιρόμενος*. But even if a speech could be said "to be cleansed," yet here *περὶ σμικροῦ πράγματος παμμήκη λόγον* could scarcely be repeated after *περὶ σμικροῦ πολλὰ λέγειν* in the sentence preceding. There is evidently an error here, which it would perhaps be not difficult to correct.

[3—3] Such is the literal translation of the Greek text; where, since there is no syntax, neither Wyttenbach, quoted by Ast, nor Ast himself, have been able to elicit a satisfactory sense. The version of Ficinus, "Compotationis autem ipsius recta secundum naturam constitutio nunquam poterit sine recta musicæ regula aperte et sufficienter oratione tractari." Unless I am greatly mistaken, Plato alluded to the well-known

all this is the work of very many words. Consider then, what we are to do, if we leave these things for the present, and pass on to some other discourse about laws.

Megil. Perhaps you do not know, Athenian guest, that our (family) hearth is the public guest[1] of your city. Perhaps then into all the boys[2] [3]of each of us the public guests,[3] when they hear that they are the public guests of some city, a certain kind feeling enters immediately from their youth towards that city, as being a second country after their own. And this very same thing has now taken place with myself. For immediately on hearing the boys, when the Lacedæmonians were blaming or praising the Athenians for something—How your city, Megillus, say they, has done to us not well or well—on hearing this, and contending [4]against these assertions, in your behalf, I have ever had every kind feeling towards those, who are bringing the city into blame.[4] And now, indeed, both

story of some drunken persons becoming sober, on hearing a solemn strain of music. See Iamblich. Vit. Pythag. p. 214, ed. Kiesling; Fabricius on Sext. Empiric. advers. Music vi. p. 357; and Bergk on Anacreont. Fragm. p. 188. But to arrive at the very words of the philosopher would require more alterations than can be stated here.

[1] On the word *πρόξενος* and the duties of the public host or guest, see Valckenaer on Ammonius, p. 201, and Herodotus vi. 57, and the commentators on Soph. El. 1443.

[2] As *νέος*, "young," was applied to a person older than *παῖς*, "a boy," the expression *παισὶν—ἐκ νέων* could not have been used by Plato; who probably wrote *ἐξ ὀνύχων*, rendered correctly by Ficinus, "a teneris usque annis." On the phrase *ἐξ ὀνύχων*, or *ἐξ ἀπαλῶν ὀνύχων*, see Bailey on Hermesianact. 62, where Blomfield happily elicited *ἐξ ὀνύχων* from *ἐκ συνόχων*.

[3—3] The words within the numerals, *ἕκαστον ἡμῶν τῶν προξένων*, found between *ἐνδύεται* and *τῇ πόλει*, are omitted by Ficinus, because he could not, nor can I, understand them. But by merely altering *ἕκαστον* into *ἑκάστου*, and placing the words after *παισὶν*, all will be perfectly intelligible; and it will be seen, what was not before, that not all boys were meant, but only those, whose families were public guests. Ast indeed asserts that both *παισὶν* and *ἕκαστον* are governed by *ἐνδύεται*, and refers to Lobeck on Aj. 716, ed. 1, for similar instances of two different cases thus following the same verb. But all the passages quoted there are evidently corrupt, and may be easily emended.

[4—4] Here again Ficinus shows by his translation that he could make nothing out of the unintelligible Greek text. His version is, "pugnabam adversus eos, qui vos vituperabant, magna erga vos affectus benevolentia." All however will be well by reading *προσάντης* (vulg. *πρὸς αὐτὰ*) *ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν ἦα* (vulg. *ἀεὶ*) *πρὸς τοὺς τὴν πόλιν εἰς ψόγον ἄγοντας, ᾗ πᾶσαν εὔνοιαν ἔσχον*: i. e. "I went head-foremost in your behalf against those, who were bringing into blame the city, for which I had every kind feeling.

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your voice is grateful[1] to me; and that too which is said by many, that such of the Athenians, as are good, are so pre-eminently, appears to be most truly asserted. For they alone, without necessity, by their very nature, and from a divine allotment, are truly and not feignedly good. Therefore on my account at least you may, my friend, boldly say whatever is agreeable to you.

Clin. And in truth after hearing and receiving, O guest, a word from myself, do you with confidence speak what you please. For you have perhaps heard, that Epimenides was held here a divine man, who was of our family, and ten years prior to the Persian war came to your city, according to the oracle of the god,[2] and performed certain sacrifices, which the god had enjoined; and he told, moreover, the Athenians, who were terrified at the expedition of the Persians, that they would not come for ten years; and that, when they did come, they would depart without having done a single thing they expected, and suffer greater evils than they inflicted. At that time our ancestors were hospitably received by yours; and hence both myself and my parents have a kind feeling towards you.

Athen. You therefore, as it seems, are prepared to hear; and I too am prepared as regards my will, but not very easy as regards my power. I must however make the attempt. In the first place then, as (preparatory) to our discourse, let us define what education is, and what power it possesses. For we say that through this must proceed the discourse taken for the present in hand by us, until it arrives at the deity.[3]

Clin. Let us altogether do this, since it is agreeable to you.

Athen. While then I am saying what it is proper to assert that education is, do you consider whether what is asserted is agreeable to you.

Clin. Say on.

[12.] *Athen.* I say then and assert[4] that he, who is about to be a good man in any thing whatever, ought immediately

[1] With *φωνὴ προσφιλὴς* may be compared *φίλτατον φώνημα* in Soph. Phil. 234.

[2] To point out the god alluded to, Plato probably wrote *τοῦ Πυθίου*, not *τοῦ θεοῦ*.

[3] Ficinus has "ad deum ipsum," as if he had found in his MS. *πρὸς αὐτὸν τὸν θεόν*.

[4] As *καὶ φήμι* could hardly thus follow *λέγω δή*, there is probably some error here. Ficinus has merely "Assero equidem."

from childhood to practise, when engaged in playful and serious pursuits, the very thing suited to each particular of the object in view. Thus he, who is about to be a good farmer or house-builder, ought, the latter [1]to play at building children's houses; the former, on the other hand, at tilling the ground;[1] and he, who brings up each of them should provide for each small instruments, the imitations of the true ones; and moreover, they should learn previously what is necessary to learn previously. For instance, a workman, to measure or use a rule; and he, who (is to be) a warrior, should in sport ride on horse-back, or do[2] something else of a similar kind; and [3](the master of the children should)[3] endeavour by sports to turn the pleasures and desires of the children thither, where, when they arrive, it is proper for them to have an end. We say then, that the very head of instruction is a right bringing up, which will lead as much as possible the soul of him, who sports, to the love of that which it will be requisite for him, when he has become a complete man, to [4]lay down as a part[4] of the virtue of the thing. See then whether, up to this point, what has been asserted does, as I said, please you.

Clin. How not?

Athen. Let not then that, which we assert instruction is, be undefined. For now, when we blame or praise the bringing up of each person, we say that one has been educated, but another uneducated; although the men have sometimes been very well educated for [5]retail trades, and those of ship-owners,[5] and for [6]the profits from some other things of this kind.[6]

[1]—[1] Taylor has followed to the letter the version of Ficinus, "oportet a prima ætate vel colere terram vel pueriles quasdam domos ædificare."

[2] Instead of *ποιοῦντα*, Boeckh correctly suggested *ποιεῖν*, similar to "facere" in Ficinus.

[3]—[3] Taylor has properly inserted these words; from which I have been led to suggest, that Plato wrote perhaps *καὶ πειρᾶσθαι δεῖν διὰ τῶν παιδιῶν τὸν παιδαγωγὸν*—For *δεῖν* might easily have been lost through *διὰ*, and *τὸν παιδαγωγὸν* through *τῶν παιδιῶν*.

[4]—[4] Instead of *εἶναι τῆς*—I have translated as if the words were *θεῖναί τι τῆς*—Ficinus has "quod in virili ætate perfecte comparata virtute operis est acturus." Ast's interpretation of the passage, I confess, I cannot understand.

[5]—[5] The *κάπηλος*, "a retail-trader," is opposed to *ναύκληρος*, "a foreign-merchant," who was a ship-owner, in the Statesman, p. 290, A. § 29.

[6]—[6] The Greek is *ἄλλων τοιούτων μάλα πεπαιδευμένων σφόδρα ἀνθρώπων*. But in the first place, there is nothing to govern the genitives

For of those, who, it seems, consider such things to be education, there would be now no account; but that (we say) is the education from childhood towards virtue, which causes a person to feel a desire of, and a love for, becoming a perfect citizen, and to know how to govern and to be governed with justice. Such a bringing up this discourse would, as it seems to me, define, and be willing to call it the only education; but that, which tends to the acquisition of wealth, or to any bodily strength, or any other cleverness, apart from intellect and justice, is a handicraft trade and illiberal, and not worthy to be called education at all. Let us not then contend with them[1] about a name; but let the assertion, which has been assented to just now, remain, that those, who are properly educated, become nearly (all of them)[2] good. And it is by no means meet to hold education in dishonour; since when it is present to the best men, it is the first of things the most beautiful. And if at any time a person goes astray, and it is possible for him to set himself right, this must ever be done by every one according to his ability, through (the whole of)[3] life.

Clin. Right; and we agree with what you are saying.

Athen. And we formerly agreed, that those are good, who are able to govern themselves, but those bad, who are not.

Clin. You speak most correctly.

Athen. Let us then resume in a still clearer way the very point we were speaking of; and do you receive me through

ἄλλων τοιούτων; and in the next, μάλα and σφόδρα could not be both united to πεπαιδευμένων. To meet the first objection, Ast would read πράγματα for μάλα, and πεπαιδευμένον, found in one MS., and ἄνθρωπον from conjecture, similar to "quamvis artem cæteraque hujusmodi calleat" in Ficinus. But though Stalbaum says he has thus overcome all the difficulties of the text, yet πράγματα ἄλλων τοιούτων seems very doubtful Greek. In μάλα, I suspect, lies hid λήμματα, "profits," as I have translated. On the word λήμματα see my note on Æsch. Suppl. 357.

[1] Instead of αὐτοῖς, Ast reads αὑτοῖς, with two MSS., in the sense of ἀλλήλοις, "each other."

[2] Ficinus has, what the sense evidently requires, "omnes ferme probi evadunt;" for σχεδὸν could not stand here by itself. He adds likewise, "qui contra, improbi." But whether from his MS. or not is a matter of uncertainty.

[3] From "per totam vitam," Bernard, in Act. Literar. Societ. Traject. i. p. 107, suggested διὰ παντὸς βίου, subsequently found in the two best MSS.

some resemblance, if perchance I am able to render clear to you a thing of this kind.

Clin. Only speak.

[13.] *Athen.* Do we not consider each of us ourselves[1] as one?

Clin. Yes.

Athen. But that each has in himself two counsellors, opposite and thoughtless, which we denominate pleasure and pain?

Clin. Such is the case.

Athen. And in addition to both these, there is the opinion about things to be, to which is given the common name of expectation; but individually the expectation, prior to pain, is fear; but that, which is prior to its contrary, is confidence. But in the case of all these there is a reasoning process, as to which of them is better or worse; which, when it becomes the common determination of the city, is denominated law.

Clin. I scarcely follow you. However, say on, what comes after, as if I were following you.

Megil. And the very same state of suffering is to myself likewise.

Athen. Let us then think upon these matters in this manner. Let us consider that each of us is a kind of animal, the wonder of the gods,[2] and put together, either as their plaything, or through some serious act; for on this point we are ignorant; but this we do know, that these passions are inherent in our nature, and that they pull us, like nerves or ropes, and being themselves contrary, draw us to contrary actions, where virtue and vice are situated apart from each other. For reason says, that each ought always to follow one of the pullings, and, never abandoning it, draw in a contrary direction by the other

[1] In lieu of *αὐτῶν*, Ast has adopted *αὐτὸν* from one MS. and Eusebius, and says that *αὐτὸς ἕκαστος* means "pro se quisque." The reading is received by Stalbaum, who wonders that Bekker should have left *αὐτῶν*. But though *αὐτῶν* is unintelligible, *αὐτὸν* is scarcely correct Greek. Perhaps Plato wrote *ἂν ὄντα τιθεῖμεν*—For the negative *οὐκ οὖν* could not be united to the subjunctive *τιθῶμεν*, and the inductive *οὐκοῦν* would be here without meaning.

[2] In lieu of *τῶν ζώων θεῖον*, from which no sense can be elicited, I have adopted *τῶν θεῶν ζῶον*, the conjecture of Muretus. Boeckh would read *τῶν ζώων θείων*, by which he understands "the living gods," referring to Plato in Timæus, p. 39, E., from which passage Taylor was led to explain "the divine animals," by the mundane or junior gods.

nerves; and that this is the [1]golden and sacred leading[1] of the reasoning power, which is called the common law of the state; but that the other (pullings) are hard, and iron-like; but that this is soft, as being golden, [2](and moreover it is uniform,)[2] but that the rest are like every variety of forms. It is necessary for us then to assist always the most beautiful leading, belonging to the law. For inasmuch as the power of reasoning is beautiful and gentle, and not violent, its leading has need of assistants, in order that the golden race in us may vanquish the rest of the races. And thus the story of virtue [3]relating to our being a wonder,[3] will be preserved; and the expression, to be superior or inferior to oneself, will in a certain manner become more clear, as to what it means; and that both a state and a private individual ought, the latter, after receiving in himself the true reason respecting those pullings, to live conformable to it; but that a state, after receiving reason from some of the gods, [4]or from the very person who knew these particulars,[4] ought to lay down reason as a law,

[1]—[1] In the words *ἀγωγὴν χρυσῆν*, Ast says there is an allusion to the golden chain, mentioned by Homer, Ιλ. Θ. 17, and to which Plato has referred distinctly in Theætet. p. 153, C. § 27.

[2]—[2] The words within the numerals, evidently requisite for the antithesis, were found only in the version of Ficinus, "et uniformem præterea," until a MS. subsequently collated furnished the Greek *καὶ μονοειδῆ*.

[3]—[3] The Greek is *μῦθος ἀρετῆς σεσωσμένος ἂν εἴη*. Ficinus has "fabula—virtute servabitur:" and while Taylor translates, "the fable—will be preservative of virtue," Ast says that *ὁ μῦθος ἀρετῆς* means "fable about virtue," with an ellipse of the preposition *περί*. But though *ὁ μῦθος ἀρετῆς σεσωσμένος ἂν εἴη* may be compared with *μῦθος ἀπώλετο ὁ Πρωταγόρειος καὶ ὁ σὸς ἅμα ὁ τῆς ἐπιστήμης καὶ αἰσθήσεως*, in Theætet. p. 164, D., yet as nothing had been said just above, where the story is alluded to about virtue individually, I am at a loss to understand the introduction here of *ἀρετῆς*. Unless I am greatly mistaken, in *ἀρετῆς* lies hid the name of the author of the story. Hence one might read *ὁ μῦθος ὁ Ἀβδηρίτης*—similar to *μῦθος ὁ Πρωταγόρειος*: while by *Ἀβδηρίτης* is meant either Protagoras or Democritus; for both those philosophers were said to be natives of Abdera. The very same word has been lost in Theætet. p. 165, § 59, where, instead of *τὴν πολυαράτου σοφίαν*, to which Heindorf justly objects, it is easy to read *τὴν τοῦ Ἀβδηρίτου σοφίαν*.

[4]—[4] The Greek is *παρὰ τούτου τοῦ γνόντος ταῦτα*. But as *τούτου* is perfectly unintelligible, Ast has adopted *παρ' αὐτοῦ τούτου γνόντος* from Eusebius, similar to "ab hoc ipso, qui hæc cognovit" in Ficinus. One would prefer *παρ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ γνόντος τὰ τοιαῦτα*, i. e. "from the very person who knew things of this kind:" for *ταῦτα* has nothing to which it can be referred.

[1]and to have an intercourse with itself and the rest of states.[1] Thus vice and virtue would be more clearly disjointed; and this taking place rather conspicuously, both education and the rest of pursuits would be perhaps more apparent, and especially that relating to the passing the time in drinking, [2]about which it might appear despicable to discourse any further.[2]

Clin. But perhaps it would appear to be not unworthy of a long discourse.

Athen. You speak well; and let us go through whatever is worthy of the present (mental) exercise.

Clin. Say on.

[14.] *Athen.* If to this wonder[3] we bring drunkenness, what thing shall we make of him?

Clin. Looking to what do you ask this?

Athen. [4]To nothing particular.[4] But if this (the wonder-thing) should be combined with that, (drunkenness,) what would happen to be the result? But I will endeavour to explain more clearly what I mean. For I am asking some such thing as this. Does the drinking of wine cause pleasure, and pain, and anger, and love, to be more violently on the stretch?

Clin. Very much so.

Athen. Does it on the other hand cause the senses, and memory, and opinion, and prudence, to be in like manner more vehement? [5]or do these entirely leave him, who may have become saturated with drunkenness.

[1]—[1] Ficinus has what is far more intelligible than the Greek, "ad ejusque normam officia sua secum et cum aliis civitatibus instituere."

[2]—[2] So Taylor translates literally the Latin of Ficinus—"de qua longiorem habere sermonem vile fortassis putabitur." The Greek is ὃ δοξασθείη μὲν ἂν εἶναι φαύλου πέρι μῆκος πολὺ λόγων περιττὸν εἰρημένον: which Stephens would correct by reading ὃ δοξασθείη μὲν ἂν εἶναι φαῦλον καὶ φαύλου περὶ, but Ast by merely altering ὃ into οὐ—I should prefer εἰ δοξασθείη μὴ ἂν εἶναι φαύλου περί του λίαν μῆκος λόγων περιττὸν εἰρημένον, i. e. "unless it be thought that there would be a superfluous length of words spoken upon a very trifling subject." For thus πολυ, which is useless after μῆκος, might have been easily the corruption of τουλιαν. Schramm would alter ὃ into οὗ governed by πέρι—

[3] By θαὐμα is meant "man," as shown in § 13, θαῦμα ἕκαστον ἡμῶν.

[4]—[4] So Taylor. The Greek is Οὐδέν πω πρὸς ὅ τι: where Stephens would read Οὐδέπω from Ficinus, "Nondum dico ad quid," adopted by Ast, but rejected by Stalb. But to the question, πρὸς τί, the answer is perpetually πρὸς ὅ, τι; by itself. Hence in οὐδέν πω there is probably some error, which it would be not difficult to correct.

[5]—[5] Here again Taylor has looked merely to the version of Ficinus,

Clin. They leave him entirely.[5]

Athen. Does he not return then to the same point, (as regards)[1] the habit of the soul, which he had when he was a boy?

Clin. How not?

Athen. At that time then he would have the least control over himself.

Clin. The least.

Athen. Is not then such a one, we say,[2] the most wretched?

Clin. Very much so.

Athen. Not the old man then, as it appears, is alone twice a child,[3] but the man likewise who is drunk.

Clin. You speak, guest, in the best manner.

Athen. Is there any reason, which should endeavour to persuade us, that we ought to have a taste of this pursuit, and not avoid it, as far as possible, with all our might.

Clin. It appears there is; at least you just now said you was prepared to show it.

Athen. You have correctly reminded me; and I am now prepared, since you have both said that you are willing to hear me with alacrity.

Clin. How should we not hear you, if on no other account, yet for the sake of the wonderful and the absurd, if it is meet for a man at any time to voluntarily throw himself into every kind of depravity?

Athen. Are you speaking of the soul?

Clin. Yes.

Athen. But what (say we) of the deformity, the leanness, and ugliness, and imbecility of the body? should we wonder, my friend, if at any time some one should voluntarily arrive at a thing of that kind?

" an prorsus exstinguat, si quis ebrietate fuerit occupatus." *Clin.* Omnino certe extinguit. For his translation is—" or does it entirely extinguish these, when any one has drunk of it to intoxication." *Clin.* It entirely extinguishes these.

[1] The margin of MS. Voss. supplies *κατὰ*, which is wanting to support the syntax of *τὴν*—But Ast seems to wish to read *καὶ* before *τὴν*—

[2] Instead of *φάμεν* one MS. has *μὲν*. I should prefer *ὡς ἔφαμεν*. See § 3, where it is said that the person, who is inferior to himself, is in a wretched state

[3] On this saying, which seems to have been first used by Sophocles, Ast refers to a host of authors and commentators.

Clin. How not?

Athen. What then, do we think that those, who go to medical shops for the sake of drinking drugs, are ignorant that, for a short time afterwards, and for many days they will have the body in such a state, that, if they were about to endure to the end, they would not accept of life? or, do we not know that those, who go to places of exercise and labour, do for the time being become weak?

Clin. All this we know.

Athen. And that they willingly go for the sake of the subsequent benefit?

Clin. (You speak) most beautifully.[1]

Athen. Is it not, then, requisite to think of the rest of pursuits in the same manner?

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. In the same manner, then, we ought to think about the occupation of (drinking) wine, if it is lawful to think correctly upon this amongst those.

Clin. How not?

Athen. If it should appear to us to possess any utility, not inferior to the occupation relating to the body, it is superior at the very outset to bodily exercise, in that, the latter is (attended) with pain, but the former, not.

Clin. You speak correctly. But I should wonder, if we are able to perceive any such thing in it.

Athen. This, then, as it seems, I must now endeavour to explain to you. And tell me—Are we able to perceive two kinds of fear, nearly opposite?

Clin. Of what kinds?

Athen. Such as these. We surely are in fear when we expect that ills will arise.

Clin. Yes.

Athen. And we are often in fear of opinion, thinking we shall be considered bad characters, by doing or saying something not good; which fear, I think, both we and all others call shame.

Clin. How not?

Athen. These then are the two fears I spoke of; one of which is contrary to pain, and the rest of other fears; and

[1] In lieu of *κάλλιστα* Stephens mentions the reading, *μάλιστα*, found at present only in MS. Voss. The words are constantly confounded.

contrary likewise to the most in number and the greatest in kind of pleasures.

Clin. You speak most correctly.

Athen. Does not then a legislator, and every one, from whom there is derived even a little, reverence this fear with the greatest honour? and calling it shame, does he not denominate the contrary to this, boldness and shamelessness? and has he not held it to be the greatest evil to all, both in a public and private view?

Clin. You speak correctly.

Athen. This fear then preserves us in many other and great matters; and not a single thing, taken by itself, works out so greatly both victory and safety in war. For there are two things which work out victory, confidence on the part of foes,[1] and the fear of shame on the ground of cowardice[2] amongst friends.

Clin. It is so.

Athen. It is necessary therefore for each of us to be fearless and fearful. But on what account, either the one or the other, we have defined.

Clin. Completely so.

Athen. When we wish to render any one fearless, in combination with law, we make him such by leading him to the fear of many terrible[3] things.

Clin. So we appear to do.

Athen. But what, when we endeavour to render any one fearful in combination with justice, must we not cause him to overcome those, who are arrayed with, and previously exercised in, shamelessness, by his having contended with his own lusts; and[4] by contending with and overcoming his usual mode of

[1] Such is the literal translation of *θάρρος πολεμίων*. But the sense requires, what Ficinus has, "adversus hostes audacia." This would be in Greek *θάρρος εἰς πολεμίους*, or *θάρρος κατὰ πολεμίων*.

[2] Ast with Ficinus unites *αἰσχύνης* with *κακῆς*. But as *αἰσχύνη* is always taken in a bad sense, I have translated *κάκης* "cowardice—"

[3] The Greek is *φόβων—εἰς φόβων*, which Taylor and Heindorf were equally unable to understand. Hence the one translated "terrible" and the other suggested *φοβερῶν*: while Ast once wished to read *θόρυβον* in lieu of *φόβον*: but he was subsequently satisfied with the verbiage in the text, and so too is Stalbaum.

[4] Instead of *ἢ* "or," the sense requires *καὶ* "and."—On the change of those two words see Bast in Palæograph, p. 815.

living, he must needs become perfect in fortitude; but whosoever is unexperienced and unexercised in contests of this kind, he will not become even the half of himself as regards virtue. [1]But how will any one be perfectly temperate, who has not fought with, and overcome by reason, and labour, and art, in sport and in earnest, many pleasures and lusts,[1] that urge him to act with shamelessness and injustice, but who is impassive with respect to all such things.

Clin. It is by no means probable that he can.

[15.] *Athen.* What then, is there a god, who has given any medicine for fear to man, so that by how much the more desirous is any one of drinking it, by so much the more from every draught he thinks himself unhappy, dreads every thing present and to come, and at last, although the bravest of men, proceeds to every kind of fear; and yet, after having slept, and being released from the effect of the potion, will always become the same man again.

Clin. And what potion of this kind, shall we say, O guest, exists amongst men?

Athen. None. Yet if such a potion had been from any quarter, it would, [2]be assured of that,[2] have been useful; [3]and we should have been able to converse with him much in such a manner as this respecting it.[3] Come, (say,) thou legislator, whether you have laid down laws for the Cretans, or any other people whatever, are you in the first place willing to be able to receive a touchstone of the citizens, as regards fortitude and timidity?

Clin. It is plain that every one would say (he was).

Athen. What, with security, and without great danger, or the contrary?

Clin. And this too every one will acknowledge, with security.

[1]—[1] Aulus Gellius in Noct. Attic. xv. 2. "Plato dicit—nullum unquam continentem prorsum ac temperantem satis fideliter visum esse, cujus vita virtusque non inter ipsa errorum pericula, et in mediis voluptatum illecebris explorata sit."

[2]—[2] Instead of ἔσθ' ὅτι, I have translated as if the text were ἴσθ' ὅτι. Respecting this parenthetic clause, see my Poppo's Prolegomena, p. 128.

[3]—[3] Such will doubtless seem to be a sufficiently intelligible translation of the Greek words, οἷον τὸ τοιόνδε περὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ μάλα εἴχομεν ἂν αὐτῷ διαλέγεσθαι: in which there are some errors that I can, and some that I cannot, correct satisfactorily to myself.

Athen. Would you make use (of this drinking)[1] by leading them to fears and trying them during their sufferings, so as to compel (one person)[2] to become fearless, by exhorting, and advising, and honouring him; but disgracing another, who would not be persuaded by you to become in all things such as you enjoin him; and would you dismiss him unscathed, who had exercised himself in a proper and manly manner, but impose a punishment upon him, who (had exercised himself) badly? or would you not use the potion at all, having no other fault to find with it?

Clin. Why should (one) not use it, O guest?

Athen. There would be, friend, an exercise contrary to those at present, and wonderful for its facility, as regards one individual and a few and as many as a person would wish. And whether any one, being alone in solitude, should place the idea of disgrace before his eyes, and thinking that he ought not to be seen, [3]before he is in a good condition,[3] should thus exercise himself against fear, and prepare merely a potion in preference to ten thousand other acts, he would do something proper; or whether some one trusting to himself to be properly prepared by nature and careful practice, should not hesitate in the company of many fellow-drinkers to show his power, [4]in the necessary difference of the drinking,[4] [5]by being superior (to others) and being (his own) master,[5] so as neither to stumble in one great matter through unseemliness, nor to be

[1] Ficinus, whom Taylor follows, inserts here "hac potione," wanting in the Greek.

[2] Ast understands *τὸν μὲν* in the first clause, to answer to *τὸν δὲ* in the second.

[3—3] Ficinus has "antea quam fortior sit."

[4—4] I willingly confess myself utterly unable to understand the words between the numerals. All the MSS. and Ficinus acknowledge *διαφορᾷ*. In Stephens it is *διαφθορᾷ*, which Taylor translates "consumption." But *διαφθείρειν πῶμα* would mean, "to destroy a draught," by a mixture of ingredients. I could have understood *ἐν τῇ τοῦ πώματος ἀναγκαίᾳ περιφορᾷ*, "in the compulsory handing round of the drink," unless it be said that *διαφορᾷ* has the same meaning.

[5—5] I have inserted the words within lunes, remembering the praises bestowed upon Socrates by Alcibiades in the Banquet, for being not only able to drink more than any one else, but to walk away perfectly sober, while all his companions were either dead drunk, or unable to reach their homes without staggering.

changed (in manner) through virtue,[1] but should [2]depart, before he reached the last drinking,[2] [3]fearing the defeat which all men suffer through drinking.[3]

Clin. Certainly. For such a one, by thus acting, would conduct[4] himself with temperance.

Athen. Let us thus then say again to the legislator this. Be it so, lawgiver, that neither has a god given nearly[5] to mankind such a medicine for fear, nor have we devised one ourselves—for I say nothing of sorcerers[6] at a banquet—but is there a potion for fearlessness and for excessive confidence, and (doing) unseasonably what is not meet? Or how say we?

Clin. There is, he will perhaps say, meaning wine.

Athen. Has this a property contrary to that which was just now spoken of? Does it make a man drinking it, to be in the first place immediately more cheerful than before; and by how much the more he tastes it, by so much the more to be filled with good hopes and an opinion of his own power; and at last is such a person filled, as if he were wise, with all freedom of speech and of behaviour and of all fearlessness, so as to say any thing whatever without hesitation, and do so likewise?

Clin. Every one, I think, will agree to this.

Megil. How not?

Athen. Let us then recollect this, that we said that two things in our souls ought to be cultivated; one, that we may

[1] With *ἀρετὴν* here may be compared the expression in Horace, "Narratur et prisci Catonis Sæpe mero caluisse virtus."

[2]—[2] Such is the literal translation of the Greek. Ficinus has, "ac juxta ultimam potionem ante ebrietatem discedat."

[3]—[3] The Greek is *τὴν πάντων ἧτταν φοβούμενος ἀνθρώπων τοῦ πώματος*. But all men, as shown in the case of Socrates, are not overcome by liquor. Hence in lieu of *ἀνθρώπων*, I should prefer *ἄνων* (senseless) *ὑπὸ*—For *τοῦ πώματος* can hardly dispense with a preposition to govern it. Taylor's translation is, "fearing any human potion the least of all things," where he evidently confounded *ἧτταν*, "defeat," with *ἧττον*, "less."

[4] Since all the MSS. have *σωφρονοῖ*, it is evident that *ἂν* has dropt out after *γὰρ*—It was found in the MS. of Ficinus; for his version is, "moderatus evadet."

[5] I cannot understand *σχεδὸν* thus standing by itself.

[6] This allusion to sorcerers is made here, because they were supposed capable of curing disorders that had baffled the regular practitioners in medicine.

be as confident as possible; the other, the very contrary, that we may be as fearful as possible?

Clin. These, I think, you said belonged to shame.

Athen. You very properly remind me. But since it is meet to practise fortitude and fearlessness in fears,[1] let us consider whether the contrary ought to be cultivated in the case of things contrary.

Clin. It is at least probable.

Athen. In those things, which when we suffer, we are naturally remarkably confident and audacious, it will be proper, as it seems, to meditate, how we may become the least possible shameless and full of boldness, but fearful with respect to daring on each occasion to speak, or suffer, or do any thing base whatever.

Clin. It seems so.

Athen. Are not then these the things, in which we are such, (namely) anger, love, insolence, ignorance, the love of gain, cowardice,[2] and these too, riches, beauty, strength, and all such things as make a person, drunk with pleasure, to be mad? Now to the making in the first place an easy and harmless experiment in all these, and afterwards to the meditating upon them, [3]with the exception of the touch-stone furnished by wine and sport, what pleasure more in measure, can we mention should it exist in any degree with caution?[3] For, let us consider. Of a disposition morose and savage, from which ten thousand acts of injustice arise, [4]is it more dangerous for a person,

[1] In lieu of *τοῖς φόβοις*, one would expect rather *τοῖς φοβεροῖς*: for thus the two adjectives *φοβεροῖς* and *ἐναντίοις* would answer, as they should do, to each other.

[2] Ast, justly objecting to *δειλία*, "cowardice," as being thus reckoned with the things, that render a person bold, would expunge the word entirely; for it owes its origin, he says, to the repetition of the letters—*δεια* in *φιλοκέρδεια*.

[3—3] Such is the literal translation of the Greek; which I confess my inability to understand. Ast is content to give the version of Cornarius. Ficinus has "Ad horum omnium facile et innocuum periculum faciendum inducendamque exercitationem, nullam habemus voluptatem commodiorem ea, quæ in vini ludo mores examinat, si modo prudens quædam cautio adhibeatur."

[4—4] Here again I have given a literal version of the Greek text, which has baffled both Boeckh and Ast; the former of whom conceives there is something wanting, which he has attempted in part to supply; while the latter says there will be nothing to desire, if we merely read *ἀσφα-*

when going for the purpose of contracts, to make a trial, and so run a risk respecting them, or when present at the shows of Dionysus?[4] or to a disposition, yielding to venery, to apply a touchstone, by intrusting to it one's own daughters, and sons, and wives,[1] and thus by running a risk in things the most dear, to see the moral condition of the soul? [2]and by mentioning ten thousand things, a person would not accomplish,[2] by how much excels [3]the contemplating in sport, and without a fixed purpose, and without a reward, bringing damage.[3] [4]And this very thing,[4] we think, that on these points at least, neither the Cretans nor other persons would doubt of this being a reasonable experiment of each other, and of its superiority, as compared with other touchstones, (on the ground)[5] of its slightness, and security, and despatch.

Clin. This at least is true.

Athen. This, then, will be one of the most useful things, to know the nature and habit of souls by that art, whose business it is to cure them. Now this, I think, is the business of the statesman's art. Is it not?

Clin. It is entirely so.

BOOK II.

[1.] AFTER this, it appears, that point must be considered respecting them, whether this alone has a good, namely, to

λέστερον for σφαλερώτερον. What Plato really wrote, will perhaps remain for ever unknown.

[1] Ficinus omits γυναῖκας.

[2]—[2] Ficinus has "permulta insuper afferre quis poterit neque verbis consequetur," which is more intelligible than the Greek.

[3]—[3] Here too a literal version shows how utterly unintelligible is the Greek; which Ficinus thus translates—"cum joco simpliciter sine damno hominum mores exquirere," as if he had found in his MS. something to this effect, τὸ μετὰ παιδιᾶς ἁπλῶς ἄνευ ζημίας εἶδος ἀνειῶν ἤθους θεωρεῖν: where ἀνειῶν is the usual abbreviation for ἀνθρωπείου.

[4]—[4] The words within numerals are omitted by Ficinus; for he could not understand them; nor can any one else. In the letters καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῦτο μὲν αὐτὸ lies hid, I suspect, an answer of Clinias, ἔοικε δὴ πᾶν τοῦτό μοι ἐννοοῦντι, "All this seems reasonable to me on reflection."

[5] The genitives are here used, says Ast, as if Plato had written accusatives with κατὰ—I have translated as if ἕνεκα had dropt out before καὶ.

see how we possess our natures, or whether some greatness of advantage likewise, that deserves much care, is inherent in the proper use of wine-parties. What then do we assert? It is inherent, as our reasoning seems desirous to point out. But when, and how, let us hear by giving our attention, lest peradventure we are shackled by it.

Clin. Speak then.

Athen. I am desirous therefore of again recalling to memory what we stated a correct education to be. For its preservation, as I now conjecture, consists in this employment being properly directed.

Clin. You speak largely.

Athen. I say then, that the first puerile [1] perception of children [1] is pleasure and pain; and that these two [2] exist in those, to whose soul vice and virtue are present for the first time. [3] But (as to) reflection and opinions true (and) firm,[3] that man is happy [4] to whom they are present even to old age. And that man is perfect, who possesses these and all the goods in them. Now I call the virtue, which is first present to children, education; but [5] should pleasure, and friendship, and pain, and hatred be correctly produced in the soul of those not yet able to understand a reason; but of those, who have understood reason, should they agree with the reason, [6] to have been cor-

[1—1] The Greek is *τῶν παίδων παιδικὴν*, where Ficinus omits *τῶν παίδων*. For those words are the explanation of *παιδικήν*.

[2] Ficinus, "hæc duo," as if he found in his MS. *τούτω*, not *ταῦτα*. But if *ταῦτα* is to be referred to *αἴσθησις*, we must read *τοῦτ*, with one MS.

[3] The Greek is *φρόνησιν δὲ καὶ ἀληθεῖς βεβαίους*—where for the syntax, says Ast, we must understand *κατὰ*, and for the sense read *ἀληθεῖς δόξας καὶ βεβαίους*, similar to *δόξαι καὶ πίστεις γίγνονται βέβαιοι καὶ ἀληθεῖς* in Temp. p. 37, B.

[4] In lieu of *εὐτυχὲς* Ast reads *εὐτυχὴς*, from "felix est" in Ficinus; and so doubtless found Cicero in his MS. For he says, De Finib. v. 21, "Præclare enim Plato, Beatum, cui etiam in senectute contigerit, ut sapientiam verasque opiniones assequi possit;" omitting however *βεβαίους*.

[5] Ast says that *δὲ* here means the same as *γὰρ*—But that it never does. The particle is omitted by Ficinus.

[6—6] Such is the literal translation of the Greek, where I can discover neither syntax nor sense. Ficinus has "propter superiorem bonorum morum consuetudinem," as if, says Boeckh, he had found in his MS. *τῷ ὀρθῶς εἰθίσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν προσηκόντων ἠθῶν*. The whole passage is quoted by Eusebius in Præpar. Evang. xii. 18, p. 591, D., but the only variation there is of *λόγον* for *λόγῳ* before *λαμβάνειν*, adopted by Boeckh

rectly accustomed by fitting customs.[6] This very consent is the whole of virtue; but its proper nurture is relating to pleasures and pains, so as to hate what it ought to hate, immediately from the beginning to the end, and to love what it ought to love, [1]after having cut off this very thing by reason,[1] and calling it education, you would according to my (mind) rightly call it.

Clin. Both formerly, O guest, and likewise now it seems to have been correctly spoken by you on the subject of education.

Athen. Correctly indeed. [2]For of these pleasures and pains, after having been rightly brought up by existing education,[2] the greater part is relaxed and corrupted by men[3] during life; but the gods, pitying the naturally laborious race of man, have ordained for it, as remissions from labour, the returns[4] of feast-days in honour of the gods, and have given the Muses, and Apollo, the leader of the Muses, and Dionysus, as fellow-feasters, in order that they may correct [5]the nurture that has taken place in the feasts with the gods.[5] It

and Ast, and shortly afterwards of *αὕτη ἔσθ' ἡ*—for *αὐτῆς θ' ἥ*—similar to "hæc ipsa consensio" in Ficinus.

[1—1] The words *ἀποτεμὼν τῷ λόγῳ* I confess I cannot understand: nor could Ast; who prefers *τοῦ λόγου*, what Ficinus, he says, seems to have read; for his version is "si per se ipsam seorsim ratione consideratam."

[2—2] Here again I am in the dark. The Greek is *τούτων γὰρ δὴ τῶν ὀρθῶς τεθραμμένων ἡδονῶν καὶ λυπῶν*, which Ast says are genitives absolute; while *παιδειῶν οὐσῶν* are added by way of an explanation; but whether these words are likewise genitives absolute, or how they are governed, he does not say. That Ficinus was quite at a loss here is shown by his version—"hujusmodi vero voluptatum atque dolorum rectam educationem, quæ disciplina dicitur, transgrediuntur homines in vita ac sæpe pervertunt," where to *χαλᾶται* is strangely given the sense of "transgrediuntur." Plato wrote, I suspect, *ὑπὸ παιδειῶν ἀνοσίων*, "by unholy instructions," an expression absolutely requisite to show how what had been rightly brought up was subsequently corrupted.

[3] In lieu of *τοῖς ἄνοις*, where the article is unnecessary, I would suggest *τοῖς ἄνοις* "the senseless." On the perpetual confusion of *ἄνοις* and *ἄνοις* see my Poppo's Prolegom. p. 106.

[4] As the change of the festivals was yearly, Plato wrote, I suspect, not *ἐτάξαντο τὰς*, but *ἐτάξαντ' ἐτείας ἀμοιβὰς*, similar to *θυσίαις διετησίοις*, "sacrifices through the year," in Thucyd. ii. 38. Ficinus has "solemnia —festa vicissim in ipsorum deorum honorem instituta," where "solemnia festa vicissim" answers exactly to *ἐτείας τῶν ἑορτῶν ἀμοιβὰς*.

[5—5] Here again a literal translation best shows the difficulties of the

is meet then to see whether the account is hymned by us truly according to nature, or how? For it says that the whole, so to speak, of youth is unable to keep quiet in its body and voice, but is ever seeking to be moved and to speak, at one time leaping and skipping, as if dancing with joy and full of fun, at another uttering all kinds of sounds; and that the rest of animals have no perception of either order or disorder in their movements, to which[1] is given the name of [2]rhythm and harmony[2]; but that the gods, whom we have said were given to us as fellow-choristers, have given to us the perception likewise of what is in rhythm and in harmony in combination with pleasure, by which they excite us and lead the dance, uniting us with each other by means of songs and dances, and given the name [3]of dance from the inherent name of pleasure.[3] [2.] Shall we then in the first place receive this? Shall we lay down that the first education was through the Muses and Apollo? or how?

Clin. Thus.

Athen. He therefore, who is uneducated, will be with us one, who has not joined a choir; but him, who has been educated, we must lay down as one, who has sufficiently engaged in a choir.

Clin. Certainly.

Athen. But a choir, as a whole, is dancing and singing.

Clin. It is necessarily so.

Athen. He then, who is properly educated, would be able to sing and dance well.

text, *ἵν' ἐπανορθῶνται τὰς τροφὰς γενομένας ἐν ταῖς ἑορταῖς μετὰ θεῶν*: where it is evident that *ἐπανορθοῦσθαι* could not be applied to *τροφὰς γενομένας—μετὰ θεῶν*, but to some deviation from or corruption of the rites. Opportunely then do all the MSS. read *τάς τε τροφὰς*: from which we may easily elicit *τὰς ἀποστροφὰς*, and still more easily *μετ' ἀθέων* from *μετὰ θεῶν*; and thus *ἀθέων* here, and *ἀνοσίων* restored just above, beautifully harmonize with each other.

[1] Instead of *οἷς*, which Poppo might have quoted on Thucyd. iii. 97, in support of *διώξεις τε καὶ ὑπαγωγαὶ, ἐν οἷς*—Boeckh suggested, and Ast has adopted, *αἷς*—

[2—2] Rhythm, says Ast, is applied to the motion of the body; harmony, to the modulation of the voice.

[3—3] Like all plays upon words, this would be unintelligible to a reader, who did not know that in Greek *χορὸς* is a dance, and *χαρὰ*, joy. The etymology is adopted in Etymol. M. *Χορὸς, οἷμαι, παρὰ τὸ χαίρειν.* There is however an error in *ὄνομα*, which Bekker should have rejected from conjecture, rather than *τὸ* after *παρὰ* from the original reading in one MS.

Clin. It seems so.

Athen. Let us see then what has been now asserted.

Clin. What is that?

Athen. (A person), we have said, sings well and dances well. Whether shall we add that he does so, if he sings what is beautiful and dances what is beautiful, or not?

Clin. Let us add it.

Athen. What then, should a person consider things beautiful, as beautiful, and things base, as base, and use them as such, will such a one be better educated for us, with respect to dancing and music, who[1] may be sufficiently able to minister to the body and voice what is considered beautiful, but yet does not rejoice in things beautiful, nor hate such as are void of beauty? Or he, who, though he is not altogether able to act[2] or think rightly, with respect to his voice and body, yet acts rightly with respect to pleasure and pain, embracing such things as are beautiful, and feeling a disgust at such as are not beautiful?

Clin. You are speaking, guest, of a great difference of education.

Athen. If, then, we three know what is beautiful in singing and dancing, we likewise know correctly the person educated or not educated: but, if we are ignorant of this, we shall not be able to know if there is, and where, a guard of education. Is it not this?

Clin. It is thus.

Athen. We must then in the next place, like dogs on the track, seek out what is beautiful in form, and melody, and singing, and dancing. But if these shall escape us and get away, our discourse about proper education, whether Grecian or Barbarian, will hereafter be in vain.

Clin. Truly so.

Athen. Be it so. What forms then, or melody, is it proper to call the beautiful? Shall we say that the form and the

[1] Ast has rejected, with the approbation of Stalbaum, ἢ before ὃς ἂν—For of the two parties, opposed to each other, the second is not alluded to till shortly afterwards.

[2] This is Taylor's translation of κατορθοῦν: and Ast too says that κατορθοῦν means "recte facere." But it does so, only when it is followed by its object, which is wanting here. Hence I suspect that Plato wrote κατ' ὀρθὸν ἀνύειν, similar to the version of Ficinus, "ut decet assequi," and similarly κατ' ὀρθὸν for κατορθοῖ in the next sentence.

voice of a brave and a timid soul, held fast by[1] the same and equal labours, are similar?

Clin. How (similar),[2] since neither are their colours?[3]

Athen. Well (said), my friend. But in music there are both forms and melody,[4] since music is conversant with rhythm and harmony;[5] so that it is possible for a person, making use of a resemblance, as the chorus-teachers do, to speak correctly of a melody or form as being in good rhythm or in good harmony, but not as being of a good colour. Now of a timid, and of a brave man, there is a certain form or melody; and (one) has the power to call those properties of brave men, beautiful, but of timid, ugly. And that there may not be to us a great prolixity respecting these matters, let all the beautiful forms and melodies connected with the soul or body be all abstractedly the property of virtue, either of itself or of some image of it; but of vice on the other hand, all that is of a contrary kind.

Clin. [6]You correctly make a call upon me;[6] and let it be decided, for the present, that such is the state of the case.

Athen. But (let us consider)[7] still further this; whether all of us are similarly delighted with all dancing, or it wants much of such being the case?

Clin. It wants it entirely.

Athen. What then shall we say is that, which has caused us to err? Is it because the same things are not beautiful to

[1] In lieu of *ἐρχομένης* Stephens suggested *ἐχομένης*, what Ast has adopted, and refers to Heindorf on Gorg. § 163, for examples of *ἔχεσθαι*, thus united to *ἐν πόνοις*, and *ἐν ξυμφοραῖς*. The participle is omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor.

[2] Ficinus inserts "similes" to fill up the ellipse.

[3] Although *φωνὴ*, *σχῆμα*, and *χρῶμα* are similarly united in Cratyl. p. 423, D., yet here *χρῶμα* is said by Boeckh and Ast to mean not only "colour," as applied to "bodies," but to modulations in music likewise, according to Suidas in Χρῶμα—*λέγεταί τι κατὰ μουσικὴν χρῶμα.*

[4] Boeckh would insert here *χρώματα δ' οὐκ ἔνεστι.* But Ast observes, that the same idea is expressed in the subsequent words, *εὔχρων δὲ μέλος ἢ σχῆμα οὔκ ἐστιν—*

[5] The words which follow in the Greek, *οὔσης τῆς μουσικῆς*, Ficinus omits here, but seems to have found them after *ὥστε εὔρυθμον μὲν καὶ εὐάρμοστον*: for his version is, "quare boni rhythmi harmoniæque figuram et cantum licet dicere."

[6—6] Ficinus, and after him Taylor, omit *προκαλεῖ.*

[7] Ficinus, followed by Taylor, has inserted "animadvertamus." But the verb is omitted elsewhere in this formula, as remarked by Ast.

all of us? Or that some are, but do not appear to be the same? For surely no one will say that the choric movements of vice are more beautiful than those of virtue; or that he is delighted himself with the forms of depravity, but others with music, the contrary to this. And yet the majority assert, that the correctness of music consists in the power which imparts pleasure to the soul. But this is not to be endured, nor is it holy to speak so at all. But this more probably causes us to err.

Clin. What?

[3.] *Athen.* Since the things relating to choric movements are the imitations of manners, that take place in all kinds of actions, and [1]fortunes, and morals, and imitations, each going through.[1] For those then, to whom is suited what is said, or sung, or danced, according to nature or custom, or both, it is necessary to rejoice in and praise those acts, and to call them beautiful; but for those, to whom they are contrary to nature, or manners, or custom, it is possible neither to rejoice in nor praise them, but to call them base. And they, to whom the things of nature happen to be right, but the things of custom the contrary, or the things of custom right, but the things of nature the contrary, [2]address their praises contrary to pleasures.[2] For they say that each of these is pleasant, but wrong; and in the presence of others, whom they consider to be intellectual, they are ashamed for such movements to take

[1]—[1] The Greek of this unintelligible passage is, *καὶ μιμήμασι διεξιόντων ἑκάστων*, where Boeckh would read *παθήμασι*, referring to Aristotle in Poetic. § 1, who says that dancers *διὰ τῶν σχηματιζομένων ῥυθμῶν μιμοῦνται καὶ ἤθη καὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις*. But Ast observes, that as Aristotle omits *τύχαις*, found in Plato, it was only natural for him to substitute its synonyme, *πάθη*. Schulthes, in the notes to his German translation, suggests *σχήμασι*. But *σχήμασι* could not thus follow *πράξεσι καὶ τύχαις καὶ ἤθεσι*. Ficinus has, "Quoniam in chorea variorum morum variarumque rerum variis in fortunis moribusque gestarum imitationes fiunt," thus giving the general sense in elegant language, but cleverly omitting the words in which all the difficulty lies. By following the clue furnished by the MSS. that read *μιμήσεσι* or *μιμήσεσι*, one may suggest that Plato wrote *καὶ γὰρ μιμήσεσι δεῖξαι τούτων ἕκαστ' ἦν*, "for it is possible to exhibit each of these things by imitations."

[2]—[2] Such is the literal version of the Greek, *ταῖς ἡδοναῖς τοὺς ἐπαίνους ἐναντίους προσαγορεύουσιν*. Ficinus has, "Laudes voluptatibus contrarias proferunt," as if he had found in his MS. *προφέρουσι*. Taylor's translation is, "will denominate things contrary to pleasures laudable."

place in their body, and ashamed to sing, [1]as if making a display with seriousness[1] of things beautiful; but by themselves they are delighted with them.[2]

Clin. You speak most correctly.

Athen. Does something then bring any injury to him, who is delighted with the forms or melodies of depravity? or an advantage on the other hand to those, who are pleased with the contraries to these?

Clin. It is probable.

Athen. Is it probable, or is it necessary also, for the same thing to take place, as when any one, associating with the depraved habits of depraved men, does not hate, but rejoices in and admits them; and yet blames his own depravity in the way of fun, as if he were in a dream. Surely at that time it is necessary for the party rejoicing to be assimilated to the things in which he rejoices, even though he is ashamed to praise them. And yet what greater good, or evil, can we say, would of every necessity happen to us than a thing of this kind?

Clin. I think, none.

Athen. But where laws are beautifully established, or will be at some future period of time, can we think that the instruction touching the Muses and amusement, will be in the power of poets, so that, whatever delights a poet in composition, or what is connected with rhythm, or melody, or verse, he can, by teaching it to the children of the well-regulated, and to young men formed into choirs, work out whatever may happen with respect to virtue and depravity?

Clin. This has no particle of reason; for how could it?

Athen. But, now it is in their power to do so in all states, so to say, except in Egypt.

Clin. But how say you that a thing of this kind has been established by law[3] in Egypt?

Athen. It is wonderful even to hear. For, as it seems, this doctrine, of which we are now speaking, has been known of old amongst them, that young men in cities should be ac-

[1]—[1] Ficinus has, what Taylor translates literally, "honestaque et studio digna asserere."

[2] Ficinus, "secum iis omnibus delectantur."

[3] All the MSS. but one, by reading *νενομοθετῆσθαι*, confirm the conjecture of Stephens, founded on "sancitum esse," in Ficinus, in lieu of *νομοθετεῖσθαι*.

customed to occupy themselves with beautiful forms and beautiful melodies. And after regulating these, as to what they are, and of what kind they may be, they exhibit them in their temples; and except these it is not lawful either for painters or others, who work out forms, and whatever else there may be, to introduce any novelty, or even to think of any other than those of the country; nor is it lawful at present to do this, either in these particulars or in the whole of music; and you will, by observing, discover, that what have been painted and sculptured there ten thousand years ago,—[1] and I say ten thousand, not as a word, but a fact,—[1] are neither more beautiful, nor more ugly, than those turned out of hand at the present day, but are worked off according to the same art.

Clin. You say what is wonderful.

Athen. It is, however, a matter relating pre-eminently to law and politics. But you would find other things there of a trifling kind. But this respecting music is true, and worthy of consideration, that it was possible for [2]a law-giver upon these points to lay down[2] firmly and with confidence melodies, possessing correctness naturally. But this would be the work of a deity, or of some divine person; as they say there, that the melodies, which have been preserved for such a length of time, are the production of Isis. So that, as I said, if any one is able to understand their correctness ever so little, he ought with confidence to reduce them to law and order. Since the search after pleasure and pain does, through[3] the seeking perpetually to make use of new music, possess [4]scarcely no great[4] power towards corrupting the consecrated dancing, by finding fault with its antiquity. The dancing there at

[1]—[1] Such is the real meaning of the words *οὐχ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν μυριοστὸν ἀλλ' ὄντως*. Ficinus has, "quasi non adeo vetera sint, ut ita dicam."

[2]—[2] I have translated as if the Greek were *νομοθέτην θέσθαι*, not *νομοθετεῖσθαι*: for *θαρροῦντα* can be said only of a person.

[3] To preserve the syntax, we must suppose that *ἕνεκα* has dropt out between *ζητεῖν* and *ἀεί*, or, since six MSS. read *που* for *τοῦ* before *καινῇ*, that *ἀπὸ* has been lost before *τοῦ*—

[4]—[4] This, I confess, I hardly understand. The train of thought would lead rather to *σχεδὸν ἀμεγάρτην* in lieu of *σχεδὸν οὐ μεγάλην*, where *ἀμεγάρτην* would mean "excessive." For *σχεδὸν* is never, I believe, thus united to a diminutive expression. Hesych. *Ἀμέγαρτον—πολὺν ἢ μέγαν*. Winckelmann would omit *οὐ*—But words are not to be thus rejected without showing how they probably came into the text.

least it does not seem to have been able to corrupt, but the contrary has been entirely the case.

Clin. It appears from what has been just now stated, that it would be so.

[4.] *Athen.* Shall we not then confidently assert that there is in music and sport together with dancing a correct use in some such manner as this? We are glad, when we think we are doing well; and, when we are glad, think on the other hand we are doing well? Is it not so?

Clin. It is so.

Athen. And at such a time in our gladness we are unable to keep quiet.

Clin. It is so.

Athen. Are not then the young amongst us ready to dance? and do not we their elders think we conduct ourselves properly in looking upon them, while we take a delight in their sports and revelry, since elasticity fails us [1]at our time of life,[1] which regretting [2]and loving[2] we thus establish games for those, who are able in the highest degree to carry us by the aid of memory to our youth.

Clin. Most true.

Athen. Do we then think that the majority give really in vain the account now told of those who celebrate festivals, that it is meet to consider him the wisest, and to decide that he is the victor, who causes us to be delighted and to rejoice in the greatest degree? For since we are permitted to play at this period, it is surely meet, for him, who causes the most in number to be glad in the highest degree, to be honoured the most; and, as I just now said, [3]to bear off the prize of victory.[3] Is not this rightly said? and would it not be (rightly) done, if it took place in this way?

Clin. Perhaps so.

Athen. But, O blessed man, let us not hastily decide upon a matter of this kind; but, dividing it into parts, let us consider it in some such manner as this. If any one should at any time simply establish a certain game—but without defining

[1—1] Instead of παρ' ἡμῖν, which can hardly be united to ἐκλείπει, the sense seems to require πρὶν ἡμῖν ὄν, "which was formerly to us."

[2—2] The words καὶ ἀσπαζόμενοι are omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor.

[3—3] Instead of the words within the numerals, Ficinus has "victorem esse dicamus," translated literally by Taylor.

whether it is gymnastic, or musical, or equestrian—and, collecting together all those in the city, should make a proclamation, after laying down the prizes of victory, for any one who wished to come and enter the contest for pleasure alone, and that he, who should delight the spectators the most, without receiving any order as to the manner (of contending),[1] and be victorious in effecting this very thing in the greatest degree possible, and should be adjudged to be the most agreeable of all the competitors,[1] what do we think would result from this proclamation?

Clin. Of what are you speaking?

Athen. It is surely likely that one would exhibit, like Homer, a rhapsody, another guitar-playing;[2] one a tragedy, and some again a comedy. Nor would it be wonderful, if some one, by exhibiting things of wonder, should think that he is especially the victor. Now when these and other competitors without number come together, can we say which of them would justly be the victor?

Clin. You ask an absurd question. For who can answer you on this point, [3]as if he were cognizant of it,[3] before [4]hearing and being himself a hearer[4] of each of the champions?

Athen. What then, are you willing for me to reply to this absurd question?

Clin. How not?

Athen. Now if very little children were to decide, they would decide that he who had exhibited the things of wonder, [5](was the victor over the others).[5] Is it not so?

[1]—[1] To avoid the difficulties arising from *νικήσῃ* thus placed before *κριθῇ*, to say nothing of the apodosis wanting after *ὃς δ' ἂν τέρψῃ*, Ast proposes, with the approbation of Stalbaum, to transpose the sentences thus, *καὶ κριθῇ τῶν ἀγωνισαμένων ἥδιστος γεγονέναι, αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὅτι μάλιστα ἀπεργασάμενος νικήσειν*, so that *νικήσειν* may depend upon *προείποι*. The transposition was suggested by Ficinus, who has "qui spectatores maxime delectabit, judicatusque fuerit id optime omnium effecisse," but omits *νικήσῃ* entirely.

[2] By this was probably meant song-singing, accompanied with the "cithera," corrupted into the modern "guitar."

[3]—[3] The word between the numerals is omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor.

[4]—[4] Others may, but I will never, believe that Plato wrote *πρὶν ἀκοῦσαί τε καὶ——αὐτήκοος αὐτὸς γενέσθαι*: for he might have written more elegantly *πρίν γε καὶ ἀσμάτων πάντων καὶ ἀθλητῶν ἑκάστων*—"before he is himself a hearer of all the songs, and of each of the champions."

[5]—[5] Ficinus alone has "vicisse alios," what the sense requires, in

Clin. How not?

Athen. But if greater boys (were to decide, they would decide in favour of the party exhibiting) comedies; but the women, who are better educated, and the young men, and perhaps nearly the whole multitude, (would decide in favour of the party exhibiting) a tragedy.

Clin. Perhaps so.

Athen. But perhaps we old men would hear with the greatest delight the rhapsodist, when stringing together in a beautiful manner the Iliad and Odyssey, or some of the works of Hesiod, and say that he was very far the victor. Who then would be rightly the victor? This (must be stated[1]) after these.

Clin. Certainly.

Athen. It is evident that it is necessary for me and you to say that those are properly the victors, who are judged so by persons of our age; [2]for habit seems to us to be by far the best of things at present which are in all states and every where.[2]

Clin. How not?

[5.] *Athen.* I grant then thus much to the many, that music ought to be judged of by pleasure, yet not by that of any person one meets with,—but that that is nearly the most beautiful music, which delights the best of men, and such as are sufficiently educated; but especially, that which delights one person, who excels in virtue and education. On this account we say that the judges of these things stand in need of virtue; because they ought to be partakers of the rest of prudence and fortitude. For a true judge ought not to learn how to judge from a theatre,[3] being stupefied by the clamours of the

Greek, *τοὺς ἄλλους νενικηκέναι*, which words, forming probably one line consisting of twenty-one letters, have dropt out after *κρινοῦσι* from all the copies, made from the Codex Archetypus, except the one that fell into the hands of Ficinus.

[1] Boeckh has adopted and confirmed the supplement of *λεκτέον* proposed by Heindorf, and added *ἂν εἴη*—For Ficinus has "quis ergo jure victor sit, declarandum nonne restat?"

[2—2] Such is the literal version of Bekker's text, *τὸ γὰρ ἔθος ἡμῖν τῶν νῦν δὴ πάμπολυ δοκεῖ τῶν*— Ficinus has "usus enim rerum, quem ab ætate habemus, omnium quidem civilium magnum quiddam ubique est et optimum"—which certainly makes an excellent sense; but it is not to be got out of the Greek. Perhaps Plato wrote *τὸ γὰρ ἔθος ἔνειμ' ἡμῖν τὸν νοῦν, ὃ δὴ πάλαι πολὺ δοκεῖ*— "for habit has imparted to us intellect, which thing of old appears to be much the best."

[3] In lieu of *θατέρου*, a MS. of Eusebius in Præp. Ev. xii. 23, p. 597,

multitude, and by his own ignorance; nor on the other hand, while knowing (something),[2] ought he through unmanliness and cowardice to give from the same mouth, with which when about to judge, he called upon the gods, [3]a decision containing a falsehood,[3] with an easy disposition. For a judge does not sit as the disciple, but, as is just, the teacher rather of the spectators, and as about to oppose himself to those, who do not afford pleasure fitly and properly to the spectators. For by the old law of Greece, it was permitted (to[4] do), what the law of Sicily and Italy (permits)[4] at present; (which[5]) by leaving to the mass of spectators to decide, by the holding up of hands, upon the victor, has corrupted the poets themselves; for they write according to the depraved pleasure of their judges; [6]so that the spectators instruct themselves;[6] and it has corrupted likewise the pleasures of the theatre. For while it is meet that the spectators should, by always hearing of manners better than their own, have a superior pleasure, it happens now that they do quite the contrary. What then do the matters discussed in the present discourse intend to point out? Consider whether it is this.

Clin. What?

Athen. The reasoning appears to me, after making a third or fourth revolution, to come to the same point—that education is the drawing and leading of youth to that, which is called by the law right reason, and which has been decreed by the most reasonable and oldest men through their experi-

and one of Plato, have alone preserved *θεάτρου*. On the uproar made in the theatre see Legg. ix. 14, p. 876, B.

[1] Instead of *αὖ* Ficinus has "fortitudinis autem," adopted by Taylor.

[2] I have translated as if *τι* had dropt out after *γιγνώσκοντα*.

[3—3] Here too Taylor has followed, what he found in Ficinus, "iniquum judicium."

[4—4] To preserve the syntax I have translated as if, instead of *δή*, the Greek were *δρᾶν*, and *ἐᾷ* had dropt out before *ὁ*—

[5] Ast has correctly supplied *ὃς* before *τῷ πλήθει*; and he might have supplied *τὸ* before *τὸν*, and altered *διακρίνων* into *διακρίνειν*. For by such slight changes would the sentences, in which there is no syntax, be brought under the rules of grammar and sense united.

[6—6] Ficinus, whom Taylor has followed implicitly, has "ita ut spectatores poetas et se ipsos erudiant," as if his MS. read *αὐτοὶ αὐτοὺς καὶ ἑαυτοὺς παιδεύουσι*. But since it would be no disadvantage for persons to teach themselves, Plato perhaps wrote *ὥστε αὐτοὺς καὶ αὐτοὺς οἱ θεαταὶ ἀπολλύασι*, i. e. "destroy them and themselves."

ence to be really correct. In order then that the soul of a youth may be accustomed not to feel joy or sorrow in things contrary to the law, and to those that are recommended[1] by law, but follow in joy and in sorrow after the same things as those which an old man does, for the sake of this, the compositions which we call odes, and which are truly incantations for the soul, are (said)[2] to have been produced, having been carefully adapted to that kind of symphony, of which we are speaking; but on account of the soul of children not being able to bear a serious pursuit, sports and (other)[3] odes (are said) [4]to be played on the pipe and executed.[4] Just as in the case of persons who are sick and have their bodies in a weak state, they, who have the care of them, endeavour to bring useful food in pleasant meats and drinks; but that, which is annoying,[5] in such as are bitter, in order that they may receive kindly the one, and be accustomed to reject rightly the other. [6]In the same way a correct lawgiver will by words fairly spoken and to be praised, persuade, or, not persuading, compel, the poet to represent correctly the attributes of men, temperate, and brave, and good in every way, by composing his forms in rhythm, and his melodies in harmony.[6]

Clin. Do persons, by Zeus, seem to you, O guest, to act thus at present in other states? For, as far as I hear, what you are now speaking of I do not know to be done except by us and the Lacedæmonians; but there are certain novelties ever taking place in dancing, and all the rest of music, and changes not through law, but some inordinate pleasures, which are very

[1] In lieu of *πεπεισμένοις*, Eusebius, Præp. Ev. xiii. 20, p. 594, A., has *τεθειμένοις*.

[2] As *γεγονέναι* has nothing to govern it, some, says Boeckh, have thought that *λέγονται* has dropt out, which it might easily have done from its similarity to *γεγονέναι*, and that it is to be understood before *καλεῖσθαι καὶ πράττεσθαι* shortly afterwards.

[3] In lieu of ΚΑΙ ΩΙΔΑΙ, the sense requires ΚΑΙ ΑΛΛΑΙ ΩΙΔΑΙ.

[4—4] The Greek is *καλεῖσθαι καὶ πράττεσθαι*. But as *πράττεσθαι* is to be referred to *παιδιαὶ*, so *ᾠδαὶ* requires its own verb. Hence I have elicited *καὶ αὐλεῖσθαι* from *καλεῖσθαι*.

[5] I have adopted Boeckh's correction, *τὴν δὲ τὴν πονηρὰν*, in lieu of *τὴν δὲ τῶν πονηρῶν*, for the genitive is without syntax or sense.

[6—6] All between the numerals Ficinus places after *οἵσπερ ὁ γέρων*, omitting there *τούτων ἕνεκα*. This variation was corrected by Grynæus, whom Taylor has followed.

far from being the same, and in the same manner, as you have said occur in Egypt, [1] but never belong to the same.[1]

Athen. Most excellent, O Clinias! But if I have appeared to you, as you say, to speak of these things as existing at present, I should not wonder, if I have done this through my not clearly stating my meaning. But as to what I mean as taking place with respect to music, perhaps I have spoken of it in such a way [2]as to seem to you to speak of it.[2] For to abuse things which are incurable, and far advanced in error, is by no means agreeable, although it is necessary sometimes. But since the same things appear good to you likewise, come, tell me, do such kind of things exist amongst you and these here, more than amongst the other Greeks?

Clin. How not?

Athen. But if they thus existed amongst others likewise, should we say that they would thus be better than they now are?

Clin. By far better, if they subsisted, as they do amongst these here and with us, and as you just now said they ought to subsist.

[6.] *Athen.* [3]Come then, (say,) should we agree[3] for the present, are the things mentioned by you in every kind of education and music these? Do you compel poets to assert that a good man, if he is temperate and just, is fortunate and happy, and if he is a big man and strong, and if little and weak, and if rich or not? and that, although he is richer than [4]both Cinyras and Midas,[4] but unjust, he is miserable, and lives in sorrow, and, as the poet says,[5] if he says rightly, "I would not mention nor place in account as a man" him, who does not perform all that is called beautiful with justice, and possess it likewise. For

[1]—[1] Ficinus has "sed variæ semper fiunt," translated by Taylor, "but continually vary."

[2]—[2] In lieu of these unmeaning words, Ficinus has, what the sense requires, "ea tibi, quæ fiant, dicere visus sum." Hence Taylor translates "I appeared to you to speak as if they actually existed."

[3]—[3] The Greek is *φέρε δὴ*—But as MS. Leid. reads *φέρε νῦν*, I have adopted Boeckh's suggestion, *Φέρε δὴ ἐὰν*, which is the perpetual form in Plato, as shown by Boeckh.

[4]—[4] Cinyras and Midas, the kings respectively of Cyprus and Assyria, passed into a proverb for persons of great wealth.

[5] The poet alluded to is Tyrtæus, whose verses are *Οὔτ' ἂν μνησαίμην, οὔτ' ἐν λόγῳ ἄνδρα τιθείμην—Πλουτοίη δὲ Μίδεω καὶ Κινύραο πλέον.*

being such a one[1] he [2]will stand near and grapple with the foe ;[2] but he, who is unjust, will [3]neither dare to look upon gory slaughter, nor will he vanquish in running the Thracian Boreas,[3] nor will there ever be to him any other of the things called good. For what are called good by the many, are not rightly called so. For it is said that health is the best thing ; beauty the next ; strength the third ; and riches the fourth ; and numberless other things are called good. Thus, to see and hear acutely, and to possess with a clear perception all that is connected with the senses ; and further, to do like a tyrant whatever you wish ; and, what is said to be the completion of all happiness, to become, after possessing all these, as quickly as possible, immortal. But you and I surely say that all these are the best possessions for just and holy men ; but for the unjust, all the worst, beginning from health. (For to be well),[4] to see, hear, and possess the (other) senses, and, in short, to live, is the greatest evil, when a man is immortal [5][through the whole of time],[5] and possesses all that is called good, except justice and all virtue ; but it is a less evil, should such a person survive for the shortest time. In this manner, I think, you will persuade, and, as I said,[6] compel the poets with you to speak ; and moreover, that persons who follow them should, by giving out rhythms and harmonies, thus educate your young men ? [7]Is it not so ? Look, then.[7] For I clearly assert, that the things that are called evil, are good to the unjust, but to the just, are evil ; but that things good are to the good truly good, but evil to the wicked. In what then, I asked, do you and I agree, or how ?

Clin. We appear (to agree) in some things, but not in others.

[1] Ficinus has, " Is igitur justitia exornatus," translated by Taylor, " Such a one being just—"

[2—2] The verse of Tyrtæus is Καὶ δήων ὀρέγοιτ' ἐγγύθεν ἱστάμενος.

[3—3] The verses of Tyrtæus are—Εἰ μὴ τετλαίη μὲν ὁρῶν φόνον αἱματόεντα, and Νικῴη δὲ θέων Θρηΐκιον Βορέην.

[4] Ficinus alone has " sanum namque esse," adopted by Taylor.

[5—5] The words within brackets, τὸν ξύμπαντα χρόνον, are properly omitted by Ficinus, as being superfluous after ἀθάνατον.

[6] The Greek is ἅπερ ἐγὼ—but as there is an allusion to what was said in § 5, Plato probably wrote ἅπερ λέγω : and for the same reason Stephens altered ποιήσετε into πείσετε, confirmed by Eusebius, and " invitabitis " in Ficinus.

[7—7] As ἦ γὰρ always end a speech in Plato, it is evident that he wrote here ἦ γάρ ; ΚΛ. ἦν γάρ. ΑΘ. ὁρᾶτ' οὖν· ἐγὼ γὰρ—

[7.] *Athen.* Is it then in the case of a person possessing health, and wealth, and despotic power completely, and, I add further, superior strength and bravery, together with immortality, and to whom there is none else of the things called evil, but who has only injustice and insolence in his own person, that I do not perhaps persuade you that the person so living is not only not fortunate, but that he is clearly wretched?

Clin. You speak most truly.

Athen. Be it so. What then ought we to say after this? For if he is brave, and strong, and beautiful, and rich, and does through the whole of life whatever he wishes, does it not necessarily appear to you, that if he is unjust and insolent, he will live in a shameful manner?

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. What then, and wickedly too?

Clin. This (does) not (seem) equally.

Athen. What then, (would he not do so) unpleasantly, and not conducing to his own interest?

Clin. How can we admit this too?

Athen. How? If, as it seems,[1] some god, my friends, should grant us to agree, as we now nearly dissent from each other. For these things appear to me as necessary, as it is not even[2] for Crete, friend Clinias, to be clearly an island. And if I were a legislator, I would endeavour to compel both the poets and all persons in the state to speak in this manner; and I would impose nearly the greatest of punishments, should any one in the land assert that there are certain wicked men, who lead a pleasant life; or that some things are more advantageous and lucrative, but others more just. And I would persuade my citizens to assert many other things, contrary to what are now advanced, it seems, by the Cretans and Lacedæmonians, and, differing from the rest of mankind. For come, by Zeus and Apollo, (say) ye best of men, if we asked the very gods, who laid down laws for us, whether the most just is the most pleasant life, or whether there are some two lives, of which one is the most pleasant, and the other the most just? and if they should say there are two, we should perhaps ask them again, if we in-

[1] The words ὡς ἔοικεν, in which I can find no sense, are omitted by Ficinus.

[2] I cannot understand οὐδὲ, nor could Ficinus, who has omitted it. Perhaps Plato wrote, οἶδ' εὖ, "I well know—"

quired properly,—Whom ought we to call the most happy, those, who lead the most just life, or those, who lead the most pleasant one? Now, should they say those, who lead the most pleasant life, their answer would be absurd. But I am desirous that an expression of this kind should not be said of the gods, but of fathers and lawgivers rather. Let then the question previously put be asked of a father and a lawgiver, and let him say that he, who lives the most pleasant life, is the most happy. After this, I would say thus—Have you not, father, wished me to live most happily? And yet you have never ceased exhorting me to live most justly. He, then, who lays down[1] in this manner, whether he is a legislator or a father, would, I think, appear absurd, and unable to speak consistently with himself. But if he should, on the other hand, proclaim that the most just life is the most happy, every one, perchance, who hears him, would, I think, inquire—What is it, which the law praises in that life as good and beautiful, and better than pleasure? For what good, separate from pleasure, can there be to a just man? Come, (tell me,)—Is renown and praise from both men and gods a thing good and beautiful, but at the same time unpleasant? and infamy the contrary? [2]We shall say—By no means, O thou dear lawgiver. But neither to do any one an injury, nor to be injured by any one, is it unpleasant, but at the same time good and[3] beautiful? And are the other things pleasant, but shameful and base?[2]

Clin. How can they be?

[8.] *Athen.* The reason, then, which does not separate the pleasant and the just, and the good and the beautiful, is persuasive, if towards nothing else, yet at least towards the wish to live a holy and a just life; so that the language of the lawgiver will be most disgraceful and opposed (to itself) should

[1] Ficinus has "una concedit—" He therefore did not, I think, find in his MS. *τιθέμενος* but *συμφάμενος*—

[2—2] All the words between the numerals are considered spurious by Ast. And a portion of them, *ἥκιστα, ὦ φίλε νομοθέτα, φήσομεν· ἀλλὰ τὸ μήτε τινα ἀδικεῖν μήτε ὑπό τινος ἀδικεῖσθαι*, is indeed wanting in the MS. from which Aldus printed. But as one cannot account for their introduction, I suspect that Plato wrote, ΚΛ. *ἥκιστα, ὡς θέλοι ὁ νομοθέτης ἄν, φήσομεν.* "By no means, we will say, as the lawgiver would wish (to say)." ΑΘ. *ἀλλὰ τὸ μήτε*—Compare viii. § 1, p. 829, A.

[3] Boeckh suggests and well supports *καὶ*, from "atque" in Ficinus.

one deny that these things are so. For no one will voluntarily wish to be persuaded to do that, on which joy does not follow more than sorrow. But that which is seen from a distance produces upon all, so to say, and especially upon boys, a haziness. But the lawgiver, by dispersing the mist, will establish for us an opinion the contrary to this; and he will persuade the citizens, somehow or other, by customs, and praises, and arguments, that things just and unjust are both painted with shadow-lines; [1] that things unjust, appearing contrariwise to that of the just, being viewed by the unjust and depraved man himself, pleasant; but things just, most unpleasant; but by the just man, all the contrary to every one as regards both.[1]

Clin. It appears so.

Athen. But which shall we say is the more decisive truth of judgment? is it that of the worse soul, or the better?

Clin. Necessarily the better.

Athen. It is necessary then that an unjust life should not only be more base and depraved, but, in truth, more unpleasant than a just and holy life.

Clin. It appears nearly so, my friends, according to the present reasoning.

Athen. Would then a legislator, from whom there is even a little benefit, although the fact were not so, as the reasoning has detected it to be, [2] dare, if there were any thing else, to tell an untruth to young persons for their good? [2] [3] knowing that he

[1]—[1] Such is the literal version of an unintelligible text. Ficinus has "atque injusta quidem contra apparere quam justa, nempe injusto ac pravo jucunda videri, cui justa videntur injucundissima; justo autem utraque contra omnino videri"—where I am quite as much in the dark as in the Greek. What Plato wrote, might perhaps be recovered by comparing Parmenid. § 73, *ἐσκιαγραφημένα ἀποστάντι μὲν ἐν πάντα φαίνεσθαι——προσελθόντι δέ γε πολλὰ καὶ ἕτερα*, and Theætet. § 154, *ἐπειδὴ ἐγγὺς, ὥσπερ σκιαγραφήματος, γέγονα τοῦ λεγομένου, ξυνίημι οὐδὲ σμικρόν· ἕως δὲ ἀφεστήκῃ πόρρωθεν, ἐφαίνετό τί μοι λέγεσθαι.*

[2]—[2] Ficinus has, what is far more intelligible, "non alienum tamen sua gravitate putaret ad juventutis utilitatem falso aliquid, si modo quid unquam aliud falso dicendum sit, dicere."

[3]—[3] The Greek is *ἔστιν ὅτι τούτου ψεῦδος—ἐψεύσατο*, which I cannot understand; nor could, I think, Ficinus; whose version is "maxime cum nullum mendacium hac falsitate utilius excogitare possit." Hence I have translated as if the Greek were *ἐπιστάμενος ὅτι τούτου οὐ ψεῦδος—*

never would have told[3] a falsehood more advantageous than this, and [1]more able to cause them to do all just things,[1] not by force, but willingly.

Clin. Truth is indeed, O guest, a beautiful thing, and stable. It does not however appear an easy thing to persuade.[2]

Athen. Be it so. And yet that fabulous tale of the Sidonian, although improbable, has been easy to persuade, and numberless others (likewise).

Clin. What fable?

Athen. That, teeth having been sown at one time, armed men were produced from them. Now this is a great example to a lawgiver, that he will persuade the souls of young men to whatever [3]a person may attempt to persuade;[3] so that he ought by considering to find out nothing else, than by persuading to what he may work out the greatest good to a state; and for this to discover every contrivance, after what manner the whole of such fellow-dwellers may speak as much as possible one and the same thing on these points, continually through the whole of life, in odes, and fables, and rational discourses. (So I think).[4] But if it appears to you to be otherwise than in this way, there will be no grudging about contesting these points in our discourse.

Clin. It does not appear to me that either of us can contest them.

Athen. [5]It shall then be my business to speak after this.[5] For I assert, that it is necessary for the choirs, being three, to bring all together[6] an enchantment upon the still young and

[1—1] Ficinus has "quod videlicet ita trahere audientes valeat, ut non vi sed sponte justitiam velint suscipere." Perhaps he found in his MS. ἑκόντας ἕλκειν ἀκούοντας, to which if we add πάντας, preserved by Eusebius, and insert ὥστε ποιεῖν between πάντας and πάντα τὰ δίκαια, we shall probably recover the very words of Plato, that made up one line of the Codex Archetypus.

[2] After πείθειν the object is evidently wanting, and something to connect this remark with the allusion to the fable of Cadmus.

[3—3] Ficinus correctly omits τις πείθειν after ἐπιχειρῇ. His version, adopted by Taylor, is "quodcunque velit, persuadere."

[4] The words within the lunes are found only in the version of Ficinus, "Equidem ita sentio."

[5—5] Ficinus has "Prosequar igitur," translated by Taylor, "I will therefore continue my discourse."

[6] Although ἅπαντας might perhaps stand, yet Plato wrote, I suspect, ἐπιόντας, similar to ὁ χορὸς—εἰσίοι, shortly afterwards.

tender souls of boys, and to say all the other beautiful things we have discussed, and shall still discuss. And let this be the sum of them. By saying that the same life has been pronounced by the gods to be the most pleasant, and the best, we shall, at the same time, speak with the greatest truth, and more persuade those, whom we ought to persuade, than if we assert any thing else.

Clin. We must agree to what you say.

Athen. In the first place then, the boy-choir of the Muses would most correctly enter the first, about to sing in public subjects of this kind, with all earnestness, and for the whole city. And let the second be the choir (of men) up to thirty years old calling upon the god Pæan, as a witness in behalf of the truth of what is said, and praying him to be, together with Persuasion, propitious to the youth. And it is necessary for the third to sing, consisting of those who are above thirty, and up to sixty years old; but those after that period—for they are no longer able to endure singing—[1] are left as the tellers of stories relating to the same habits through a divine oracle.[1]

Clin. Who do you mean, guest, by these third[2] choirs? for I do not clearly understand what you mean to say about them.

Athen. And yet these are nearly the parties, for whose sake most of the above assertions were made.

Clin. We do not yet understand. But endeavour to speak still more clearly.

[9.] *Athen.* We said, if we remember, at the beginning of our discourse, that the nature of all young persons was fiery, and unable to keep quiet either in body or voice, but that it was always speaking without order, and leaping; and that of the rest of animals not one had a sense of order in both of these things, but that the nature of man alone possessed it; and that rhythm was the name given to the order of motion, but to that of the voice, when the acute and the grave are

[1]—[1] This I cannot understand; nor could Ficinus, whose version, partly adopted by Taylor, is "quia non amplius de iisdem moribus fabulas poterunt decantare, dimittendos divino oraculo censemus."

[2] Instead of τρίτους one would expect τρεῖς, as before τρεῖς ὄντας τοὺς χορούς. The words τοὺς τρίτους, written in MSS. τοὺς $\bar{\gamma}$, are evidently an explanation.

mingled together, the name of harmony was addressed;[1] and that both together are called a choir. We said too that the gods in pity have given us Apollo and the Muses as our associates in, and leaders of, the choir; and we mentioned, if we recollect, Dionysus as the third.

Clin. How do we not remember?

Athen. Now the choir of Apollo and the Muses have been mentioned; and it is necessary for the third and remaining choir of Bacchus to be spoken of.

Clin. How so? Say on. For to a person hearing on a sudden a choir of old men in honour of Dionysus it would seem very absurd, if persons, who have been born above thirty and fifty and up to sixty years old, were to join in the dance for that god.

Athen. You speak most truly. But I think there is need of a reason on these points, to show how this, taking place thus, may take place rationally.

Clin. How not?

Athen. Are then the previous points agreed upon?

Clin. Respecting what?

Athen. That every man and boy, freeman and slave, female and male, and the whole city itself, should never cease singing for the whole city what we have gone through, [2]yet changed perpetually in some manner, and exhibiting altogether a variety, so that there may be to the singers no satiety of hymns and pleasure.[2]

Clin. How should it be not agreed that this ought to be done?

Athen. Where then will the best part of the city, and which by its age together with intellect is the most persuasive of those in the state, effect the greatest good by singing the most beautiful subjects? or shall we thus thoughtlessly omit that, which would be the chief object of songs, the most beautiful and the most useful?

[1] The Greek is *ἁρμονία ὄνομα προσαγορεύοιτο*. But the two last words are manifestly superfluous after the preceding *ὄνομα εἴη*, and are properly omitted by Ficinus. Ast too feels some difficulty in *ὄνομα προσαγορεύεται*, joined to a dative without the preposition *ἐπί*.

[2]—[2] With this literal translation of the Greek original may be compared the looser version of Ficinus, "quotidie—variis modis et carminibus decantare, ut ex innumerabili hymnorum varietate inexplebili quodammodo voluptate concinentes afficiantur," where "quotidie" seems to be introduced as the translation of *ἀμῶς γέπως*—

Clin. But it is impossible to omit it, as[1] has been just now said.

Athen. How then would it be proper (to do)[2] this? Consider, if it is in this way.

Clin. In what way?

Athen. Every one on becoming rather old, is full of hesitation with respect to songs, and is less delighted [3]in doing this; and when a necessity arises,[3] is the more ashamed by how much the older and more modest he is. Is it not so?

Clin. It is so.

Athen. He will therefore be still more ashamed to stand up and sing in the theatre, and amongst persons of all kinds; and this too, if like the choirs that, contending for victory, are compelled, after practising their voices, to sing lean and fasting, such persons should, by singing altogether in a manner unpleasant to themselves and with feelings of shame, perform without readiness their part.

Clin. You speak of what is most necessary (to happen).

Athen. How then shall we soothe them into being ready for singing? Shall we not lay down a law, in the first place, that boys shall not taste wine at all, until they are eighteen years old? (thus) teaching them, that it is not proper [4]to bring by a funnel fire to fire,[4] into the body and soul, before they attempt to proceed to labours, (and) exercising a caution about the mad-like habit of young persons; but afterwards to taste indeed wine in moderation, until they are thirty years old; but that a young man is by all means to keep himself from intoxication and much wine; but on reaching forty years, to indulge freely in convivial meetings, and to call upon the other gods, and especially to invite Dionysus to the mystic rites and sports of old men, [5]in which he kindly[5] bestowed wine

[1] Instead of *μεθιέναι, ὥς γε*, one would prefer *μεθιέναι δι' ἃ ἐστι—*

[2] Ficinus has "Quomodo—decenter id fiet," as if he had found in his MS. *δρᾶν* between *τοῦτο* and *ὁρᾶτε*.

[3—3] The Greek is *πράττων τοῦτο καὶ ἀνάγκης γενομένης*. But Plato evidently wrote *καὶ πράττειν τοῦτο ἀνάγκης γενομένης—*

[4—4] On this proverbial expression see the notes of Boeckh and Ast.

[5—5] The Greek is in one MS. *ἣν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις*—But *ἄλλοις* is omitted in all the others, and by Athenæus x. p. 440, C., which might easily happen from the similarity of *αλλοις* and *ἀνοις* in MSS. I have, however, translated as if *ἄλλοις* were a corruption of *ἵλεως*, and *ἣν τοῖς* of *ἐν γ' αἷς*—for *ἣν* can neither be referred to *παιδιὰν* singly, nor to *τελετὴν* and *παιδιὰν* jointly, nor can it thus precede *τὸν οἶνον* by way of an epexegesis, as Ast imagines.

upon man as a remedy against the austerity of old age, so that through this we might grow young again, and that, by a forgetfulness[1] of heart-sinking, the habit of the soul might become from a harder state more soft, just as iron becomes, when it is placed in the fire, and moulded thus more readily. In the first place then, will not each person, who is thus affected, be willing with more readiness (and) with less shame, not indeed amongst many, but a moderate number, nor amongst strangers, but familiar friends, to sing, and, as we have often said, to join in a song?

Clin. Very much so.

Athen. To lead them then to join with us in singing, this method will not be altogether unseemly.

Clin. By no means.

[10.] *Athen.* But what voice, and what music, will these men pour forth?[2] Or is it not evident that it must needs be some one becoming to them?

Clin. How not?

Athen. Now what will be becoming to divine men? Will it not be that of choirs?

Clin. We indeed, O guest, and these here,[3] would not be able to sing any other song, than what we have learnt in the choirs, and have been accustomed to sing.

Athen. And reasonably so. For you have not in reality hit upon the most beautiful singing. For you have the polity of an army, but not of those dwelling in cities; and you keep your young men collected together in pastures, like colts, and feeding in herds. And not one of you has taken to himself his own offspring, and [4]dragging from his fellow-feeders[4] one that is very wild and very unmanageable,[5] placed over him a groom, [6]or privately[6] educates him by rubbing him down and

[1] Instead of *δυσθυμίας λήθην* the sense requires *δυσθυμίας λήθηι*—

[2] In lieu of *ᾄσουσιν*, Porson, on Eurip. Suppl. 932, reads *ᾄσουσιν*, (for the fut. of *ᾄδω* is *ᾄσομαι*,) which Stalbaum says is probably correct.

[3] From this expression it would seem that more persons were present than the speakers in the dialogue.

[4]—[4] The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and after him tacitly by Taylor.

[5] In *ἀγανακτοῦντα*, which would be properly applied to a colt, that frets, while it is being broken in, evidently lies hid, *ἄγαν ἀτακτοῦντα*, as I have translated.

[6]—[6] I have translated as if the Greek were *ἢ ἰδίᾳ παιδεύει*, not *ἰδίᾳ καὶ παιδεύει*.

rendering him gentle, and giving all that is suited to the bringing up of a boy; from whence he would become not only a good soldier, but able to administer a state and cities, and one who, as we said at the beginning, would be more warlike than the soldiers of Tyrtæus, and would honour always and every where the possession of fortitude, as being the fourth, and not the first part of virtue, for the benefit of individuals and the whole state.

Clin. I do not know, guest, why you are thus again holding cheap our lawgivers.

Athen. I do so, if (so I do), by not giving, my good man, my mind to that point.[1] But by what road the discourse may carry us, by that, if you are willing, we will go. For if we possess music more beautiful than that of the choirs and in the public theatres, let us endeavour to impart it to such as we said were ashamed of that music, and to seek that, which is the most beautiful, to share with them.[2]

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. In the first place, then, it is meet for this to be present to all things, which a certain agreeableness follows, that there be either this (the agreeableness) itself alone an object of the most serious attention,[3] or a certain rectitude, or, in the third place, utility. For instance, I say, that agreeableness follows food and drink, and every kind of aliment, and this agreeableness we should call pleasure; [4] but if it contributes to health, we denominate it rectitude and utility.[4]

Clin. Entirely so.

[1] Ficinus has "si quidem facio," from whence Stephens wished to insert *ὀρῶ* after *εἴπερ*— But both Boeckh here, and Heindorf on Parmenid. p. 138, D., have learnedly supported the ellipse. They have not, however, remarked, that, as *ἀλλ'* always precedes *εἴπερ*, we must read so here.

[2] In lieu of *ταύτης*, which I cannot understand, I have translated as if the word were *τούτοις*. Ficinus has "et aliam quærere meliorem."

[3] Ficinus renders *αὐτοῦ τὸ σπουδαιότατον* by "in his alliciat sitque præcipuum."

[4]—[4] Such is Taylor's translation of the version of Ficinus, "rectitudinem vero et utilitatem, si confert ad sanitatem." The Greek is *ἦν δὲ ὀρθότητά τε καὶ ὠφέλειαν, ὅπερ ὑγιεινὸν τῶν προσφερομένων λέγομεν ἑκάστοτε, τοῦτο αὐτὸ εἶναι ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ ὀρθότατον*: which I confess I cannot understand, nor, I suspect, could Ast; for he is content to give the Latin of Cornarius, which, he says, expresses the general sense— Rectitudo vero et utilitas sita est in salubritate eorum, quæ exhibentur, et hæc est in ipsis id, quod rectissimum est.

Athen. [1]And that learning too does an agreeableness follow, (namely,) the pleasure, but that it is the truth which perfects the rectitude and utility, and the well and the beautifully.[1]

Clin. It is so.

Athen. [2]But what, in the working out of things similar, should such arts as are productive of resemblances effect this, namely, for pleasure to result from them, would it not be most just to call it, should it by following be produced, an agreeableness?[2]

Clin. Certainly.

Athen. But the equality rather [3]of the so great, and of the such kind,[3] would, to speak universally, effect the rectitude of such things.

Clin. Right.

Athen. Hence that alone can be rightly judged of by pleasure, which works out and affords neither a certain utility, or truth, or similitude; nor, on the other hand, a hurt; but which subsists for the sake of that very thing alone, (namely,) agreeableness, which follows the other things, and which a person may most beautifully denominate pleasure, when none of those follow it.

Clin. Are you speaking of innoxious pleasure alone?

Athen. Yes; and I say that this very same (agreeableness) is sport, when it does neither an injury or a benefit worthy of serious consideration or mention.

Clin. You speak most truly.

Athen. Shall we not then assert, from what has been now said, that all imitations, and moreover all equality, ought to be judged of the least by pleasure and false opinion? For equality [4]would not be equality, or symmetry symmetry[4]

[1]—[1] Here again I must leave for others to ascertain the meaning of this literal translation of the Greek. Ficinus has "Sic et in discendo gratia inest, quæ voluptas nominatur; rectitudo etiam et utilitas et bonus habitus atque pulcher, quæ ab ipsa veritate efficiuntur."

[2]—[2] Whether I have succeeded in making the meaning of Plato intelligible, I know not; but the translation, I do know, is as close to the Greek as it can be; which cannot be said of the version of Ficinus—Quid porro in artibus, quibus similia effinguntur, nonne id ipsum inspicimus? Voluptas profecto ex illis quandoque provenit, quam par est gratiam nominare."

[3]—[3] Ast remarks that by "the so great," and "the such kind," are meant, what is now called abstractedly, "quantity" and "quality."

[4]—[4] Ficinus has "æquale ipsum æquale est aut commensurabile ipsum

wholly,[1] although it appears so to some one, or some one is [not][2] delighted with it; but they are so from truth, the most of all things, [3]but from any thing else the least.[3]

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. Do we not therefore say, that all music is productive of resemblances and is imitative?

Clin. How not?

Athen. When therefore any one asserts that music is to be judged of by pleasure, we must receive such an assertion the least of all, and seek in the least degree such music, as a serious thing, if, perchance, it exists any where; but that music (rather) which possesses a resemblance to the imitation of the beautiful.

Clin. Most true.

Athen. By those then, who are inquiring after the most beautiful singing and music, there ought, as it seems, to be sought not that which is pleasant, but that which is right. For the rectitude of imitation, as we said, was then, when the thing imitated is exhibited, as great and such as it is.

Clin. How not?

Athen. And surely every one will allow this with respect to music, that all its poetry is an imitation and resemblance. And this will not all poets and auditors and players allow?

Clin. Very much so.

Athen. It is meet then, as it seems, for a person to know in the case of each poem, what it is, if he is about not to err in that point. For he who does not know its being, what it means, and of what it is the resemblance, will scarcely[4] understand the rectitude or erroneousness of its intention.

Clin. Scarcely indeed; how not?

Athen. But would he, who does not know, ever be able to decide upon what is well or ill (done)? But I am not speaking very clearly; and perhaps it will be thus said more clearly.

Clin. How?

etiam commensurabile;" as if he had found in his MS. *αὐτὸ τό γε ἴσον οὐδ' αὐτὸ τὸ σύμμετρον.*

[1] One MS. omits ὅλως. Perhaps Plato wrote ὄντως, "really"—

[2] Instead of *μὴ*, omitted by Ficinus, and at variance with the train of thought, Boeckh would read *καὶ*—

[3—3] The words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor. Ficinus has "sed nullo alio quam virtute sola."

[4] Literally, "at leisure." On this use of σχολῇ see at the Sophist, § 39.

[11.] *Athen.* There are surely numberless resemblances, as regards the sight.

Clin. Yes.

Athen. What then, if any one in these cases does not know what each of the imitated bodies is, would he ever know whether it is worked out correctly? I speak of some such thing as this, for instance, whether it has the joints[1] of the body, and the positions of each of the parts of the body, and how many are (the joints), and of what kind, when placed near to what kind, have (the parts) received their fitting arrangement, and moreover their colours and shapes; or whether all these are worked out in a confused manner. Do you think that any one can at all know these particulars, who does not know what is the animal imitated?

Clin. How should he?

Athen. But what, if any one knows that the thing painted, or modelled is a man, and that it has received all its parts, colours, and shapes from art, is it not necessary for a person knowing these facts, to know readily that too, whether it is beautiful, or whether it is in any respect wanting in beauty?

Clin. We should all of us, so to say, O guest, have known the beautiful points in animals.[2]

Athen. You speak with perfect propriety. Is it not then necessary for a person who is about to be an intelligent judge, to possess these three things, as regards every representation both in painting and music and every where?[3] In the first place, to know what the thing is; then that it is [4]rightly; and then thirdly, that whatever it be of representations, it is worked out well in words and melodies and rhythms?[4]

[1] In lieu of *ἀριθμοὺς* Heindorf suggested *ῥυθμοὺς*; but Boeckh understands by *ἀριθμοὺς* "the numbers and proportions," while Ast explains it by "the measures." Since, however, Ficinus has "articulos," he found, no doubt, in his MS. *ἀρθμοὺς*, what Plato probably wrote.

[2] By *ζώων* Ast understands here, as in Politic. p. 277, C. § 19, a painted animal.

[3] Ficinus has "sive quomodocunque aliter fiat," as if his MS. had *καὶ ὁπῃοῦν ἄλλῃ*, instead of *πάντῃ*.

[4]—[4] Since *ὀρθῶς* and *εὖ* are synonymous, one of those words is evidently wrong. Taylor translates, "that it possesses rectitude." Plato wrote, I suspect, *ἔπειτα ὡς ὀρθή ἐστι τῶν εἰκόνων ἠτισοῦν· ἔπειθ' ὡς, τὸ τρίτον, εὖ εἴργασται πᾶν χρώμασί τε καὶ μέλεσι καὶ τοῖς ἀρθμοῖς*, where colours would refer to painting, melodies to music, and joinings, similar to the "callida junctura" in Horace, to writings and other arts.

Clin. It appears so.

Athen. Let us then be not faint-hearted in speaking of music in what point it is difficult. For since it has been bruited beyond the other representations, it requires of all representations the greatest caution. For a person erring in this, will be injured in the greatest degree by receiving kindly[1] depraved manners; and it is most difficult to perceive them, through poets being inferior to the Muses themselves. For these would never err so much as, in composing [2]the words of men, to give the figure[2] and melody of women; and on the other hand in putting together the melody and gestures of freemen, to fit them for the rhythms[3] of slaves and the not free; or, in taking as a subject the rhythms and gestures of a freeman, to assign a melody or words contrary to the rhythms. Moreover, they would never place together the voices of beasts and men, and instruments, and every kind of noise, as imitating one certain thing. But human poets, [4]interweaving things of this kind very much, and mixing them together irrationally,[4] would produce a laugh amongst men, such, as Orpheus says, "have obtained by lot the season of delight."[5] For the poets perceive[6] all these things mingled together; and moreover they tear away rhythm and figures[7] apart from melody, put-

[1] Since *φιλοφρονεῖσθαι* is not elsewhere said of things, there is probably a word wanting here. Ficinus has "sub ejus suavitate malos imbibat mores."

[2—2] The Greek is *ῥήματα ἀνδρῶν ποιήσασαι τὸ σχῆμα γυναικῶν καὶ μέλος ἀποδοῦναι.* But as Ficinus has "colorem mulierum," answering to *χρῶμα* in all the MSS. but the one used by Aldus, Plato wrote, perhaps, *τὰ ἀνδρῶν ποιήσασαι τὸ ῥῆμα καὶ χρῶμα*— "the language, and colour, and melody." For *ῥήμασι—σχῆμα—μέλη* are found in ii. § 5, unless it be said that *ῥήματα* is a corruption of *δράματα.*

[3] Instead of *ῥυθμοὺς*, the syntax and sense require *ῥυθμοῖς.*

[4—4] Ficinus has "hujusmodi multa perturbate et sine ratione commiscent," as if he had found in his MS. *πολλὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα*, with *ἐμπλέκοντες* omitted.

[5] To Orpheus then is probably to be referred the definition of man, as a laughing animal; although, according to Homer, even the gods indulged in "unextinguished laughter," when they beheld Vulcan with his lame foot acting as their cup-bearer. On this fragment of Orpheus see Lobeck's Aglaophamus, i. p. 339, and ii. p. 947.

[6] I cannot understand *ὁρῶσι*, nor could De Grou, who suggested *δρῶσι*— Plato wrote, I suspect, not *γὰρ ὁρῶσι*, but *παρορῶσι*, "overlook—"

[7] Twining, on Aristotle's Poetics, n. 5, proposes to read *ῥήματα, μέλους χωρὶς*, "words, apart from melody;" and observes, that by *λόγοι ψιλοὶ* are meant "words without melody," not, as elsewhere, "words in prose."

ting naked words into measures, and, on the other hand, melody and rhythm without words, and employing the playing the harp and the hautboy nakedly;[1] from which it is very difficult to know what rhythm and harmony mean without words, and to which of the imitations,[2] worthy of mention, they are similar. But it is necessary to understand that every thing of this kind is full of rusticity, [3]as much as it loves swiftness and not stumbling,[3] and the voice of wild beasts, so as to make use of playing on the hautboy and the harp, except for dancing and singing. But to use either of those instruments unaccompanied with words, would be wholly a non-musical education, and a wonder-exciting act. In this way such assertions have a reason. And we are considering not only that persons of thirty years old, and those even beyond fifty, ought to make use of the Muses, but in what they ought. This then, for such reasons, does the discourse seem to me to point out to us respecting the music of choirs, that those who are fifty years old, and for whom it is suited to sing, ought to be better instructed (than the others).[4] For they must necessarily possess a proper sensation and knowledge of rhythms and harmonies. Or how shall any one know the rectitude of melodies, and for what the Doric[5] harmony is proper or improper, and of rhythm, which the poet has united to it, whether it is right, or not?

Clin. It is evident he cannot by any means.

Athen. But the numerous common people are ridiculous in thinking that they sufficiently know what is well harmonized, and in proper rhythm, and what is not so; such (at least) as have been compelled to sing and walk in rhythm. But as they do each of these things ignorantly, they do not reason upon them. Now every melody, when it has what is fitting, is in a proper state; but (when it has) what is not fitting, it is in an erring one.

[1] i. e. "without any words."

[2] Ast suggests, in lieu of *τῶν μιμημάτων*, "imitations," *τῶν μιμητῶν*, "things imitated."

[3—3] Such is the literal version of the nonsensical Greek, *ὁπόσον τάχους τε καὶ ἀπταισίας*, where Ast would read *ἀπνευστίας*, or *πτοήσεως*, or *ἀπαυστίας*, all of which are to myself at least equally unintelligible, and so is Orelli's *ἀποτάσεως*. What Plato wrote might perhaps be recovered by a bold conjectural critic.

[4] Ficinus supplies here "cæteris—"

[5] On the Doric harmony see Rep. iii. § 10.

Clin. Most necessarily so.

Athen. What then, will the person, not knowing what it possesses, know, as we have said,[1] how it is in a proper state in any way and at any time?

Clin. What plan is there (for so doing)?

[12.] *Athen.* This then, as it appears, we have now again discovered, that those singers, whom we are now calling upon, and, after a fashion, compel to sing voluntarily, ought from necessity to be disciplined thus far, as to be able each of them to follow the progressions of the rhythms, and the chords of the melodies, in order that, by perceiving the harmonies and the rhythms, they may be able to choose such as are fit to be sung by persons of such an age, and of such a kind, and who may sing thus, and by singing may themselves be immediately innocently delighted, and become the leaders to an adoption of good manners, suited to younger persons; and being educated to this point, they would take into their hands a share of that more accurate discipline, which has reference to the multitude, and is conversant about poets themselves. For, it is by no means necessary for a composer to know the third point, whether the imitation is beautiful or not. But it is nearly necessary (to know) that which relates to harmony and rhythm; but for those (the elders) to know all the three, for the sake of choosing the most beautiful, and the second, or else never to become a sufficient enchanter of young persons towards the acquisition of virtue. And thus, what our discourse intended at the beginning, namely to exhibit a well-spoken support in favour of the choir of Bacchus, it has spoken to the best of our power. But let us consider whether this has taken place in this manner. For such an assembly does of necessity ever happen to become tumultuous through the drinking going forward to a higher point, as we supposed at the beginning of our discourse it would necessarily do, [2]as regards those of the present time.[2]

Clin. It is necessary it should.

[1] Instead of ὅτι περ, Bekker suggests ὅπερ, which he got from "ut" in Ficinus. He should have suggested ὃ τὸ πρὶν—

[2—2] This I cannot understand, nor could Ast, who has adopted λεγομένων, found in Eusebius, in lieu of γιγνομένων. Perhaps in περὶ τῶν νῦν γιγνομένων lies hid περὶ τῶν οἴνῳ γανυμένων, "as regards those delighted with wine." On the confusion of γιγνόμενος and γανύμενος, see at i. § 15.

Athen. And every one becoming lighter than himself is elevated and joyous, and is filled with a freedom of speech, and with the not-listening at such a time to his neighbour, but considers himself sufficient to have a command over himself and the rest.

Clin. Certainly.

Athen. Did we not say, that, when this takes place, the souls of the drinkers, becoming warmed, are rendered, like iron, more soft and juvenile? so that they are easily led by a person able and knowing how to instruct and mould them, as when they were young, and that this moulder is the same as he, who was then said to be a good lawgiver, from whom there ought to be laws for convivial drinking, competent (to restrain) [1] the person who had become full of confidence and bold and more impudent than is proper, and unwilling to endure a regulation, and the turn for silence and talking and drinking and music; (and so to instruct him,) [2] that he is willing to do every thing the contrary to those acts; and (laws) also competent to send, together with justice, a fear the most honourable, which is to fight against a confidence not honourable, whilst it is advancing; which divine fear we have denominated modesty and shame.

Clin. It is so.

Athen. [And we said] that there are guardians and fellow-fabricators of these laws, the cool and sober leaders of those not sober; without whom it is more difficult to fight against drunkenness than against enemies without cool leaders; and that the person [3]unable to be willing [3] to obey these and the leaders of Dionysus, upwards of sixty years old, suffers an equal or even [4] a greater disgrace than the person, who disobeys the leaders of Mars.

[1, 2] Ficinus alone has preserved some words requisite for the sense, "cohibere, atque ita instruere ut," in Greek *κωλύειν παιδεύειν θ' ὥστε*— which may have been lost between *ὑπομένειν* and *ἐθέλειν*, where they made up one line of the Codex Archetypus, consisting of twenty-one letters. See at § 4, p. 52, n. [5], and § 8, p. 61, n. [1].

[3—3] The Greek is *μὴ δυνάμενον ἐθέλειν πείθεσθαι.* But as the will is that feeling of the mind over which there is no control, Ficinus has omitted *δυνάμενον* in his version, "si quis autem neque obtemperare velit," and so after him has Taylor. Perhaps Plato wrote *μὴ δυνάμενον ἢ ἐθέλοντα*, "not able or willing—"

[4] Ficinus has "æquale vel etiam majus," in Greek *ἴσην ἢ καὶ μείζω*, not *ἴσην καὶ μείζω*—

Clin. Right.

Athen. If then there were such drunkenness and such sport, such fellow-drinkers, by being benefited and friends more than before, would not be separated from each other, nor enemies as at present; but having formed their whole association according to law, they would follow, whenever the sober should [1] come and lead [1] the not sober.

Clin. Certainly; if the (sport) were such as you now speak of.

[13.] *Athen.* Let us then not blame that part [2] of the gift of Bacchus simply, that it is an evil, and not worthy to be received into a state. For one might go on and say much more still, since [3] it is the greatest blessing which he gives. [4]There is a fear of speaking before the many, through men improperly taking it up, and knowing it when spoken.[4]

Clin. What is that good?

Athen. A certain tale and rumour is somehow floating secretly, that this god had the intellect of his mind [5] scattered by his step-mother Juno; [6] on which account he did, to avenge himself, introduce the Bacchic rites, and the whole of the mad choir; from whence he gave for this purpose likewise wine. But things of this kind I leave for those to say, who think they can assert them with safety respecting the gods. But thus much I know, that every animal is not born with

[1]—[1] The Greek is ὁπότε ἀφίκοιντο in six MSS. Ficinus has "ducentibus sobriis," from whence Stephens elicited ἀφηγοῖντο, but Ast more correctly, ὑφηγοῖντο— I have translated as if Plato had written ἀφίκοιντο καὶ ὑφηγοῖντο—

[2] I cannot understand what is meant by ἐκεῖνό γε— There is an error here, which I could, if needful, correct very easily.

[3] Before "since," says Ast, must be supplied "let us pass it by in silence." But such an ellipse would be inadmissible here, where the speaker, after confessing his fear of mentioning something before the multitude, actually proceeds to lay open his mind. Here again I could easily restore what the author wrote.

[4]—[4] The Greek is λέγειν μὲν— But μὲν could not thus stand by itself without οὖν, even admitting, with Ast, that it could without its corresponding δὲ. Moreover, the subsequent τὸ ποῖον requires not αὐτὸ, but τοῦτο.

[5] As the expression, τῆς ψυχῆς τὴν γνώμην is not, I believe, to be found elsewhere in Greek, I should prefer τὴν ῥώμην, similar to "strength of mind" in English. On the confusion of γνώμη and ῥώμη see my note on Prom. 535.

[6] The earliest allusion to the madness of Dionysus is in Eurip. Cycl. 3.

such and so much intelligence as is suited to it, when perfectly grown; but that, during the time in which it has not yet obtained its proper intelligence, every animal is mad, and cries out in no order; and [1]when any one slays it rapidly, it again leaps without order.[1] But let us recollect that we said these were the principles of the musical and gymnastic arts.

Clin. We recollect it. How not?

Athen. And did we not say too, that this principle imparted to us men the sense of rhythm and harmony, and that Apollo, the Muses, and Dionysus were the causes of gods?[1]

Clin. Certainly.

Athen. And wine too, it seems, the account of the others says, was given as a punishment for men, in order that we might become mad. But what has been now stated by us shows, on the contrary, that it was given as a medicine, for the sake of the soul acquiring shame, and the body health and strength.

Clin. You have brought, very beautifully, O guest, the story to our recollection.

Athen. And now let the half of the subject respecting the choir be held to be gone through. Shall we go through the (other) half, how it seems to be, or omit it?

Clin. What parts are you speaking of; and how do you divide each of them?

Athen. The whole of the choir was with us the whole of education. But of this one part consists in rhythms and harmonies according to the voice.

Clin. Certainly.

Athen. But the other, according to the movement of the

[1]—[1] Such is Taylor's translation of the then common text, *ὅταν ἀποκτείνῃ αὐτὸ τάχιστα, ἀτάκτως πηδᾷ*, and this is his note on the passage: "viz. in another life; for the soul carries with it into another the habits and manners which it possessed in the present life." Since his day, the reading in all the MSS. is, *ἀκταινώσῃ ἑαυτὸ*, similar to which Ficinus has, "et fastu elatum lasciviensque salit." Schneider suggested *ἀπακταίνῃ* or *ἀπακτάνῃ*. Ast prefers *ἀκταίνῃ τις, αὐτὸ τάχιστα—πηδᾷ*, for he saw that *ἑαυτὸ* would make nonsense here. Winckelmann would read *ἀποκναίσῃ ἑαυτὸ*, "weary itself down." But of an animal that had wearied itself, Plato would not have said that it *ἀτάκτως πηδᾷ*. What the author really wrote still remains to be discovered.

[2] Instead of *θεῶν αἰτίους*, found in all the MSS., Ficinus has "duces ad hæc," from whence Stephens elicited *τούτων*, adopted by Ast. From the two we might make *τούτων τῶν ἐθῶν*, "of these customs."

body, had a rhythm in common with the movement of the voice, but a figure peculiar to itself; but there (in the former part) melody is the movement of the voice.

Clin. Most true.

Athen. The things then pertaining to the voice, (and extending) as far as the soul, for the discipline of virtue, we have, I know not after what manner, denominated music.

Clin. They were rightly called so.

Athen. But the things pertaining to the body, which we called a dancing of those in sport, if such a movement should extend as far as the virtue of the body, we denominated the artistic leading of it to a thing of this kind, the gymnastic art.

Clin. Most rightly.

Athen. [1]Let then that portion of the musical art, which we have just now said we have gone through, as the half of dancing, and has been brought to an end, be held to have been spoken of.[1] But of the other half shall we speak? Or, in what manner and by what road must we proceed?

Clin. O thou most excellent man, who art conversing with Cretans and Lacedæmonians, (say,) since we have gone through the subject relating to the musical art, but are deficient in that relating to the gymnastic, what do you think either of us ought to reply to this question?

Athen. I would say that you have by putting this question nearly answered it clearly; and I understand that this, although a question, is for the present, as I have said, both an answer, and moreover a command to go through the points relating to the gymnastic art.

Clin. You understand me excellently well; and now act in this way.

Athen. And act I must; for it is not very difficult to speak about things known to both of you; for in this very art you have a greater share of skill than in that (of music).

Clin. You speak nearly the truth.

[14.] *Athen.* Is not then the principle of this very sport, that every animal is naturally accustomed to leap? But man,

[1]—[1] Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus has "De musica quidem, quam mediam choreæ partim diximus, satis actum putavimus; atque ita de ea sit dictum:" which Taylor has tacitly adopted. It is certainly preferable to the Greek, where I confess I cannot see the difference in sense between *διεληλυθέναι* and *διαπεπεράνθαι*.

as we have said, receiving a sense of rhythm, has begotten and brought forth dancing; [1]but melody, putting him in mind of, and exciting, rhythm,[1] these two have, by their connexion with each other, brought forth dancing and sport.

Clin. Most true.

Athen. One portion of this, we say, we have already gone through; but the other we will endeavour to go through in in order.

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. Let us then first put a Colophon[2] (finish) to the use[3] of drunkenness, if it seems good to you likewise.

Clin. [4]Of what kind of person, and whom[4] are you speaking?

Athen. If any state shall make use of [5]the pursuit lately mentioned, as being a serious thing,[5] by law and with order, [6]employing it as an exercise[6] in behalf of temperance, and shall not keep itself from the rest of pleasures, in like manner, and for the same reason, by devising a plan for the sake of subduing them, after this manner it may use all these. But (if it uses them) as a sport, and it shall be lawful for any one to drink, both when he pleases, and with whom he pleases, in combination with any other pursuit whatever, I would not give my vote in this way, that it is meet for that state, or that individual to make use at any time of drunkenness; but I would give it much more to the law of the Carthaginians than to the custom of the Cretans and Lacedæmonians, namely, that no one, when in camp, is to taste of that drink, but to exist upon water during all that period; and that in the city neither a male or female slave

[1]—[1] Ast would read *τὸ δὲ μέλος ὑπομιμνήσκοντος καὶ ἐγείροντος τοῦ ῥυθμοῦ*— "but rhythm putting him in mind of melody and exciting—" For, says he, if man, already imbued with a perception of rhythm, discovered dancing, how could rhythm be said to be excited by melody?

[2] On the proverb "to put a Colophon," i. e. a finish, see at Euthyd. § 15.

[3] In lieu of *χορείᾳ*, Cornarius suggested *χρείᾳ*, found subsequently in four MSS. One, however, has *χρήσει*, which seems preferable.

[4]—[4] Instead of *ποῖον—καὶ τίνα*, where the allusion to a person seems out of place, Ficinus has more correctly "Quonam pacto—"

[5]—[5] The Greek is *ὡς οὔσης σπουδῆς τῷ ἐπιτηδεύματι τῷ νῦν εἰρημένῳ*. But as *οὔσης σπουδῆς* is without regimen, for a genitive absolute would be here inadmissible, Plato wrote, no doubt, *οὔσηι σπουδῆι*, similar to *ὡς παιδιᾷ* just afterwards. And so Ficinus found in his MS., as shown by his version, "tanquam re seria, compotationibus," adopted literally by Taylor.

[6]—[6] A MS. of Eusebius, Præp. Ev. xii. p. 598, C., has correctly, *μελέτῃ*, instead of *μελέτης*: while *χρωμένη* is no less correctly omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor.

should ever taste it, nor magistrates during the year of their office, nor pilots, nor judges, engaged in business, should taste wine at all; nor any one, who goes to any council to deliberate upon any matter of moment, neither in the day-time at all, unless for the sake of bodily exercise or disease; nor at night, when any man, or even a woman, are thinking of begetting children. And many other cases a person might mention, in which wine ought not to be drunk by those, who possess a mind and correct laws; so that, according to this reasoning, there is to no state any need of many vineyards,[1] but other kinds of field-works should be ordained, and the whole of diet: but those relating to wine should be nearly of all the most moderate in kind and the least in number. And let this, if it seems good to you, O guests, be held to be said as the Colophon to the discourse relating to wine.

Clin. It is beautifully (said), and it does seem good to us.

BOOK III.

[1.] [2] THUS much then on this point. But shall we say what was the commencement of civil government? Would not any one see it from hence in the easiest and best manner?

Clin. From whence?

Athen. From whence he might behold the progress of states marching[3] continually to virtue and to vice.

Clin. From whence do you say?

Athen. I conceive, from a length and infinity[4] of time, and from the mutations in it.

[1] In lieu of *ἀμπέλων*, Ficinus, whom Taylor follows, found in his MS. *ἀμπελώνων*, as shown by his version "vineis," and so it is quoted by Eusebius.

[2] From this commencement it is evident that Plato did not himself divide the dialogue into books.

[3] In lieu of *μεταβαίνουσαν* Boeckh correctly suggested, what Ast has adopted, *μεταβαινουσῶν*, referring to Arist. Polit. iv. 5, *τὰς μεταβολὰς τῶν πολιτειῶν· οὐ γὰρ εὐθὺς μεταβαίνουσιν*: and to Proclus on the Timæus, ii. p. 88, *πολιτείας γὰρ ἀρχὴν ζητήσας, ἀφ' ἧς εἰς ἀρετήν τε καὶ κακίαν μεταβαίνουσιν αἱ πόλεις*, where this very passage is alluded to.

[4] The words *τε καὶ ἀπειρίας* seem unnecessary after *χρόνου μήκους*,

Clin. How say you?

Athen. Come (tell me), do you seem to have ever conceived what a length of time has elapsed, since cities and [1] men have been formed into polities?[1]

Clin. This is by no means easy.[2]

Athen. It would however be something endless, and impossible (to be told).

Clin. Yes, this very much so.

Athen. Have not myriads upon myriads of states existed during this period? and, [3]through the same ratio of the length (of time)[3] have there not been destroyed no fewer in number? and have they not every where been often under every kind of polity? and at one time become greater from less, and at another less from greater, and worse from better, and better from worse?

Clin. It is necessary.

Athen. Let us then lay hold, if we can, of the cause of this change; for perhaps it would show us the first birth of polities, and their altered state.[4]

Clin. You speak well. It is then necessary for you to be ready to show, what you are thinking about them, and for us to follow.

Athen. Do the stories of old appear to you to possess any truth?

Clin. Of what kind?

Athen. That there have been frequent destructions of the human race through deluges and diseases and many other events, in which some small family of mankind was left.

Clin. Every thing of this kind must be very probable to every one.

Athen. Come then, let us consider one (of these destructions)

to which alone is referable the subsequent *ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ*. Perhaps Plato, *καὶ τῶν διά γε ἀπειρίας μεταβολῶν*, i. e. "and the changes through the want of skill, during that period."

[1—1] Ficinus, followed to the letter by Taylor, has "civilesque hominum institutiones cœperunt."

[2] Instead of *ῥᾷον* Ficinus found in his MS. *ῥᾴδιον*. For his version is, "facile."

[3—3] The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, who has merely "totidemque destructos."

[4] The MSS. vary between *μεταβολὴν* and *μετάβασιν*: which lead to *μετάστασιν*, as I have translated.

out of many, (namely) that which took place through a deluge.

Clin. Considering what about it?

Athen. That those, who then escaped the destruction, were nearly some[1] hill-shepherds, preserved on the tops (of mountains),[2] like some slight fire-preserving (embers) of the human race.

Clin. It is evidently so.

Athen. Now such as these must surely of necessity have been ignorant of the rest of the arts and contrivance of those in cities towards each other, with respect to cupidity and a love of quarrel, [3]and whatever other deeds of ill they had in their thoughts against each other.[3]

Clin. It is likely.

Athen. Let us suppose then that the inhabited cities, which were in the plains and on the sea-coast, were at that time entirely destroyed.

Clin. Let us suppose it.

Athen. Shall we not say then, that all instruments were destroyed, and that, if any thing connected with art, either in politics or any other wisdom, had been carefully discovered, all such were lost at that period?

Clin. For how, O most excellent man, if these things had remained through the whole time, as they are placed in order at present, could any thing new whatever have been invented by any one whatever?[4] [5]Because ten thousand times ten thousand years lay hid from persons then.[5] But there have been a thousand or twice as many years, since some things have been made known by Dædalus, others by Orpheus, and others by Palamedes; while those relating to music have become

[1] In lieu of τινες, "some," one would prefer πάντες, "all," on account of σχεδὸν, "nearly."

[2] Ficinus alone has "in montium cacuminibus."

[3—3] The words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor, whose "and other base ends," is the version of "ceterasque adversus alios astutias" in Ficinus.

[4] From "quicquam alicui" in Ficinus, Stephens fancied he found in his MS. ὁτιοῦν ὁτῳοῦν, but Boeckh ὁτιοῦν τῳ—

[5—5] Such is the literal version of the Greek, where I am quite in the dark; and so is Boeckh, who endeavours to throw some light on the passage by supplying something which he supposes to have been lost, but which Ast rejects without being able to solve the difficulties of the text.

so by Marsyas and Olympus, and, as regards the lyre, by Amphion; and very many other things by others, so to say, but yesterday and the day before.

Athen. Know you not, Clinias, that you have omitted your friend, who was really of yesterday?

Clin. Do you mean Epimenides?

Athen. Yes, him. For he has leaped far over all amongst you in his contrivance, which Hesiod had formerly, my friend, divined in word, but he has in reality accomplished, as ye assert.

Clin. We do assert it.

[2.] *Athen.* Let us then assert, that, when that destruction took place, human affairs had then a solitude[1] infinitely terrible; that there was a very great part of the earth ungrudged;[2] and that the other animals having perished, there were some herds of oxen, and a race of goats, if perchance it happened to have survived, [3]and these too rare to live for those feeding then at the commencement.[3]

Clin. How not?

Athen. But of a state, and polity, and legislation, to which our conversation has now turned,[4] do we think there was any, so to say, any recollection at all?

Clin. By no means.

Athen. From those people then so situated all the present

[1] To the horrors of solitude Cowper alludes, when he feigns Alexander Selkirk, the real Robinson Crusoe of De Foe, to say—

> Oh, Solitude, where are the charms
> That sages have seen in thy face?
> Better live in the midst of alarms,
> Than reign in this horrible place:

where in the word "sages" he had an eye to Zimmermann's work on Solitude.

[2] This is the literal version of the Greek, *γῆς δ' ἀφθόνου πλῆθος πάμπολυ*. Ficinus has "fertilium agrorum magnitudinem desertam." Taylor, "a prodigious part of the earth was unprolific."

[3—3] Here again a literal translation will best show how unintelligible is the Greek, *σπάνια καὶ ταῦτα νέμουσιν εἶναι ζῆν τότε κατ' ἀρχάς*: where to support the syntax Ast says that *ζῆν* depends upon *σπάνια*. Ficinus, no doubt finding himself at a loss, has "caprarumque genus, et illud quidem rarum relictum fuisse, quibus pascendis tunc homines vitam agebant."

[4] Instead of *παρέστηκεν* I have translated as if the Greek were *περιέστηκεν*.

things did not arise, namely, cities and polities and arts and laws and much of vice and much of virtue.

Clin. How say you?

Athen. Think we, O wonderful man, that the persons of that time, who were inexperienced in many beautiful things relating to cities,[1] and many too of a contrary kind, had become perfect as regards either virtue or vice?

Clin. You speak well, and we understand what you say.

Athen. As time then went on, and our race multiplied, all things advanced to [all][2] their present state.

Clin. Most right.

Athen. But, as is probable, not suddenly, but by little, during some very long period.

Clin. And this too is very likely.

Athen. For there was a fear, I think, tingling[3] in all, of coming down from their high ground to the plain.

Clin. How not?

Athen. Did they not with delight behold each other, through the fewness [4]in things about that time?[4] For the means of going to each other at that period by land or sea, were nearly all, so to say, lost together with the arts; hence it was not, I think,[5] very possible for them to mingle with each other. For iron and brass and all metals had disappeared confused together; so that there was every want of means for them to be purified,[6] and they had a scarcity (of means) in felling timber. For if any instrument had by chance been preserved in the mountains, these had by rapidly wearing away disappeared; and no others were about to be made, before the art of metallurgy had returned again to man.

[1] Ficinus has "cives," by an error, for "urbes," adopted by Taylor.

[2] Ficinus properly omits *πάντα* between *εἰς* and *τὰ νῦν*; but has "ad eum, quem nunc videmus, habitum." Perhaps Plato wrote *πάντα πάντῃ*, "all in all ways," similar to *πᾶν παντί* in § 1.

[3] Instead of *ἔναυλος*, "tingling in the ears," so well explained by Ruhnken on Timæus, p. 100, Plato wrote, I suspect, *σύναυλος*, "fellow-dweller."

[4—4] Here too a literal translation is the true touchstone of the text; where the letters *περὶ ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον* have been wilfully altered from others, which it would be easy to recover; and at the same time to re-arrange the different members of the sentences, so as to meet the acute objections of Boeckh.

[5] Ficinus omits *οἶμαι*.

[6] Ficinus, whom Taylor follows to the letter, has "ut inveniri et in lucem erui non possent."

Clin. How could it?

Athen. But in how many generations afterwards think we did this take place?

Clin. It is evident, in a great many.

Athen. Would not then the arts that require iron and brass, and all things of that kind, have disappeared for the same and even a longer time at that period?

Clin. How not?

Athen. Dissension then together with war was at that time dead every where.[1]

Clin. How so?

Athen. In the first place, they loved and had a friendly feeling towards each other, on account of their solitude; and then their food was not an object of contention; for of pastures there was no scarcity—except perhaps to some at the beginning—on which they lived for the most part at that time; for they were not at all in want of milk and flesh; and besides, by hunting they obtained food, neither indifferent (in kind) nor little (in quantity). Moreover, they had plenty of clothing, and beds, and dwellings, and utensils, for fire or not. For the earth-moulding and weaving arts did not require iron at all. And [2]a god gave to man these arts to procure all those things,[2] in order that, when at any time they might fall into a difficulty of this kind, [3]the race of man might have a shooting up and an improvement.[3] Through some such means persons at that time were not very poor, nor had they, compelled by poverty, any differences with each other. But neither would they ever have become rich, being without silver and gold, [4]which was then present in them.[4] Now in any association, where neither riches nor poverty dwell, in this manners nearly the most just will exist. For neither inso-

[1] So Taylor translates πολλαχῆ. But that would be in Greek παντα-χῆ. Ficinus omits the word entirely, as being here unintelligible. Perhaps Plato wrote τά τ' ἄλλ' ἔχθη, "and the rest of enmities."

[2—2] Ficinus has "hæc omnia dei nutu consequimur," as if he had supplied what was wanting in his MS.

[3—3] Ficinus, whom Taylor follows, has "propagari genus humanum possit."

[4—4] The words within numerals Ficinus no doubt omitted, as being unintelligible; and so, after him, has Taylor. The sense required seems to be, "for the metals, which then existed, it was not for them to find;" in Greek, ἃ γὰρ τότ' ἦν, οὐκ ἐκείνοις παρῆν εὑρεῖν, corrupted into ὃ τότ' ἐν ἐκείνοις παρῆν.

lence nor injustice, neither emulation nor envy, are produced there. Through these causes, and their so-called simplicity, they were good. For whatever they heard to be beautiful or base, they thought, through being of simple manners, it was said so most truly, and were persuaded. For no one, through his wisdom, knew to suspect an untruth, as at present; but, conceiving all that was said about gods and men to be true, they lived in this manner; and hence they were altogether such, as we have just now described them.

Clin. Both to me and to this person here such seems to be the case.

[3.] *Athen.* Shall we then not assert,[1] that many generations, both of those prior to the deluge and of those at present living in this manner, are likely to be less skilful and less learned as regards the other arts, and those too of war, such as exist at present by land and sea; and such, as in the case of a city being called only there[2] law-trials and seditions, contrive both by words and deeds every plan for doing evil and injustice towards each other? but that they were more simple and brave, and at the same time more temperate, and in every respect more just? Now of these things we have already detailed the cause.

Clin. You speak correctly.

Athen. Let then this be held to have been said by us; and let all that still follows upon this be said for the sake of understanding what need of laws there was to persons of that period, and who was their lawgiver.

Clin. You have spoken well.

Athen. Were they then neither in want of legislators, nor was there wont to be any matter of such a kind at that time? For surely to those existing at that portion of the period there were not writings, but they lived following the customs and the spoken[3] laws of their ancestors.

[1] Instead of *εἴπωμεν*, one MS. reads *εἴπομεν*, similar to "diximus" in Ficinus. The two lead to *εἴποιμεν ἂν*—

[2] I cannot understand *αὐτοῦ*; nor could Stephens, who suggested *αὐτὸ*, which Ast correctly says has no meaning. Perhaps Plato wrote *νόμου αὐτοῦ δίκαιαι στάσεις λεγόμεναι*, "the so-called just stations of law itself," where lies hid an Iambic verse, *Αὐτοῦ δίκαιαι λεγόμεναι στάσεις νόμου*. Or we may read *καταστάσεις*, as in § 6, p. 684, B.

[3] The *λεγόμενοι νόμοι* mean here the same as the *ἄγραφα νόμιμα, οὓς πατρίους νόμους ἐπονομάζουσι*, in Legg. vii. 4, p. 793, A. Ficinus, appa-

[1] *Clin.* It is probable. But the manner of their polity do you know well what it was?

Athen. This.

Clin. What?[1]

Athen. All appear to me to call the polity subsisting at that period, a dynasty, which even now exists in many places, both amongst the Greeks and Barbarians. And even Homer speaks some where of it as taking place in the administration of the Cyclópes, saying, (Od. ix. 12,)

> "Meetings, that counsel bring, to them are not,
> Nor legal judges. On the high hill-tops
> They dwell, or in the hollow cave; and each
> To wife and children gives the law, nor care
> Aught have they of each other."

Clin. This poet of yours appears to have been a graceful one; for we have gone through some other pieces of his, very clever, but not many of them; for we Cretans do not make a very great use of foreign poems.

Megil. But we do on the other hand make use of them. And he seems to excel poets of this kind; although he does not describe every where a Laconic, but rather an Ionic, life. At present indeed he appears to testify fairly to your language, mythologically referring the ancient state of mankind[2] to a savage life.

Athen. So he does testify; and let us receive him, as pointing out that polities of this kind did once upon a time exist.

Clin. Well (said).

Athen. Is it not then from those, who were dispersed by single families and races through the want arising from those destructions, amongst whom the oldest bears sway on account of the authority having come from the father and mother, that following them, as birds[3] do, persons will form

rently not aware of this, omitted the word λεγομένοις; which Grynæus, however, reintroduced, and hence Taylor has "as they were called."

[1—1] I have followed the arrangement of the speeches found in Ficinus; but in lieu of ἤδη καὶ, which are unintelligible, substituted ἤδης εὖ.

[2] In lieu of αὐτῶν Ficinus seems to have found in his MS. $\overline{\alpha\nu\omega\nu}$, as shown by his version, "hominum," adopted by Taylor.

[3] The mention of birds seems rather strange here. For all birds are not gregarious. There is evidently some error in ὄρνιθες, which it would not be difficult to correct.

one herd, and under their fathers' laws be governed by kingly rule, which is the most just of all?

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. And after this, more of them come together to a common spot, and form larger cities; and betaking themselves to agriculture, first at the foot of hills they make certain enclosures of thorns, as defensive walls against wild beasts, and thus establish one common and large dwelling.

Clin. It is probable that this occurs.

Athen. But is not this also probable?

Clin. What?

Athen. That, while these larger dwellings are increasing from the less and original ones, each of the small would remain,[1] having, according to the race, the oldest person as its ruler, and, through living separate from each other, its own peculiar customs, and different from different parents and bringers-up, and which have been accustomed to be, as regards the gods and themselves, the more modest in the case of the more modest, and more manly in that of the more manly; and thus according to reason, each one, after stamping his own edicts[2] on his children and children's children, would come, as we said, to the greater community, bringing their own peculiar laws.

Clin. How not?

Athen. Moreover it is surely necessary for each to be pleased with their own laws (first),[3] and afterwards with those of the others.

Clin. It is so.

Athen. We appear then to be unconsciously walking, as it were, in the commencement of legislation.

Clin. Entirely so.

[4.] *Athen.* After this then, it is necessary for those, who thus come together to choose some among themselves in com-

[1] Instead of *παρεῖναι* the sense requires *περιεῖναι*, as I have translated.

[2] The Greek is *ἀναιρέσεις*, "takings off." Ast suggests *ἀνευρήσεις*, "discoveries," or *αἱρέσεις*, "choice in living," to which Orelli would prefix *ἀεὶ*, not *ἂν*, as stated by Stalb. Winckelmann prefers Ast's *ἀνευρήσεις*. I have therefore translated as if Plato wrote *ἀναρρήσεις*, "edicts," literally "proclamations." Ficinus has been content with the general sense. His version is "et in ceteris omnibus, prout singuli filios aut nepotes erudierunt, quorum ritus, quasi leges proprias, ad majorem habitationem ferunt.

[3] Ficinus alone has, what the sense requires, "in primis" to answer to "afterwards."

mon, who, after inspecting the laws of all, shall lay open such of them as they most approve of in common before the rulers and leaders of the wards,[1] as before kings, and enable them to make a choice; and these would be called legislators; and after appointing their magistrates and making out of the dynasties an aristocratical or kingly government, they would dwell in such a change of polity.

Clin. This would in this way take place in due order.

Athen. Let us then speak of a third form of polity as occurring, in which all the forms and accidents of polities and at the same time of cities happen to exist together.

Clin. Of what kind is this?

Athen. That, which Homer likewise has pointed out, as having taken the third place after the second (Il. xx. 216).

> "He built Dardania; for Ilion holy
> Was in the plain, not yet a city made
> For voice-dividing men; but still they dwelt
> Below Mount Ida with its many rills.

For he pronounces these verses, and those which he said respecting the Cyclopes, as having been spoken somehow divinely and naturally. For the race of poets being divine does enthusiastically[2] handle the hymnings on many events which have truly happened, in conjunction with some of the Graces and Muses.

Clin. Very much so.

Athen. Let us then now proceed onwards, [3] a fable having just now come upon us;[3] for, perhaps, it will make some sign respecting our wishes.[4] Is it not proper?

Clin. Very much so.

[1] This is perhaps the nearest translation of *δήμους*.

[2] The Greek is *ἐνθεαστικὸν ὑμνῳδοῦν*, where Boeckh proposed to omit *ἐνθεαστικὸν*, as being not a Platonic, but a Neo-Platonic word; and his idea is adopted by Ast, Bekker, and Stalbaum. To myself however it is evident that Plato wrote *ἐνθουσιαστικῶς ὑμνῳδιῶν*, as I have translated, to which I was led in part by Winckelmann's conjecture, *ἐνθουσιαστικὸν*—

[3]—[3] The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus; for probably he could not understand them, nor certainly can I. Ast however says that Cornarius has correctly translated, "Ulterius itaque pergemus in eo sermone, qui nunc nobis incidit." But *μῦθος* is not "sermo." It means "fabula." Perhaps Plato wrote *ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν ὑπελθόντος μύθου* i. e. from a fable that has come upon us secretly just now.

[4] Instead of *βουλήσεως* I should prefer *βουλεύσεως*, "deliberation."

Athen. We say[1] then that Ilion was colonized down from elevated places to a large and beautiful plain, upon a hill not very lofty, and having many rivers which rush from Mount Ida.

Clin. So they say.

Athen. Do we not think that this occurred at some long time after the deluge?

Clin. How not a long time?

Athen. A dreadful oblivion then it seems has taken place of the destruction just mentioned, since they thus placed a city under rivers many and flowing from high ground, and put their trust in hills not very high.

Clin. It is then quite evident that they were distant some considerable time from that event.

Athen. And many other cities, I think, were at that time inhabited as mankind multiplied.

Clin. How not?

Athen. And these perchance fought against it; and perhaps by sea, all of them now fearlessly using the sea.

Clin. It appears so.

Athen. But the Achæans, after remaining ten years, overthrew Troy.

Megil. Entirely.

Athen. During then that period of ten years, in which Troy was besieged, the affairs of the besiegers happened to each of them to turn out very ill at home through the seditions of the young men, who received the commanders, when returning to their cities and homes, neither in a becoming nor just manner, but so that deaths[2] and murders and very many banishments occurred to those, who, after being exiled, returned with a change of name, and were called Doriens instead of Achæans, through Dorieus being the person who collected together the exiles of that period. And hence you Lacedæmonians turn all these things into a fable, and go through them.

Megil. How not?

[5.] *Athen.* To the same point from whence, while discoursing at the commencement about laws, we turned aside through falling upon music and drunkenness, we have now arrived again,

[1] From the answer of Clinias, "they say," it is evident that *φασὶ*, not *φαμὲν*, is the correct reading. Ficinus has twice "accepimus."

[2] To avoid the tautology in *θανάτους* and *σφαγὰς*, it is easy to read *ὥστ' ἀθεμίτους* in lieu of *ὥστε θανάτους*, without *τε*, omitted in one MS.

as it were, through some god; and our discourse gives us, as it were, a handle. For it has come to the colonization of Lacedæmon, which you said was properly governed by laws fraternal to those in Crete. For the present then we obtain something additional to this extent from the wandering of our discourse, while passing through certain polities and colonizations. For we behold a first, a second, and a third city connected with each other, as we think, by their colonizations during a boundless length of time. But now this fourth city, or, if you please, nation, presents itself to us, [1]which was formerly colonized, and is so now.[1] From all which, if we are able to understand what has been colonized well or not, and what laws of theirs preserve, what is preserved, and what corrupt, what is corrupted, and what being changed for what will render, Megillus and Clinias, a state happy,[2] (we shall think that enough has been done).[2] But all these matters must be discussed by us, as if from the beginning, unless we have any fault to find with what has been said.

Megil. If, O guest, a god had promised us that, if we put our hands a second time to the inquiry respecting legislation, we should hear discourses neither worse nor fewer than those already spoken, I would go a long road, and the present day would appear to me to be short, although it is nearly that of the god, when he is turning from the summer to the winter (solstice).

Athen. It is meet then, as it seems, to consider these matters.

Megil. Entirely so.

Athen. Let us then be present in thought at that time, when Lacedæmon, and Argos, and Messéné, and the places which with them were, Megillus, under the power of your ancestors. [3]For then, it is said, (according to) the story,[3] that after having divided their army into three parts, they colonized three cities, Argos, Messéné, and Lacedæmon.

[1—1] The Greek is *κατοικιζόμενόν τέ ποτε καὶ νῦν κατῳκισμένον.* But since Ficinus, whom Taylor follows tacitly, has "alicubi habitavit, et jam habitat," he evidently found in his MS. *κατῳκισμένον τέ ποτε καὶ νῦν κατοικιζόμενον.*

[2—2] The words between the numerals are found only in the version of Ficinus, "satis nobis factum putabimus."

[3—3] Ficinus has "Tunc enim illud fabulæ ipsis, ut dicitur, placuit," as if in *τὸ τοῦ μύθου* there were an allusion to some dramatic story.

Megil. Entirely so.

Athen. And Temenus became king of Argos, and Cresphontes of Messéné, but Procles and Eurysthenes of Lacedæmon.

Clin. How not?

Athen. Now, all of those then (present) swore to assist them, if any one should destroy their kingly rule.

Megil. How not?

Athen. Now (say), by Zeus, is kingly rule destroyed, or has any government whatever been destroyed by other parties than by themselves? Or after having just now [1][a little before][1] met with these words, did we suppose so, but have now forgotten it?

Megil. How so?

Athen. Now then, we will more confirm this kind (of assertion). For meeting with deeds, as it seems, which have occurred, we have arrived at the same discourse; so that we shall not seek the same discourse respecting a vain thing, but one that has occurred and possesses truth. Now this has occurred. Three kingdoms have made an oath with three cities under a kingly government, each with each other, according to the laws which they had laid down, about governing and being governed in common, that one party (the rulers) should not make for itself a government of violence, as time and race progressed, and the other, (the ruled,) that, while the rulers observed these (conditions), they would not at any time themselves destroy the kingly rule, nor permit others to destroy it, but that the kings would defend both kings and the people when injured, and the people, both kings and the people. Was it not so?

Megil. It was so.

Athen. Was not then that, which is of the greatest moment in the establishments of polities, present to these three[2] cities, regulated by law, whether the kings laid down the laws, or some other person?

[1]—[1] The words *ὀλίγον ἔμπροσθεν* are evidently an interpretation of *νῦν δή*, although quoted by Photius in *Νῦν δὴ μὲν*. Unless it be said that *ὀλίγον ἔμπροσθεν* ought to be inserted after *μᾶλλον ἢ* in the next speech, and *νῦν δ' αὖ* be read there instead of *νῦν δή*, as in Eurip. Hippol. 233. *Νῦν δὴ μὲν—Νῦν δ' αὖ.*

[2] I have with one MS. rejected *ἐν ταῖς*, found in the others between *ταῖς* and *τρισὶ*, unless it be said that *ἐν* ought to be inserted before *ταῖς καταστάσεσι.*

Megil. What was this?

Athen. That two cities should always assist[1] against the one, which happened to be disobedient to the laws laid down.

Megil. It is evident.

Athen. And yet this do the many order the lawgivers, that they are to lay down such laws as the wards and the masses will willingly receive; just as if any one should order the exercise-masters, or physicians, to take care of, and cure, the bodies under their direction in an agreeable manner.

Megil. Entirely so.

Athen. It is however often a desirable thing, should any one with no great pain be able to render bodies of a good habit and in health.

Megil. How not?

Athen. This too, which is not a small matter towards making easy the laying down of laws, was present to those of that period.

Megil. What was that?

[6.] *Athen.* There was not to the lawgivers, while preparing an equality of property, the greatest blame, and which exists in many other cities regulated by laws, when any one endeavours to disturb the possession of land, or to wipe out[2] debts, through perceiving that equality can never sufficiently exist without such measures. For to the lawgiver, who endeavours to disturb any thing of this kind, every one on meeting cries out, Do not move things to be not moved;[3] and utters curses upon him, who introduces the distributions of land, and the cutting off debts, so that every man is thrown into a difficulty. [4] But to the Dorians even this happened successfully and without any finding fault, that both the

[1] Ficinus has "insurgerent," translated by Taylor "rise up against."

[2] This is the English phrase equivalent to the Greek *διαλύειν*, "to dissolve. According to Plutarch it was the policy of Solon to get rid of debts, which he said was *σεισάχθεια*, "the shaking off a burden."

[3] On this proverbial expression see Ast.

[4]—[4] Such is the literal version of the Greek; where, says Ast, instead of *ἦν* one would have expected *εἶναι*, to answer to *διανέμεσθαι*. But, unless I am greatly mistaken, Plato wrote *γῆν τε ἀναμφισβητήτως διανέμεσθαι, οὖσαν πολλὴν, καὶ διαλύεσθαι χρέα, ἃ μεγάλα καὶ παλαιὰ οὐκ ἦν*. For Ficinus has "Doris autem hæc difficultas turbatioque non fuit. Nam agros abunde sine controversia possidebant, debitaque ipsis æris alieni prisca et magna non erant:" where his "abunde" led me to suggest *οὖσαν πολλὴν*; while *διαλύεσθαι χρέα* is similar to *χρεῶν διάλυσιν* just above. The reason why the words *οὖσαν πολλὴν καὶ διαλύεσθαι*

land was divided without causing disputes, and the debts were not large and of long standing.[4]

Megil. True.

Athen. How then, ye best of men, did the colonization and legislation turn out so badly to them?

Megil. How do you mean? and for what do you blame them?

Athen. That when three administrations had been established, two parts of them quickly corrupted their polity and laws, and one alone, belonging to your city, remained.

Megil. You ask a question not very easy (to answer).

Athen. And yet it is requisite for us, while considering now and examining into laws, and playing a game suited to old men temperately,[1] to go through the journey without annoyance, as we stated, when we began to enter upon it.

Megil. How not? and we must do as you say.

Athen. What inquiry can we make to ourselves relating to laws (in general), more beautiful than respecting those (individually) which have adorned cities of this kind?[2] or shall we make an inquiry about any cities and colonizations more illustrious and larger than these?

Megil. It is not easy to speak of others in preference to these.

Athen. It is then nearly evident, that the persons of that period conceived this arrangement would be an assistance sufficient not only for the Peloponnesus, but for all the Greeks, if any of the Barbarians should do it any injury; [3]just as those, who dwelt then about Ilion, were, when trusting to the power of the Assyrians, as it existed in the time of Ninus, emboldened to excite war against Troy.[3] For the showy

were omitted, is to be referred to the similarity of *διανέμεσθαι* and *διαλύεσθαι*, which were found at the end of two consecutive lines in the Codex Archetypus.

[1] Ficinus has, "senili quodam modestoque loco;" from whence Stephens proposed to insert *καὶ* after *πρεσβυτικὴν*—I have translated as if the Greek were *σωφρόνως*, not *σώφρονα*.

[2] Instead of *ταύτας*, Ficinus found in his MS. *πόλεις τὰς τοιαύτας*, as shown by his version, "civitates hujusmodi."

[3—3] Respecting the events here alluded to, Ast refers to Pausanias, ii. 22, and Herodotus, i. 3, ii. 120; and, after observing that the account given by Herodotus in i. 95 is at variance with that of Ctesias, preserved by Diodorus, ii. 22, adds, that nothing can be stated for certain about the empire of Ninus and the war against Troy. With regard to the words, *τῇ περὶ Νῖνον γενομένῃ*, Ficinus, whom Taylor follows tacitly,

appearance[1] of its government, still preserved, was by no means small. (And) as we at present fear the great king, so the people then feared the combination (of power) standing together. For the taking of Troy a second time became a great accusation against them; because the Trojan power was a portion of that (the Assyrian) government. On all these accounts then, the unity of the arrangement of the army at that time, divided into three states, under the brother kings, the offspring of Hercules, appeared surely[2] to be beautifully planned and put into order, and superior to that which went against Troy. For, first, they conceived that the descendants of Hercules were better commanders than those sprung from Pelops; and, next, that this army far surpassed in valour that which came against Troy; for that these were the victors, but those vanquished[3] by these, the Achæans by the Doriens. Do we not then conceive, that the persons of that period made their arrangements with this very view?

Megil. Entirely so.

Athen. Is it not probable then, that they thought their affairs would be in a firm state, and endure for some lengthened period, through their having shared in many dangers and labours, and in being orderly governed by one race of brother kings; and in addition to this, through having made use of many other prophets, and the Delphic Apollo likewise?

Megil. How is it not probable?

Athen. But all these expectations so great flew away, as it seems, at that time quickly, except, as we just now said, a small part around your region; and this has never ceased warring against the two other parts, even to the present day.[4]

seems to have found in his MS. *τῇ παρὰ Νίνου γενομένῃ*; for his version is, "quæ a Nino traxit originem."

[1] On this meaning of *σχῆμα*, Ast quotes Wernsdorf on Himerius, p. 51. See too Musgrave on Eurip. in Andr. 1, *Ἀσιατίδος γῆς σχῆμα Θηβαία πόλις*.

[2] As all the MSS. read *καλῶς ὡς*, it is evident that Plato wrote *καλῶς πως*, where *πως* was spoken with a sneer. Stephens, whom Bekker, Ast, and Stalbaum have followed, was the first to reject *ὡς*, omitted by Ficinus.

[3] Ficinus has "superatos fuisse," from whence Boeckh, whom Ast follows, suggested *ἡττῆσθαι* in lieu of *ἡττᾶσθαι*.

[4] All the MSS. read *μέχρι τὰ νῦν*. Ficinus has "ad hunc usque diem," from whence Stephens, whom Bekker follows correctly, elicited *μέχρι τοῦ νῦν*.

Since the policy then [1]existing would,[1] by agreeing for one object, have possessed a power in war not to be overturned.

Megil. How not?

[7.] *Athen.* How then, and why was it dissolved? Is it not worth while to consider, what accident destroyed a constitution of such a standing, and of such a kind?

Megil. Scarcely[2] would any one, looking elsewhere,[3] behold either laws or other[4] polities, conservative of doings beautiful and great, or on the contrary destructive of them, if he neglects these.[5]

Athen. It seems, then, we have by some good fortune come upon a sufficient consideration of this question.

Megil. Entirely so.

Athen. Do not, then, all persons, thou wondrous man, and we too at the present moment, unconsciously fancy perpetually that they see some beautiful thing existing, and which would effect wonders, if a person knew how to use it properly. But now we should ourselves, perhaps, neither think correctly about it, nor according to nature; and moreover all men (err)[6] respecting all the other things about which they think in a similar manner.

Megil. What do you mean? and about what especially shall we say this speech has been spoken?

Athen. My good man, I have been just now laughing at myself. For upon looking to that very expedition about which we have been conversing, it appeared to me to be very beautiful, and that a wonderful possession would have fallen accidentally to the Greeks, if, as I said, any one had at that time made a proper use of it.

Megil. Did you not say all correctly and with a fixed mind; and did not we properly praise them?

[1]—[1] Instead of *καὶ*, we must read *ἂν*, unless *γενομένη* conceals, what is likely, a corruption; for *γενομένη ἡ τότε* could not be written in the sense of *ἡ τότε γενομένη*.

[2] Literally, "at leisure." See at ii. § 10.

[3] I have adopted Ast's correction, *ἄλλοσε σκοπῶν*, in lieu of *ἄλλο σκοπῶν*.

[4, 5] I hardly understand *ἄλλας* here and afterwards *τούτων*, which Ast explains by "ours." But in that case Plato would, I think, have written *ἀλλοδαπὰς* and *ἡμεδαπῶν*.

[6] Ficinus alone, whom Taylor tacitly follows, has preserved the word "errant," requisite for the sense; unless it be said that *τὰ αὐτὰ ποιοῦσι* have been lost after *πάντες πάντα*.

Athen. Perhaps so. But I think that every one, who beholds any thing great, and having much power and strength, has immediately this feeling, that if he knew as its possessor how to use it, being of such a kind, and such an age, he would do many and wonderful things, and be happy.

Megil. Is not this correct? or how say you?

Athen. Consider now, by looking to what does he, who gives this praise to each thing, speak correctly. Now first, as regards what has been said just now, how would the persons of that period, even if they had known how to draw up an army properly, have, by a complete marshalling, met with [1]the opportunity somehow?[1] Would it not have been, had they put it together securely, and preserved it[2] for ever, so that they might be free themselves, and rule over others whom they pleased, and do[3] in short, both themselves and their descendants amongst all men, both Greeks and Barbarians, whatever they desired? Would they not for the sake of these things have felt a desire?[4]

Megil. Entirely so.

Athen. Has not he too, who, on seeing great wealth, or superior honours arising from a family, or any thing else of this kind, would have said the very same thing, said so, looking to this, as if through this there would come to him all he desires, or the greater part of them, and such as are the most worthy of mention?

Megil. It appears so.

Athen. [5]But there is certainly one common desire to all men, which is signified by our present discourse.[5]

[1—1] I cannot understand *τοῦ καιροῦ πως*. For the indefinite *πως* is at variance with the definite article. Plato wrote, I suspect, *τοῦ κατὰ ῥοῦν πλοῦ*, "a sailing down the stream," i. e. a successful voyage. On the metaphor in *πλοῦς* see Ast in Legg. vii. p. 803, A.; and with the phrase *κατὰ ῥοῦν* compare *φερομένην κατὰ ῥοῦν* in Rep. vi. p. 492, C.

[2] i. e. *τὸ στρατόπεδον*, "the army."

[3] Ficinus, whom Taylor follows implicitly, has "consequerentur," as if he had found some other word in his MS. in the place of *πράττειν*.

[4] Instead of *ἐπιθυμοῖεν*, which Ast says truly makes nonsense here, he would read *ἐπαινοῖεν*, in reference to the *ἔπαινον* at the commencement of the speech. Orelli suggests *ἐπαινεθεῖεν ἄν*.

[5—5] Such is Taylor's literal translation of the Latin of Ficinus. The Greek is *Φέρε δὴ, πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶ κοινὸν ἐπιθύμημα ἕν τι, τὸ νῦν ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου δηλούμενον, ὡς αὐτός φησιν ὁ λόγος*. But there the two last sentences present an insufferable tautology. Which of them was really written by Plato, it is not easy to decide.

Megil. What is it?

Athen. That the things which do take place, should take place at the command of his own soul, all for the most part, but, if not (all), at least human affairs.

Megil. How not?

Athen. Since then all of us when children, and men, and grown old, perpetually wish a thing of this kind, we should of necessity[1] pray for that very thing to the end (of life).

Megil. How not?

Athen. And we would pray for our friends that which they do for themselves.

Megil. How not?

Athen. Now a son, being a boy, is a friend of his father, being a man.

Megil. How not?

Athen. And yet many of the things which the boy prays may happen to himself, the father would pray the gods that they may not happen according to the prayers of his son.

Megil. When, you mean, (the son) prays, being thoughtless and still young.

Athen. Yes; and when the father, being old, or with very youthful feelings, shall, although he knows nothing of what is honourable and just, offer up a prayer with great fervour in the midst of sufferings, akin to those that happened to Theseus, in the case of the unfortunate Hippolytus, when dying, will the boy, think you, who does know, join in prayer with his father?

Megil. I understand what you mean. For you appear to me to assert, that a person ought not to pray, nor be urgent for all things to follow his wishes, but for wishes rather[2] (to follow) his prudence; and that both a state and each of us ought to pray for and hasten to this, how to possess intellect.

[8.] *Athen.* Certainly. And, moreover, that the statesman (and[3]) lawgiver ought always to lay down the ordinances of

[1] Ficinus has "sedulo," as if his MS. read another word in the place of *ἀναγκαίως*. Perhaps *διηνεκῶς*.

[2] I cannot understand *μηδὲν*, which Bekker has inserted from four MSS. before *μᾶλλον*. Two MSS. read *πολὺ*—Neither word is acknowledged by Ficinus. Perhaps Plato wrote *ὀπηδεῖν*, of which *πο* has been preserved by some MSS. and *ηδειν* by others.

[3] Boeckh was the first to insert *καὶ* from "legumque lator" in Ficinus; for the statesman and legislator are thus constantly united, as shown by Boeckh and Ast.

your recollection, what, if we remember,[1] was said, at the commencement, that it was your advice, that a good lawgiver ought to lay down all laws for the sake of war; but it was mine, that this would enjoin him to make laws for one virtue out of four existing; that he ought to look to every virtue, but especially the first, which is the leader of the whole of virtue, and that is prudence, and intellect and opinion together, with love and desire attendant on them. But our discourse has now returned again to the same point; and I now say again, what I then said in jest, if you please, or in earnest, [2]that I assert then,[2] that it is dangerous for a person not possessing intellect to pray; but that (it is better[3]) for the contrary to his wishes to happen to him. If you are willing to suppose that I am in earnest,[4] suppose it. For I now fully expect to find you following the reasoning we produced a little before, that timidity was not the cause of the destruction of kings, and of the whole of their policy; nor was it because the rulers and they, whom it was meet to be ruled, did not know what relates to war; [5]but they were destroyed by all the remaining depravity,[5] and especially by their ignorance respecting the greatest of human affairs. That these things thus happened at that time, [6]and (must so happen) now, if they happen any where,[6] and will hereafter happen not otherwise, I will en-

[1] This—"if we remember," is strangely introduced here, and is properly omitted by Ficinus; who has "et ipse recordatus sum et vos nunc recordari volo; nempe vos in disputationis principio dicebatis." Perhaps Plato wrote *κατὰ γὰρ ἀρχὰς ἦν, εὖ μεμνημεθα, τὰ λεχθέντα*, i. e. for it was said, I well remember, at the commencement—

[2]—[2] The Greek is *ὅτι δή φημι*. But as Plato had just alluded to his being in jest or in earnest, I suspect he wrote *σπουδάζων οὕτω· φήμι δὴ*— for on pronouncing the words *φήμι δή*, he no doubt imitated the earnest manner adopted by speakers in public; and to which *σπουδάζων οὕτω* would naturally draw the attention of the other interlocutors.

[3] Ficinus alone has, what the sense requires, "satius esse," as if his MS. read *ἀλλὰ κάλλιον*, not *ἀλλὰ* by itself.

[4] If Plato wrote, as I have supposed, just before *σπουδάζων οὕτω*, he must have written here *σπουδάζοντα δὲ μὴ εἴ με τιθέναι βούλεσθε*, not *δ' εἴ με*, for *σπουδάζοντα μὴ* would answer to *παίζοντα*.

[5]—[5] I confess I cannot make syntax or sense out of *τῇ λοιπῇ δὲ πάσῃ κακίᾳ διεφθαρμένα*. I could have understood *τὰ δ' ὅλα ὀπηδῷ ἁπάσῃ κακίᾳ διεφθαρμένα*—"but the whole was destroyed by every depravity following them."

[6]—[6] The Greek is *καὶ νῦν, εἶπον, γίγνεται*: where Bekker would repeat *γίγνεται*.

deavour, if you wish it, to find out, by proceeding according to a discourse in due order, and to show, as far as I can, to you, who are my friends.

Clin. To praise you, guest, in words, would be rather offensive; but we shall mightily praise you in deed. For we shall cheerfully follow what is said, by which (acts) he, who praises as a free-man or not, is most apparent.

Athen. You speak most excellently, Clinias; and let us do as you say.

Clin. These things will be so, if god pleases. Only speak.

[9.] *Athen.* We say then, proceeding along the still remaining road of our discourse, that the greatest ignorance destroyed that power at that time, and that it is naturally able to do the same thing now. So that, if this be the case, the lawgiver must endeavour, as far as he can, to infuse prudence into states, and destroy to the utmost thoughtlessness.[1]

Clin. It is evident.

Athen. What then may be justly called the greatest ignorance? Consider whether you agree with me [2]in what I am going to say.[2] For I lay it down to be such as this.

Clin. Of what kind?

Athen. When any one does not love, but hates that, which seems to him to be beautiful, or good; but loves and embraces that, which appears to him to be base and unjust, I assert that this discordance, respecting pain and pleasure, with opinion founded on reason, is the extreme of ignorance; and it is the greatest, because it belongs to the mass of the soul. For that part of the soul, which feels pain and pleasure, is what the common people and the mass are in a city. When, therefore, it is opposed to science, or opinions, or reason, the natural rulers, I call this ignorance; and it is the same as that of a city, when the multitude will not obey the rulers and the laws; and likewise in the case of one man, when although beautiful reasons reside in his soul, yet they do not produce any good effect, but every thing the contrary. All these kinds

[1] Although *ἄνοια* would be properly opposed to *φρόνησις*, yet *ἄγνοια* unites better with *ἀμαθία*: and so Ficinus found in his MS., as shown by his version "ignorantiam:" whom Taylor, Boeckh, and Ast have followed.

[2]—[2] So Taylor, which would be in Greek *τὸ* λεχθησόμενον, not λεγόμενον, which Ficinus has omitted.

of ignorance I would lay down as the most inordinate,[1] in the case of a state and each individual citizen, but not as applied to handicraftmen, if, guests, you understand what I mean.

Clin. We do understand you, friend, and assent to what you say.

Athen. Let this then be laid down as determined upon, and said, that to citizens, who are after this manner ignorant, nothing connected with government is to be committed, but they are to be reproached as ignorant, even though they are very skilful in argument, and have laboured at all that is elegant (in language), and whatever relates to a quickness of intellect; but that those, who possess qualities contrary to these, are to be called wise, although they should, according to the saying, [2]know neither their letters, nor how to swim,[2] and that power is to be given to them as being prudent persons. For how, friends, can the smallest form of prudence subsist without symphony?[3] It is not possible.[4] But the most beautiful and greatest of symphonies may be most justly called the greatest wisdom; of which he participates, who lives according to reason; but he, who is deficient, is a family-destroyer, and in no respect a saviour as regards the city, but, quite the contrary, he will appear to be always ignorant on these points. Let this then, as I just now said, be laid down, as having been spoken of in this manner.

Clin. Let it be laid down.

[10.] *Athen.* But it is surely necessary for rulers and ruled to exist in states.

Clin. How not?

Athen. Be it so. But of what kind, and how many, are the axioms[5] respecting the ruling and being ruled in the case of great and small states, and similarly in that of families? Is there not one relating to a father and mother? and universally

[1] Ficinus has "perniciosissimas—"

[2—2] This proverb, peculiar to Athens, is alluded to in Aristoph. Σφηκ. 953.

[3] I confess I hardly understand what is meant by ξυμφωνίας here. Ficinus has "consensu—" I could have understood ψυχῆς ξυμφωνίας, "a harmony of soul—" Perhaps the best English version of ξυμφωνία would be, "the being in tune," a musical expression, applied sometimes to the mind.

[4] Ficinus alone attributes the words "οὐκ ἔστιν" to Clinias.

[5] By ἀξιώματα are meant here "the received notions—"

would it not be a correct axiom every where that parents should rule over their offspring?

Clin. Very much so.

Athen. And the next to this, that men of high birth should rule over those of low birth? and the third, that the more aged should rule, and the younger be ruled?

Clin. How not?

Athen. And the fourth, that slaves should be ruled, and their owners rule?

Clin. How not?

Athen. And the fifth, I think, that the better person should rule, and the worse be ruled?

Clin. You speak of a ruling very necessary indeed.

Athen. And one that exists the most in all animals, and is "according to nature,"[1] as the Theban [Pindar] says. But the greatest axiom, as it seems, would be the sixth, which commands the ignorant to follow, but the prudent to lead and rule. And yet, O thou most wise Pindar, I should almost say, that this at least is not contrary to nature, but according to it, for the rule of law to be over willing (subjects), and not by an act of violence.

Clin. You speak most correctly.

Athen. Let us then in speaking of the seventh rule, as being god-loved and fortunate, bring[2] it to a lot-drawing, and say,[3] that he, on whom the lot falls, is most justly the ruler, but he the ruled, who goes away, after being unsuccessful in the lot.

Clin. You speak most truly.

Athen. We will say then, playing with some one of those who go on with facility to the laying down of laws—Dost thou, O lawgiver, see how many axioms there are relating to rulers, and how they are naturally contrary to each other? For now we have discovered a certain fountain of seditions, to which it is necessary for you to attend. First, consider with us, by erring how and in what point, contrary to these axioms, did the kings of Argos and Messéné destroy themselves, and the power of the Greeks, which at that time was wonderful.

[1] On this saying of Pindar, frequently quoted by Plato, see Boeckh; who should however have rejected Πίνδαρος as a gl.

[2, 3] From "producamus" and "ducamus" in Ficinus, it is easy to see that his MS. read προάγωμεν and φῶμεν, not προάγομεν and φάμεν.

Was it not through their not knowing that Hesiod had said most truly, that "the half is often more than the whole?"[1] (For), when to receive the whole brings a damage, but in the half is moderation, he held in that case the moderate to be more than the immoderate, as being better than the worse.

Clin. Most correctly so.

Athen. But whether think we that this, when it occurs, destroys on each occasion what[2] relates to kings before what exists amongst the people?

Clin. It is probable that this is mostly the disease of kings, who live proudly in luxury.

Athen. Is not this evident then, in the first place, that the kings of that time had a power above the established laws? [3]and (as) to what they had praised both by word and an oath, they did not accord with themselves.[3] But discordance, as we have said,[4] being the greatest ignorance, although appearing to be wisdom, has destroyed all those things through[5] error and a sad want of education.

Clin. It appears so.

Athen. Be it so. But why was it meet for the lawgiver then laying down laws to be cautious about the generation of this disease?[6] Is it, by the gods, at the present time, no wisdom to know this, and not difficult to speak of it? but that, if it had been possible to foresee it then, the person, who foresaw it, would have been wiser than we are?

[1] Had not the hexameter line of Hesiod been preserved, Νήπιοι οὐκ ἴσασιν, ὅσῳ πλέον ἥμισυ παντός, any one would have said that the words in the text, Ἥμισυ τοῦ παντὸς πολλάκις ἐστὶ πλέον, made a pentameter.

[2] I have translated as if τὰ had dropt out before περὶ, in order that διαφθείρειν might not want its subject.

[3—3] Such is the literal version of the Greek, καὶ ὃ λόγῳ τε καὶ ὅρκῳ ἐπῄνεσαν οὐ ξυνεφώνησαν αὐτοῖς. But the perpetual antithesis between λόγος and ἔργον requires ἃ λόγῳ τε καὶ ὅρκῳ ἐπῄνεσαν, οὐ ξυνεφώνησεν ἔργοις, i. e. "and what they had praised by word and an oath, did not accord with their acts." Taylor's version is, "and that their actions did not accord with what they had celebrated both in discourse and by an oath."

[4] In § 9, p. 98.

[5] Such is perhaps the meaning of the Greek πλημμέλειαν καὶ ἀμουσίαν τὴν πικρὰν, which Taylor translates "through confusion and bitter unskilfulness." Ficinus, "propter errorem et amaram inconcinnitatem." This, however, is not the only passage, where Plato has made use of words conveying a very vague instead of a definite sense.

[6] I have followed Ficinus in translating πάθους "disease," in allusion to the disease mentioned just above.

Megil. What kind of thing are you speaking of?

Athen. For a person looking, O Megillus, to what has occurred with you, it is easy to know, and, knowing, to state what ought to have occurred then.

Megil. Speak yet more clearly.

Athen. Some such thing as this then will be most clear.

Megil. What?

[11.] *Athen.* If any one gives a power too great to things rather small, by disregarding moderation,—as, for instance, sails to ships, food to bodies, and dominion to dispositions—all things are overturned; for some, by being full of insolence, run [1] into disorders, and others [2]to injustice, the offspring of insolence.[2] What then are we saying? Is it not, my friends, of this kind? that there exists not the nature of a mortal soul, which will be able, when young and not under supervision, to bear the greatest rule amongst men, so as, when filled as to its thinking faculty with folly, which is the greatest disease, not to suffer a hate from his nearest friends; which, when it takes place, is wont to corrupt quickly, and to cause all its power to disappear. To be cautious on this point, through knowing moderation, is the province of great lawgivers. [3]Hence what took place at that time, it is now easy to perceive.[3] It appears to have been this.

Megil. Of what kind?

Athen. Some god, [4]I think, (is) taking care[4] of you; who,

[1] Ficinus has "in morbos incidunt." Hence two MSS. give as a var. lect. *πίπτει* for *θεῖ*: which is here applied in Greek, as "run" is in English, metaphorically, to persons running into debt, extravagance, and vice generally.

[2—2] Compare Soph. Œd. T. 863, *Ὕβρις φυτεύει τύραννον.*

[3—3] Such is the literal version of the Latin of Ficinus, "Quod igitur tunc factum, facile modo perspectu est." The Greek is *ὡς οὖν δὴ τότε γενόμενον νῦν ἔστι μετριώτατα τοπάσαι*, where Ast was the first to suggest, what the sense requires, *τὸ τότε*: but his paraphrastical translation of *μετριώτατα*, "satis certo et accurate," is at variance with the train of thought; which leads to *ἔστιν οὖν δὴ τὸ τότε γενόμενον νῦν εἰς τὰ μέτρια ῥᾷστον τοπάσαι*, i. e. "It is, then, now very easy to conjecture what then took place as regards things moderate:" where *τὰ μέτρια* is confirmed, not only generally by what has gone before, but specifically by *εἰς τὸ μέτριον* in what immediately follows; while it is not without reason that one MS. offers *μετριώτατον* for *μετριώτατα*.

[4—4] The Greek is *εἶναι κηδόμενος*, where Ast understands *ἐστὶ*—But Ficinus has "ut arbitror," as if his MS. read *οἶμαι*, adopted tacitly by Stephens, instead of *εἶναι*. Hence Taylor translated "as it seems—" But

through foreseeing future events, and planting for you the twofold generation of kings descended from one, has contracted you rather to a moderate state; and after this a certain human nature,[1] mixed up with a certain divine power, did, perceiving your government to be still in an inflamed state, mingle the temperate power of old age with the self-willed strength of noble birth, and made equal with the power of the kings the vote of twenty-eight[2] old men in matters of the greatest moment. But your third saviour,[3] perceiving your government swelling with desire and passion, placed upon it the power of the Ephori,[4] as a bit, and led it near the power which is chosen by lot. And by this arrangement the kingly power with you, being mingled with such things as were proper, and possessing moderation, was both preserved itself, and became the cause of preservation to others. For under the rule of Temenus and Cresphontes, and the lawgivers of that time, [5]if indeed they were lawgivers,[5] not even the portion of Aristodemus would have been saved. For they were not then sufficiently skilled in legislation; for, (had they been so,)[6] they never would have thought to moderate by oaths a youthful spirit, when receiving a power from which it was possible for a tyranny to arise. But now the deity has shown what kind of government it was and is necessary to be, that is about to continue the longest. But that these things should be known by us, as I said before, now that they have happened, is no feat of wisdom. For from a model already existing, it is not difficult to see.[7] But if any one had then

since another MS. has *εἶναι καὶ κηδόμενος*, it is easy to elicit *εἶναι ἔοικε κηδόμενος*, i. e. "seems to have had a care for you—"

[1] This alludes to Lycurgus.

[2] Taylor has, by an unaccountable mistake, "men eighty years old." On the senate of Sparta, called *Γερωία*, see Meursius in Miscell. Lacon. § 4, and Cragius de Rep. Lacedæm. ii. 3, who have collected all that is known on the subject.

[3] On the third saviour see Ast at Rep. ix. § 9, p. 583, B., who did not see that Plato wrote *ὁ δ' αὖ τρίτος, ὡς σωτὴρ*—alluding to Theopompus, as shown by Plutarch in Lycurgus.

[4] According, however, to Plutarch, in i. p. 43, E., the Ephori were appointed about thirty years after the time of Lycurgus. They were five in number.

[5—5] The words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor; where, instead of *οἵ τινες ἄρα*, the sense requires, as I have translated, *εἴ τινες ἄρα*—

[6] Ficinus, whom Taylor follows, supplies the ellipse by "si fuissent—"

[7] Here is evidently something wanting as the subject of *ὁρᾷν*. Hence

foreseen these things, and had been able to render governments moderate, and to form one out of three, he would have preserved all the beautiful conceptions of that time, and neither the Persian expedition, nor any other, would have come against Greece, through despising us as being of little account.

Clin. You speak the truth.

Athen. Hence, Clinias, they defended themselves shamefully. Now by shamefully I mean, not that the persons of that time did not conquer by sea and land, and gain honourable victories; but what I call shameful at that time, I say is this. In the first place, that, out of those three states, (only) one fought in defence of Greece, but the other two were so miserably corrupted, that one of them (Messéné) prevented Lacedæmon from assisting her, (Greece,) by warring against it with all its strength; but the other, which had the first share at that period in the distribution, [1]that about Argos,[1] did, when called upon to repel the Barbarian, neither give ear nor assistance. But by detailing many things that occurred then relating to that war, a person might bring a charge against Greece by no means of a pleasant kind; nor would he, who should say that Greece defended herself, speak correctly; since, unless the policy in common of the Athenians and Lacedæmonians had warded off the slavery coming against them, there would have been mixed together nearly all the races of Greeks with each other, and Barbarians with Greeks, and Greeks with Barbarians; just as those, over whom the Persians are now the tyrants, are, after [2]being carried away separately or together, and scattered abroad, made to settle down in a miserable state.[2] This, Clinias and Megillus, is what we have to urge against the men of old, called politicians and legislators, and likewise those of the present day, in order that, by seeking out the causes, we may

Ficinus supplied the sense by translating, "exemplis commoveri." Perhaps ἃ δεῖ has dropt out before εἰ δὲ—

[1]—[1] The Greek is ἡ περὶ τὸ Ἄργος, which Ast says is an explanation of ἡ πρωτεύουσα. But though Ἄργος, or τὸ Ἄργος, might be so, ἡ περὶ could not be. In η περι το evidently lies hid ἥνπερ εἶπον; for the allusion is to the διανομὴ mentioned in § 5, while Ἄργος would be the gl. for ἡ δ' αὖ—

[2]—[2] This description may be applied to the very letter to the slaves, carried away singly or together, and compelled to settle formerly in the British West Indies, and even now in Spanish South America.

discover what else besides these ought to have been done, as we say for the present,[1] that it is not meet to lay down great or unmixed powers of rule, through considering this, that it is requisite for a state to be free and intellectual, and a friend to itself, and that a legislator ought looking to these points, to lay down laws. And let us not wonder if, after proposing (other)[2] things, we have frequently said that the legislator ought to look to these, while laying down laws, and that what have been proposed do not appear to us to be the same. But it is proper to infer that, when we say the legislator ought to look to temperance, or prudence, or friendship, our design is not different, but the same; [3]and let not many other expressions of that kind, should they occur, disturb you.[3]

Clin. We will endeavour to do so by recurring to your reasoning.[4] But for the present explain, [5]what you mean by saying with respect to friendship, and liberty, and prudence, that a legislator ought to aim at those objects.[5]

[12.] *Athen.* Hear then now. There are, as it were, two mothers of polities, from which he, who says that all the rest are produced, will speak correctly. Now one of these it is right to call a monarchy, but the other a democracy; and to say that the race of the Persians possess the extreme of the one; but we of the other. Now nearly all the rest are, as I have said, variously formed from these. [6]It is proper then, and necessary for (a state)[6] to participate in both these, if there is to be freedom and friendship in conjunction with prudence. Now this our discourse intends to enjoin, by

[1] The Greek in Ald. from one MS. is *τὸ παράπαν*. But Ficinus has "quod nunc exposuimus," from whence Stephens elicited *τὸ παρὸν*, found in all the other MSS. I suspect however that Plato wrote *τὸ παρὸν ἀπλοῦν*—

[2] Ficinus has "alia quædam." For he found in his MS. *ἄλλ' ἄττα* correctly; since *ἄττα* cannot stand by itself.

[3—3] Such is the exact version of the Greek. Ficinus has "ac si multis etiam aliis hujuscemodi verbis utemur, ne turbemini," literally translated by Taylor.

[4] Here again Taylor was content to follow Ficinus' version, "verba ordine repetentes."

[5—5] I have translated as if the Greek were *τὰ περὶ τῆς φιλίας—, πρὸς αὐτὰ, τί βουλόμενος*, not *τὸ περὶ—πρὸς ὅτι βουλομενος*, where Ast has failed, I think, to make out the syntax.

[6—6] Ficinus, by omitting *δεῖ*, and inserting "civitatem," shows that he found in his MS., what the sense requires, *πόλιν δὴ οὖν*—

saying that a city is unable to be beautifully governed, while it is destitute of these properties.

Clin. For how can it?

Athen. When therefore the one embraces monarchy alone, but the other liberty more than is proper, neither of them [1] possess what is moderate in these.[1] Your cities however in Laconia and Crete (possess it) more (than others); and so too did the Athenians and Persians formerly, but now less so. Shall we go through the causes of this, or not?

Clin. By all means, if we wish to bring to an end what we have proposed for ourselves.

Athen. Let us hear then. The Persians under Cyrus possessed[2] more of moderation in slavery and freedom. At first they were free, but afterwards the masters of many others. For by sharing as rulers their freedom with the ruled, and leading them to an equality, the soldiers became greater friends with their commanders, and conducted themselves with alacrity in dangers. And if any one among them was intelligent and competent to give advice, as the king was not envious, and granted a liberty of speech, and honoured those, who were able to advise any thing, he brought into the midst of all the common power of intellect; and at that time every thing exhibited an improvement,[3] through liberty, and friendship, and a communion of intellect.

Clin. It appears somehow that what has been stated did so occur.

Athen. How then was (that government)[4] almost destroyed under Cambyses, and again restored under Darius? [5] Are you willing for us, while thinking, to make use, as it were, of divination.[5]

Clin. This at least brings our inquiry to the point, whither we have been hastening.

[1]—[1] Ficinus has, what is far more intelligible, "mediocritatem servitutis libertatisque servavit."

[2] The Greek is *ἦγον*. But Ficinus found in his MS. *εἶχον*, as shown by his version, "habebant."

[3] I have adopted with all the modern editors Stephens's *ἐπέδωκεν*, instead of *ἀπέδωκεν*.

[4] Ficinus, "regnum id fere," as if he had found in his MS. *ποτ' αὐτὰ ἀπώλετο σχεδὸν*—

[5]—[5] Ficinus, whom Taylor follows literally, has "vultisne ut, quasi divinatione usi, dicamus," as if his MS. read *διαλεχθέντες* instead of *διανοηθέντες*.

Athen. Respecting Cyrus, then, I thus divine; that in other respects he was a good general, and a lover of his country, but that he had not laid hold at all of a correct education, nor applied his mind to the regulation of his household.

Clin. How shall we say a thing of this kind?

Athen. He appears from his youth to have passed his life in the army, and to have committed to women the bringing up of his boys. Now these brought them up as persons fortunate immediately from their childhood, and born blessed, and indigent of nothing of these.[1] Hence they forbade any one to oppose them in any respect, as being [2] sufficiently fortunate;[2] and compelling every one to praise what was said or done by them, they brought them up [3] being some such.[3]

Clin. You have detailed, as it seems, a beautiful education.

Athen. At least a feminine one, the women princesses having become recently rich, and bringing up the boys, during a scarcity of men, through the men not having leisure (to do so) in consequence of wars and many dangers.

Clin. So goes the story.

Athen. But their father possessed cattle and sheep and many herds of men, and of many other (animals); but he was ignorant that those, to whom he was to hand down all these things, were not instructed [4] in his country's trade, which was a rough one, as the Persians were shepherds, the children of a rugged land,[4] and competent to render the shepherds very strong, and able to live out of doors, and to be without sleep, and, if required,[5] to become soldiers. But he disregarded the corruption of education by the so-called happiness of Media, and by his

[1] There is evidently some error in *τούτων*, which is omitted by Ficinus.

[2]—[2] I am at a loss in *ἱκανῶς εὐδαίμοσι*, especially as *εὐδαίμονας* is repeated just before. Perhaps Plato wrote, *οὐκ ὄνομ', ἰσοδαίμοσι*—On *ἰσοδαίμων*, see Blomf. on Pers. 81.

[3]—[3] Such is the literal version of the Greek, where I must leave for others to explain what I cannot, *τοιούτους τινας*. Taylor has "After this manner they were educated by certain women." Ficinus gives, with his usual fidelity, "ita ipsos tales quosdam educaverunt."

[4]—[4] The Greek is *πατρῴαν—τέχνην οὖσαν Περσικὴν, ποιμένων ὄντων Περσῶν τραχείας χώρας ἐκγόνων σκληρὰν*, where Ast would reject all between *οὖσαν* and *σκληρὰν*, as an interpolation. But it will be sufficient to omit *Περσικὴν*, and to insert *ἅτε* before *ποιμένων*, as I have translated. Respecting the rugged country of Persia, see Herodotus i. 71; ix. 122.

[5] Ficinus has, "et militare, si res postularet." For his MS. omitted *στρατεύεσθαι*, found in other MSS. before *δέοι*.

sons being instructed by women and eunuchs; from whence they became such as it was likely for those to become, who are brought up in luxury[1] unreproved. Upon the death of Cyrus his sons came into the possession (of power), and being full of luxury and without reproof, at first one of them slew the other, through brooking ill an equality; and subsequently the survivor (Cambyses) becoming mad through drinking and a want of education, lost his power through the Medes and the then called Eunuch,[2] who viewed with contempt his silly conduct.[3]

Clin. These things also are reported, and it seems they somehow happened nearly in this manner.

Athen. And it is said moreover that the power came again to the Persians through Darius and the seven.[4]

Clin. How not?

Athen. Let us then take a view,[5] following out the reasoning. For Darius was not the son of a king, nor brought up in a luxurious manner. But coming to power, and receiving it,[6] he divided it, himself the seventh (sharer), into seven portions, of which there are at present left some small dream-(like)[7] remnants, [8]and he thought proper to live, laying down laws (and) introducing a kind of equality common (to all);[8] and he bound under law[9] the tribute,[10] which Cyrus had promised the Persians, (and) infusing into all the Persians a feeling of

[1] Ast was the first to correct *τροφῇ* into *τρυφῇ*: to which he was probably led by finding in Ficinus, "in summa rerum licentia."

[2] The name of the Eunuch was Smerdis. See Herodot. iii. 61.

[3] Ficinus has "quasi amentem contempserunt." Hence in one MS. *μανίας*. Perhaps Plato wrote both *μανίας τε καὶ μωρίας*, "his conduct at once mad and silly."

[4] See Herodot. iii. 86. But as there were only seven conspirators, Valckenaer suggests ϛ (6) instead of ζ (7).

[5] Perhaps *θεωρῶμεν* should be taken in the sense of a mental vision, and be translated, "Let us found a theory—"

[6] Between *λαβὼν* and *αὐτὴν* I suspect *μίαν* has dropt out, i. e. "and receiving it as one—"

[7] Compare Shakspeare's language in the speech of Prospero:

> "And like the baseless fabric of a vision,
> Leave not a rack behind."

[8—8] Ficinus, whom Taylor translates literally, has "censuitque vivendum esse sub legibus, ad communem quandam conferentibus æqualitatem.'

[9] In lieu of *ἐνέδυ* Stephens elicited *ἐνέδει*, found subsequently in six MSS., from "complexus est," in Ficinus.

[10] Respecting the tribute paid by the Persians, see Herodotus, i. 192; iii. 90.

interest, he attached to himself the masses in Persia, by money and gifts. [1]His armies therefore did with a good will add countries to his power[1] not less in number than what Cyrus had left. After Darius (came) Xerxes, who was again brought up with a royal and luxurious education. But it may be most just to [2]say perhaps, "O Darius, thou hast not learned the evil conduct of Cyrus, but hast brought up[2] Xerxes in the same manners, as Cyrus did Cambyses. He therefore, as being a child of the same education, has brought to pass what is very near to the sufferings of Cambyses; and from that time[3] scarcely a single Persian king has become truly great except in name. Now the cause of this was not fortune, but, according to my reasoning, the vicious life, which the sons of those, who were remarkably rich and tyrannical, for the most part lived. For neither boy, nor man, nor old person, will ever become superior in virtue from such an education." And these are the matters which we say should be considered by a legislator, and by us likewise at present. But it is just, O Lacedæmonians, to give this praise to your state, that you never distribute any superior honour or food[4] to poverty or wealth, or to a private station or a kingly one, which the oracle[5] from some god has not at the first prophetically enjoined. For it is not proper in a state, [6]to distribute to any one[6] superior

[1]—[1] Ficinus has, followed to the letter by Taylor, "ita dilectus a militibus—regiones ipse subjugavit."

[2]—[2] The Greek is *ἴσως, ὃς τὸ Κύρου κακὸν οὐκ ἔμαθες, ἐθρέψω δὲ*, where Stephens was the first to reject *ὃς* and to read *ὡς*—Ast, however, prefers *ἴσως τὸ Κύρου——ὃς ἐθρέψω Ξέρξην*— Perhaps Plato wrote *ἔσωσας τὸ Κύρου κακὸν, ὃ οὐκ ἔμαθες εὖ, ἐθρέψω δὲ*, i. e. thou hast preserved the evil of Cyrus, which thou hadst not learned well.

[3] Ficinus has "ex illo tempore." But that would be in correct Greek *ἔκ γε τοῦ τότε*, not *ἐκ γε τοσούτου*, which means either "after so great a person," or, "from such a long time."

[4] In lieu of *τροφὴν* Cornarius suggested *ἀρχὴν*, to which he was led perhaps by "munera" in Ficinus. Boeckh and Ast however say that *τροφὴ* implies not only food, but education likewise.

[5] To avoid the tautology in *τὸ—θεῖον παρὰ θεοῦ*, Ficinus has "oraculo." But Ast says that by *τὸ θεῖον* is meant Lycurgus, who is described in § 11, as *φύσις ἀνθρωπίνη μεμιγμένη θείᾳ*. But in that case Plato would have written *ἀνθρωπεῖον*. Perhaps he did write *τὸ—ἰθῦνον*, "the directing power—"

[6]—[6] The Greek is *κατὰ πόλιν γε εἶναι*. But Ficinus found in his MS. *κατὰ πόλιν τῳ νεῖμαι*, as shown by his version, "in civitate cuiquam conferre."

honours, because he is superior in wealth; nor because[1] he is swift-footed, or handsome, or robust, without some virtue, and not in the case of a virtue even, from which temperance is excluded.

Megil. [2]How, guest, say you this?

[13.] *Athen.* Fortitude is surely one part of virtue.

Megil. How not?

Athen. Judge then yourself, after hearing my reasoning, whether you would admit any fellow-dweller or neighbour to be very brave, when not temperate, but profligate?

Megil. Speak good words.

Athen. What then, that an artist is wise in things of his art, but unjust?

Megil. By no means.

Athen. But justice could not be produced[3] without temperance.

Megil. How could it?

Athen. Nor could he, whom we just now laid down to be wise, as possessing pleasures and pains, in harmony with, and following right reason.

Megil. Certainly not.

Athen. [4]But let us still consider this too, touching the bestowing of honours in states, of what kind do they take place properly or not on each occasion.[4]

Megil. What?

Athen. Whether temperance, if it be alone in a soul without all the rest of virtue, can justly be a thing either of honour or dishonour?

Megil. I know not what to say.

Athen. You speak with moderation. For had you said either the one or the other, about which I asked the question,

[1] Ficinus omits ἐπεὶ, found after διαφέρων. Perhaps Plato wrote Πλούτῳ διαφέρων αὐτῷ, "superior to Plutus himself."

[2] From hence to nearly the end of the book the conversation is carried on with Megillus, and not, as before, with Clinias. This arrangement, as Boeckh was the first to remark, is found in Ficinus.

[3] On account of ἂν in the answer, we must read here φύοιτ' ἄν in lieu of φύεται.

[4]—[4] Such is the literal version of the Greek. Taylor has translated the Latin of Ficinus, "Id præterea consideremus, ut quomodo inter cives honores recte vel non recte distribuantur, inspiciamus."

you would have appeared[1] to me at least to have spoken beside the measure.[2]

Megil. [3]It would then have turned out well.[3]

Athen. Be it so. The addition then relating to honours and dishonours will be worthy not of a discourse, but rather of some irrational silence.[4]

Megil. You appear to me to mean temperance.

Athen. Yes. But that which benefits us the most of the others, would, in addition to its being honoured the most, be honoured the most justly; and that which is second (in benefit) would be second (in honour); and thus each thing obtaining, according to the reasoning in succession, its honours in due order, would obtain them justly.

Megil. Such is the case.

Athen. What then, shall we not say that it is the business of the legislator to distribute these?

Megil. And very much so.

Athen. Are you then willing for us to allow him to distribute all things, both pertaining to each work, and to trifling particulars? But with respect to making a triple division, let us endeavour, since we also are somehow desirous of laws, to divide the greatest, second, and third, apart from each other.

Megil. Entirely so.

Athen. We say then that a state ought, as it seems, if it is about to be preserved happy to the utmost of human power, necessarily to distribute honours and dishonours in a proper manner. Now (to do so) properly, it is for the good things pertaining to the soul, to be laid down as the most honourable and the first in rank, temperance at the same time being present to it (the soul); and as the second in rank, the things beautiful and good pertaining to the body; and as the third in rank, the things pertaining to property and riches. But if any legislator or state proceeds beyond these, by leading either riches to honours, or by placing by means of honours in the

[1] I have adopted Boeckh's ἐδόκεις, similar to "videreris" in Cornarius, in lieu of δοκεῖς in some MSS., or δοκῆς in others.

[2] On the phrase παρὰ μέλος see at Phileb. § 49.

[3—3] The Greek is Καλῶς τοίνυν γεγονὸς ἂν εἴη, which I cannot understand. Ficinus has, what the sense requires, "Bene igitur factum est."

[4] Here again I am at a loss to understand ἀλόγου σιγῆς. Unless I am mistaken, Plato wrote τινος—οὐ λόγου, of which σιγῆς would be the interpretation, with a play upon λόγου and οὐ λόγου.

foremost rank any of the things in the rear, he will do a deed neither holy nor statesman-like. Is this to be held as said, or how?

Megil. Let it be held as said clearly.

Athen. The inquiry into the Persian polity has caused us to speak to a greater length on these points. And we find that they became much worse still;[1] and we say the reason was, that through their taking away too much of liberty from the people, and introducing a despotic power more than was proper, they destroyed the feeling of friendship and of a common interest in the city; and that, when this is destroyed, the deliberations of the rulers are not engaged in behalf of the governed and the people, but for their own power; (and)[2] should they think that something more, even if it were little, would accrue to themselves, they would, by destroying with fire[3] cities overturned, and by (treating) friendly[4] nations in an hostile and unpitying manner, at once hate and be hated.[5] But when they come to the people during a time of need to fight for them, they find in them no such communion of interest, [6]that any one is willing with alacrity[6] to run a risk and to fight; and though they possess myriads, not to be defined in a calculation, yet they are all useless for war; and, as if in want of men, they hire some, and think they will be saved by mercenary and foreign troops; and added to this, they are compelled to act the part of simpletons, proclaiming by their acts,[7] that the things constantly called honourable or beautiful in a state are a trifle as compared with silver and gold.

Megil. Entirely so.

[14.] *Athen.* Let then the subject of the affairs of the Persians, which are now administered not correctly through excessive slavery and despotism, have an end.

[1] In the Greek ἐπὶ ἔτι, to which Stephens was the first to object, evidently lies hid πολὺ ἔτι—Cousin would supply τούτοις after ἐπὶ—

[2] [4] The words within the lunes have been supplied to complete the sense.

[3] As the expression πυρὶ καταφθείραντες is better suited to πόλεις than to ἔθνη, I doubt not it has been accidentally transposed.

[5] On account of the preceding ἂν—ἡγῶνται, the syntax requires, as I have translated, μισοῖντ' ἄν in lieu of μισοῦνται.

[6]—[6] The Greek is αὖ μετὰ προθυμίας τοῦ—I have translated as if it were ὥστε μετὰ προθυμίας τινα—

[7] One MS. omits ἔργοις, which was originally written, I suspect, before λέγοντες, not after it.

Megil. Entirely so.

Athen. But after this it is proper for us to go through in a similar manner the polity of Attica, [1](that it may appear)[1] how perfect liberty even, exempt from all rule, is not a little worse than that, which has a moderation [2]in rule under others.[2] For at the time, when the Persian invasion took place against the Greeks, and perhaps against almost all the inhabitants of Europe, our polity had been of long standing; and we had some four institutions framed with reference to a property-census;[3] and a certain modesty too at that time was a despot, through which we were then willing to live in subjection to the laws. In addition to this, the magnitude of the expedition, extending over land and sea, brought on a fear not to be overcome, and caused us to endure a still greater submission to the rulers and the laws. And on all these accounts a violent friendship came upon us towards ourselves. For nearly ten years before the naval battle at Salamis, Datis had arrived, leading the Persian expedition of Darius, who had sent him distinctly against the Athenians and Eretrians, to reduce them to slavery, and to carry them off; and proclaiming[4] death to him, if he did not do so. And Datis did in a very short time with his many myriads and by main force subdue them entirely; [5]and he sent a certain dreadful report to our city,[5] that not one of the Eretrians had escaped him; for that the soldiers of Datis had by joining hands to hands [6]got, as into a net, the whole of Eretria.[6] This report, whether arriving true or in any way whatever, struck with terror the other Greeks, and the Athenians likewise; and on their sending ambassadors every

[1—1] So Taylor, from "ut pateat" in Ficinus.

[2—2] The Greek is in one MS. *ἀρχῆς ὑφ' ἑτέρων*. In all the others *ἀρχῆς* is omitted. It answers however to "magistratuum dominatione" in Ficinus, who omits on the other hand *ὑφ' ἑτέρων*: to which both Boeckh and Ast object, but are unable to correct it satisfactorily. Perhaps Plato wrote *ὑφ' ἡγητόρων*—without *ἀρχῆς*.

[3] This alludes to the four divisions of the people made by Solon, and called respectively Πεντακοσιομέδιμνοι, Ἱππεῖς, Ζευγῖται, and Θῆτες, as we learn from Plutarch, i. p. 87, F., and Aristotle Polit. ii. 10.

[4] As there is nothing on which *προειπὼν* can depend, Plato probably wrote *προειπόντος*, to answer to the preceding *πέμψαντος*.

[5—5] Ficinus, whom Taylor follows, has "terribilisque inde rumor ad nos pervenit."

[6—6] The Greek is *συνάψαντες γὰρ ἄρα τὰς χεῖρας*, where Valckenaer on Herodotus iii. 149, tacitly omits *ἄρα*. He should have read *χερσὶ—*

where,[1] no one was willing to assist them, except the Lacedæmonians; and even they, through the war then raging against Messéné, or whether something else, as alleged,[2] prevented them,—for we know not,—arrived one day later than the battle that took place at Marathon. After this, mighty preparations and innumerable threats are said to have come from the king. But as time went on, Darius was reported to have died, and his son, young and violent, to have received from him the government, and by no means to have desisted from his (father's)[3] undertaking. Now the Athenians were of opinion, that the whole of this preparation was against themselves, on account of what had occurred at Marathon; and hearing of Athos being dug through, and of (the shores) of the Hellespont being united, and of the great number of the vessels, they thought there was no safety for themselves by land or sea; [4] for that none would assist them; as they recollected that, even when (the Persians) had come before, and had done thoroughly for the Eretrians, not one had given them assistance then,[4] or had run a risk by fighting with them; and they expected the same thing would then take place, at least by land; and on the other hand, by sea they saw a want of all means of safety, since more than a thousand ships were being brought against them. They thought, however, upon a single source of safety, slender indeed and dubious, yet the only one, through their looking to what had previously occurred, how even then victory had appeared to spring out of difficulties, as they were fighting.[5] Carried along upon this hope, they found their refuge rested in themselves alone and in the gods. All these things then [6] engendered in them a friendship [6] with each other, both the fear which was then present, and that which had been produced by the laws

[1] Ficinus alone adds, what Taylor adopts, "universam Græciam—"

[2] Plato alludes to the reason assigned by Herodotus vi. 106. See other reasons in Justin ii. 9, and Lucian Astrolog. § 25.

[3] So Taylor follows the Latin of Ficinus, "a cæptis paternis desistere," where *πατρίης* is wanting in the Greek.

[4—4] Here again Taylor has neglected the Greek entirely, and looked only to the Latin of Ficinus, "præsertim quia in nullius præsidio confidebant, quippe qui memoria tenerent neque tunc, cum primo illorum ingressu capti Eretrienses fuerant, quemquam sibi opem ferre."

[5] I have translated as if the Greek were *μαχομένοις* dependent on *γενέσθαι*, not *μαχομένους* connected with *νικῆσαι*.

[6—6] Ficinus has "majori inter se benevolentia copularunt—"

before,[1] and which they had felt, when they were submitting to their former laws; (a fear) which we have frequently in the preceding discourse called modesty; to which we have said (all)[2] must be subservient, who are about to become good men; (and) of which he who is the slave[3] is free and fearless; [4]whom had not this fear seized,[4] he would never have [5]quickly come[5] and defended himself and aided the sacred places, and tombs, and country, and all the rest of household ties, and friends, as he did aid at that time; [6]but each of us would at that period have been routed in small parties, and scattered one hither and another thither.[6]

Megil. And very much so, guest; and correctly have you spoken, and in a manner becoming both to yourself and country.

[15.] *Athen.* Such is the case, Megillus. For it is just to mention to you, what happened at that time, as being a sharer in the nature of your parents. But do you and Clinias consider, whether we say what is suited to legislation. For I do not go through these matters for the sake of telling a story, but for the sake of what I am saying. For look ye. Since the same circumstance has in a certain manner happened to us, that did to the Persians, while they were leading the people to every kind of slavery, but we, on the contrary, turning the masses to every kind of[7] freedom, how and what shall we say henceforth? [8]The reasons that have previously occurred to us, have in a certain manner been detailed correctly.[8]

[1] Instead of *τῶν ἔμπροσθεν*, which I cannot understand, Ficinus has "jam pridem," for he found, no doubt, in his MS. *τῷ ἔμπροσθεν*—

[2] Ficinus alone has "omnes," adopted tacitly by Taylor.

[3] In lieu of *δειλὸς*, Heusde, Heindorf, Faehse, and Ast justly read *δοῦλος*, similar to "quo quisquis afficitur" in Ficinus, translated by Taylor "a slave—"

[4—4] The Greek is *ὃν εἰ τότε μὴ δέος ἔλαβεν*. Ficinus has "ac nisi præsens ille metus pudori huic junctus fuisset—" But *ὃν* is to be referred to the person alluded to in *δοῦλος*, and hence I have translated as if the original reading were *τόδε*, not *τότε*—

[5—5] The Greek is *ξυνελθών*, but as that could not be said of a single person, I have translated, as if the original were *ὀξὺς ἐλθών*—On the loss or corruption of *ὀξύς*, see Porson in Adversar. p. 161, on Æsch. Suppl. 901.

[6—6] Such is the literal translation of the Greek. Ficinus has "ut fecisse narrantur; sed sparsi alius alio abiissent;" adopted in part by Taylor.

[7] Instead of "all" Ficinus has "mere—"

[8—8] Such is the literal version of the Greek. Taylor has translated the Latin of Ficinus, "habita jam verba et commode dicta quodammodo demonstrant."

Megil. You speak well. But endeavour to point out to us still more clearly what has been said just now.

Athen. This shall be. The people was not, my friends, according to the laws of old, the master of any, but did after a certain manner obey willingly the laws.

Megil. Of what laws are you speaking?

Athen. Those relating in the first place to music as then existing—in order that we may detail from the beginning the great progress made in a life of freedom. For music was then divided by us according to certain kinds and figures of itself;[1] and prayers to the gods was a kind of ode, and they were called by the name of hymns; and the contrary to this was another kind of ode, and a person would have called it lamentations for the most part;[2] and another was Pæans,[3] and another the birth of Dionysus, called, I think,[4] a Dithyramb: and they have called laws[5] by this very name, as being another ode; and they have given the additional name of "harp music." After these and some others had been ordained, it was not lawful to use one kind for another. But the authority to know any of these, and, after knowing, at the same time to judge of them, and to fine the person not obedient, was not the whistle[6] nor certain uneducated noises of the multitude, as at present, nor yet the clatterings that express praise, but it was decreed that persons, who were conversant with education, should themselves hear to the end in silence; but for boys, and boy-leaders,[7] and the numerous vulgar, there was

[1] I confess I cannot understand ἑαυτῆς, omitted by Ficinus.

[2] Instead of μάλιστα I should prefer κάλλιστα—

[3] The Pæans were hymns to Apollo, sung originally at Delphi to commemorate his killing the serpent, called Python.

[4] This "I think" is said rather strangely by Plato, as if he did not know whether the Dithyramb did or did not relate to the birth of Dionysus. Cousin refers οἶμαι to the etymology given to διθύραμβος.

[5] In Greek νόμος is literally "a distribution," taken in a legal sense, the object of law being to give each person his own; but here it is applied in a musical sense to a measure or tune, that distributes the notes according to the laws of harmony. Specifically the musical "nomes" were sung in honour of Apollo, the god of music. Cousin has given another but less simple explanation.

[6] Ast says that σύριγξ, "a reed," is put here for the whistling sound made by a reed, and he refers to Muretus, Var. Lect. i. 19, and to Salmasius on Solinus, p. 156. Perhaps it answered to the English "cat-call."

[7] The boy-leaders are, I presume, thus put on a level with boys and the masses, because they were sometimes only manumitted slaves.

the admonition by a rod putting them in order. These things having been thus ordained,[1] the multitude of citizens were willing to be ruled, and not to dare to judge in a tumultuous manner. After this, as time went on, the poets (themselves) became the leaders of this uneducated lawlessness; being naturally indeed poetical, but ignorant with respect to what is just and lawful in music, they were acting like Bacchants, and possessed with joy more than was becoming, and were mingling lamentations with hymns, and pæans with dithyrambs, and imitated with harp music the music of the hautboy, and by bringing together all things to all they involuntarily, through their ignorance, asserted falsely that music did not possess any correctness whatever; but that it might be judged of most correctly by the pleasure of the party gratified, whether he were a better person or a worse. Composing, therefore, works of this kind, and adding to them words of this kind, they infused into the multitude a lawlessness with respect to music, and a daring of their being competent to judge. Hence theatres, from being silent, came to be noisy, as if capable of understanding what is beautiful or not in music; and instead of an aristocracy in it, a certain depraved theatrocracy was produced. For if only a democracy of free men had existed, nothing very dreadful would have taken place; but now from music there began an opinion with us respecting the wisdom of all men in all things, and a lawlessness, and after these did a licentiousness follow. For men became fearless, as if endued with knowledge; and this absence of fear generated shamelessness. For through boldness to feel no fear of the opinion of a better person, is almost a depraved shamelessness, (resulting) from a certain liberty that has dared too much.

Megil. You speak most true.

[16.] *Athen.* And consequent upon this liberty, there would arise that of being unwilling to submit to rulers; and following this, to fly from the submission to, and admonition of, a father and mother and elders, and to the being near the point of seeking to be not subject to laws; and (having arrived) at that point, to think nothing at all of oaths and faith and the gods; [2] by

[1] I have adopted Heindorf's correction, *τούτων οὕτω τεταγμένων*, founded on Ficinus's "hæc cum ita ordine fierent," in lieu of *ταῦτ' οὖν οὕτω τεταγμένως*.

[2] Ficinus has "unde, ad priscam illam tyrannicamque revoluti naturam,

exhibiting and imitating the ancient Titanic[1] nature, as it is called, so that, by again arriving at those[2] same things, they led a life of difficulty, and never ceased from ills. On what account then has this been said by us? It appears that I at least[3] ought to pull up[4] a discourse, like a horse, on each occasion,[5] and not, by having its mouth without a bridle, to be carried away forcibly, and, according to the proverb, fall[6] from the discourse, as from an ass. But I again ask[7] what was just now said. On what account has this been mentioned?

Megil. Correctly so.

Athen. This then has been said on account of those?

Megil. Whom?

Athen. We have said that a legislator ought in laying down laws to aim at three things, how the state may, by being legislated for, become free, and friendly to itself, and possess a mind. These were the objects. Is it not so?

Megil. Entirely so.

Athen. For the sake of this we selected two kinds[8] of go-

eadem illa iterum patiemur duraque secula rursus degemus," plainly proving that his MS. read *τυραννικὴν* for *τιτανικὴν*, and was defective in other respects, or that Ficinus himself did not understand what Plato was alluding to.

[1] To this passage Cicero alludes De Legg. "Noster vero Plato Titanum e genere statuit (esse) eos, qui, ut illi cœlestibus, sic hi adversentur magistratibus." From whence it is easy to perceive that instead of *τὴν λεγομένην παλαιὰν Τιτανικὴν φύσιν ἐπιδεικνῦσι καὶ μιμουμένοις*, Plato wrote *τὴν λεγομένην πάλην Τιτανικὴν ἐπιδεικνῦσι καὶ φύσιν μιμουμένοις*— "by exhibiting the so-called Titanic contest, and imitating their nature—"

[2] In lieu of *ἐκεῖνα* one would prefer *τὰ Κρόνια*, in allusion to the acts of the Titans, the allies of *Κρόνος*, who after their defeat were doomed to everlasting torments.

[3] For the sake of the syntax we must read *ἐμέ γε* for *ἐμοί γε*, as I have translated.

[4] This would be an English jockey's correct translation of *ἀναλαμβάνειν*.

[5] As *ἑκάστοτε* could not be said of a single occasion, one would prefer *ἀκατάστατον*, "restless," similar to "stare loco nescit," in Virgil.

[6] Instead of *βίᾳ ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου φερόμενον*, it is evident at a glance that Plato wrote *βίᾳ φερόμενον, ἀπὸ τοῦ λόγου, ὡς*— With regard to the proverb *ἀπ' ὄνου πεσεῖν*, and the play upon it in *ἀπὸ νοῦ πεσεῖν*, see Aristoph. Νεφ. 1275, and Erasmus in Adag. Chil. i. Cent. 7. p. 200, who seems to have wished to read *ἀπὸ νοῦ, ὡς ἀπ' ὄνου, πεσεῖν*.

[7] I have translated as if the Greek were *ἐπανερωτῶ αὖ*, not *ἐπανερωτᾷν*· where the infinitive could hardly depend upon *δεῖν*.

[8] Ficinus alone has "duas gubernationum species," from whence Boeckh elicited *ἕνεκ' εἴδη δύο* from *ἕνεκα δὴ*—

vernment, one most despotic, and the other most free; and we were considering which of these is rightly administered. But on laying hold of each of them, as regards[1] a certain moderation, on the part of some to be despots, and of others to be free, we saw that then (in moderation) prosperity resulted to them in an eminent degree, but that when each party was proceeding to the extreme, the one, of slavery, and the other, of the contrary, no benefit had accrued to either these or those.

Megil. You speak most true.

Athen. And moreover, for the sake of these things, we looked into both the Doric army, and the country under the Dardan mountains, and the settlement by the sea, and first those persons who remained after the deluge; and moreover we had a previous conversation about music and drunkenness, and on subjects still prior to these. For all this has been mentioned, for the sake of seeing, how a state may be best administered, and how every one may individually best pass through life. Now, if we have done any thing of importance, what proof of error can be brought, Megillus and Clinias, against us?

Clin. I seem to myself, O guest, to have something in my mind. For it appears that the subjects of all the discourse, we have gone through, have arisen through some good fortune. For I have come almost in want of them at the present moment; and both you and Megillus here are by some opportune accident present. For I will not conceal from you what has just now occurred to me, but I will make it a kind of omen. For the greatest part of Crete is attempting at present to establish a certain colony, and orders the Cnossians to take the care of the matter; but the city of the Cnossians (imposes it) upon me and nine others; and at the same time orders us to lay down laws (taken) from this place, if any are pleasing to us, and, if there are any, from elsewhere, making no account of their foreign character, should they appear to be better. Let us then grant this favour[2] to myself and you. [3]After making a selection out of what has been said,[3] let us in our discourse form a state, and colonize it, as if from its commencement;

[1] By simply inserting εἰς between ἑκατέρας and μετριότητα I have restored both syntax and sense.

[2] There is evidently some error here, which might, I think, be satisfactorily corrected.

[3—3] Ficinus has, what makes better sense, "collectis undique legibus—"

and there will be to us at the same time an inquiry into what we are in search of, and at the same time I may perhaps make use of this formation for the city that is to be.

Athen. You are not, O guest, proclaiming a war. And, unless there is some opposition on the part of Megillus, conceive that every thing on my side will be to the best of my power according to your mind.

Clin. You speak well.

Megil. And on my side likewise.

Clin. You both have spoken most beautifully. Let us then endeavour, in the first place, to form in our discourse a state.

BOOK IV.

[1.] *Athen.* COME then, what kind of state must we imagine it is to be? [1]I mean that I am not asking what is its name now, nor what it will be necessary to call it in after-time;[1] for this perhaps its colonization, or some spot, or the surname of some river or fountain, or of the gods of the place, may give their own appellation to the new state; but this is rather what I wish to ask concerning it, whether it is near the sea, or inland?

Clin. The state, of which we are now speaking, is, O guest, distant from the sea nearly eighty stadia.[2]

Athen. Are there any harbours along it, or is it entirely harbourless?

Clin. It has, as far as is possible, very good harbours, O guest.

Athen. Ho! ho! What say you? But is the country about it likewise all-prolific, or is it wanting in some things?

Clin. It is nearly in want of nothing.

Athen. Will there be any neighbouring state near to it?

Clin. Not very; on which account it is colonized. For an expulsion of the inhabitants having taken place of old in that spot, caused the country to be desolate for an immense space of time.

Athen. But with respect to plains, and mountains, and woods, how has it obtained by lot a portion of each?

[1]—[1] Ficinus, translated literally by Taylor, has merely "neque vero nunc de præsenti ejus nomine aut de futuro interrogo."

[2] About eight miles.

Clin. It is wholly[1] similar to the rest of Crete.

Athen. Would you say it is more rough than plain?

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. It is not therefore incurably unfit for the acquisition of virtue. For, if it were near the sea, and had good harbours, but not all-productive, but wanting in many things, it would require for itself some powerful preserver, and certain divine lawgivers,[2] unless being such naturally, it had been about to acquire[2] many various and depraved manners.[3] But now it has some consolation from its distance of eighty stadia. It is situated indeed nearer the sea than is becoming, by nearly as much that it has, as you state, good harbours. There is however this desirable circumstance. For a sea, being near to a country, [4]brings something[4] pleasant each day, although it is in reality a very brackish and bitter neighbour.[5] For filling it through [6]retail-trading with foreign commerce[6] and money-making, it begets in the disposition a moral conduct tost backwards and forwards,[7] and not to be trusted, and (renders) the state faithless and unfriendly to itself and to other nations likewise. It possesses however against these evils a consolation in being all-productive; since if it were rugged, it is evident that it would not be [8]very productive and all-productive at the same

[1] Ficinus has "totius Cretæ," as if his MS. read ὅλης instead of ὅλη· And so Taylor. Eusebius, in Præp. Ev. xii. p. 617, offers ὅλῃ.

[2—2] Such is the literal version of the unintelligible Greek. Perhaps Plato wrote *ἵνα μὴ πολλὰ, ἃ γ' ἔμελλεν, ἤθη—ἕξοι—*similar to "ne contraheret" in Ficinus, in English—that it might not have, what it was about (to have), many—

[3] On the mischief done to the morals of a people by living near the sea, Strabo, in vii. 9, refers to Plato, assigning, by a slip of the memory, to the Republic what he had read here in the Laws.

[4—4] I have translated as if the Greek were originally *τι νέμει*, not, as at present, *τὸ μὲν—*

[5] The expression *ἀλμυρὸν γειτόνημα* Plato is said to have taken from Alcman, the lyric poet, as we learn from the Scholiast on Aristides, quoted by Creuzer on Plotinus de Pulchritud. p. 464, who remarks that *πικρὸν* might perhaps be considered by some to be a gloss; for Aristotle says, Περὶ Αἰσθησ. iv. p. 1438, B., *τὸ δὲ ἀλμυρὸν καὶ πικρὸν σχεδὸν τὸ αὐτὸ*: but such is not his own opinion.

[6—6] On the difference between *ἔμπορος* and *κάπηλος* see at Sophist, § 19.

[7] Timæus rightly explains *παλίμβολος* by *πολυμετάβολος καὶ ἐπὶ μιᾷ γνώμῃ μὴ μένων*, similar to the description given by Virgil of a woman, "varium et mutabile semper."

[8—8] This I confess I cannot understand. I could have understood,

time.[8] For possessing this (advantage), by possessing a great export-trade, it would in return be filled with gold and silver coin in abundance;[1] than which a greater evil cannot, so to say, exist, (comparing) one thing with another, in a state, as regards the possession of manners generous and just, as we stated, if we remember, in our previous discourse.

Clin. We do recollect; and we concede that we were then and we are now speaking correctly.

Athen. But how is the country situated as regards timber for ship-building?

Clin. There is not any fir worth mentioning, or pine, and not much cypress; and a person would find little of larch, or plane-trees, which it is necessary for shipwrights to make use of for the inner parts of vessels.

Athen. And this too would not be ill for the nature of the country.

Clin. How so?

Athen. Because it is good for a city to be unable to imitate easily its enemies in mischievous imitations.

Clin. To which of the subjects that have been mentioned have you, after looking, said what you are now stating?

[2.] *Athen.* Do thou, O excellent man, [2]watch me, looking to what was said at the beginning, the question about the Cretan laws, how they looked to one thing.[2] And you two asserted that this very thing was what regards war; but I, taking you up, said, that when[1] such laws, being laid down, looked to

"since, had it been rugged, it would not have been very productive, much less all-productive I think," in Greek, *οὐκ ἂν πολύφορος γε εἴη, μή τι γε πάμφορος, οἶμαι.* Ast however says that Ficinus has correctly translated, "cumque silvosa sit et aspera, licet omnia ferat, non tamen abunde omnia; nam si esset ad omnia ferax et fœcunda—" And so Taylor to the letter.

[1] Ficinus, whom Taylor follows, has "multum auri atque argenti," as if his MS. read *πολλοῦ* in lieu of *πάλιν*—

[2]—[2] Ast says that after *φυλαττε*, "watch," is to be supplied "if perchance I say what is at variance with previous assertions." But such an ellipse is not, I suspect, to be found elsewhere in Plato; who probably wrote here *Ὦ δαιμόνιε, ἐφύλαττές μ' εὖ, εἰς τὸ κατ' ἀρχὰς εἰρημένον ἀποβλέπων περὶ τῶν Κρητικῶν νόμων*— Well hast thou, O excellent man, watched me while looking to what was said at the beginning about the laws of Crete, that they looked to one thing—where I have omittted *τὸ* before *περὶ*—To avoid however all the difficulties of the text, Ficinus omits *ὡς πρὸς ἕν τι βλέποιεν*: and so too does Taylor; but he translates "I am looking," as if the Greek were *ἀποβλέπω*, not *ἀποβλέπων*.

virtue, it was well; but when[1] only to a part, but not to the whole almost of virtue, I did not entirely agree. Do you then still again watch[2] my present[3] legislation, while following me, if perchance I lay down any law not tending to virtue, or to a part of virtue. For I make it a fundamental position, that he alone lays down a law correctly, who, like an archer, ever aims at that, on which alone some of those things that are ever beautiful[4] follow close, but who leaves all the rest, whether it be wealth or any thing else of that kind, which happens to exist without those before mentioned. And I said on one side, that the imitation of enemies would be then[5] mischievous, when any one residing near the sea is annoyed by enemies, as for instance—for I will relate (it) to you, although not wishing to remind you of a past annoyance—when Minos imposed the payment of a tribute upon the inhabitants of Attica, through his having acquired a great power by sea.[6] But the Athenians did not at that period possess, as they do now, ships of war, nor a country abounding in wood, suited for ship-building, so as to exhibit with facility a naval power. Hence they could not, through nautical imitation, become immediately sailors themselves at that time, and defend themselves against their enemies. And it would have been for their advantage to have lost many times [7]seven young men,[7]

[1] I have twice translated as if the Greek were ὅτε, not ὅτι—Ficinus has "quoniam—quoniam," adopted by Taylor.

[2] As Clinias had been already said to be on the watch, he and his friend Megillus could not be ordered "to watch in return;" but they might be "to watch still again." Hence I have translated, as if the Greek were αὖ ἔτι φυλάξατε, not ἀντιφυλάξατε.

[3] Before τῆς παρούσης the article τὰ has evidently dropt out; for otherwise the genitive would be without regimen, and so too would the verb transitive.

[4] Bekker retains here καλῶν, acknowledged by Ficinus, as shown by his version, "aliquid eorum, quæ bona sunt." But Ast would read καλὸν, found subsequently in four MSS., and taking τίθεσθαι passively, compare the law, and not the law-giver, to an archer, as in Legg. xi. p. 934, B., § 12, τοὺς νόμους τοξότου—στοχάζεσθαι δίκην. But as παραλείπῃ must be said of a person, not a thing, we must adopt the ordinary version.

[5] Instead of τὴν κακὴν τοιάνδε, Ficinus found in his MS. κακὴν τότε—For his version is "improbam tunc—"

[6] To the naval power of Minos allusion is made by Thucydides, i. 4, while the circumstances relating to the tribute are detailed by Diodorus, iv. 60, and Ovid. Met. vii. 556.

[7]—[7] Such was the tribute the Athenians were required to pay.

before [1](suffering what happened to them. For,)[1] instead of being foot-soldiers, with heavy arms, and remaining firm,[2] they were accustomed, on becoming sailors, frequently to leap with a run into and upon the vessels, and to come back again quickly; and to think they were doing nothing disgraceful in not daring to die, by waiting for the attacks of the enemy advancing; and there were pretexts plausible and ready to those throwing away their arms, and making, as they said, not disgraceful flights; for language of this kind[3] is wont to arise from naval heavy-armed troops[4]—(language) by no means worthy [5]of unbounded praise, but very much the contrary.[5] For it is never proper to accustom persons to mischievous habits, and this too the best part of the citizens. And it is surely possible to understand this from Homer, that such conduct is not honourable. For with him Ulysses abuses Agamemnon for exhorting the Greeks, at that time pressed down by the Trojans in fight, to draw down their ships to the sea, and he (Ulysses) is harsh against him (Agamemnon), and says, (Il. xiv. 96,)

> Thou bid'st, while e'en of war, still standing round,
> The clamour's heard, our well-bench'd ships to drag
> Seaward, that, what the Trojans oft have wish'd,
> Their prayers may be accomplish'd, and 'gainst us
> The scale from on high Death turn. But ne'er will Greeks
> Hold to the fight, while ships to sea are drawn;
> But frighten'd look, and from the fray retreat.
> Such hurt will bring the counsel thou dost preach.

He too knew then that three-banked galleys standing near[6]

[1]—[1] The words between the lunes are found only in the Latin of Ficinus, which Taylor has translated "quod illis accidit perpeti; nam."

[2] In lieu of *νομίμων*, which is unintelligible, Ficinus found in his MS., with which all but one agree, *μονίμων*, as shown by his version "terrestribus firmisque copiis;" and so read Plutarch, i. p. 363, F., *ἀντὶ μονίμων ὁπλιτῶν κατὰ Πλάτωνα ναῦται γενόμενοι.*

[3] From "hujusmodi," in Ficinus, Coray was led, on Plutarch i. p. 208, 20, to suggest *τοιαῦτα* for *ταῦτα*, adopted by Bekker.

[4] In lieu of *ναυτικῆς ὁπλιτείας*, which seems a very strange expression, one would expect *ναυτικῆς πολιτείας*, "a nautical polity." For a state and ship were first compared by Alcæus, as shown by Horace, Od. i. 14, and then by Sophocles in Antig. 189, and Cicero Epistol. xii. 25.

[5]—[5] The Greek is *ἐπαινων πολλάκις μυρίων ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον.* But Ficinus has "non laude quidem ulla sed vituperatione summopere dignas," which leads to *ἐπαίνων μυρίων ἀλλὰ πολλάκις τοῦ ἐναντίου.*

[6] Ficinus, whom Taylor follows literally, has "ad pugnantium fugam

were an evil to heavy-armed soldiers while fighting at sea. For even lions would, by adopting similar conduct, be accustomed to fly from stags. Moreover the states, when power and safety depend upon a navy, do not bestow honours [1]on the most beautiful of warlike concerns.[1] For an account of the pilot's art,[2] and the rower's art, and that which is connected with persons of various kinds and of no great worth, no one could bestow upon each individual honours in a proper manner. And yet how can a polity deprived of this exist correctly?

Clin. It is nearly impossible. But yet, O guest, we Cretans say that the naval battle, which took place at Salamis, of the Greeks against the Barbarians, has preserved Greece.

Athen. And indeed many both of the Greeks and Barbarians assert the same thing. But we, my friend, both I and Megillus here, say, that the battle of foot-soldiers at Marathon and Platææ did one of them begin, and the other complete, the safety of the Greeks; and some made the Greeks

paratas," omitting *ἐν θαλάττῃ παρεστῶσαι.* With regard to the sentiment in the text, it was proposed by some of the Athenians to burn all their vessels, previous to the last decisive battle, in the harbour of Syracuse, and to march their army by land through Sicily; for the enemy would not be able to follow them thither, and the troops would conduct themselves with greater fortitude, when they saw all means of retreat cut off. See Thucyd. vii. 60.

[1]—[1] This I can hardly understand. For honours were most assuredly bestowed on those who excelled in war. Hence in lieu of *πολεμικῶν* one would prefer *πολιτικῶν*, "statesmanlike."

[2] Between *κυβερνητικῆς γὰρ* and *καὶ ἐρετικῆς* the text has *καὶ πεντηκονταρχίας*, which means, says Ast, "the command of a ship with fifty rowers," referring to Jul. Pollux i. 119, and he might have added i. 96. But though the word *πεντηκόνταρχον* is found in Demosthenes, p. 1212, 21, R., as applied to the officer over fifty rowers, yet here the question is not about the number of rowers, or even of soldiers on board, but about a specific art, requisite in all vessels. Hence, unless I am greatly mistaken, in *καὶ πεντηκονταρχίας* lies hid *καὶ κελευστικῆς καὶ ἀναρχίας*: of which *καὶ κελευστικῆς* should follow *κυβερνητικῆς γὰρ* and *καὶ ἀναρχίας* come after *καὶ ἐρετικῆς*; for otherwise the subsequent *γιγνομένης* will want its noun. With regard to the office of *κελευστὴς*, it will be sufficient to refer to Alcibiad. i. p. 125, C., Ἆρα κελευστῶν χρωμένων ἐρέταις; Ναί. Κυβερνητικὴ γὰρ αὕτη γε ἀρετή: where the same three things are united, and all relating to the arts required in vessels. Then as regards *ἀναρχίας*, the sailors of old were, like those of more modern times,—witness the mutiny at the Nore in 1797—accustomed to disregard discipline; and hence Euripides has in Hec. 611, *ναυτικὴ τ' ἀναρχία.*

better, but some not better, so to say of the battles that conjointly saved us at that time; for to the naval battle at Salamis I will add the one at Artemisium. But now, looking to the virtue of a polity, let us consider the nature of the region, and the order of the laws; not thinking, as the many do, that to be preserved and to exist is alone to mankind the most honourable of all things, but to become the best, and to continue to be so, for as long a period as they may live. But this, I think, has been stated by us in the former part of our discourse.

Clin. How not?

Athen. Let us then consider this alone, whether we are proceeding in the same path as being the best for states, touching their settlement and legislation.

Clin. (Let us do so) very much.

[3.] *Athen.* Tell me, then, what is next in order to this, what are the people, who are to be the colonists; whether any one (may go), who is willing from the whole of Crete, since the masses have become in the cities more numerous than according to the quantity of food to be got from the land? For you surely do not bring together whoever of the Greeks is willing (to go). And yet I see that some persons from Argos, and Ægina, and other parts of Greece, have settled themselves in the country amongst you. But for the present, tell me, from whence do you say there will be an army of citizens?

Clin. It seems it will be from the whole of Crete; and of the rest of the Greeks it appears that (the colonizers) will receive persons from Peloponnesus, as fellow-settlers for the most part. For, what you were saying just now, you said truly, that there are some from Argos, and the race, which has the highest character here at present, is that of Gortyna, because it happens to have settled there [1] from Gortyna in the Peloponnesus.

Athen. The establishment of a colony would not take place in states with equal facility, when one family, like a swarm of bees, going from one country settles down, friends from friends, after having been, as it were, besieged by a certain want of space, or compelled by some other sufferings of a similar kind. For it sometimes happens that a part of a city is forcibly driven out by seditions and compelled to migrate as strangers to

[1] In lieu of *ταύτης* Ficinus found in his MS. *ταύτῃ*—At least his version has "huc migravit—"

some other spot; and sometimes a whole city has exiled itself, after being thoroughly vanquished in war. In all these cases then it is easy for one to be colonized and governed by laws, but difficult for another. For when a colony is of one race, and has the same language, and the same laws, it possesses a kind of friendship, as being a partaker in the same holy rites, and every thing else of a similar kind, nor does it easily endure other laws, and a polity foreign to what it had at home. And sometimes a colony, having revolted through the badness of its laws, and through custom still seeking to adopt the very same habits as those, by which it was previously corrupted, becomes refractory and disobedient to its colonizer and legislator. But on the other hand a colony, composed of all kinds of people flowing together to the same point, will perhaps be more willingly obedient to certain new laws; but to conspire together, and, like a pair of horses to froth together,[1] as the saying is, individually to the same point, is the work of a long time and very difficult. Nevertheless legislation and the colonization of states is a thing the most effective of all for virtue in man.

Clin. It is probable; but tell me more clearly, looking to what have you said this?

[4.] *Athen.* I appear to myself, good sir, while praising[2] and speculating about legislators, to be about to say something

[1] The MSS. generally read *ξυμφυσῆσαι*, "to weld together," translated by Ficinus, "unum idemque—efflare." But that would be a tautology merely after *ξυμπνεῦσαι*. One MS. has *ξυμφῦσαι*, which leads to *ξυναφρίσαι*, "to froth together," which a pair of horses would do by making similar exertions. The word *ἀφρίζειν* is applied to horses in a chariot-race by Sophocles in El. 70, and hence in Aristophanes, *Εἰρ.* 902, "*Αρματα δ' ἐπ' ἀλλήλοισιν ἀνατετραμμένα Φυσῶντα καὶ πνέοντα προσκινήσεται*, where since *φυσῶντα* is the same as *πνέοντα*, we may read *Ἀφρίσαντα*, similar to the expression in Petronius, "inter sudores anhelitusque." There are however those, who would be content with "puffing and blowing," as the version of *φυσῶντα καὶ πνέοντα*.

[2] One MS. has *ἐπανιὼν*, adopted by Bekker in lieu of *ἐπαινῶν*, which Ast refers to the words spoken just before, *ἐστὶ νομοθεσία—τελεώτατον πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀνδρῶν*. But in that case Plato would have written *εἰρηκέναι*: for *ἐρεῖν* has always a future sense. On the other hand, *ἐπανιὼν*, "returning," could hardly be said here; for the subject of the laws had not been lost sight of. Hence I should prefer *ἐπαΐων*, "knowing—" The two verbs *ἐπαινεῖν* and *ἐπαΐειν* have been similarly interchanged in Hipp. Maj. p. 291, D., and Euthyd. § 79, as remarked by Heindorf.

unimportant. But if we shall say aught opportunely, it would be no matter. And yet why do I feel a difficulty? for nearly all human affairs appear to exist in this manner.

Clin. Of what are you speaking?

Athen. I was about to say, that no man is ever a legislator; but that fortune and all kinds of accidents, happening in all kinds of ways, are our legislators. For either a war by violence has overturned polities and changed laws, or the want of means arising from severe poverty. Many innovations too diseases compel men to make, through pestilences falling upon them, and unfavourable seasons during many years. He then, who foresees all this, will be eager[1] to exclaim, as I just now did, that no mortal was ever a legislator, but that nearly all human affairs are accidents; and that it is possible for him, who asserts all this respecting navigation, and the arts of the pilot, and physician, and general, to appear to speak correctly. But on the other hand, it is equally possible for the person (to appear) to speak correctly on these points, who says this.

Clin. What?

Athen. That a god, and, together with a god, fortune and opportunity govern all human affairs; but that it is necessary to admit that art, a somewhat milder power, follows them. For on the occasion of a storm I should consider it a thing of great moment for the pilot's art to take a part, or not. Or how (say you)?

Clin. Thus.

Athen. Will not the same reasoning apply similarly in the case of other things? And we must attribute the very same principle to legislation; that, other things concurring which ought to happen to a country, if it is about to live happily, it is requisite for a legislator, who adheres to truth, to fall on each occasion upon a state of such a kind.

Clin. You speak most true.

Athen. Would not he then, who possesses an art for each of the above-mentioned occasions, be justly able[3] to pray for

[1] Instead of *ἀἰξειεν* Ficinus seems to have found in his MS. *ἀξιώσειεν*, for his version is "non verebitur," translated by Taylor "will think fit."

[2] This is the only rendering of *μέγα πλεονέκτημα* suited to the context. But such is not the usual meaning of *πλεονέκτημα*.

[3] One would rather expect "be said" than "be able—"

something to be present[1] with him through fortune, should he be wanting[2] only in art?

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. And all the rest just now mentioned would, if commanded to tell their prayers, say so. Is it not so?

Clin. How not?

Athen. And a legislator likewise would, I think, do the same.

Clin. So I think.

Athen. Come then, Legislator, (and say)—for let us address him—a city possessing what, and being in what state, shall we give you, [3]and you take and hold,[3] so that you may administer sufficiently, from the things remaining,[4] the city? What is it possible to assert rightly after this? [5]Shall we not say surely something belonging to the legislator? For it is meet.[5]

Clin. It is.

Athen. This. Give me a city governed by a tyrant, he will say; and let the tyrant be a young man, of a good memory, and docile, and brave, and naturally of a magnificent disposition; and let that, which, we said before, ought to follow all the parts of virtue, now accompany the soul of the tyrant, if there is about to be any benefit from the presence of the other qualities.

Clin. Our guest, Megillus, appears to me to say that temperance should follow the other virtues. Is it not so?

Athen. Yes, temperance, Clinias, in its popular sense, and not that, which any one in solemn phrase would call prudence, and compel it to be temperance; but that feeling which, inherent in boys and savage animals, bursts into flower

[1] Correct Greek requires *παρεῖναι αὐτῷ*, not *παρὸν αὐτῷ*—

[2] One MS. has, what the syntax demands, *ἐπιδέῃ*. Ficinus has "nec alia re, præterquam artificio, opus sit." From which it is difficult to discover what he found in his MS.

[3—3] The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor.

[4] Ast says that *ἐκ τῶν λοιπῶν* means "hereafter—" But till such a meaning is confirmed by sufficient examples, I shall continue to believe that Plato wrote *ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων*, "after what has been said—"

[5—5] The Greek is *ἆρα τοῦ νομοθέτου φράζωμεν τοῦτο; ἢ γάρ;* which, Stalbaum says, labours under some great corruption. He would therefore read *ἆρα τὸ τοῦ—* with Ast, and reject *τοῦτο*, and *ἢ γάρ* likewise, as it is wanting in Ficinus. I have however translated, as if Plato had written *ἆρα τοῦ νομοθέτου φράζωμέν πού τι ὄν; δεῖ γάρ.*

on the instant, so that some are incontinent[1] with respect to pleasures, but others continent; and which we said,[2] when it exists apart from the many things called good, is not worth mention. For you understand what I am saying?

Clin. Perfectly.

Athen. This nature, then, let our tyrant possess in addition to those (mentioned above), if the city is about to have a polity in the quickest and best manner possible, and on the receiving of which it may live the most happily. For there neither is, nor will there ever be, the establishment of a polity more rapid or better than this.

Clin. But how, O guest, and by what argument would any one, who asserts this, persuade himself that he is speaking correctly?

Athen. It is easy, Clinias, to understand how this is so naturally.

Clin. How say you? Do you assert,[3] if the tyrant is a young man, temperate, docile, of a good memory, brave, (and) magnificent?

Athen. Add too fortunate[4] in nothing else, except in that during his time a legislator is existing worthy of praise, and that a certain fortune leads the two to the same point. For, on this taking place, there is brought to pass by a god nearly every thing which (is done), when he wishes any state to be eminently prosperous; and in the second degree, when two rulers are of such a kind; and in the third degree, (when three);[5] and in a similar proportion more difficult, (as the rulers)[6] are more numerous;[7] but, the contrary, by how much the contrary happens.[7]

[1] How the idea of temperance can be thus mixed up with that of incontinence, I certainly cannot understand. Others, I hope, will be more fortunate.

[2] In iii. § 12, p. 696, D.

[3] The Greek is *εἰ τύραννος γένοιτο, φῂς, νέος*— But as there is an allusion to what had been stated just before, Plato wrote, I suspect, *οὐ, τύραννος εἰ γένοιτο, ἔφης, νέος*— "Did you not say, if a tyrant were young—"

[4] I have followed Ast in assigning *Εὐτυχὴς* to the Athenian, not, as Stephens did, to Clinias, misled, it would seem, by Ficinus.

[5, 6] Ficinus has alone preserved the words, requisite for the sense, in his version, adopted by Taylor, "tertio loco, si tres; et, successionis eadem ratione servata, eo difficilius, quo plures."

[7—7] Ficinus has paraphrased this, "atque contra, quo pauciores, eo facilius."

Clin. You assert, as it seems, that the best state would result from a tyranny, in conjunction with a superior legislator and a well-regulated tyrant; and that it would most easily and rapidly change [1] into that from such a kind as this;[1] and that the second in degree is from an oligarchy; and [2] the third in degree, from a democracy. Is it not so?[2]

Athen. By no means. But the first is produced from a tyranny; the second, from a regal polity; the third, from a certain democracy; but with respect to the fourth, an oligarchy would be able to receive a generation of this kind with the utmost difficulty. For in it there are the greatest number of the powerful. Now we say, that these things then take place, when a legislator is naturally true, and when there exists in him a strength in common with those, who possess the greatest influence in the state. But where this exists the fewest in number, but at the same time the most strong, as in the case of a tyranny, in this way and then there is wont to take place a rapidity and easiness in the change.

Clin. How? For we do not understand.

Athen. And yet I think this has been said by us, not once, but often. But perhaps you never saw a state under a tyrant.

Clin. Nor am I desirous of such a spectacle.

Athen. And yet you may see it in the one just now spoken of.

Clin. What?

Athen. That the tyrant, who wishes to change the habits of a state, has no need either of (great)[3] labour, or any very long time for the accomplishment of his purpose. For[4] it is necessary that he should proceed the first in whatever road he wishes, either to turn the citizens to the pursuit of virtue, or the contrary, and mark out the course by acting himself the first, and praising and honouring some things, but bringing a

[1]—[1] The Greek is *εἰς τοῦτο ἐκ τοῦ τοιούτου*, which I hardly understand. Ficinus, whom Taylor follows, has "ex illa in hanc:" but *οὗτος* and *ὁ τοιοῦτος* are not opposed to each other in Greek, as "ille" and "hic" are in Latin.

[2]—[2] So Ficinus correctly. The Greek is *ἢ πῶς λέγεις; καὶ τὸ τρίτον ἐκ δημοκρατίας*. But *ἢ πῶς λέγεις* could not be thus introduced between the second and third assertion. It is true however that *οὐδαμῶς* could not give the answer to *πῶς*, but it might to *οὕτως*, what Plato probably wrote, not *ἢ πῶς*.

[3] Ficinus has "multo labore," as if his MS. read *πολλῶν πόνων*, not *πόνων* simply.

[4] In lieu of *δὲ* one would prefer *γὰρ*, similar to "nam" in Ficinus.

blame upon others, and disgracing the party that is disobedient in each of these doings.

Clin. And how can we imagine[1] that the other citizens will quickly follow him, who has obtained such persuasion, and at the same time force?

Athen. Let no one persuade us, friends, that a state has ever changed[2] its laws more quickly and easily by any other way than the leading of its rulers, or that this happens now by any other means, or will happen ever again. For that indeed is neither impossible for us, nor would it be done with difficulty. But this is the thing difficult to be done, and has rarely taken place in a long time; although, when it does happen, it produces in the state, in which it is found, ten thousand, or rather every good thing.

Clin. Of what are you speaking?

Athen. When a divine love of temperate and just pursuits is inherent in certain mighty powers, whether they rule according to a monarchy, or a marked superiority in wealth or family, or should any one bring back the nature of Nestor, who they say excelled all men in the power of speaking, and still more in temperance. But this, as they say, took place in the times of Troy, but in ours not at all. If then such a man existed formerly, or shall exist, or is at present amongst us, he lives in a blessed state, and blessed too are those, who hear the words proceeding from his temperate mouth. Of a similar kind is the reasoning respecting all power, that, when the greatest power of a man falls to the same point with the acting prudently and temperately, then the production of the best polity and of such kind of laws takes place, but otherwise it will never be. Let this then be held to be spoken oracularly, as if it were a story detailed,[3] and to have been shown, that in one way it is difficult for a state to have good laws, and in another, that, if what we have said should take place, it would have them in a manner the quickest and the easiest by far.

[1] One MS. has *πανταχοῦ μέγα οἰόμεθα*, similar to "ubique magnum quid aut arduum existimabimus—" adopted by Cousin.

[2] On account of the following, *μηδὲ νῦν γίγνεσθαι μηδὲ αὖθις ποτε γενήσεσθαι*, it is evident that a past tense is required here, *μεταβαλεῖν*, found in one MS., without *ἂν*, or what would be preferable, *μεταβεβληκέναι*.

[3] Unless I am mistaken, Plato wrote not *οὖν καθαπερεὶ*, but *οὖν, οὐ καθάπερ γραυσὶ*, similar to *ὥσπερ γραὸς μῦθος* in Gorg. p. 527, A., and *ὥσπερ ταῖς γραυσὶ ταῖς τοὺς μύθους λεγούσαις*, in Rep. i. p. 350, E.

Clin. How so?

Athen. Let us now endeavour, by adapting our laws to your state, to mould it, as old men do boys,[1] by our discourse.

Clin. Let us go this road, and no longer delay.

[5.] *Athen.* But let us call upon a god for the preparation of the state. And may he hear, and hearing come to us, in a propitious and kind manner, to adorn, in conjunction with us, the state and laws!

Clin. May he come!

Athen. But what kind of polity have we in our mind to enjoin upon the state?

Clin. Inform me still more clearly what you wish to say; for instance, whether it is a certain democracy, or oligarchy, or aristocracy, or a regal government. For you would not surely speak of a tyranny, as we should imagine.

Athen. Come, then, which of you is willing to answer first, by stating what is the polity at home?

Megil. Is it not more just for myself, who am the elder, to speak first?

Clin. Perhaps so.

Megil. When I consider, guest, the polity of Lacedæmon, I am unable to tell you what I ought to call it thus.[2] For it appears to me to be similar to a tyranny. For the power of the Ephori in it is wonderfully tyrannical. And yet it sometimes appears to me to be the most similar of all states to a democracy. But, on the other hand, not to say that it is an aristocracy, is perfectly absurd. There is in it likewise the office of a king for life, which is said, both by all men, and by us too, to be the most ancient of all. On being then asked thus suddenly, I cannot, as I have said, by a definition, tell you which of these polities it is.

Clin. I too, Megillus, appear to be affected in the same manner as yourself. For I am quite at a loss as to which of these I should firmly assert the polity in Cnossus to be.

Athen. For you, most excellent men, do really[3] participate

[1] The Greek is παῖδα—But Ficinus, "tanquam seniores pueris," as if his MS. had ὥσπερ παισὶ— One MS. reads παῖδες, evidently an error for παῖδας.

[2] Ficinus, probably through not understanding οὕτως, has omitted it. Plato wrote, I suspect, ἁπλῶς, "simply."

[3] Ficinus has "Veræ—reipublicæ:" which has led me to believe that

in polities. But those, which we now name such, are not polities, but settlements of cities, ruled over, and a slave to[1] some portions of each other, and each is denominated from the power of the ruler. But if it were meet for a city to be called after this manner, it ought to be called by the name of the god, who is the ruler of those that possess truly a mind.

Clin. Who is this god?

Athen. Must we then still to a small extent make use of a fable, if we are about to explain in a careful manner what has been just now asked? Is it not meet to do so in this way?

Clin. By all means.

[6.] *Athen.* A long time antecedent to that of the cities, whose settlement we have before gone through, there is said to have existed in the time of Saturn a certain government of, and dwelling in, them extremely happy, and of which that, which is now administered the best,[2] exhibits an imitation.

Megil. It would as it seems be very requisite to hear about it.

Athen. It appears so to me; and hence I have brought the subject amongst us during our conversation.

Megil. And you have done so most correctly; and you will act very correctly too in bringing to an end the fable in due order as far as it is suitable.

Athen. I must do as you say. We have received then a report of the happy life of the persons living of that period, how it possessed all things without stint and produced spontaneously. Of this state of things the cause is said to have been something of this kind. Saturn, well knowing, as we have already detailed, that no human nature, when administering with absolute power the affairs of man, is so sufficient, as not to be filled with insolence and injustice, did, from reflecting upon this, place over our cities, as kings and rulers,

Plato wrote Ὄντως γὰρ, ὦ ἄριστοι, ἀρίστων πολιτειῶν, with the usual play on the words ἄριστοι ἀρίστων. See my note on Æschyl. Suppl. 304.

[1] Ficinus, whom Taylor follows to the letter, has more correctly "in quibus una pars servit alteri." For he thus avoids the tautology in δεσποζομένων καὶ δουλενουσῶν. And hence his MS. probably read δεσποζόντων—

[2] In lieu of ἀριστοκρατεῖται, acknowledged by Ficinus, whose version is "ab optimatibus gubernatur," Stephens mentions a var. lect., ἄριστα οἰκεῖται, subsequently found in two MSS., and similar to ἄριστα οἰκοίη, in iii. § 16, p. 702, A.

not men, but Dæmons of a more divine and excellent race; [1]just as we now do, by placing some men over flocks of sheep[1] and such herds of cattle as are tame. For we do not make oxen rulers of oxen, nor goats of goats; but we ourselves rule over them, as being of a better race than them. The same thing does[2] the god, who being a lover of mankind has placed over us the race of Dæmons, as being better than us; which through the great inactivity[3] on their part, and great too on ours, has taken care of us, and by imparting to us peace and modesty and good legislation[4] and abundance of justice, rendered the human race exempt from sedition, and happy. And now this our discourse, employing (the language of) truth, asserts, that of such states as not a god but some mortal governs, there is to them no escape from evils and labours; but it conceives that we ought, by every contrivance, to imitate the life, said to have been under Saturn; and, as far as immortality is in us, by being obedient to it, to administer both publicly and privately our houses and cities, calling law the distribution of mind. For should one man, or an oligarchy, or even democracy, possess a soul eager after pleasures and desires, and requiring to be filled with these, and retaining nothing,[5] but connected closely with an [6]evil not to be finished, and a disease not to be filled,[6] and should such

[1—1] The Greek is *οἷον νῦν ἡμεῖς δρῶμεν τοῖς ποιμνίοισι*, where the dative is without regimen. Hence, since the words *αὐτοῖσί τινας* are found shortly afterwards following *ποιοῦμεν*, where they are perfectly useless, although acknowledged by Julian in Epistol. ad Themist. p. 476, Petav., I have translated as if the words in the original were *ἀνθρώπους ἱστάντες τινας*.

[2] From APA, to which Ast justly objects, I have elicited ΔPA.

[3] Here is evidently some error. For the Dæmons did not take care of men through their inactivity, but quite the reverse, in Greek *δραστοσύνης*, of which the Ionic form *δρηστοσύνη* is found in Homer Od. O. 302. And as thus the *δραστοσύνη*, the "activity" of the Dæmons, is properly opposed to the *ῥᾳστώνη*, the "inactivity" of mortals, we might insert *δραστοσύνης* after *πολλῆς μὲν* and *ῥᾳστώνης* after *πολλῆς δε*, were it not that the common reading is acknowledged by Julian.

[4] Instead of *ἐλευθερίαν* Ast and Bekker have adopted *εὐνομίαν* from two MSS. Neither word is found in Julian.

[5] The metaphor, says Ast, is taken from a sieve or a perforated vessel unable to retain any liquid, and he refers to Gorgias, p. 493, C., *τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν κοσκίνῳ ἀπείκασε—τετρημένην, ἅτε οὐ δυναμενην στέγειν*. I suspect however that Plato wrote *στέργουσαν οὐδὲν*, "contented with nothing—"

[6—6] Such will perhaps seem to be a correct rendering of *ἀνηνύτῳ καὶ*

a person[1] rule over either a city or an individual, and trample upon the laws, there would be, as we just now said, no contrivance for security. It is necessary then to consider, Clinias, whether we shall be persuaded by this account or not.

Clin. It is surely necessary to be persuaded.

Athen. You understand then, that some say there are as many species of laws as of polities; but of polities we have already gone through as many as the multitude say there are. Do not then think that our present doubt is about a matter of no moment, but about one of the greatest. For that, to which the just and the unjust ought to look, has come again to us as a matter of doubt. For persons say that the laws ought not to look either to war or to the whole of virtue, but to see[2] what may be beneficial to a polity whatever it may be, so that it may always rule, and never be dissolved; and (they say) that the natural definition of the just is laid down most beautifully thus.

Clin. How?

Athen. That what belongs to the superior is beneficial.

Clin. Speak still more clearly.

Athen. Thus (do I speak). On every occasion the superior power, they say, lays down the laws in a state. Is it not so?

Clin. You speak the truth.

Athen. Think you then, say they, that ever at any time will a mob after being victorious, or any other polity, or even a tyrant,[3] lay down willingly laws for any other purpose at first, than for what is conducive to the continuance of its own power?

Clin. How should it?

Athen. Whoever transgresses what is thus laid down, him will the lawgiver, who calls such laws by the name of just, punish as a person acting unjustly.

ἁπλήστῳ κακῷ νοσήματι. For ἀνηνύτῳ may belong to κακῷ, as in Gorg. p. 507, E., ἀνήνυτον κακὸν; and καὶ follow instead of preceding ἁπλήστῳ. One would however prefer ἀπαύστῳ κακῷ καὶ ἀνηκέστῳ νοσήματί, similar in part to "inexplebili inextinguibilique ardore et insanabili morbo" in Ficinus.

[1] Julian properly omits ὁ τοιοῦτος, which words could hardly be interposed between κατα πατήσας and τοὺς νόμους.

[2] I have adopted ἰδεῖν, suggested by Schneider in lieu of δεῖν, to which Ast justly objects. Sydenham and Winckelmann would read ζητεῖν—

[3] In lieu of τύραννίδα Ficinus, as shown by his version, "tyrannum," found in his MS. τύραννον, what Bekker has edited from four others.

Clin. It appears so.

Athen. In this way then, and in this wise, and by this manner, will what is just exist.

Clin. So at least this reasoning says.

Athen. For this is one of those prerogatives [1] relating to government.

Clin. What are those?

Athen. Those, which we were then considering as to what ought to govern what. And it appeared that it was proper for parents (to rule over) their progeny, and the older over the younger, and the well-born over the ignobly born. And there were many other things, if we remember, and [2] some an obstacle to others; and among them there was this one; (for) we said somehow that Pindar conceived it to be according to nature for the most violent to take the lead, to use his own words.[3]

Clin. This was indeed said formerly.

Athen. But consider to what [4] persons our state is to be committed. For a thing of this kind has taken place ten thousand times in certain states.

Clin. Of what kind?

[7.] *Athen.* When power has been fought for, the conquerors are wont to take the affairs of the state so strongly into their own hands, as to give no share of the government to the conquered, or to their descendants, and they live watching each other,[5] lest any one should get into power and cause an

[1] In lieu of *ἀδικημάτων*, Schulthes, in his German translation of the Laws, was the first to read *ἀξιωμάτων*. For the allusion is to iii. § 9, p. 690, A., as remarked by Ast, who has adopted the reading. The Zurich editors have however given *δικαιωμάτων*—

[2] Instead of *καὶ*, which is unintelligible here, Ficinus seems to have found *ὧν*, for his version is "quorum—"

[3] From the expression *ὡς φάναι*, Ast supposes that the words of Pindar were "*κατὰ φύσιν ἄγει τὸ βιαιότατον.*" But in the passage of the lyric poet, to which there is an allusion in iii. § 10, p. 690, and a quotation from it more at length in Gorg. p. 484, B., the words were, as shown by Boeckh, *κατὰ φύσιν ἄγει τὸ δικαιότατον ὑπερτάτᾳ χερί*: from whence, in lieu of *ὡς φάναι*, one would prefer *ἐς θέμιν*—Ficinus has "secundum naturam ac justum imperium esse, ut potentiora imbecillioribus dominentur," which is a paraphrase rather than a translation.

[4] The Greek is *ποτέροις τισιν*— But that could be said only if a choice were to be made between two persons or things stated distinctly. Ficinus has "quibus," which leads to *ποίοις τίσιν*—

[5] In lieu of *ἀλλήλους*, which I cannot understand, nor could Ficinus,

insurrection, through remembering the ills which had taken place. At present we surely say that those are neither polities, nor upright laws, which are not laid down for the sake of the whole state in common; and those, which so exist for the sake of some (alone), we call [1]seditions, but not polities;[1] and that the things which they call just, are called so in vain. Now this has been asserted by us on this account, because we will give your state no one as a magistrate, because he is rich, or possesses any thing of this kind, such as strength, or size, or family; but whoever is most obedient to the laws laid down, and gains this victory in the state, to him we assert must be given the ministerial office, that relates to the gods,[2] the greatest to the first; the second to him, who gains the second prize; and [3]so, according to a certain ratio,[3] to those coming in a certain order must each of the things after these be assigned. But those, that are called rulers, I have now denominated the ministers of the laws, not for the sake of introducing any innovation in names; but I think [4]there will be to a state a safety from this more than from any thing (else), and the contrary (from a contrary).[4] For I see destruction is at hand to that state, [5]in which the law is ruled over, and is powerless.[5] But in the state, where the law is the absolute ruler over the rulers, and the rulers are slaves of the law, I behold safety and all

for he has omitted the word, Plato wrote, I suspect, *ἄλλοι ἄλλους*, "some these, and others those—"

[1]—[1] Ficinus has "non cives sed seditiosos." He therefore found in his MS., what is read in all the rest, *στασιώτας ἀλλ' οὐ πολίτας*. Ast however defends *στασιωτείας ἀλλ' οὐ πολιτείας*, by quoting viii. 3, p. 832, C., *πολιτεία μὲν οὐδεμία, στασιωτεῖαι δὲ πᾶσαι λέγοιντ' ἄν*.

[2] In lieu of *θεῶν* Schulthes suggested, what Ast has adopted, *νόμων*, on account of the subsequent *ὑπηρέτας νόμοις*. Sydenham too would read *νόμων*—Orelli prefers *θεσμῶν*—Stalbaum defends *θεῶν* by saying that in *θεῶν*, "gods," is included the idea of "the laws." But how this can be, I do not see. Perhaps Plato wrote *θείων νόμων*, "laws given by the gods."

[3]—[3] Ficinus has "eademque ratione," as if his MS. read *κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον* in lieu of *κατὰ λόγον οὕτω*—

[4]—[4] The Greek is *παντὸς μᾶλλον εἶναι παρὰ τοῦτο σωτηρίαν τε πόλει καὶ τοὐναντίον*. But Ficinus has, what is far more intelligible, "salutem hinc maxime civitati fore et contrarium ex contrario," as if he had found in his MS. *παντὸς μᾶλλον ἂν εἶναι παρὰ τούτου σωτηρίαν τῇ πόλει, καὶ παρὰ τοῦ ἐναντίου τοὐναντίον*.

[5]—[5] Ficinus, whom Taylor follows to the letter, has "in qua non lex magistratibus, sed legi magistratus præsunt."

other good things, such as the gods have bestowed upon states.

Clin. Truly so, by Zeus, O guest! For according to your age you perceive acutely.

Megil. For every man, when young, sees, himself by himself, matters of this kind very dully; but most acutely, when old.

Clin. Most true.

Athen. But what after this? Shall we not suppose settlers as having arrived and being present? and must we not finish the portion next in order of our discourse for them?

Clin. How not?

Athen. Let us then address them. O ye men, God, as the old saw[1] (says), having (in himself) the beginning, and end, and middle of all things, does, proceeding in a circle, according to nature, bring things to an end by a straight road;[2] and him does Justice ever follow, the punisher of those, who are deserters from the divine law; and close upon her attends in a humble and orderly manner he, who would be happy; [3]but

[1] The old saw alluded to is the Orphic verse preserved by Eusebius in Præp. Evang. xiii. 12, Ἀρχὴν αὐτὸς ἔχων καὶ μέσσατον ἠδὲ τελευτήν, not the distich quoted by the Scholiast, Ζεὺς ἀρχή, Ζεὺς μέσσα, Διὸς δ' ἐκ πάντα τέτυκται, Ζεὺς πυθμὴν γαίης καὶ οὐρανοῦ ἀστερόεντος, i. e. "Zeus is the beginning, and the middle, Zeus; And formed from Zeus are all things, and of earth Zeus is the base, and of the starry sky:" which the Scholiast, probably after Proclus, thus explains—"He is the beginning, as the producing cause; but the end, as the final (cause); the middle, as being equally present to all things, although all things partake of him differently. But by 'that which is direct according to justice,' (Plato) signifies desert, and the not inclining to one side, and, as it were, by one rule; but by 'proceeding round,' he signifies the existing eternally, and that too which is perpetually after the same manner, and according to the same; for the circumference has in sensible objects this property." Such is the literal translation of the Scholium. But Taylor has—"But by that which is direct according to nature Plato signifies desert, according to justice"—as if he wished to read εὐθείᾳ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν σημαίνει κατὰ δίκην τὴν ἀξίαν.

[2] Ast quotes opportunely Eurip. Tro. 896, Ζεύς, εἴτ' ἀνάγκη φύσεος εἴτε νοῦς κρατῶν, Προσηυξάμην σε· πάντα γάρ, δι' ἀψόφου Βαίνων κελεύθου, κατὰ δίκην τὰ θνήτ' ἄγεις.

[3—3] Unless I am greatly mistaken, in the whole of this description Plato had an eye to Alcibiades, who used to pride himself upon his wealth, and honours, and handsome person, and was no less remarkable for his insolent bearing, than for the high opinion he entertained of his talents as a statesman. With regard to the language, it is quite evident that Plato has put into prose, what he found in the verses of Eupolis or Aristophanes to this effect—Σκιρτᾷ ταράττων πάντα, καὶ πολλοῖς τι-

he, who is lifted up by high-boasting, exalting himself[1] through his riches, or honours, or the fine form of his body, and having from his youthfulness and thoughtlessness his soul inflamed with insolence, as one who is in no need of either a ruler or a leader, but competent to lead even others, is left, deserted by the deity; and being thus left, and falling in with others of a similar kind, he leaps about, when he throws all things into confusion together; and to many indeed he appears to be somebody; but in no long time afterwards suffers a punishment, which justice would not blame, and causes himself and family and city to be utterly destroyed.[3] With regard then to these matters thus disposed in order, what must a prudent man do, or think, and what must he not?

Clin. This at least is plain, that every man ought to think how he may be one of those, who are to follow the deity.

[8.] *Athen.* What manner of acting then is dear to and attendant upon the deity? There is one, which possesses one reason of old, that the similar will be friendly to the similar, when it is moderate; but that the immoderate are neither friendly to each other nor to the moderate. Now the deity will be especially the measure to us of all things, and much more than, as persons say, a man.[2] He then, who is to become friendly to a nature of this kind, must necessarily become such to the utmost of his power. And, according to this reasoning, our temperate man is dear to the deity, for he is similar to him. But the intemperate man is dissimilar, and at variance (with the deity), and unjust; and the rest of instances are by the same reasoning affected in this way. Let us then consider that language of this kind is to follow these premises, (language) I think the most beautiful, and the most true of all, namely, that for a good man to sacrifice to, and be conversant ever[3] with, the gods, [4]by means of prayers, and

σὶν Ἔδοξεν εἶναί τις· μετὰ δ' οὐ πολὺν χρόνον Τιμωρίαν ὑπέσχεν οὐ μεμπτὴν, ποιῶν Ἄρδην ἑαυτὸν, δῶμα, πόλιν, ἀναστάτους.

[1] Others may, but I will never, believe that Plato would thus after *ἐξαρθεὶς* introduce *ἐπαιρόμενος*, when he might have written *γαυρούμενος*, although *ἐπαιρόμενος* is acknowledged by Suidas in Πλάτων.

[2] The persons alluded to are the sect of Protagoras, who said that "man was the measure of all things," as stated in Cratyl. p. 386, A. § 6.

[3] In lieu of ΔΗ all the MSS. read ΔΕΙ, answering to "decet" in Ficinus: from which it is easy to elicit ΑΕΙ.

[4]—[4] The words between the numerals, although found in Ficinus, are omitted by Taylor.

offerings, and every kind of attention to the gods,[4] is a conduct the most beautiful, and best, and most conducive to a happy life, and moreover pre-eminently becoming; but to the wicked man the contraries of these naturally happen. For the wicked man is unpurified in his soul, but the contrary one is pure; and to receive gifts from a defiled person is not at all correct for either a good man or a god.[1] To the unholy then there is much labour in vain respecting the gods; but it is the most seasonable to all holy men. Such then is the mark at which we ought to aim. [2] Whither then can be most correctly carried, what are called the arrows of a person, and what is the shooting out by thought, as it were by arrows?[2] We assert, in the first place, that he, who gives after the Olympian gods, and those who preside over the city, as honours to the terrestrial gods, the things of an even number, [3] and secondary, and on the left hand,[3] will in the most proper manner reach the mark of piety; but to the gods above these, things of an odd number, and those that signify the opposite to what have been just now mentioned. And after these gods a prudent person will celebrate the holy rites of Dæmons, and after them of Heroes. And after them follow the statues of the household gods, held holy according to law; and after them are the honours paid to living parents; since it is just for a person, who owes the first and the greatest of debts, to pay those that are of the

[1] To this passage Cicero alludes De Legg. ii. 16, and there is a similar sentiment in Plautus' Rudens Prolog. quoted by Ast.

[2—2] The Greek is *βέλη δὲ αὐτοῦ καὶ οἷον ἡ τοῖς βέλεσιν ἔφεσις τὰ ποῖ' ἂν λεγόμενα ὀρθότατα φέροιτ' ἄν*; where I am completely in the dark; and so was Ast, who has laboured, as I conceive, in vain, to make out the syntax and sense. I have therefore translated as if the Greek were *βέλη δ' ἄν του τὰ λεγόμενα ποῖ ἂν ὀρθότατα φέροιτο, καὶ διανοίᾳ τίς, ὡς βέλεσιν, ἡ ἄφεσις*. The error arose from the words *διανοίᾳ, ὡς βέλεσιν, ἡ ἄφεσις*, forming one line of the Codex Archetypus, being displaced, and *οιον η τοις* being written instead of *διανοιηι τις ως*. Ficinus, whom Taylor follows tacitly, has "sagittæ vero ad illud quænam? at quis proprius ipsarum impetus rectissime diceretur?" as if he had found in his MS. *βέλη δὲ αὐτόσε τίνα; καὶ τίς αὐτοῖς ἔφεσις ὀρθοτατα λέγοιτ' ἄν*. Winckelmann would read *τὰ ποῖ' ἀθλ' ἂν*—

[3—3] The idea of giving to the gods above the earth things of the first number (odd), and of the first place, and omens on the right (lucky) hand, emanated from the school of Pythagoras, as remarked by Ast; who quotes from Porphyry's Life of that philosopher, p. 197, ed. Cant., *τοῖς μὲν οὐρανιοις θεοῖς περιττὰ θύειν, τοῖς δὲ χθονίοις ἄρτια*: and refers to Plutarch, who says that Numa put forth many precepts similar to those

longest standing; [1] and to think,[1] that the things he has acquired and holds belong all to those, who begot him and brought him up, for supplying what is required for their service to the utmost of his power, beginning from his substance; and, in the second place, from his body; and, thirdly, from his soul, by paying off the debts due for their care of him, and in favour of those, who gave the pangs of labour as a loan to the young; and by returning [2] what has been due a long time to those[2] who in old age are greatly in want. It is requisite likewise through the whole of life for a person to hold and to have held pre-eminently a kind language towards his parents; because there is [3] for light and winged words a punishment most heavy; for Nemesis, the messenger of Justice, has been appointed an inspector over all persons in matters of this kind.[3] It is necessary then to yield to them when in anger, and gratifying their feelings, whether they so conduct themselves by words or deeds, as not being ignorant [4] that a father would very reasonably be exceedingly angry with his son, if he conceived he had been injured by him. But, on the death of parents, the funeral which is the most moderate is the best; and (let) not its size exceed what is customary, nor be deficient in those things, which the forefathers made for their parents; and on the other hand, let persons pay yearly to such, as have now reached their end, the attention that brings a decoration (to the tomb); and by omitting nothing,[5] that contributes to a perpetual re-

of Pythagoras, and amongst others *τοῖς μὲν οὐρανίοις περισσὰ θυέιν, ἄρτια δὲ τοῖς χθονίοις.*

[1]—[1] Ficinus alone has "putare quisque debet," adopted by Taylor.

[2]—[2] The Greek is *ἀποδιδόντα δὲ παλαιοῖς*, where the article before *παλαιοῖς* could not be omitted. I have translated as if the text were *ἀποδιδόντα, ἃ δεῖ πάλαι, τοῖς*— To avoid the difficulty in *δὲ* after *ἀποδιδόντα*, Ast has cut out what he should rather have corrected.

[3]—[3] Here again lies hid a poetical fragment, found originally in an Æsopo-Socratic fable—*πράγματος κούφου Ἥν ζημία δὴ βαρυτάτη λόγων πτηνῶν. Ἐπίσκοπος γὰρ ἄγγελός τε περὶ ταῦτα Δίκης ἐτάχθη πᾶσι Νέμεσις οὖσ' ἡ παῖς*: where *πράγμάτος κούφου* is confirmed by *λόγων, κούφου πράγματος* in xi. § 13, p. 935, A., while *Νέμεσις* is here called the daughter of Justice, as in the hymn of Mesomedes in Antholog. Gr. iii. p. 6, and as Adrastæa is by Ammianus Marcellin. xiv. 1, "Adrasteia —quam theologi veteres fingentes Justitiæ filiam."

[4] So Taylor has adopted "non ignorantes," found in Ficinus. But *ξυγγιγνώσκειν* means in Greek "to pardon," rather than "to be conscious."

[5] I have translated as if *τι* had dropt out before *παραλείπειν.*

membrance, by this especially is there ever an honour, and likewise by a person contributing for the dead a moderate expense, such as is allowed by fortune. By acting thus, and living thus, we shall each of us on each occasion carry off what is due to us both from the gods and such as are superior to us, and we shall pass the greatest part of our lives in a good hope. But why[1] the person who is doing perfectly what relates to his offspring, and kindred, and friends, and fellow-citizens, and what relates to the rites of hospitality (laid down)[2] by the gods, and the intercourse arising from all these matters, ought to make his life a shining ornament according to law, the very course of the laws will (show forth);[3] which, by persuading some of our habits and punishing by violence and justice others, that do not yield to persuasion, renders our state blessed and happy. But what it is meet and necessary for a legislator, who thinks as I do, to say, but which when spoken are unfitted to the form of a law, respecting these it appears to me that a person would,[4] by bringing forward a pattern both before himself and those, for whom he is about to give laws, and by going through all that remains to the utmost of his ability, make after this a beginning in the laying down of laws.

[5] *Clin.* Let then such things be laid in some form especially.

Athen. But[5] it is not a very easy thing to embrace them, as it were in some one form, and to speak of them; but let us in

[1] Here again Ast has laboured hard to unravel the intricacies of this perplexed passage; which can be overcome I think only by supposing that Plato wrote not Ἃ δὲ πρὸς, but Ἀλλὰ διότι τὰ πρὸς—as I have translated.

[2] The Greek is ξενικὰ πρὸς θεῶν θεραπεύματα: where since the words πρὸς θεῶν are perfectly unintelligible thus standing by themselves, Ast would expunge them. But though the idea is adopted by Stalbaum, yet it is more reasonable to suppose that τεθέντα has dropt out between θεῶν and θεραπεύματα, as I have translated.

[3] Ficinus has "legarum ipsarum tractatio demonstrabit," from which Ast was led to believe that δείξει had dropt out before ἡ διέξοδος. Plato wrote, I suspect, διδάξει ἡ ὁδὸς—

[4] The syntax requires us to read, as I have translated, προενεγκόντ' ἂν ὑατῷ—ἄρχεσθαι, not with ἂν omitted.

[5]—[5] I have adopted the arrangement of the speeches suggested by Ast; who did not however perceive that Plato wrote ἔστω, not ἐστι, and that ἀλλ' has been lost after κείμενα.

this way take some method, if perchance we may be able to establish any thing of a firm kind respecting them.

Clin. Say what method.

Athen. I should wish them to be very obedient as regards virtue; and it is evident that the legislator will endeavour to accomplish this through the whole of his legislation.

Clin. How not?

[9.] *Athen.* What then has been now said appears to me to effect something of moment towards a person listening with a greater mildness and a kinder feeling to what the words recommend, provided they do not come in contact with a disposition altogether savage; so that should what the words say render the person, who has become if not very much, yet a little more kindly disposed, more docile, we must be quite content. For there is no great facility[1] nor an abundance of those, who feel a desire to become the best to the greatest degree and in the shortest time; and the many point out Hesiod as a wise person for asserting that the road to wickedness is smooth, and offers itself to be passed through without sweat, as being very short; but (says he)

> "Th' immortal gods have before virtue placed
> The sweat of labour, and the road is long
> And steep, that to it leads. At first 'tis rough;
> But when you reach the top, 'tis easy all,[2]
> Although it was all difficult before."[3]

Clin. And he appears to be like a person who speaks well.

Athen. Entirely so. But what the discourse has done, as it has been going on, I wish to place in the midst of you.

Clin. Place it then.

Athen. Let us then say to the legislator, while addressing these words to him—Tell us, Legislator, is it not evident that, if you knew what we ought to do and say, you would have said it?

Clin. It is necessarily so.

Athen. Did we not hear you saying a little before, that a legislator ought not to suffer poets to say what they please?

[1] I cannot very well understand here *εὐπέτεια*; nor could, I think, Ficinus, who has omitted the word entirely.

[2, 3] Instead of *δὴ ῾πειτα* and *χαλεπή περ*, I have translated as if the Greek were *δὴ ᾽ς πάντα* and *χαλεπὴ πρὶν*—

For they would not know, that by saying what is contrary to the laws, they would injure the state.

Clin. You speak truly.

Athen. If then we should speak in this manner to him in behalf of the poets, would what has been said be in moderation?

Clin. In what manner?

Athen. In this. There is an old story, O legislator, which is constantly told by ourselves, and seems correct to all the rest, that a poet, when he sits on the tripod of the Muse, is then not in his right senses, but, like a fountain, readily permits what comes to it to flow out:[1] and as his art is an imitation, he is (often) compelled, when representing persons placed in situations contrary to each other, to contradict himself frequently, and does not know whether of what is told these or the others are true. But it is not possible for a legislator to act in this manner in the case of a law, namely [2](to say) two (different) things about one thing;[2] but he must always make one assertion about one thing. And do you so consider it from what has been said just now. For in the case of a funeral, one being excessive, and another deficient, and a third moderate, you, having chosen one of these, the moderate, order it, and simply praise it. But if my wife were pre-eminently rich, and should order me to bury her, [3]I would celebrate in a poem her magnificent sepulchre;[3] but on the other hand, a parsimonious and poor man (would praise) a deficient one; but he who possesses moderate means, and is moderate himself (in mind), would praise a moderate one. But you must not talk, as you did just now, when speaking of the moderate; but you must tell us what the moderate is, and of what quantity it is; or do not imagine that a discourse of this kind is a law.

[1] I have translated, as if the Greek were not *ῥεῖν*, but *ἐκρεῖν*, similar to "effundere" in Ficinus.

[2—2] Ficinus has "duo quædam diversa de uno in lege loqui," as if he had found in his MS. *ἐν τῷ νόμῳ δύο περὶ ἑνὸς λέγοντι ἀλλοῖα, ἀλλὰ—*

[3—3] Such is Taylor's translation of the Latin of Ficinus, "in poëmate excedens sepulchrum laudarem." The Greek is *ἐν τῷ ποιήματι τὸν ὑπερβάλλοντα ἂν τάφον ἐπαινοίην*: where Ast, unable to understand *ποιήματι*, suggested *γράμματι*, in allusion to the writing of the will; but Winckelmann prefers *ἐπιστήματι*, referring to ix. p. 958, E.—*λίθινα —ἐπιστήματα*—said of the stone tablet on a tomb. Perhaps Plato wrote

Clin. You speak most true.

[10.] *Athen.* Whether then will he, who is placed by us over the laws, say nothing of this kind at the beginning of his laws, but immediately state what it is meet to do, and what not, and, having threatened a fine, turn himself to another law, and add nothing of exhortation and persuasion [1]to those, for whom the laws are laid down?[1] [2]But as in the case of physicians, one is accustomed on each occasion to attend in this way, and another in that,[2] let us call to mind the method of either, in order that we may beg the legislator, as children do a physician, to cure them in the mildest manner. But what are we saying? There are, surely, we say, some persons physicians, and others the ministers of physicians; and these too we somehow call physicians.

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. And (this too), whether they are free-men, or slaves, and possess the art through the injunctions of their masters, both according to theory and experience, but not by nature, just like free-men, (who)[3] have both learnt the art in this way themselves, and are teaching it to their children?[4] Would you put down these as two kinds of the so-called physicians?

Clin. How not?

Athen. Do you then not perceive that when there are both slaves and free-men sick in cities, the slaves do for the most part go round and cure the slaves, or remain in the medical

ἐν τῷ Πλούτου νοήματι—" with the thoughts of a Plutus." Cousin translates " dans mes vers."

[1]—[1] The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, while Taylor translates τοῖς νομοθετουμένοις, " the legislators," thus confounding the active voice with the passive.

[2]—[2] Ficinus has " Afferamus autem in medium modos medendi duos, quibus alii medici aliter curare consueverunt; ut quemadmodum pueri medicum orant, ut modo quodam facillime eos curet, ita et nos legum latorem—" From which it is evident that his MS. was defective here; or, if as full as the others, that he did not know how to make sense of the passage. After θεραπεύειν, Cornarius proposed to insert καὶ αὐτὸς οὕτως ποιήσει. Ast, however, conceives that a question put by Clinias, has been lost, while Bekker is content to place a dash after θεραπεύειν, to mark an aposiopesis. Stalbaum says the passage is corrupt, and requires correction.

[3] Ficinus has " sicuti liberi, qui," which leads to what the syntax requires, ἐλεύθεροι, οἳ—

[4] From this it would seem that in Greece the medical art was frequently hereditary; although occasionally a slave was taught his master's trade.

shops; and that not one of such physicians either give or receive any reason respecting each of the diseases of each of the slaves, but, as if knowing accurately from experience, orders, as if he were a self-willed tyrant, what seems good to him; and then goes away, bounding off from one sick domestic to another; and by this means affords a facility to his master of attending to (other) patients? But the freeborn physician, for the most part, attends to and reflects upon the diseases of the freeborn; and, by exploring them from the beginning, and according to nature, and communing with both the patient himself and his friends, does, at the same time, learn something himself from the sick, and at the same time teach him, as far as he can, something, and does not order him any thing until he has persuaded him of its propriety; and then, after rendering the patient gentle by persuasion, endeavours to finish the business by bringing him (back)[1] to health. Which of these is the better physician? he who cures in this way or in that? [2][and which is the better exerciser? he who exercises in this way or that?][2] he, who effects his single power in a twofold manner, or he, who works it out in one way, and in the worse and the more rustic of the two?

Clin. The twofold, O guest, is surely the superior.

Athen. Are you willing then for us to look into this twofold and simple method, as it exists in legislation?

Clin. How am I not willing?

[11.] *Athen.* Come then, by the gods, (and state) what law will the legislator first lay down? Will he not, according to nature, regulate by his ordinances first the commencement of generation[3] relating to states?

Clin. How not?

Athen. Is not the connexion by and communion of marriages the commencement of generation in all cities?

[1] In *ἀεὶ*, which is found, without any meaning, before *παρασκενάζων*, lies hid, I suspect, *αὖ*, which should be placed after *ὑγίειαν*.

[2]—[2] Unless the word *γυμναστὴς* is to be taken in the sense of the English "practitioner," applied to a medical man, one would suspect the words *καὶ γυμναστὴς γυμνάζων* to be an interpolation; for not a word had been said, nor even an allusion made to the exerciser previously; although it is true that amongst the ancients there was such a connexion between the professors of the medical and gymnastic arts, that the two were sometimes found united in the same person. See Sydenham on the Rivals, § 3, n. 33.

[3] I have with Ast omitted *περὶ* before *γενέσεως*. For Ficinus has "generationis—principium."

Clin. How not?

Athen. The laws then of marriage being first laid down correctly, seem to be laid down for correct conduct in every state.

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. Let us then first speak of the simple law, which would perhaps exist somehow in this way; that a man is to marry when he is from thirty to thirty-five years old; but if he does not, that he should be fined both in money and with the loss of political privileges;[1] in money to this or that amount, and in disfranchisement of this or that kind. Let this then be the simple law respecting marriages; but this the twofold; that a man is to marry from thirty to thirty-five years old, considering that the human race has in some measure partaken naturally of immortality, of which every one has naturally every desire.[2] For to become famous, and not to lie when dead without a name, is the desire of a person of this kind. The human race then is a thing connected with all time, and follows and will follow it to the end, becoming in this manner immortal through that, which is ever the same and one, partaking by generation of immortality, in consequence of its leaving[3] children's children. Now for a man to deprive himself willingly of this, is by no means holy; and he intentionally deprives himself of this, who has no care for children and a wife. He, therefore, who obeys this law would depart without a fine. But let him, on the other hand, who does not obey it, and does not marry when he is thirty-five years of age, be fined yearly so and so, in order that his solitary life may not seem to bring him gain and an easy state; nor let him share in those honours, which the younger in the state pay on every occasion to the elder. It is then in the power of a person, who hears this law compared with that, to form an idea of each particular law, whether it ought to become in this way double, and the longest[4] in length

[1] Such is the real meaning of *ἀτιμία* in Greek, not simply "dishonour," but what in one word would be "disfranchisement," wholly or in part.

[2] A similar sentiment is to be found in the Banquet, § 32.

[3] Instead of *καταλειπόμενον* the passive participle, which has no meaning here, Ficinus found in his MS. *καταλεῖπον*, as shown by his "relinquendo," unless it be said that *καταλειπόμενον* is in the middle voice.

[4] Instead of *σμικρότατον*, which is perfectly unintelligible, Ast suggests, what I have adopted, *μακρότατον*—

through its mingling threats with persuasions; or by employing threats alone, it ought to become simple in length.

Megil. It is the Laconic practice, O guest, to prefer ever the shorter method. But should any one order me to become a judge of such enactments, which of the two I would wish to be written and laid down for a state, I would prefer the longer; and as regards every law according to this model, if two such were proposed, I should make the same choice. It is, however, requisite that the present legislation should be agreeable to Clinias; for his is the state, which is now thinking of making use of laws of this kind.

Clin. Well have you spoken, Megillus.

[12.] *Athen.* To take any account of enactments either prolix or brief is very silly. [1]For we must honour, I conceive, the best, but not the shortest, nor (look to) their length.[1] But, in the laws which we have just now spoken of, one differs from the other not by the double alone as regards the value of their use; but that, which was said just now, respecting the twofold kind of physicians, was most properly adduced. To this point however no legislator seems at any time to have given a thought, that, when it is possible to make use of two things in legislation, persuasion and force, they employ the other alone,[2] as far as is possible, against the masses unexperienced in education. For they legislate, not mingling a fight[3] with force, but (employing) unmingled violence alone. But I, O blessed men, perceive that a third thing likewise ought to exist with regard to laws, but which does not exist at present.

Clin. Of what kind are you speaking?

Athen. Of something, which has arisen, through a certain god-send, out of the matters we have just now discussed. For

[1]—[1] Ficinus, whom Taylor follows to the letter, has more elegantly "non enim brevissima aut longissima sed optima sunt, ut arbitror, eligenda."

[2] If τῷ ἑτέρῳ is to be referred to βία it should be τῇ ἑτέρᾳ. But Plato wrote, I suspect, τῷ βιαιοτέρῳ τρόπῳ, "the more violent method."

[3] In lieu of μάχην, which is perfectly unintelligible, Ast would read ἀνάγκην; but Winckelmann on Plutarch Amator. p. 233, διδαχήν, referring to Plato in Tim. p. 51, E., τὸ μὲν—διὰ διδαχῆς, τὸ δὲ ὑπὸ πειθοῦς. Epist. vii. p. 332, A., πειθοῖ καὶ διδαχῇ. Ficinus has "minas," as if he had found in his MS. ἀπειλήν— Cousin defends μάχην by saying that it means the same as ἀνάγκην, and is sufficiently well opposed to πειθώ. Badham on Euripid. Helen. 907, suggests ἀρχήν—

from the time when we began to speak about laws in the morning, mid-day has now arrived; and we have been in this very beautiful retreat discoursing upon no other topic than laws. But we seem to me to be just now beginning to speak about laws; and that all before has been a prelude to laws.[1] Now why have I mentioned this? It is because I wished to say, that in all discourses, and whatever else partake of a vocal sound, there are both preludes and, as it were, movements backwards and forwards,[2] that possess some artificial handling, useful to that which is about to be gone through. And, indeed, of the laws, as they are called, of guitar-songs and of every kind of music, preludes are laid down composed with wondrous care. But of laws really so, which we say are political, no one has ever at any time made any mention of their preludes, nor, as being a composer, has he brought it to light, as if it did not naturally exist. But our present discussion, as it seems to me, indicates that it does exist; and the laws, which were just now mentioned as twofold, have seemed to be[3] not surely thus twofold simply, but there (have seemed) to be some two things, law and a prelude to a law; but the tyrannical injunction, which was spoken of as being similar to the orders of slave-physicians, (has appeared) to be an unmingled law; but that, which was spoken of prior to this, and called persuasive by this person here, (seemed) to be in reality persuasive, but to have the power of a prelude, relating to discourses. For in order that the person, to whom the legislator addresses his law, may receive kindly, and, through his kindness, with more docility, the injunction, which is the law, on this account the whole of this discourse has appeared to me to have been spoken; [4]which the speaker has spoken persuading.[4] Hence, according to my reasoning, this very thing

[1] Cicero de Legg. ii. 7, 16, "Habes legis proœmium; sic enim appellat Plato."

[2] By *ἀνακινήσεις*, says Ast, are meant the movements of the arms which a boxer especially adopts, previous to his striking a blow; and he refers appositely to Aristotle Rhetor. iii. 14, *οὐδὲν προεξαγκωνίσας οὐδὲ προανακινήσας εὐθὺς ἄρχεται*, and the notes of Victorius on that passage.

[3] To support the syntax of *εἶναι*, Ast would supply here *κατεφάνησαν* from *κατεφάνη*, found a little below. But all the infinitives here depend rather upon *ἔδοξαν*.

[4—4] I confess I cannot understand *ὃν πείθων εἶπεν ὁ λέγων*: nor could, I think, Ficinus, whose version is "quæ ad persuadendum est inducta."

would be properly called a prelude to a law, but not a discussion of it. What then, after saying this, should I wish to be stated subsequently? It is this; [1]that the legislator ought ever prior to all laws to make them not without a share of preludes; and as regards each law, in so far as they differ from themselves, as much as the two just now mentioned have differed.[1]

Clin. For my part,[2] I would never exhort[2] a man, skilled in these things, to lay down laws in any other manner.

Athen. You appear therefore to me, O Clinias, to speak correctly, so far that there is a prelude to all laws; and that it is requisite for a person commencing the business of legislation, to prefer to every discourse a preface, that is natural to each. For that, which is to be said after this, is not a thing of little moment, nor is it a trifling difference, whether they are stated clearly or not clearly. However, if we should enjoin upon legislators to make a prelude equally about what are called great and small laws, we should not speak[3] correctly. For this is not to be done either in every song or in every discourse; since, though it naturally belongs to all, yet it is not to be used for all; and a thing of this kind is to be allowed to the orator, the lyric singer, and the legislator.

Clin. You appear to me to speak most true. But let us make a no further exercise of delay, but return to the question, and begin, if it is agreeable to you, from those points, which you did, as a person not preluding, speak of at that time. Again then, as persons say, when playing,[4] since second things are better, let us turn up and back[5] from the be-

[1]—[1] Here again I am quite at a loss; and so is Ast; who has however suggested some slight alterations, from which nothing is gained.

[2]—[2] So Ficinus translates correctly *τό γ' ἐμὸν οὐκ ἂν—διακελεύοιτο—*

[3] Ficinus has "si—jubeamus, non recte jubebimus," in Greek *εἰ—προστάττοιμεν, οὐκ ἂν ὀρθῶς προστάττοιμεν*, which would be more in the manner of Plato, who is generally wont in this formula to repeat the same verb.

[4] The Scholiast says that the proverb alluded to has reference to persons making a second sacrifice, after the omens in the first have proved unfavourable; but this idea is disproved at once by the introduction of the word *παίζοντες*. There is a somewhat similar proverb in Phileb. p. 60, A. § 140, *τὸ καὶ δὶς καὶ τρὶς τό γε καλῶς ἔχον ἐπαναπολεῖν τῷ λόγῳ δεῖν*.

[5] The verb *ἐπαναπολεῖν* has two metaphorical meanings, one applied to turning up the soil, and causing that which was previously under to

ginning, as finishing a prelude, and not an accidental discourse, as just now. Let us take then their commencement[1] acknowledging that we are preluding. And what has been just now stated, respecting the honours to be paid to the gods, and the attention due to ancestors, is sufficient. But let us endeavour to speak about what is next in order, until it shall appear to you that the whole prelude has been spoken of sufficiently. And after this you will go through detailing the laws themselves.

Athen. About the gods, then, and those that come after them,[2] and parents, both when living and dead, we made sufficiently then a prelude, as we call it now; but the portion that still remains of this kind of a subject, you appear to exhort me to lead forth into the light.

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. And after these matters, how it is necessary for persons to keep their souls, and bodies, and substance with reference to serious pursuits and remissions (of labour), and fitting too for both the speaker and the hearers to ruminate[3] in common, and to become, to the utmost of their power, successful in attaining instruction. These very matters then must in reality[4] be spoken of and heard by us after those.

Clin. You speak most correctly.

come to the top, as persons do when digging or ploughing; and the other to the act of ruminating, when an animal throws up the cud from the stomach to the mouth, where it is rolled about and turned over. But as neither sense seems suited to this place, I have translated the word literally, "turn up and back," for the allusion is probably to some sport, of which nothing is known at present.

[1] I cannot understand λάβωμεν αὐτῶν ἀρχὴν, nor could, I suspect, Ficinus; whose version is "incipiamus" merely, which Taylor has translated. I could have understood "Let us lay down a foundation for other (laws)," in Greek, βάλωμεν ἄλλων ἀρχὴν—for thus "the others" would be opposed to those relating to the gods.

[2] Namely the Dæmons and heroes, see § 8.

[3] I have adopted this word, found in its metaphorical sense in Shakspeare, as the ordinary meaning of the Greek ἀναπεμπάζεσθαι; but I conceive that the other sense, "to reckon up," as persons do on their five fingers, is what Plato here intended; and if so, πάντα must be inserted before ἀναπεμπαζομένους.

[4] Instead of ὄντως, which I cannot understand, the sense seems to require οὕτως, "thus."

BOOK V.

[1.] *Athen.* Let every one then hear, who has already heard what we have said respecting the gods, and our dear progenitors. For a man's soul is, after the gods, the most divine of all his possessions, as being most his own. Now the whole of a man's possessions are altogether twofold. The more powerful and the better are the lords, but the weaker and worse, the slaves. Of those then that are his the lord must always be held in honour before the slaves. Hence after the gods, who are lords, and those that follow next to them, I properly exhort a person [1] to honour his own soul by speaking of it as the second in rank. But not one, so to say, honours his soul properly, although he appears (to do so). For honour is somehow a divine good; but of things that are evil not one is honourable. He then, who fancies that he shall enlarge his soul by certain discourses or gifts or certain yieldings, and yet does not make it better from being worse, appears indeed to honour it, but by no means does so. For instance, [2]every boy on becoming a man thinks himself competent to know all things,[2] and that he honours his soul by praising it, and he freely permits it to do whatever it pleases. But [3]we now say[3] that he, who acts so, injures and does not honour (his soul). And yet it is necessary, as we have said, (to honour) it in the second rank after the gods. Nor, when a man does not consider himself, but others, as the cause of his own errors and of ills the most in number and magnitude, and ever exempts himself as free from blame, is he honouring his own soul, as he forsooth fancies; for he is far from doing so; since he injures it; nor when [4]contrary to

[1] Instead of *δεῖν*, which I cannot understand, I have translated as if the Greek were *τινι*— It came from *δεῖ—δευτέραν* a little below.

[2—2] Such was the case of Menexenus, it would seem, and of Melitus. See Menex. § 1, n. 7.

[3—3] Taylor has adopted "nos dicimus," found in Ficinus; whose MS. probably read *λέγομεν*, not *λεγόμενον*. Hence we may read *ὃ δὲ νῦν λέγομεν ἔννοι*, i. e. what we intellectual people say; for *τὸ δὲ νῦν λεγόμενόν ἐστιν* would mean "there is now said as a proverb."

[4—4] So Ficinus from his MS. probably. The others read *παρὰ λόγον τὸν τοῦ νομοθέτου καὶ ἔπαινον*.

reason, and the praise of the legislator,[4] he indulges in pleasures, does he honour it all; but he dishonours it, by filling it with vice and repentance. Nor yet when, on the contrary, he does not thoroughly labour by bearing up against exertions that receive praise, and against fears and pains, but sinks under them; for [1] by sinking he then dishonours it; for he causes it to be in dishonour by doing all these acts.[1] Nor does he honour it, when he thinks that to live is altogether a good: for then too he dishonours it. For while his soul imagines that every thing in Hades is evil, he yields, nor does he strive against it by teaching and convincing it that it does not know whether, on the contrary, that, what relates to the gods there is not the greatest of all good to us. Nor yet, when any one honours beauty before virtue, is this any other thing than truly and wholly a dishonour to the soul. For such an assertion falsely proclaims that the body is more houourable than the soul. For nothing born of earth is more honourable than what is in Olympus; and he, who thinks otherwise of the soul, is ignorant that he is careless of this wonderful possession. Nor when a person, who desires to possess wealth not honourably, or when possessing (unjustly),[2] does not bear it ill, does he then honour his soul with gifts? He fails[3] of it entirely. For he sells what is honourable and at the same time beautiful in his soul for a little gold; for all the gold both on the earth and under the earth is of no value against virtue. And, to speak comprehensively, he, who is neither willing by every contrivance to abstain from such things, as the legislator numbers up and ranks amongst the disgraceful and bad, nor, on the other hand, to pursue to the utmost of his power the good and the honourable, does not perceive that, in all these cases, he treats his soul, which is a thing the most divine, with the greatest dishonour, and in the most unseemly manner. For not one, so to

[1]—[1] Ficinus, whom Taylor follows, has merely "hæc enim agens omnia animum suum dedecorat," rejecting *τότε οὐ τιμᾷ ὑπείκων*, words certainly quite unnecessary.

[2] Ficinus alone has "possidens injuste," thus preserving the very word required by the train of thought. Hence we must insert *κακῶς* before *κτώμενος*.

[3] The Greek is *παντὸς μὲν οὖν λείπει· τὸ γὰρ αὐτῆς*— But in this formula, as remarked correctly by Ast, *λείπει* is not elsewhere found. It is always *δεῖ*. Hence we may read *παντὸς μὲν οὖν δεῖ· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ αὐτῆς*.—

say, considers what is the greatest of the so-called[1] punishment for evil conduct. Now the greatest is in the becoming similar to bad men; and by becoming similar, to avoid good men and good discourses, and to be cut off from them, but to be glued to (the bad),[2] while [3]pursuing according to their intercourse;[3] and sticking close to such persons, he must of necessity do and suffer what such persons naturally do and say to each other. Such a state then is not one of justice, for the beautiful is just [and justice],[4] but of punishment, the attendant on a state[5] of injustice, with which both he, who does meet, and he, who does not meet, are miserable; the one in not being cured; the other in being destroyed, in order that many may be saved. But to us it is an honour, to speak generally, to follow the better and to make the worse, still[6] capable of becoming better, the best possible.

[2.] There is not then a possession belonging to a man more naturally fitted, than the soul, to flying from evil, and [7]to tracking out and taking[7] what is of all things the best; nor, when it has taken it, to associate with it for the rest of life. Hence it has been ranked second in honour; but the third—every one will understand this at least—is the honour, according to nature, of the body. It is however requisite to consider these honours, which of them are genuine, and which with a false stamp. [8]Now this is the business of a legislator. And he appears to me to point out that they are these and some such as these;[8] that the body is honourable, not when it pos-

[1] Ficinus, probably unable, like myself, to understand *τὴν λεγομένην*, has "maximam enim secundum Justitiam ultionem—"

[2] Ficinus alone has "improbis," what the antithesis requires.

[3—3] The Greek is *διώκοντα κατὰ τὰς ξυνουσίας*, which is, I believe, equally at variance with sense and syntax, that united require *διώκοντα τὰ ἀκόλαστα τῆς ξυνουσίας*, i. e. "while pursuing the licentiousness of an intercourse with them."

[4] The words *ἡ δίκη* are plainly an explanation of *τὸ δίκαιον*.

[5] As Plato had just before used *πάθος*, he could not possibly have written *πάθη*: which Ast says is put for *πάθημα*. One MS. has *πάθει*, governed by *ἀκόλουθος*: and so I have translated.

[6] The Greek is *αὐτὸ τοῦτο*, words I cannot understand; nor could, I suspect, Ficinus; for he has omitted them. Plato probably wrote *δυνατὰ ἔτ' ὄντα*—as I have translated; while in *δὲ*, before *βελτίω*, lies hid *ἤδη*—

[7—7] Ficinus, followed by Taylor, has "ad investigandum eligendumque."

[8—8] Ficinus, supplying perhaps what was partly wanting in his MS., has "quorum differentia a legislatore declaranda mihi videtur."

sesses beauty, or strength, or swiftness, or size, or health—although this would seem so to many—nor even when it possesses the contraries to these. But those things which, being in the middle, touch upon the whole of this possessing,[1] are by far the most moderate and safe.[2] For the former cause the soul to be puffed up and confident, but the latter humble and servile. And similarly situated is the possession of [3]money and means,[3] according to the same measure of valuation.[4] For an excess in the bulk of all these things produces enmity and revolts, both in states and amongst individuals; but a deficiency (produces) slavery for the most part. Let not then any one be desirous of riches for the sake of his children, in order that he may leave them very wealthy; for this is better neither for them nor the state. For the substance of the young is not the prey of flatterers; and if it is not in want of the necessaries of life, it is the most harmonious and the best of all. For by its harmony and fitness in all things it renders our life free from pain. It is meet then to leave to children abundance of modesty, not of gold. And we think we [5]shall accomplish this[5] by reproving impudent young men, when they act shamelessly. This, however, is not effected by the exhortation given at present to young men; which persons give by saying that it is meet to be modest in every thing; but a prudent legislator will rather advise old men to feel a shame before the young; and above all things to take care, that no young person, at any time, either sees or hears them doing or saying any thing base; since where old men are shameless, there too must young men of necessity be the most impudent; for the most excellent education both of the young and of themselves is, not in giving advice, but in being seen to do through the whole of life, what a person would say, while giving advice to another. But he who honours and venerates his relationship and the whole communion [6] of family gods, that possess the nature of

[1] In ἕξις there is an allusion to the preceding ἔχον.

[2] Ficinus has, what Stephens preferred, "moderatiora tutioraque."

[3—3] In Greek χρήματα and κτήματα differ as in English "personal" and "real" property.

[4] I have followed Cornarius and Ast in rejecting καὶ before τιμήσεως.

[5—5] So Taylor follows the version of Ficinus, "id nos facturos," instead of the Greek, τοῦτο καταλείψειν, "will leave this—"

[6—6] Ficinus has, more briefly, "et universam sub iisdem penatibus generis communionem."

the same blood,[6] will have, according to reason, the gods who preside over births favourably disposed towards him for the procreation of children. And moreover, he will obtain the kind feeling of friends and associates in the intercourse of life, by considering their attentions to himself as of a greater and more respectful kind than they do; but his own favours to them less than his friends and associates do themselves. As regards, however, the state and fellow-citizens, he is by far the best, who prefers before the contests at Olympia and all in war and peace, to be victorious in the glory of being the servant of the laws at home, [1][as having been subservient to them][1] in a manner the most beautiful of all men through (the whole of)[2] life. We must consider too the laws of intercourse[3] with strangers to be matters of the most holy kind. For nearly all the delinquencies of strangers towards strangers depend more upon an avenging deity [4]than do those in the case of fellow-citizens.[4] For a stranger being destitute of companions and kindred, is an object of greater pity both to men and gods. He therefore, who is more able to take vengeance, is more ready to assist. Now the [5]Dæmon of each person, and the god of hospitality, are as the attendants upon Zeus, who presides over strangers, powerful in the greatest degree. It is then a matter of much caution for a person, to whom there is even a little portion of forethought, to proceed on to the end of life, without having committed any error with regard to strangers. But,

[1]—[1] The words *ὡς ὑπηρετηκὼς* are evidently an explanation of *ὑπηρεσίας*.

[2] In *αὐτοῖς* lies hid *πάντως*—the origin of "totam" in Ficinus, whom Taylor has tacitly followed.

[3] The Greek is *συμβόλαια*, derived from *σύμβολον*, "a symbol," which was a piece of metal, wood, or leather, cut into two corresponding parts, one of which was retained by a person who had formed an acquaintance with a stranger, and the other by the stranger himself. The bearer of the symbol, whether one of the original parties, or a friend of theirs, was entitled, on presenting it, to the rights of hospitality, which were considered to be of the most sacred kind, and not to acknowledge them was a crime of the deepest dye.

[4]—[4] I have translated as if the Greek were *ἢ τὰ περὶ τῶν πολιτῶν*, not *παρὰ τὰ τῶν πολιτῶν*—which would require the addition of *εἰς πολίτας*. Ficinus has "præ illis, quæ inter cives committuntur."

[5] I have translated as if the Greek were *ἑκάστων δαίμων καὶ θεὸς ὁ ξένιος τῷ ξενίῳ*—not *ὁ ξένιος ἑκάστων δαίμων καὶ θεὸς τῷ ξενίῳ*— For *ὁ ξένιος* ought to precede *τῷ ξενίῳ*, as shown by the mass of passages collected by others and myself on Æsch. Suppl. 139.

of all the crimes done by strangers and denizens, the greatest is that which takes place in the case of each towards suppliants. For the god, with whom the suppliant happens to have met, as a witness to agreements made with a suppliant, becomes himself pre-eminently the guardian of the sufferer.[1] [2]So that no one, who injures suppliants, will go unpunished.[2]

[3.] Thus then have we nearly gone through the modes of intercourse[3] relating to parents, and to a person himself, and the things belonging to him, and those relating to the state, and friends, and kinsmen, and strangers, and natives. But as to what follows how a person by being what can best pass through life, (it is meet)[4] to detail, not what a law, but what praise and blame may, by teaching individuals, render them more obedient to the rein, and more kindly disposed to the laws about to be established. These then are the matters we must subsequently speak of. Now truth is the leader of every good both to gods and men; of which he, who is about to be blessed and fortunate, should participate immediately from the beginning, in order that for the greatest length of time he may live a person of truth. For he is trust-worthy; but he is not trust-worthy, by whom a voluntary falsehood is loved; while he, by whom an involuntary one is so, is a senseless person; of which states neither is an object of envy. For he, who is not trust-worthy and untaught, is unloved; and as time progresses towards morose old age, he becomes known, and at the end of life has prepared for himself a solitude complete; so that, whether his associates and children are alive or not, his life becomes nearly equally an orphanhood. He however who

[1] Ficinus has "deus enim, per quem supplex fœdus est consecutus, diligentissimus ejus est custos." For he could not understand, nor can I, the Greek, *μεθ' οὗ γὰρ ἱκέτευσας μάρτυρος ὁ ἱκέτης θεοῦ ἔτυχεν ὁμολογιῶν, φύλαξ διαφέρων οὗτος τοῦ παθόντος γίγνεται.* But by merely changing *ἱκετεύσας* into *ἱκετεύσαντι* all will become quite plain, as is shown by the translation.

[2]—[2] Such is Taylor's translation of the Latin of Ficinus, "quare nullus in supplices sceleratus impunis abibit." The Greek is literally, "so that he, who has met with (the god), will not suffer, what he has suffered, unavenged."

[3] This is the only way of translating literally *ὁμιλήματα*. Ficinus has "officia—"

[4] For the sake of the syntax and sense, we must suppose that *δεῖ* has dropt out before *διεξελθεῖν*, as I have translated. Ficinus, being equally at a loss, has omitted *ἑπόμενον τούτῳ*, and so after him has Taylor.

does no injury is held in honour; but he, who does not suffer the unjust to act unjustly, deserves more than double the honour of the former person. For the former has a value equal to one man; but the latter to many others,[1] by pointing out to the rulers the injustice of the rest. But let him, who unites with the rulers in inflicting punishments to the utmost of his power, be proclaimed the great man in a state, and the complete victor, if ever one was,[2] in virtue. The very same praise it is meet to proclaim of temperance and prudence; and the person, who possesses other goods, that have a power not only for him to possess them himself, but to share them with others, it is meet to honour, as being at the tip-top (of excellence); but him, who is unable, although willing, to put aside in the second rank; and to blame indeed the man who is envious and unwilling through friendship[3] to be a sharer of any of his good things with any one; but not to hold a jot the more in dishonour his possession on account of the possessor, but to acquire it with all one's might. Let then every one contend with us for virtue unstintingly. For such a person advances a state by striving himself, and not cutting down others through calumny. But the envious man, while he thinks to become the superior by detracting from others, tends less himself to true virtue, and makes his competitors disheartened through their being blamed unjustly; and by these means causing the whole state to be untrained for the contests of virtue, he renders it, as far as he can, of less account as regards its renown. It is proper, moreover, for every man to possess a spirit, and yet to be as mild as possible. For it is not possible to avoid the unjust acts of others, which are harsh and difficult to be cured, or entirely incurable, otherwise than by fighting and conquering, after defending oneself, and by remitting nothing, when in the act of punishing. Now to do this every soul is unable, without possessing a noble spirit.

With respect to the acts of those, who do an injury that admits of a cure, it is requisite to know, in the first place,

[1] The Greek is *ἑτέρων*: but one would have expected here *ἄλλων*, as in the very words of Homer, *πολλῶν ἀντάξιος ἄλλων*, which Plato had in mind. Ficinus however omits *ἑτέρων*—

[2] In lieu of *οὗτος*, which is never said in praise of a person, correct language requires *εἴ τις*, as I have translated

[3] Instead of *διὰ φιλίας*, the sense evidently requires *δι' ἀφιλίας*, "through a want of friendship."

[1]that no unjust man is voluntarily unjust.[1] For no one would at any time willingly possess any of the greatest evils, and least of all in the case of the most honoured belonging to himself. Now the soul, as we have said, is in truth a thing the most honoured by all. No one, therefore, would at any time voluntarily receive the greatest evil in the thing most honoured, and live through the whole of life possessing it. But the unjust man and he who has what are evils, is in every respect an object of pity. It is proper, however, to pity him, who has an evil that is curable, and to restrain and soften down one's anger, and not, like a woman with an excess of passion, to continue embittered against him. But it is meet to let loose one's anger against a person incontinently[2] sinful, and past all exhortation depraved. On which account we have said that the good man ought to be conspicuous[3] for possessing a spirit, and yet to be on each occasion mild.

[4.] But of all evils the greatest is implanted in the souls of the major part of mankind; for which, while each one is giving himself a pardon, he devises no plan for avoiding it. And this is what people[4] say; that every man is naturally a friend to himself, and that it is well for a thing of this kind to be necessarily so. But, in truth, the cause of all his mistakes arises to each man, upon each occasion, through the violent love of self. For the lover is blinded with respect to the object loved.[5] So that he judges improperly of things just, and good, and beautiful, through thinking that he ought always to honour what belongs to himself in preference to truth. For it is necessary that he, who is to be a great man, should love neither himself, nor the things belonging to himself, but what is just, whether it happens to be done by himself or by another

[1]—[1] On this celebrated saying of Plato, Ast refers to a mass of writers, who have alluded to it.

[2] In lieu of *ἀκρατῶς* Ast would read *ἀνιάτως*, as the antithesis to *ἰάσιμα*. Ficinus too has "qui autem ita sunt flagitiosi, ut incurabiles sint."

[3] Stephens would reject *πρέπειν*, omitted by Ficinus; while Ast would read *θυμοειδῆ, εἰ πρέπει*, "if fitting—"

[4] Since the time of Plato, not only the people, but philosophers likewise have said the same, as may be seen in Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments. Aristotle however, in Polit. ii. 2, says *τὸ φίλαυτον εἶναι ψέγεσθαι δικαίως*.

[5] To this doctrine of Plato allusion is made, says Ast, by Plutarch, Galen, and Longinus.

person rather.[1] From this very same mistake it has come to pass in all cases that his ignorance appears to a person to be a wisdom peculiarly his own. Hence, although we know, so to say, nothing, we fancy we know every thing; but, by not permitting others to do that, of which we ourselves are ignorant, we are compelled to make mistakes through doing it ourselves. On this account every man ought to avoid the vehement love of himself, and ever[2] to follow one better than himself, without placing, in a matter of this kind, a feeling of shame in the foreground. But what are of less importance than these, and mentioned frequently, and not less useful than these, it is proper for a person to remind himself of and to state. For, as something is always flowing away from us, it is necessary for something on the contrary to be flowing (to us). Now recollection[3] is the influx of thoughts, which had left us. On which account[4] it is meet to abstain from ill-timed laughter, and tears; and for every man to announce to every man that he must endeavour, by concealing[5] all excessive joy and all[5] excessive sorrow, to preserve a decent bearing,[6] each person, while his Dæmon is standing steadily, going on successfully or unsuccessfully to places on high and steep, while Dæmons are opposing

[1] This *μᾶλλον* is found rather strangely here. It should follow *ἀλλὰ* or *τὰ δίκαια*—

[2] Instead of ΔΕΙ, which is unnecessary after *χρὴ*, Plato evidently wrote ΑΕΙ, as I have translated.

[3] On the Platonic doctrine relating to memory, see the Phædrus, p. 72, E., and Meno, p. 81, D.

[4] Unless I am greatly mistaken, something is wanting here to unite what now appears to be very disjointed.

[5]—[5] By merely placing *πᾶσαν* before *περιωδυνίαν*, instead of after *περιχάρειαν*, we shall get rid of the difficulty, which Stephens and Ast could not master, nor Orelli, who proposed to read *κοάλεμον* for *ὅλην*, nor Winckelmann, who suggests *ἄλλην*—

[6]—[6] Such I conceive to be the meaning of this difficult passage, where the Greek is at present *κατά τε εὐπραγίας ἱσταμένου τοῦ δαίμονος ἑκάστου καὶ κατὰ τύχας οἷον πρὸς ὑψηλὰ καὶ ἀνάντη δαιμόνων ἀνθισταμένων τισὶ πράξεσι*. But from the preceding mention of excessive joy and excessive sorrow, it is evident that as *εὐπραγίας* is to be referred to *περιχάρειαν*, so must *τύχας* be referred to *περιωδυνίαν*. Hence for *κατὰ τύχας*, I suspect, Plato wrote *κατ' ἀτυχίας*: while for the syntax and sense united *τε* has been changed into *γε*, *ἑκάστου* into *ἕκαστον*, *καὶ* into *ἤ*, *οἷον* into *ἰόντα* and *πράξεσι* into *ταράξεσιν*: unless it be said that after *οἷον* there has dropt out *Σίσυφον* and *ἰόντα* after *ἀνάντη*. With regard to *ἱσταμένου*, that verb is applied to a wind, which when it blows steadily from any quarter is said to stand, as in Thucyd. ii. 97, *κατὰ πρύμναν ἱστῆται τὸ πνεῦμα*.

with certain disturbances ;[6] and that it is meet ever[1] to hope that the deity will, when troubles fall upon the good state,[2] which he has given, make them less instead of greater, and (cause) a change from the present state to a better one ; and with respect to [3][good things][3] the contraries of these, that they will always be present to them[4] with good fortune. In these hopes it is meet for every one to live, and in the recollection of all these things to be sparing on no point, but ever amidst serious and sportive occupations to remind another and himself clearly.[5]

[5.] Now then there have been mentioned nearly (all), as far as divine things are concerned, respecting the pursuits, to which every one ought to attend, and respecting each individual himself, of what kind he ought to be ; but matters relating to man have not been at present spoken of. But it is necessary (to speak of them) : for we are conversing with men, and not with gods. Now pleasures, and pains, and desires, are naturally in the highest degree human ; on which it is necessary for the whole mortal animal to hang, as it were, [6][and to be suspended][6] with the greatest earnestness. It is requisite then to praise the most beautiful life, not only because by its form it is superior, as regards fair renown ; but because, if any one is willing to taste of it, and not, as being young, to become a deserter from it, it excels in that too, of which we all are in search, (I mean) the possessing more of joy and less of sorrow through the whole of life. That this will be clearly the case, if any one tastes of it correctly, will readily and vehemently appear. Now what is this correctness ? This it is requisite to ascertain from the reasoning, and to consider whether it is produced according to nature in this way, or in another, contrary to nature. It is requisite therefore to consider in this manner one life, as compared with another, if it be more pleasant and more pain-

[1] Ficinus has "sperare semper—debent." He therefore found in his MS. *ἐλπίζειν δὲ ἀεὶ δεῖν*, not merely *ἐλπίζειν δὲ ἀεὶ*—

[2] I have followed Cornarius and Ast in considering *τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς* to be governed by *ἐμπιπτόντων*, and in that case *τὸν θεὸν* must precede, not follow, *τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς*.

[3—3] The words *τὰ ἀγαθὰ* are evidently an explanation of *τὰ ἐναντία*.

[4] Instead of *αὐτοῖς*, which has nothing to which it can be referred, one would prefer *ἀγαθοῖς*.

[5] In lieu of *σαφῶς* the sense requires *σοφῶς*, "wisely."

[6—6] I must leave for others to explain, what I cannot, the difference between *ἐξηρτῆσθαι* and *ἐκκρεμαμένον εἶναι*. Nor could, I suspect, Ficinus ; who has merely "quasi pendere—"

ful. We wish for pleasure to be present with us; but we neither choose nor wish for pain. But what is neither the one or the other we do not wish for in the place of pleasure; but we do wish for it to be exchanged in the place of pain. We wish too for less pain with more pleasure; but we do not wish for less pleasure with greater pain. But we can show clearly that we do not wish to possess each of these, equal in the place of equals. All these differ in multitude and magnitude and intensity and equality, and in whatever things are the contrary to all these, with respect to wishing; but [1] with respect to the choice of each,[1] they do not differ. Since then these things have been thus arranged by necessity, we wish for that life, in which the many and great and intense of each kind exist, but in which pleasures exceed; but we do not wish for that life, in which the contraries to these exist. And on the other hand, the life in which things few and little and quiet exist, but in which pains exceed, we do not wish for; but we wish for that life in which the contraries to these exist. [2] And again, the life, in which the balance is equal, as we said before, it is meet to consider as an equal-balanced life;[2] since we wish for the life, which exceeds [3] in what is agreeable to us; but we do not wish for that (which exceeds) in what is disagreeable.[4] Now it is necessary to consider all our lives as naturally bound up in these; and [5] [it is necessary to consider] [5] what kind (of lives) we naturally wish for. And if we say,

[1]—[1] As the words *πρὸς βούλησιν* and *πρὸς αἵρεσιν* have the same meaning, Ast would place *πρὸς αἵρεσιν ἑκάστων* in the next sentence before *ἐξ ἀνάγκης*—But see just before *οὔθ' αἱρούμεθα οὔτε βουλόμεθα*.

[2]—[2] Ficinus has more briefly, "si autem æqualia sunt, de æquali vita, ut diximus, cogitandum;" while Taylor translates *ἰσορροπεῖ* by "these possess equal power." Plato wrote, I suspect, *ἰσορροπεῖ πάντα καθ' ἑκάτερα τὰ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν*,—"all are balanced according to either of the things previously stated," namely, pleasure and pain.

[3] The Greek is *τῶν ὑπερβαλλόντων—τῶν δ' αὖ*—But as the genitive is without regimen, Ast suggests *τὸν ὑπερβάλλοντα—τὸν δ' αὖ*—to agree with *βίον* understood, and so Taylor had already translated. I should prefer *τὰ τῶν ὑπερβαλλόντων*— Ficinus has "volumus enim, quæ illo excedunt—"

[4] Why Plato should thus have written *τοῖς ἐχθροῖς* here, to balance the preceding *τῷ φίλῳ*, I cannot understand. Ficinus, whom Taylor follows, avoids the difficulty by translating, "quæ contrario superant," as if his MS. read *τῷ ἐναντίῳ*, of which *τοῖς ἐχθροῖς* would be the explanation.

[5]—[5] The words within the brackets are evidently an interpolation, and properly omitted by Ficinus.

that we wish for any thing except these, we say so through an ignorance of, and inexperience in, lives as they exist.

[6.] What then and of what kind are the lives, respecting which it is necessary for a person to know something,[1] while forecasting[2] what is to be wished for and is voluntary, and what is to be not wished for and is involuntary; and,[3] after prescribing a law to himself, to choose what is agreeable and pleasant and the best and the most beautiful, and to lead a life as far as possible, the most happy for man? Let us then call one life temperate, another prudent, another brave, and rank one as healthy;[4] and four others, the contraries to these four, by the name of the imprudent, the cowardly, the intemperate, and the diseased. He, then, who knows the temperate, will lay it down as mild in all things, and exhibiting quiet pains, and quiet pleasures, and placid desires, and loves not insane; but the intemperate as being impetuous in all things, and exhibiting vehement pains, and vehement pleasures, and desires on the stretch and goaded on, and loves the maddest possible; and that in a temperate life the pleasures exceed the pains; but in an intemperate one the pains (exceed) the pleasures in magnitude and multitude and intensity. Hence, the one of these lives happens of necessity to be according to nature more pleasant to us, but the other more painful; and it is no longer in the power of him, who wishes to live pleasantly, to live voluntarily in an intemperate manner; but it is evident, if what has been said is correct, that every licentious person is of necessity so unwillingly. For the whole mass of mankind live in the want of temperance, either through the want of teaching, or through incontinence, or through both. The same things are to be considered respecting a diseased and healthy life, that

[1] The Greek is *ἰδόντα*. But Ficinus has "nosse." Hence his MS. probably read *ἐπαΐειν τι*— On the loss or confusion of *ἐπαΐειν*, and of the phrase *ἐπαΐειν τι περί τινος*, see myself on Hipp. Maj. § 22, n, 4.

[2] In lieu of *προελόμενον*, which could not thus precede the subsequent *ἑλόμενον*, I have translated as if the word were *προιδόμενον*— Ficinus omits *προελόμενον* entirely.

[3] Ficinus has "hisque cognitis," from which Stephens was led to suggest *εἶτα* for *εἰς*, which Ast says may mean "instar." But such is never its meaning. Perhaps Plato wrote *καὶ*, which was first corrupted into *ὡς*, and then into *εἰς*—

[4] Ficinus has "sanam denique quartam," as if his MS. read not "ENA, but ONTA Δ, where Δ would mean "the fourth—" On the errors arising from letters expressive of numerals see my Poppo's Prolegom. p. 223.

they possess pleasures and pains, but that the pleasures exceed the pains in health, but the pains the pleasures in illness. Our wish however in the choice of lives is not that pain may exceed, but, where it is exceeded, that life we have decided to be the more pleasant. Now the [1][temperate man],[1] we would say, possesses in both respects things fewer, and less, and slighter than [the intemperate], and the prudent than the imprudent, and the man of bravery than the one of timidity, each exceeding each on the score of pleasures; but on that of pains, [2]the former exceeding the latter,[2] the brave man has the victory over the timid, and in that of the prudent the imprudent; so that [3]of the lives, the more pleasant are the temperate, and the brave, and the prudent, and the healthy, than the timid, and imprudent, and intemperate, and the diseased;[3] and in short, the life which is connected with virtue, pertaining either to the body or the soul, is more pleasant than the life which is connected with depravity, and is superior even to superfluity in the other points, such as beauty and rectitude and virtue and fair renown; so that it causes the person, who possesses it, to live more happily in every respect and totally, than he (who possesses) the contrary (life).[4]

[7.] [5]Let then the prelude of the laws, having been here spoken of, have an end of the speeches.[5] But after the prelude

[1—1] The words within brackets, in Greek ὁ δὴ σώφρων τοῦ ἀκολάστου, Cornarius, with whom Ast agrees, was the first to reject as an interpolation. For the question relating to the σώφρων and ἀκόλαστος has been discussed already; besides, the subsequent words, ἑκάτερος ἑκάτερον, prove that only two lives are spoken of, not three.

[2—2] So I have translated, as if the Greek were ἐκείνων ὑπερβαλλόντων, τούτους, not αὐτοὺς; but why the genitive plural ἐκείνων and τούτους should be thus introduced in lieu of the nominative singular to answer to the preceding antithetical clause, I confess I cannot understand, much less explain. Ast indeed refers the plurals to the ἄφρων and δειλὸς, opposed to the φρόνιμος and ἀνδρεῖος respectively; and as regards the genitive for the nominative quotes his own note on ii. 3, from which however nothing is gained. With respect to Ficinus, he seems to have been so completely at loss, as to omit nearly all the words, in which the whole difficulty lies, between ἔχων and βίων; for his version is, "habet; et alter voluptatibus, alter doloribus superat, ita ut fortis—"

[3—3] All between the numerals are tacitly omitted by Taylor.

[4] So Taylor correctly; for he probably wished, instead of τοῦ ἐναντίου, to read τοῦ τὸν ἐναντίον, with the ellipse of ἔχοντος and βίον.

[5—5] All between the numerals Taylor has tacitly omitted; while Ficinus has merely "Verum exordium legum jam finem accipiat." For he was doubtless dissatisfied (as who is not?) with the Greek, Καὶ τὸ μὲν

it is necessary somehow for the strain to follow; or rather, in good truth, to write down the laws of a polity. As then it is not possible, in the case of a web, or any other tissue whatever, to work up the weft and the warp from the same materials, but there must needs be a difference as regard their quality in the production of the warp, by being some of it [1] strong and assuming a firmness through the spindle,[2] and another part of it softer and [3]making use of a just easiness;[3] from whence[4] it is meet that those, who are about to hold great offices in the state, should be judged of separately in this way, and those too, who have been tested in a trifling education, on each occasion according to reason. For there are two kinds of polities, one relating to the appointment of offices to each individual, and the other relating to the laws assigned to the offices. But before all it is requisite to consider things of this kind. A shepherd, and a herdsman, and a breeder of horses, and whatever else there are of this kind of occupations, will, after receiving the whole herd, never attempt to attend to them otherwise than by first applying a purification suited to their individual living together; and having by a selection separated the healthy and diseased, and the well-bred and ill-bred, he will send away one part to some other herds, but attend upon the other part, thoroughly perceiving that his labour would be in vain and non-effective as regards both the body and soul,[5] which after nature and improper aliment had corrupted, [6]they

προοίμιον τῶν νόμων ἐνταυθοῖ λεχθὲν τῶν λόγων τέλος ἐχέτω: where Plato wrote, I suspect, δειχθὲν τῷ λόγῳ, i. e. "shown by the discourse—"

[1] Here, as elsewhere, τὸ μὲν is to be supplied from the subsequent τὸ δὲ.

[2] Instead of τοῖς τρόποις, which is perfectly unintelligible, Ast would read from "tortura" in Cornarius, ταῖς στροφαῖς, referring to Politic. p. 282, E., τούτου δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀτράκτῳ τε στραφὲν καὶ στερεὸν νῆμα γενόμενον: from which it is easy to elicit τοῖς ἀτράκτοις, as I have translated. Cousin translates βεβαιότητα ἐν τοῖς τρόποις by "solide dans sa façon' c' est a dire, solidement."

[3]—[3] I must leave for others to explain, what I cannot, the words ἐπιεικείᾳ δικαίᾳ χρώμενον, applied to a process in weaving. For ἐπιείκεια is elsewhere applied to a person. Ficinus has "ut facilius cedat."

[4] Ast correctly remarks, that to answer καθάπερ there should have been here ὡσαύτως, similar to "ita" in Ficinus.

[5] The idea of a soul is strangely united to that of the body in the case of an animal; unless it be said that ψυχὴ means here "spirit," as in Minos, § 17.

[6]—[6] Such is the literal translation of the Greek. Ficinus, whom Taylor follows to the letter, has "ut, nisi quis segreget sanorum integrorumque morum ac corporum genus, in singulis contagione interimant."

moreover destroy the race of healthy and unmixed habits and bodies in each of the flocks, unless a person purifies what is present in them.[6] The attention, however, which is paid to other animals is indeed less, and is alone worthy to be brought forward for the sake of an example. But the affairs of men (need) the greatest attention on the part of the legislator, to investigate and detail what is suited to each individual, as regards purification and all other actions. For instance, that which relates to the purification of a state should be in this way. Of many existing purifications, some are rather easy, but others more difficult; and he who is both a tyrant and a legislator may be able to use such purifications as are difficult and the best. But the legislator, who without being a tyrant lays down a new polity and laws, would, if he were able to purify with the mildest of purifications, do a thing of this kind contentedly. [1]The best purification is however painful; just as are the remedies of some such kind, which leading for justice to punishment with avenging,[1] put death or exile as the finish to punishment. For it is wont to free the city from those, who have erred the greatest, and who, as being incurable, are the greatest hurt to the state. But with us there is a milder purification of this kind. For upon these, who, having nothing themselves, do, through the want of food, exhibit themselves as prepared to follow their leaders in an attack upon the property of persons, who possess something, upon such, as being naturally a disease in the state, it imposes a removal, under the name, by way of good omen, of a colony, and sends them away in the kindest possible manner. This then should somehow be done at the very commencement by every one legislating. To us however what is still more strange than this has now happened relating to these. For there is no need to devise either a colony or any selection for a purification; but as if the waters, partly from fountains and partly from mountain torrents, were flowing together into one lake, it is necessary for persons to be on the watch, that, partly by pumping

[1—1] Such is the literal translation of the Greek, *ἔστι δὲ ὁ μὲν ἄριστος ἀλγεινὸς, καθάπερ ὅσα τῶν φαρμάκων τοιουτότροπα, ὁ τῇ δίκῃ μετὰ τιμωρίας εἰς τὸ κολάζειν ἄγων*, where I am quite at a loss in the last clause; and so, I think, was Ficinus; whose version is "nam exactissima purificatio, quemadmodum medicina, quæ validior corporibus adhibetur, doloris plena est, et cum ultione justa pœnam infert, morte peccantem aut exilio damnans."

out, and partly by drawing off into channels, and partly by diverting its course, the water flowing together may be the most clear. But labour and danger, as it appears, are to be found in every political establishment. However, since what is now done exists in discourse, and not in action, let our selection be held to be completed, and the purification to have taken place according to our notions. For having by every kind of persuasion and for a sufficient length of time tried by a test those amongst evil men, who were endeavouring to enter our city in order to administer it, let us prevent them from reaching it, and let us introduce the good, (rendering them)[1] well-disposed and propitious to the utmost of our power.

[8.] Let not, however, the good fortune, which has happened, lie hid from us, that, as we said that the colony of the Heraclidæ was fortunate, because it escaped the dreadful and dangerous strife respecting the division of land and the abolition of debts,[2] in which strife[3] it is impossible for a state, compelled to be regulated by law, to leave any of its ancient institutions undisturbed, nor on the other hand is it possible to disturb them after a certain manner (successfully),[4] (the same thing appears nearly to have happened to us);[5] and there is left merely, so to say, a prayer,[6] and a trifling change to those making a slight alteration cautiously[7] and slowly in a great length of time;[8] which alteration should take place[8] by those persons innovat-

[1] Ficinus alone has, what the sense requires, "facientes:" unless it be said that Plato wrote *τοὺς δὲ ἀγαθοὺς, θεοῖς ἴσους δυναμένους εἶναι εὐμενεῖς*—not *τοὺς δὲ ἀγαθοὺς εἰς δύναμιν εὐμενείς*—i. e. "the good, able to be, equally with gods—"

[2] From the version of Ficinus, adopted by Taylor, "dividendorum agrorum contentionem," it is evident he found in his MS. *γῆς διανομῆς καὶ χρεῶν ἀποκοπῆς πέρι*—not *γῆς καὶ χρεῶν ἀποκοπῆς καὶ νομῆς πέρι*—for the correct word is *διανομὴ*, not *νομὴ*, as shown by *διανομὴν τῆς γ.ς* shortly afterwards; although *νομὴ* is found a little below—

[3] The Greek is *ἣν*, which is without regimen. The sense and syntax require *ἐν ᾗ*, i. e. *ἱρίδι*: where *ἐν* has been lost through the last syllable of *ἐξέφυγεν*—

[4] Here I have inserted *εὖ*, which might easily have dropt out before *εὐχὴ*—

[5] Ficinus, whom Taylor follows, has alone, what is required to complete the sentence, "ita ferme et nobis accidisse videtur."

[6] On this use of *εὐχὴ* in Greek, and "votum" in Latin, see Ast.

[7] I have translated as if the Greek were *εὐλαβῶς*, not *εὐλαβὴς*—

[8]—[8] The Greek is *ἡ δὲ τῶν κινούντων—ὑπάρχειν*, where I cannot discover either sense or syntax. Hence for the sake of both I have translated as if the text were *ἣν δεῖ οὕτω κινούντων—ὑπάρχειν*.

ing, who have an abundance of land, and have likewise many debtors, and are willing through a kind consideration to share with those in want, partly by giving up (debts) and partly by distributing (property), and by holding to moderation, and by thinking that poverty does not consist in a diminution of property, but in an insatiable desire to acquire more. For this is the greatest beginning of safety to a state; and upon this, as upon a stable foundation, it is possible to build up whatever political arrangement any one would raise up, befitting a constitution of this kind. But when the change is of an unsound kind, no political movement will afterwards take place easily in a state. [1] From this, as we have said, we fly. It would however have been more correct to have said in what way, if we have not fled from it, we might have made for ourselves the flight. Let it then be said how that through not being fond of money together with justice; but there is no other escape, either broad or narrow, of such a plan.[1] Let this then be laid down by us as [2]a prop of a state.[2] For it is necessary that (the citizens)[3] should somehow raise up for themselves their property without reproach from each other; [4]or, that they should not be willing to proceed previously to the before of the rest of the constitution,[4] who have

[1]—[1] Such is the literal translation of the Greek, which I cannot understand, nor could Ficinus; whose version, of which the latter portion has been adopted by Taylor to the letter, is "itaque nos, id fugientes, immo vero verbis, quo pacto fugiendum sit, ostendentes, dicimus nullam esse aliam aut latam aut augustam fugiendi viam, nisi ut colamus justitiam, neque acquirendi cupiditatem sequamur." Equally in the dark was Heindorf, who wished to read *μετ' ἀδικίας* for *μετὰ δίκης*, with the full approbation of Ast, and the less decided one of Stalbaum. With regard to *ὀρθότερον*, Stephens correctly saw that *ἂν εἴη* had dropt out before *εἰ*— while Ast remarks that *τῆς τοιαύτης μηχανῆς διαφυγὴ* is put for *τῶν τοιούτων διαφυγῆς μηχανή*— But he does not state what could induce Plato to put down words, that, taken literally, have no meaning, in the place of others, which would have been perfectly intelligible.

[2]—[2] Since two MSS. offer *λιμὴν* as a various reading for *ἡμῖν*, it is probable that both are corruptions of the word written here originally; and as Plutarch has in Polit. Præcept. ii. p. 814, 25, *ὥσπερ ἔρμα τῆς πολιτείας βέβαιον*, I suspect he has preserved what he found in Plato, although *πόλεως ἔρμα* is similar to *ἔρμα πόληος* in Ιλ. Π. 549, and Οδ. Ψ. 121.

[3] Ficinus alone has "cives," what is required by *ἀλλήλους*.

[4]—[4] Here again the version of Ficinus proves he could not understand the Greek, which to myself is equally unintelligible. His translation, adopted to the letter by Taylor, is "vel ulterius in acquirendo progredi ultro desistant."

accusations of old standing against each other, and to whom there is even a small share of intellect. But for those persons, to whom a god has given, as it has to us at present, to settle a new state, and for [1]no enmities to exist[1] against each other, to become [2]themselves the cause of enmities to each other[2] through the division of the land and dwellings, would be a not-human want of education, united to every kind of wickedness.

What then would be the method of a correct distribution? In the first place, it is requisite to fix[3] the same quantity[3] of the number, [4]how great it ought to be.[4] After this it must be agreed respecting the distribution to the citizens, into how many and what kind of parts it is to be made by them for the mass of people. And for this purpose the land and dwellings must be distributed as equally as possible. Now a sufficient quantity of the mass of people cannot be correctly stated otherwise than with reference to the land and cities of neighbouring nations. As regards[5] the land, how much of it is sufficient to feed how many temperate persons[6]—for of more there is no need—but as regards the number, how many would be able to defend themselves [7]not altogether without resources[7] against bordering tribes acting unjustly, and to assist their neighbours when injured. Having then viewed these points, we will define both

[1]—[1] The Greek is *μή τινας ἐχθρὰς—πρὸς ἀλλήλους*. It was originally, I suspect, *ἐχθροὺς*—

[2]—[2] Here again, by the slight change of *τούτους* into *αὐτοὺς*, and taking *ἑαυτοῖς* in the sense of *ἀλλήλους*, I have recovered what is required by the train of thought.

[3]—[3] The Greek is *τὸν αὐτὸν ὄγκον*, where Boeckh suggested, what Bekker, Ast, and Stalbaum have adopted, *αὐτῶν*. But *αὐτῶν* could not be thus inserted between *τὸν* and *ὄγκον*—It would be in correct Greek, *αὐτῶν τὸν ὄγκον* or *τὸν ὄγκον αὐτῶν*. Ficinus has omitted *αὐτὸν* entirely. Perhaps Plato wrote *τὸν ὅλον ὄγκον*—

[4]—[4] The words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor.

[5] Six MSS. read *γῆ*, one *γῆι*, and another *γῆς*. The last, answering to *πλήθους* in the next sentence, has been retained by Ast; who says that the genitive is used absolutely in the sense of *κατὰ γῆν*. But Stephens more correctly would supply *δεῖ*—for otherwise in lieu of *προσδεῖ* there would have been written simply *δεῖ*.

[6] Ast observes correctly that Aristotle, alluding to this passage in Polit. ii. 4, has misrepresented the very party with whose doctrines he finds fault.

[7]—[7] The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and after him tacitly by Taylor, because they were not in his MS., or deemed by him to be not suited to the train of thought; which would require rather *βοηθῆσαι εὖ παντάπασιν ἀπόροις οὖσι*, i. e. to well assist (the neighbours) altogether without resources.

by deed and word the land and neighbours. But now, for the sake of a sketch and outline,[1] that the thing itself may be accomplished, let the discourse proceed to our laying down the laws.

Let the land-owners and those that defend the distribution of the land, be, for the sake of a fitting number, five thousand and forty; and let, in like manner, the land and the dwellings be distributed into the same portions, [2]so that the man and his portion may accord in distribution.[2] And in the first place, let there be of the whole number two parts distributed, and afterwards three of the same;[3] for it is by nature (divisible) into four and five, and so in succession as far as ten. Thus much ought every person, who is legislating, to understand respecting number, what it is, and what kind will be the most useful to all states. Let us then say it is that, which possesses in itself the greatest quantity of divisions and most in orderly succession. For the whole number does (not)[4] obtain by lot all kinds of divisions for all things. But the number five thousand and forty, in matters relating to war and whatever in peace have to do with conventions and communions, and relating to revenue and distributions, cannot be cut into more than sixty parts wanting one; but there are continuous divisions of it from one up to ten.

[9.] These things however it is meet for those to take in hand firmly at leisure,[5] on whom the law enjoins to take them; for they cannot exist otherwise than in this manner. But it is requisite for them to be mentioned to a person settling a state for the sake of this; that no one, whether

[1] Ast aptly compares Rep. viii. § 3, p. 548, E., *λόγῳ σχῆμα πολιτείας ὑπογράψαντα, μὴ ἀκριβῶς ἀπεργάσασθαι.*

[2—2] So Taylor translates the Latin of Ficinus—"ut vir et portio cum distributione conveniant." The Greek is *διανεμηθήτων γενόμενα ἀνὴρ καὶ κλῆρος ξυννομή*: which I cannot understand. Perhaps Plato wrote *διανεμηθήτων, ἵν' ἂν λεγομένη, ἀνὴρ καὶ κλῆρος, ξυννομὴ ᾖ*, i. e. "that a man and portion may be called a co-share."

[3] I have adopted with Ast the correction of Stephens, *τοῦ αὐτοῦ* for *τὸν αὐτὸν*, omitted entirely by Ficinus and Taylor.

[4] Instead of *ὁ μὲν πᾶς*, Ast reads *οὐ μὲν πᾶς*, from "non enim omnis" in Grynæus' refiction of Ficinus, adopted tacitly by Taylor. Ficinus himself has not the negative.

[5] Before *κατὰ σχολὴν* there is introduced *καὶ*, which I cannot understand; nor could Ficinus, who has omitted it.

he is making a (polity) new from the beginning, or patching up an ancient one that has been corrupted, will, if he has any mind, attempt to disturb, with respect to the gods or sacred rites, and whatever else ought to be established in the state for each of the gods or dæmons, by whatever name they may be called, whatever (has come)[1] from Delphi or Dodona[2] or Ammon,[3] or what [4]certain old accounts have somehow persuaded persons on hearing them, when, through visions having occurred or an inspiration from gods having been declared,[4] parties have, through being persuaded,[5] established sacrifices mixed up with mystic ceremonies, (emanating) either from their own country, (or) being exotic[6] from Tyrrhenia,[7] or Cyprus,[8] or any other place what-

[1] I have translated as if ἦκεν had dropt out between ὅσα and ἐκ—

[2] Delphi and Dodona, the two most ancient oracular shrines in Greece, are similarly united by Æschylus in Prom. 678, Ὁ δ' ἔς τε Πυθὼ κἀπὶ Δωδώνης συχνοὺς Θεοπρόπους ἴαλλεν: and by Sophocles in Ὀδυσσ. Ακανθοπλ. Fr., Νῦν δ' οὔτε μ' εἰς Δωδῶνος οὔτε Πυθικῶν Γυάλων τις ἂν πείσειε (τοὺς θεοπρόπους Πέμψαι).

[3] There is not, I believe, any mention in ancient authors of the shrine of Ammon in Libya antecedent to the time of Herodotus, when those at Delphi and Dodona had lost no little of the odour of sanctity they once possessed.

[4]—[4] Ficinus exhibits all between the numerals in this abridged form, "vel prisca quadam oratione per visiones inspirationesque deorum asserta." Hence it is impossible to ascertain whether his MS. had the insufferable tautology ἔπεισαν—πείσαντες, or, what the sense manifestly requires, ἀκούσαντας, as I have translated, and to which πείσοντας in one MS. seems to lead.

[5] The Greek is ἔπεισαν—πείσαντες δὲ, in which on the ground of language there is nothing to offend except that κατέστησαν should have been written instead of κατεστήσαντο. Hence, as Ficinus has "quibus approbatis veteres," he probably found in his MS. πεισθέντες, as I have translated.

[6] The Greek is αὐτόθεν ἐπιχωρίους. But from the mention of two places, Tyrrhenia and Cyprus, it is evident that Plato wrote, as I have translated, αὐτόθεν ἢ ἀποχώριους οὔσας—

[7] Although it is known that the Romans received their religious rites from Tuscany, yet that the Greeks did so likewise, is not, I believe, mentioned elsewhere. Perhaps however Plato had heard of what is stated by Theopompus, quoted by Athenæus, xii. p. 517, that they had wives in common,—the very doctrine which he inculcated.

[8] It is difficult to understand what are the Cyprian rites to which Plato alludes. For if they were those of Venus, these, according to Ovid, were taught by Nature alone, and were indigenous in all countries. Is there any reference here to the fact mentioned by Strabo, xiv. p. 1001, B., that there was in Cyprus a temple of Venus, which women were not permitted to enter?

ever; and from these ancient accounts and oracles they consecrated statues, and altars, and temples, and made for each of the deities a sacred grove. Of all these not even the least must the legislator disturb; but he must assign to each of the portions a god, a dæmon, or some hero. And in the division of the land, he must give up, selected for the first in rank, the groves and all that is fitting, so that the assemblies of each of the portions, taking place at stated times, may furnish resources against their wants, and during the sacrifices kindly entertain, and become familiar with, and recognise, each other. [1]For there is no greater good to a state than for persons to be the acquaintances of each other.[1] Since where there is no light[2] to each other in the manners of each other, but a darkness, there no one will properly meet with the honour due to his worth, nor with offices, nor even with the justice which is fitting. [3]It is meet then for every man in all states to be earnest in this matter, compared as one with one,[3] that he never appear to any one to be of a base stamp, but always artless and true, and that no other person of that kind[4] deceive him. But the next movement, as in the case[5] of the pebble-game,

[1]—[1] The Greek is *οὗ μεῖζον οὐδὲν πόλει ἀγαθὸν ἢ γνωρίμους—εἶναι*: where Ast says that *ἢ γνωρίμους—εἶναι* is superfluously added by way of an explanation. But correct sense would require *οὐ γὰρ μεῖζον οὐδὲν—* and correct syntax, *ἢ τὸ γνωρίμους—εἶναι*, as I have translated. With regard to the sentiment, Ast refers to Aristotle Politic. vii. 4, 7.

[2] On this metaphor Ast quotes from Cicero, "in luce atque in oculis civium magnus," and from Xenophon, *εἰς κάλλος βίῳ τὸ φῶς—παρέχειν*, and refers to Wetstein on S. John iii. 21, "Let your light so shine before all men, that they may see your good works—"

[3]—[3] Such is the literal translation of the Greek. Ficinus has what is more intelligible, "nihil est autem, si unum uni conferas, in quo majus studium—ponere quisque debeat," as if he had found in his MS. *οὐδὲν δὲ ἦν, ὃ δεῖ πάντα ἄνδρα μᾶλλον, ἓν πρὸς ἕν, ἢ τοῦτο σπεύδειν*, not *δεῖ δὴ πάντα ἄνδρα, ἓν πρὸς ἓν τοῦτο σπεύδειν*.

[4] Namely, "of a base stamp."

[5] The proverb, to which Plato alludes, has been thus explained. In the game called *πέττεια* there were five lines on two opposite sides of the board, as there are eight on a draught-board; and between them a vacant line, not occupied by the pebbles, or counters, used in the game. This vacant line was called *ἱερὰ γραμμή*, "the holy line;" and the party who was driven to it the first, was considered as the loser, just as in the game of fox and geese; although there it is not a line, but a space that is left vacant: and hence, as Plato has written *ἀφ' ἱεροῦ*, we must understand *τόπου*; but *γραμμῆς* after *ἀφ' ἱερᾶς*. With regard to the authors who have treated on the subject, Ast refers to the Scholiast here; Suidas on *Ἀφ' ἱερᾶς*;

from the sacred spot would, as being unusual, cause, in the case of legislation, the person who hears of it for the first time perhaps to wonder. To him however who has reasoned upon, and tried it, it will appear that the state is in a second way settled for the best. Perhaps however some one will not receive the movement, through its not being customary with a tyrannic legislator. It will[1] however be most correct to speak of the best polity, and of the second and third, and then to leave the choice to each person, [2]who is the lord in the co-settlement.[2] Let us act then even now according to this very method, by speaking of a polity the first, and the second, and the third in worth; and let us leave the choice to Clinias at present, and to any one else who may be willing to come to the selection of such polities, and to assign, according to his own method, [3]that which is agreeable to him (with respect to) his own country.[3]

[10.] Now the first state and polity and the best laws are there, where the old saying may be most in vogue through the whole state; for[4] it said that, amongst friends all things are really in common. This saying, whether it now is or ever will be (practised), [5]that women are in common, and children in common, and all possessions in common,[5] has taken away[6] by every means every where and entirely from life what is called private property; and it has planned that things even naturally

Pollux, ix. 7; Eustath. Od. A. p. 28, 42; Meursius De Ludis Græcor.; Erasmus Adag. p. 28; and Salmasius on Vopisc. p. 466, A. The proverb was applied to those, who placed themselves in a perilous position.

[1] Ficinus has "agetur." He found therefore in his MS. ἔσται, not ἔστι.

[2—2] Such is the literal version of τῷ τῆς συνοικήσεως κυρίῳ. Ficinus has "arbitratu suo quamlibet electuro," from whence Taylor translated "to choose that which pleases him the most."

[3—3] The Greek is τὸ φίλον αὐτῷ τῆς αὐτοῦ πατρίδος. This Ast renders "ea quæ in patria sua ipsi placent;" which I cannot understand. Ficinus, whom Taylor follows to the letter, has "patriæque (Bekker incorrectly "partique") suæ, quod sibi placet tribuere." I have translated as if περὶ had dropt out after πατρίδος.

[4] Instead of δὲ the sense requires γὰρ, as I have translated, or else ᾧ λέγεται, similar to "quo fertur" in Ficinus.

[5—5] The St. Simonians of the present day have attempted to put this precept into practice, but with so little success, as to show that Plato's Laws are better suited for an ideal Republic than a real one.

[6] If the doctrine had never been put into practice, one cannot understand why Plato used the definite perfect ἐξῄρηται and μεμηχάνηται instead of the indefinite pluperfect ἐξῄρητ' ἂν and μεμηχανητ' ἂν.

private, as far as possible, become by some means in common; such as the eyes, the ears, and the hands, in seeming[1] to see, and hear, and work, in common; and that, again, all men taken singly[2] praise and blame as much as possible (the same things), [3]rejoicing in, and pained by,[3] the same things; [4]and (hence) no one (has) ever laid down or will lay down a definition more correct and better (than this), that of such laws as cause a state to be as much as possible one, (there is) the superiority on the ground of virtue.[4] Such a state will ours[5] be, whether gods or the children of gods, more in number than one,[6] dwell there,[7] and with delight save and regulate [8]those living in that manner.[8] Hence it is proper to reflect upon the pattern of a polity in no other way; but, sticking to this, to seek that, which is as much as possible of such a kind. But that, which we have now taken in hand, would,[9] if it ex-

[1] This "seeming" seems very strange here, as if the eyes, ears, and hands did not really see, hear, and work. The verb *δοκεῖν* ought, I conceive, to follow *ἐπαινεῖν τε*, in lieu of *αὖ*, which is perfectly superfluous.

[2] In lieu of *καθ' ἕν*, which is unintelligible, Ast, whom I have followed, suggests *καθ' ἕνα*.

[3]—[3] Ficinus alone has, what the sense requires, "laudentque et vituperent eadem similiter."

[4]—[4] The Greek is *καὶ κατὰ δύναμιν οἵ τινες μάλιστα νόμοι μίαν ὅτι μάλιστα πόλιν ἀπεργάζονται τούτων ὑπερβολῇ πρὸς ἀρετὴν οὐδείς ποτε ὅρον ἄλλον θέμενος ὀρθότερον οὐδὲ βελτίω θήσεται*: which, says Ast, has been wrongly translated by Ficinus, Cornarius, Serranus, and Schulthes. In fact they were all equally at a loss, and naturally so; for the passage is evidently corrupt. It was, I suspect, originally to this effect—*Καὶ οὕτω κατὰ δύναμιν—τούτων ὑπερβολὴν πρὸς ἀρετὴν εἶναι οὐδείς ποτε ὅρον ἄλλον ἢν θέμενος*—as I have translated. To meet the difficulty Ficinus pla cesthe clause *τούτων ὑπερβολῇ—θήσεται* after *κοινὰ φίλων*: and from his version, "certe in hoc præcipue virtutis erit terminus, quo nullus poni rectior poterit," it is evident that his MS. was defective, or that he designedly abridged what he found in it.

[5] The Greek is *ἡ μὲν δὴ τοιαύτη πόλις*, which Ast calls an absolute sentence. He should have called it rather an imperfect one. For Plato probably wrote *ἡμῖν δὴ τοιαύτη ἡ πόλις ἔσται*, as I have translated.

[6] By the expression of more numerous than one are probably intended Castor and Pollux, the twin sons of Jupiter, who were the tutelary gods of Sparta.

[7] The gods were supposed to dwell in the towns sacred to them.

[8]—[8] The Greek is *οὕτω διαζῶντες*. But four MSS. read *διασώζοντες*. Ficinus united both—"ita viventes eamque servantes—vivunt—" Hence I have been led to *τοὺς οὕτω ζῶντας διασωζοντες*—

[9] In lieu of *εἴη τε*, where *τε* is connected with nothing, Heindorf suggested *γε*— He should have proposed *ποτε*—

isted at all, be the nearest to immortality; and if it is [1]not in the first rank, it will be at least one in the second.[1] After this we will, god willing, go through the polity, which is the third in order. But now let us speak of this polity, what it is, and how it may be produced.

In the first place, let them distribute the land and houses. But let them not cultivate the ground in common; since a thing of this kind is spoken of as greater than is suited to their present birth, nurture, and education. Let them however distribute land and houses with somehow such an intention as this, that each on obtaining his allotment ought to consider it as being common to the whole state; and, as this country is their paternal land, they ought to attend to it in a greater degree than children do their mother, in that, being a goddess, she is the sovereign mistress of mortals. The same conceptions they ought to have of the gods of the place, and likewise of dæmons. But that these things may exist in this manner through all time, on this too they must thoroûghly reflect. As many hearths as are distributed by us at present, so many must there be always, and neither more nor less. Now a thing of this kind will be firmly established through every state in this way. Let the person, who has obtained his allotment, leave ever the child, who is most dear to him, the only heir of his household, and his successor, and the attendant upon the gods and family and state, and of those still living, and of such as their end has already reached up to the then period. But with respect to the other children, they, to whom there are more than one, must give their daughters in marriage according to a law to be laid down; but distribute their male children as sons to those, who have no family, as an act of kindness conferred; but if there be a lack of kindness, or if more females are born than some[2] males, or the contrary, when they are fewer, through barrenness taking place, let the magistrate,[3] whom we shall lay down as the greatest and most honourable, consider what

[1]—[1] Such is the literal version of the Latin of Ficinus, "ac si non primo, saltem secundo loco erit una." He therefore found in his MS. *καὶ, εἰ μὴ ᾱ, ἀλλὰ δευτέρα ἔσται μία*: where *ᾱ* is *πρώτη*. See my Poppo's Prolegom. p. 223. The Greek is *καὶ ἡ μία δευτέρως*, which Ast would explain by referring *δευτέρως* to what is to follow.

[2] I scarcely understand *τινες* here. It is omitted by Ficinus.

[3] In lieu of *ἀρχὴν* Winckelmann would read *ἀρχὴ*, obtained from "magistratus" in Ficinus.

is proper to be done with the superabundance and deficiency of children, and devise a method by which five thousand and forty households alone may exist always. Now there are many methods. For there are checks to procreation when it is overflowing;[1] and, on the contrary, care and an attention to the number of births do, by means of honours, and disqualifications, and [2]the advice of elders to young persons, meet (the difficulty), and are able to effect what we are speaking of [by admonitory discourses].[2] [3]Moreover, should at last every difficulty arise about the inequality of the five thousand and forty households,[3] and an excessive influx of citizens take place through the kind feelings of those, who dwell together, and we come to want, there remains the old contrivance, which we have often mentioned, of friendly colonies being sent out from friends, whithersoever it may appear to be suitable. But if, on the contrary, there should at any time come[4] a wave bringing an inundation,[5] or [6]a destruction arising from plagues or wars, and the people become, through a state of orphanhood, much less than the prescribed number, we must not willingly introduce citizens educated in a not legitimate discipline; but [7]to use force against necessity it is said not even a god has the power.[7]

[1] Aristotle had this passage in view in Polit. ii. 3, 6.

[2]—[2] The Greek is *νουθετήσεσι πρεσβυτέρων περὶ νέους διὰ λόγων νουθετητικῶν ἁπαντῶσαι*. But after *νουθετήσεσι* the words *διὰ λόγων νουθετητικῶν* present an insufferable tautology; and hence they ought to be inserted just above after *γένεσις*, as showing of what nature are the checks to which Plato allude. The cause of the mistake is owing to the fact, that they formed one line of the Codex Archetypus, containing about twenty-one letters. Moreover, as Ficinus has "monitionibus senum ad juvenes," Cornarius correctly saw that his MS. read *πρὸς νέους*— Lastly, as one MS. offers *λόγους* in lieu of *νέους*, it is probable that in *περὶ λογοὺς* lies hid *ἀπορίᾳ λέχους*, and thus *ἁπαντῶσαι* will recover, what it has lost, its object.

[3]—[3] Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus, whom Taylor follows in part, has "denique hinc omnes defectus oritur et inopia, cum quinquies millium et quadraginta domorum numerus non servatur."

[4] Instead of *ὢν* Ficinus found in his MS. *οἳ*, as shown by his "quo—"

[5] For examples of cities situated on the sea-coast being destroyed by a wave, see Thucyd. ii. 89; Pausanias vii. p. 585; Agathias ii. p. 53; Athenæus vii. p. 333, C.; and Suidas in Ὕφαλος.

[6] I have adopted *ἢ*, introduced by Cornarius, before *καὶ*—Ficinus has "morborum lues bellorumve calamitas, velut quadam illuvione."

[7]—[7] This sentiment is attributed to Simonides by Plato in Protag. p. 345, D. § 87, but to Pittacus by Diogen. Laert. i. 77.

[11.] This then let us assert our present discourse advises, by saying—O ye best of all men, do not relax[1] in honouring similitude and equality and the same and what is generally acknowledged according to nature and according to number and all the power of things beautiful and good.[2] And now guard, in the first place, through the whole of life the above-mentioned number; next, do not hold in dishonour [3]the height and magnitude of[3] the property, which ye first distributed, as being moderate, by buying from, and selling to, each other. For neither[4] the distributing lot, being a god, is an ally,[4] nor the legislator. For now the law, in the first place, enjoins upon the disobedient,[5] by proclaiming beforehand, that upon these conditions any person, who is willing, may cast lots or not; and that, since the land, being sacred, belongs first to all the gods, and next, to the priests and priestesses, who pray at the first sacrifices, and the second, and even to the third, both the buyer and seller of tenements and farms, which they have obtained by lot, are to suffer what is befitting upon such transactions; and having written [6]memoranda on cypress (tablets),[6] they shall place them in temples [7]written for the time hereafter;[7] and in addition to

[1] Ficinus has "neque id unquam transgrediamini," as if his MS. read *παρίετε αὐτὰ*—

[2] I must confess my inability to understand what Plato is aiming at.

[3—3] The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus.

[4—4] Such is the literal version of Bekker's text. Ficinus has "neque, deus ipse distributor—favebit," as if his MS. read *οὔτε γὰρ ὁ νείμας θεὸς αὐτὸς*, not *οὔτε γὰρ ὁ νείμας κλῆρος ὢν θεὸς*, where Stalbaum has *ν*— adopted *κλῆρον*, found in Stephens, and written thus in two MSS., *κλῆρος*— But who was the god, that distributed the lot, is no where mentioned. Hence Plato wrote, I suspect, *οὔτε γὰρ Ἑρμῆς, ὁ νείμας κλῆρον, ὢν θεὸς*— For Hermes was not only the god, who presided over buying and selling, but he gave his name likewise to the lot first drawn out, and therefore the successful one; as we learn from a gl. in Hesychius and Photius, *Ἑρμοῦ κλῆρος*—and hence we find in Aristoph. *Εἰρ.*, 364, *Ἑρμῆς γὰρ ὢν κλήρῳ ποιήσεις οἷδ' ὅτι*: where see the Schol.

[5] Although *ἀπειθοῦντι* is repeated a little below, yet here it is scarcely intelligible: for there is nothing to which the idea of disobedience can be referred.

[6—6] The Greek is *κυπαριττίνας μνήμας*, where Stephens explains *κυπαριττίνας* by saying that the cypress tree was selected as being free from the attacks of worms.

[7—7] Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus has "ad posteritatis instructionem," omitting *γεγραμμένας*, which certainly seems unnecessary, and adding, what renders *εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον* more intelligi-

this they shall invest the guardianship of these, [8]in order that they may be,[8] in that magistrate, who seems to see the most acutely, in order that the matters fraudulently introduced [1] may not lie hid from them, but that they may punish the person disobedient at the same time to the law and to the god.[2] For how great a good will what is now enjoined be to all states that are persuaded, when they adopt the following arrangement, according to the old proverb,[3] no person being wicked will know, but being experienced and reasonable in his habits (he will). For in such an arrangement there exists not much of money-making; and there is attendant upon it the being neither necessary nor lawful for any one to make money by any illiberal kind of money-making—inasmuch as the so-called operative art is reproached as subverting liberal habits—nor to think it right to scrape money together at all by such means.

[12.] In addition to this a law still follows all these, that no private person be permitted to possess any gold or silver;[4] but that (there be)[5] a coin[6] for the sake of daily exchange, which it is almost necessary for handicrafts to change, and for all, who have a need of such things,[7] to pay the wages due to hired persons, be they slaves or domestic servants. On which account we say that they must possess coin, which is of value amongst themselves, but of no worth amongst the rest of mankind. For the sake of war indeed and of going abroad to other countries—for instance in the case of embassies, or some other business of a herald, compulsory on the state—should it be

ble than those words now are. But unless I am greatly mistaken, the clause *εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον* ought to follow ([8]—[8]) *ὅπως ἂν γίγνηται*, or rather *γίγνωνται*, i. e. *μνῆμαι*, as in Ficinus, "ut—serventur."

[1] Ast translates *παραγωγαὶ* "transgressiones." But this neither is nor could be its meaning. Ficinus has more correctly "si qua forte præter rationem hæc commercia fiant."

[2] Here again by the god is to be understood Hermes.

[3] What the old proverb is, to which Plato alludes, I confess I do not know. It was perhaps like the line of Pope—

"He best can paint them, who has felt them most."

[4] This was the law of Lycurgus, as we learn from Polybius vi. 47, and Plutarch in Lycurg. i. p. 44, D.

[5] Ast understands *κεκτῆσθαι*: but I suspect that *εἶναι* has dropt out before *ἕνεκα*.

[6] The coin was iron in Laconia. What kind of metal Plato had in mind is no where stated.

[7] The Greek is *τῶν τοιούτων*, which, says Ast, agrees with *νομισμάτων*

requisite to send out the common coin of Greece, it will be necessary on each occasion for the state to possess it.[1] But if there be any necessity for a private person to go abroad, let him, after obtaining leave of the magistrate, go abroad; but the foreign coin, which on his return home he has brought from any place, still remaining, let him put down for the state, and take up that of the country at the rate (of exchange).[2] And if [3] any one is detected in making (the foreign money) his own,[3] such money shall become public property; and let him, who [4] knows the fact, but does not divulge it, be subject to a curse [4] and reproach together with the party bringing it in, and to a fine in addition, not less than the amount of the foreign money so brought in.

And (be it enacted), that a person who is going to marry, or is giving (a daughter) in marriage, is neither to give or receive a marriage portion at all of any kind whatsoever, nor to deposit money with a person, [5] whom one does not trust,[5] nor to lend money upon interest, since it will be lawful for the borrower to repay neither interest nor principal. Now that these pursuits are the best for a state to pursue, a person would decide correctly by considering them in this way, and referring them ever [6] to their origin and intention.[6] Now the intention of the statesman, who has a mind, we say, is not that, which the many would say, that a good legislator ought to wish, how the state, [7] for which he is with correct thoughts legislating,[7]

understood; for coin is of different kinds and value. I suspect however that in *χρεία τῶν τοιούτων* lies hid *χρεία ἂν ᾖ ἀντὶ τοῦ τι ποιειν*— where *ἀντὶ τοῦ τι ποιεῖν* would depend upon *μισθοὺς*, "wages for doing something."

[1] Ast correctly rejects *νόμισμα Ἑλληνικὸν* as interpolated from the beginning of the sentence; where however those words are omitted by Ficinus, who perhaps found in his MS. *ἕνεκα δὲ*, not *ἕνεκά τε*—

[2] Ficinus omits *πρὸς λόγον*, which he perhaps did not understand.

[3]—[3] Ficinus has, what the sense requires, "quod si quis eos occultare et in privatum usum convertere—"

[4]—[4] With this passage may be compared the curse imprecated by Œdipus on the party, who might know, but would not divulge, the murder of of Laïus in Soph. Œd. T. 236.

[5]—[5] This seems a strange idea, as if any one would deposit money with a person he could not trust. What Plato really wrote might be guessed at, but not without, perhaps, a rather violent alteration.

[6]—[6] Ficinus has "si ad præcipuam ipsam recti legum latoris semper referat voluntatem," which would lead to *εἰς αὐτῶν τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τὴν τοῦ νομοθέτου βούλησιν*, what the train of thought evidentiy requires.

[7]—[7] The words *ᾗ νοῶν εὖ νομοθετοῖ*, omitted by Ficinus, Ast considers an

may be the greatest and the wealthiest possible, and possess gold and silver money, and rule over as many as possible by sea and land; and they would add, that the person legislating correctly ought to wish the state to be the best and the happiest possible. Now of these things some can take place, but others cannot. The possible then the arranging party would wish; but the impossible he would not; [1]nor would he make even an attempt at wishes that are vain.[1] For it is almost necessary for them to be at the same time happy and good. This then he would wish. But it is impossible for persons to be very rich and good, such at least as the many reckon rich. For they reckon rich those, who amongst a few persons have possessions valued at the greatest quantity of coin, which even a bad man may possess. Now if such be the case, I will never agree with them that the rich man, if not a good one, can be truly happy; but that it is impossible for the person pre-eminently good, to be pre-eminently rich. What then?[2] some one would perhaps say. Because, we would say, the possession of what is obtained both justly and unjustly, is more than double of that which is obtained justly alone; and that the expenditure, which is wont to be made neither honourably nor disgracefully, is doubly less than that which is honourable, and is wont to be made for honourable objects. He, therefore, who acts in a contrary manner, will never be richer than him, who has double the means and half the expenditure. Now of these, the one is a good person, but the other not a bad one, since he is (merely)[3] parsimonious; sometimes, indeed, he is altogether bad; but, as we have just now said, is never good. For he, who receives both justly and unjustly, and spends neither justly nor unjustly, is indeed rich, because he is parsimonious; but he who is altogether bad, as being for the most part luxurious, is very poor. And he, who spends upon honourable objects and acquires only justly, will never at any time become pre-eminently rich, nor yet very poor; so that our assertion is

interpolation. Perhaps however they ought to follow *τὴν βούλησιν*, just before, by reading *ᾗ ὁ εὖ νοῶν ἂν εὖ νομοθετοῖ*, thus forming one line of the Codex Archetypus, consisting of twenty-one letters.

[1]—[1] I have translated as if the Greek were *οὐδ' ἂν ματαίας βουλήσεις*, not *ματαίας βουλήσεις οὔτ' ἂν*— Ficinus avoids the difficulty by his version, "nam vana esset cupiditas; neque aggreditur."

[2] The sense requires *τί δ' οὔ*; why not? not *τί δή*; Ficinus, "cur ita?"

[3] Ficinus alone has "duntaxat," required by the sense.

right, that the very rich are not good men; and, if they are not good, they are not happy.

[13.] With us, however, the laying down of laws looks to that point, that the citizens may become the most happy and in the highest degree friends to each other. But the citizens will never be friends, where there are many lawsuits with each other and much injustice; but (most so) where the least and fewest are found. We have said too, that there ought to be neither gold nor silver in the state; nor, again, much money-making through handicraft trades and usury,[1] or ugly cattle,[2] but what agriculture gives and bears,[3] and of these too such as will not compel a person by making money to neglect those things, for the sake of which riches are produced.[4] Now these are the soul and body; which, without gymnastics and the rest of discipline, would never be worth mentioning. Hence we have said more than once, that we must put the attention to money in the last place of honour. For, since all, about which every man is seriously engaged, are three, the last and third is correctly the attention paid to riches, but the middle is that relating to the mind; but that relating to the soul the first. And, indeed, the polity, which we have just now been going through, has been correctly laid down by laws, if it ordains honours in this manner. But if any one of the laws which are ordained in it shall seem to put health in the place of honour in the state before temperance, or wealth before health and temperance, it will appear to be not properly laid down. A legislator, therefore, ought often to point out to himself this. [5]"What do I intend?" and, "If this happens, or I fail in my

[1] Ficinus, "cauponationibusque et fœnore," which would lead to *καὶ καπηλειῶν καὶ τόκων*.

[2] This introduction of *βοσκημάτων αἰσχρῶν* is very strange, for nothing had been said on the subject before. Ficinus has "ex pecoribus turpiter," as if his MS. read *βοσκημάτων αἰσχρῶς*. I suspect however that some words have dropt out, in which interest was said to increase like cattle, just as Shylock says in Shakspeare, that "his monies breed as fast as ewes;" or as Aristophanes in Νεφ. 1291, says of interest, that it is a wild beast, which "by months and days becomes a larger sum."

[3] Instead of *φέρει*, I should prefer *τρέφει*, "feeds."

[4] This idea of Plato seems to have been caught by Juvenal, and embodied in the verse—"Et propter vitam vivendi perdere causas."

[5—5] Such is the literal translation of the Greek. Ficinus, whom Taylor follows almost to the letter, has "quid ipse velit; quid, si contigerit, bene succedet; sin minus, instituti sui spes eum frustrabitur—" To supply however the ellipse, I have added "what then?"

aim,"[5] (what then?) And thus perhaps he would get himself out of legislation, and liberate likewise the rest, but never a single person by any other means. Let then the person, who has obtained by lot his portion, keep it on the conditions we have detailed.

[1]It were a beautiful thing[1] for each person to come to the colony possessing the rest of things also equally. But as this is not possible, and one will come possessing more means, and another less, it is requisite, for the sake [2]of many things, and of the opportunities in the state, for the sake of equality,[2] that the value of property should be unequal, in order that magistracies, and contributions, and distributions, [3](may exist) to each (according) to the value of his worth;[3] [4](and) that, not according to his own virtue alone, and that of his ancestors, nor yet according to the strength or beauty of his body, but according to the using of wealth and poverty they may receive as equally as possible, by what is unequal, but commensurable, and not differ.[4] For the sake of these things it is requisite that there should be four valuations in the size[5] of property; and that these should be called first, second, third, and fourth, or by some other appellation; and that, when they remain in the same valuation, and when becoming richer from being poor, and poor from being rich, each may pass to the valuation suited to themselves. This scheme of law I would lay down as following after these.

We say then that in a state, which is to have no part in the greatest of diseases, which would be more correctly called dissension or sedition, there should exist neither severe poverty amongst some of the citizens nor (great)[6] wealth: for both

[1]—[1] Ficinus, whom Taylor has followed, has "probe autem fieret," as if his MS. read ἦν δ' ἂν καλὸν in lieu of ἦν μὲν δὴ καλὸν.

[2]—[2] The words between the numerals I scarcely understand; nor could, I think, Ficinus; whose version is "multorum et æqualitatis in civitate, temporum opportunitatumque causa," as if his MS. read πολλῶν, ἰσότητός τε καὶ τῶν κατὰ πόλιν καιρῶν, for thus ἰσότητος—καίρων would be put in opposition with πολλῶν—

[3]—[3] I have adopted the suggestion of Stephens, who supposes that κατὰ has dropt out before τὴν τῆς ἀξίας, and γίγνωνται after τιμῆς.

[4]—[4] Such is the literal version of the unintelligible Greek; in which Ast confesses there are more errors than he can pretend to correct.

[5] Ficinus has "magnitudine—" His MS. therefore read μεγέθει, subsequently found in another.

[6] From "ingentes divitiæ" in Ficinus, it is easy to see that he found in his MS. πολὺν before πλοῦτον.

these produce both. It is therefore requisite for a legislator to say at present what is the bound of each. Let then the limit of poverty be the valuation of the lot, which ought to remain, and which no magistrate will ever overlook its becoming less to any one, nor any one of the rest of those who in the same way love honour on the score of virtue. Now the legislator, having laid down that limit as a measure, will permit a person to possess the double, triple, and even to the quadruple of it. But, if any one possesses more than these, whether by finding them, or their being given, or by money-making, or by acquiring through any other such like fortune, by giving up what is above the measure to the state and to the gods, who guard the city, he will be in good repute and without damage. But if any disobeys this law, any one may inform against him on condition of receiving half the property, and the delinquent shall pay another portion to the same amount, and the half shall go to the gods. And let the whole property of all, except the allotment,[1] be written down openly before the magistrates, who are the guardians, in order that such of the suits upon all points as[2] relate to money may be easy and extremely clear.

[14.] After this it is meet in the first place to build[3] the city as much as possible in the middle of the country, [4]after selecting a spot from those at hand, which possesses what is suited for a city,[4] which it is not difficult to imagine and detail. After this, to divide it into twelve[5] parts; and placing first the temple of Hestia, (Vesta,) and Zeus, and Athéné, to call it the

[1] Ficinus has "ultra sortem"—Taylor, "as surpasses the allotted portion," what the sense seems to require. But in that case the Greek should have been *πέρα*, not *χωρὶς*—

[2] From *ὅσαι*, which is unintelligible, Stephens elicited *ὅσ' εἰς*, adopted by Ast.

[3] For the sake of the syntax we must read *ἱδρῦσαι* in lieu of *ἱδρύσθαι*, as I have translated.

[4—4] I have followed Ast in the interpretation of this passage; who should however have proposed to read *ἔχοντα ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων τόπον*, in lieu of *τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἔχοντα τόπον*.

[5] The reason, says Taylor, why Plato adopted this division is, because the number 12, the image of all-perfect progression, is the product of 3 by 4, both of which numbers, according to the Pythagoreans, are images of perfection. On the other hand, Ast conceives that Plato had in mind the division of the country into twelve parts found in Egypt and elsewhere, and which seems, as may be inferred from vi. 15, p. 771, B., to have been connected with the division of the year into twelve months, each under the superintendence of one of the twelve greater gods.

Acropolis, and to throw round it a circular (enclosure), and from it to cut the city and all the country into twelve parts. But the twelve parts ought to be equalized by the portions of the prolific land being small, but those of the unprolific large, and the allotments to be five thousand and forty. And again (it is meet) to cut each of these into two; and to unite two sections into one allotment, each having a share of what is near to, and what is remote from, the city, the near portion being added to that one farthest off, making one allotment; and that, which is the second from the city, (to be added) to that, which is the second from the extremity; and so on with all the rest.[1] And (it is meet) to contrive in the twofold divisions, that what has just now been said (respecting)[2] the badness and goodness of the land, be equalized[3] by the greater and less quantity at the distribution; and to divide the males[4] likewise into twelve parts; and for a person to arrange the whole[5] of the rest of property into twelve parts equal, as much as is possible, a description being made of all particulars. After this, to assign the twelve allotments to the twelve gods, and to call them after their names, and to consecrate to each the portion obtained by lot, and to call it a Phylé;[6] and again to divide the twelve sections of the city in the same manner as they divided the rest of the country; and that each should possess two habitations, one near the centre and the other near the extremity; and thus let the method of settlement have an end. But it is requisite for us to consider by all means a matter of this kind, that all the points, which have just now been stated, will never concur on such like occasions, so that all should happen to take place according to reason; and that men will exist, who would not feel annoyed at such a method of living together,

[1] To this passage Aristotle alludes in Polit. vii. 10.

[2] Ast would supply correctly *πέρι* after *φαυλότητός τε* from "de fœcunditate" in Ficinus.

[3] I have translated as if the Greek were *ἐπανισούμενον ἔσεσθαι*, not *ἐπανισουμένους*, which is without syntax or sense.

[4] Taylor has "the streets," as if his head was running upon *τὰς ἀγυιὰς* in lieu of *ἄνδρας*—

[5] Ast, unable to understand *τὴν τῆς ἄλλης οὐσίας*, would read *τὰ τῆς*—Plato wrote, I suspect, *καὶ τὴν ὅλην τῆς*—as I have translated, or else *τὸν—συνταξάμενον*—

[6] From this passage it is evident that *Φυλὴ* means "a parish," which in Christian countries is dedicated to some saint, as the Phylé was in Attica to some god or demigod.

but would endure to have property fixed (by law) and moderate through the whole of life; and the procreation of children to be such as we have mentioned; and to be deprived of silver and gold, and other things, which the legislator is clearly, from what has been said, about to forbid; and (endure) further [1]the equalization of the land and the dwelling in a city placed in the centre,[1] as we have mentioned above. [2]Of all which matters a person has been speaking almost as if they were dreams, and moulding[2] a state and citizens, as it were, of wax. Subjects however of this kind have been in a certain manner not badly spoken of. [3]But it is requisite to take up again against himself things of this kind.[3] [4]For the legislator would say[4] again to us this—"Do not think, my friends, that what has been now asserted in these speeches has lain hid from me, and that (a person)[5] has gone through in some manner the truth. But I think this will be most just in each of those things about to be, that he, who exhibits a pattern, according to which the thing attempted ought to be done, should omit nothing of what is most beautiful and true; but that he, to whom it is impossible for any thing of this kind to happen, should decline executing that very thing; but that of those which remain, and is nearest to it, and most closely connected naturally with what it is fitting to do, [6]he should devise a plan how this very thing may take place;[6] but permit the legislator to put a finish to his intention; and this being done, then to con-

[1]—[1] I have translated as if the Greek were *ὡς εἰρήκαμεν ἰσότητας*, not *εἴρηκε μεσότητας*. For the construction is *χώρας ἰσότητας καὶ ἄστεος ἐν κύκλῳ οἰκήσεις*. Ficinus has "regiones et urbis in medio et in extremis, sicut ordinavimus, ubique habitationes."

[2]—[2] The Greek is *πάντη σχεδὸν οἷον ὀνείρατα λέγων ἢ πλάττων*— But as there is nothing to which *λέγων* can be referred, I have translated as if the Greek were—*ἃ πάντ' ἦν σχεδὸν οἷον ὀνείρατά τις λέγων καὶ πλάττων*.

[3]—[3] Such is the literal translation of the Greek—*χρὴ δ' ἐπαναλαμβάνειν πρὸς αὐτὸν τὰ τοιάδε*: where I am quite in the dark; and so, I think, was Ficinus; whose version is, "sed ea quoque narranda, quæ legislator adversus diceret—" One MS. has *πάντα λαμβάνειν*. Perhaps Plato wrote *χρὴ δ' εἰπεῖν τιν' ἀναλαμβάνειν πρὸς ταῦτ' ἂν τοιάδε*. "But it is meet to conceive that a person would say against such remarks something of this kind."

[4]—[4] The Greek is *πάλιν ἄρα—φράζει*— I have translated as if it were *πάλιν γὰρ ἂν φράζοι*—

[5] After *διεξέρχεται* there has evidently dropt out *τις*—

[6]—[6] Ficinus has "omni studio prosequatur—"

sider in common with him, which of the matters that have been mentioned are conducive, and which adverse to legislalation.[1] For it surely behoves the artist in a matter the most trifling to make by all means his work consistent with itself, if it is to be worthy of mention. But now after the decree relating to the division into twelve parts, we must be ready to look into this too,[2] namely, to show in what manner the twelve parts have the greatest possible number of divisions of the things within them,[3] and what are consequent upon these, and produced from them, up to the five thousand and forty; and from whence (they have)[4] clans,[5] and wards, and villages, and, in addition, the drawing up and leading out of (troops) in war, and moreover coins, and measures dry and liquid, and weights; all these it is requisite for the law to regulate in measure[6] and in harmony with each other. In addition to these we ought not to feel a fear even on that ground, lest there should be what is considered an attention to trifles, should any one regulate all the chattels which persons are to possess, nor permit any of them to be immoderate, and consider by a reason common to all, that the distributions and variations of the numbers are useful for all things, even such as are various themselves[7] in themselves, and such as are so in length and depth, or in sounds and motions, both those that proceed in a straight direction upwards and downwards, and (those that)[8] move in a circle. For it behoves the legislator, looking to all these points, to enjoin all the citizens not to swerve from this arrangement to the utmost of their power. For no one branch of learning suited to

[1] The Greek is *πρόσαντες εἴρηται*. But *εἴρηται* is plainly superfluous after the preceding *εἰρημένων*.

[2] Instead of *δῆλον δή*, which I cannot understand, nor could Ficinus, I think, for he has omitted those words, wanting likewise in another MS., I have translated as if the Greek were *δηλοῦν δή*—

[3] In lieu of *αὐτοῦ*, which is unintelligible, Ast reads *αὐτῶν*—He should have suggested *αὑτῶν*, similar to "in se" in Ficinus.

[4] I have introduced "they have" from "habent" in Ficinus.

[5] By *φρατρία* was understood one of the three sections into which the *φυλή* was divided, as shown by Harpocration in *Τριττύς*, which was another; and the third was called *ἔθνος*.

[6] Ficinus has "commensurata," as if his MS. read *σύμμετρα*.

[7] In lieu of *αὐτοὶ*, the sense requires *αὐτὰ*, and hence we can get rid of the verb, "accipiunt," which Ficinus has introduced to supply the otherwise defective syntax in *ποικίλμ τα*, which is evidently an interpolation.

[8] Before *τῆς* there has evidently dropt out *ταῖς* to answer to the preceding *ταῖς*.

children possesses such a mighty power as regards domestic economy, and state polities, and all arts, as the study of numbers; and, what is the greatest of all, excites even the sleepy person and naturally untaught, and renders him docile, and with a good memory, and clever, while making a progress, by a divine art, beyond his own nature. All these, if a person shall have taken away by other laws and pursuits illiberality and a love of money from the minds of those, who are about to possess them sufficiently and profitably, would become a course of instruction honourable and befitting; but if not, a person would unconsciously, instead of wisdom, produce the so-called cleverness, such as it is in our power to see the [1] Egyptians and Phœnicians,[1] and many other nations produce, through the illiberality of their other pursuits and possessions; either because some indifferent legislator of theirs has caused such results, or a severe misfortune has fallen upon them, or some other nature of this kind. For let not this, Megillus and Clinias, lie hid from us respecting places, that some differ[2] from others in producing men better or worse; in opposition to which we must not lay down laws. For through all kinds[3] of winds and violent heat, some persons are of an alien disposition, and with feelings of hostility;[4] others through the water; but others [5] through that food from the

[1—1] Respecting the love of money amongst the Egyptians and Phœnicians Ast refers to Plato Rep. iv. 11, p. 436, A., and respecting the so-called cleverness of the former, see the learned note of Berkelius on Steph. Byz. Αἴγυπτος.

[2] So Ficinus, whom Cornarius, Taylor, and Ast have followed. The Greek is *οὔκ εἰσιν*, where, I suspect, *ἀκούουσιν* lies hid in the Latin sense of "audiunt," and which is found likewise in Greek.

[3] In lieu of *παντοῖα* I should prefer *ἀνταῖα*, "hostile," see my note on Æsch. Suppl. 814, or *πάνυ βίαια*, see my Poppo's Prolegom. p. 261. For it was not the variety but the quality of the wind, that would produce the difference in the inhabitants.

[4] I have adopted the emendation of Ruhnken, *ἀνάρσιοι* for *ἐναίσιοι*. Ast would read *ἐξαίσιοι*, which Stalbaum passes off as his own conjecture. But *ἐξαίσιος* is never, I believe, applied to a person.

[5—5] The Greek is at present *διὰ ταύτην τὴν ἐκ τῆς γῆς τροφὴν ἀναδιδοῦσαν οὐ μόνον τοῖς σώμασιν ἀμείνω καὶ χείρω*. But as Galen in T. i. p. 349, ed. Bas., quotes *διὰ τὴν—ἄμεινον καὶ χεῖρον*, Plato wrote, I suspect, *διὰ τὴν γῆν ἐκ τῆς γαστρὸς τροφὴν ἀναδιδοῦσαν οὐ μόνον τοῖς σώμασιν ἀμείνω καὶ χείρω*, i. e. through the earth yielding from its womb food, better or worse, not only for the body— For thus *πνεύματα*, *ὕδατα*, and *γῆ* would make up the three powers of matter, air, water, and earth, which

earth,[5] which not only imparts to bodies (properties) better and worse, but which is no less able to infuse all things of this kind into their soul. But of all the places in a country those excel the most, in which there is a certain divine inspiration, and allotments for dæmons, who are either always propitious to the inhabitants, or the contrary; for whom the legislator, who has a mind, would, after reflecting, as much as it is possible for man to reflect upon (all)[1] things of this kind, endeavour to lay down laws; which must be done by you, Clinias; for to matters of this kind must he turn himself, who is about to colonize a country.

Clin. Very beautifully, Athenian guest! do you speak; and so must it be done by me.

BOOK VI.

[1.] *Athen.* But, after all that has now been said, there will be almost[2] the appointment of magistrates in your state.

Clin. Such is the case.

Athen. Respecting the proper arrangement of a polity, these two kind of things happen to exist. First, the appointment of offices, [3][and of persons about to rule,][3] how many they ought to be, and in what manner appointed. Next, with respect to the laws that are to be imposed upon each office, what, and how many, and of what kind it will be fitting (to impose) upon each. But, previous to choosing them, let us

were constantly united, as being the creators and preservers of the world, and all that it contains, as I have shown on Æsch. Prom. 88, and to the passages there quoted I could now add many more; while on the causes that have led to the loss or corruption of γαστρὸς it would be easy to write a still longer note. Suffice it to say that γαστρὸς might have easily dropt out between τῆς and τρο—

[1] Instead of οὕτω, which I cannot understand, I have translated as if the Greek were πάντα.

[2] In σχεδὸν, although supported by "ferme" in Ficinus, there is, I suspect, some error. For it could hardly thus stand by itself.

[3]—[3] The words between brackets are properly omitted by Ficinus. They are evidently an explanation of ἀρχῶν, as shown in part by ἀρχόντων, found in Bas. 2, in lieu of ἀρξόντων.

stop a little, and give some account fitting to be detailed respecting them.

Clin. What account is this?

Athen. This. Something of this kind is surely evident to all, that, since the work of legislation is a matter of moment, [1] by placing a state well furnished with laws well laid down under not suitable magistrates,[1] not only would there be a very great laugh at the (laws) well laid down to no purpose, but there would arise nearly the greatest mischief and bane to states from them.

Clin. How not?

Athen. Let us then consider this, as happening to you, my friend, touching the present polity and state. For you see that it is necessary in the first place for those, who are proceeding in a straight road to the powers of magistrates, to have given, both themselves and their respective families from childhood to the period of their election, a sufficient test. Next for those, who are about to make the choice, to have been brought up and well taught in legal habits, so as to be able to judge correctly of those worthy of either (fate), and to receive, or to reject them with disgust.[2] But how can those, who have recently met together for this purpose, and are unacquainted with each other, and moreover uninstructed, be ever able to choose magistrates in a blameless manner?

Clin. They nearly never can.

Athen. But a contest, as they say,[3] does not readily admit of

[1]—[1] By merely changing τοῦ into τῷ, and ἐπιστῆσαι into ὑποστῆσαι, the passage which Stephens, Heindorf, Ast and all others consider to be defective, and endeavour to supply, becomes perfectly intelligible. For Plato meant it to be inferred that even good laws, when improperly administered, are a bane to a state.

[2] Ast remarks correctly that in the words δυσχεραίνοντάς τε καὶ ἀποδεχομένους ὀρθῶς κρίνειν καὶ ἀποκρίνειν, there is the figure of speech called Chiasmus; by which δυσχεραίνοντας and ἀποκρίνειν, the two extreme terms of the sentence, are to be united, and ἀποδεχομένους and κρίνειν, the two middle terms.

[3] This passage alone would be sufficient to show that Taylor translated from neither the Greek nor the genuine version of Ficinus, but the refiction of it by Grynæus; who alone has added "ut aiunt." The Greek is προφάσεις οὐ πάνυ δέχεσθαι, where to support the syntax, Stephens proposed to insert φασὶ after προφάσεις: while Ficinus has "suscipit," as if his MS. read δέχεται. Respecting the proverb see Aristoph. Ἀχ. 367, Ὡς σκῆψιν ἀγὼν οὗτος οὐ προσδέξεται, and the Schol. on Cratyl. p. 421, D., with Heindorf's note.

excuses. This then must now be accomplished both by you and me; since you have with readiness undertaken to settle a colony for a clan of the Cretans, and are, as you say, the tenth commissioner; and I have promised to assist you, according to our present story-telling. I will not therefore willingly leave this discourse without a head.[1] For should it meet us,[2] while wandering in this state, it would appear to be deformed.

Clin. You have spoken, guest, very well.

Athen. Not (spoken) merely, but so I will do to the utmost of my power.

Clin. Let us do by all means, as we have said.

Athen. Be it so, if god be willing; and so far at least let us be victors over old age.

Clin. And it is likely that he will be willing.

Athen. It is reasonable. Following him therefore, let us understand this.

Clin. What?

Athen. In how manly and hazardous a manner will our state have been at present settled.

Clin. Looking to what[3] and whither especially have you thus spoken at present?

Athen. How easily and fearlessly have we laid down laws for persons unskilled, in what way they may receive what has been just laid down. Thus much, at least, is evident, Clinias, nearly to every one, although not very wise, that no one will easily admit these laws at first. But if we wait for the time [4]when those, who in their boyhood had tasted of, and been sufficiently brought up in, the laws, and accustomed to them,[4] shall have taken a common part in them with the whole city in the election of magistrates, [5]on such an event happening as we

[1] A similar idea is to be found in Gorgias, p. 505, D., § 131, of a story without a head: which is explained by Plutarch, de Defect. Orac. p. 417, E.

[2] I have adopted with Ast the version of Erasmus, who saw that Plato wrote here *ἀπαντῇ*, similar to *περιΐῃ* in the similar passage of the Gorgias. Bekk. and Stalb. are content with *ἀπάντη*, for which Heindorf proposed to read *ἄπαντι*—

[3] Stephens correctly proposed *πρὸς* in lieu of *περὶ*. Ficinus has merely "Quorsum hæc."

[4—4] Ficinus has "donec legibus instituti pueri unaque et diu sub iisdem legibus conversati," from which it is difficult to see what he found in his MS.

[5—5] Here again the version of Ficinus is extremely loose, "certe et tunc et in posterum procul ab errore sic instructa civitas permaneret."

are speaking of, if this should take place in a certain manner and skill, I conceive there would be a great security that a state would remain even after the then existing period educated in this way.[5]

Clin. This carries reason with it.

Athen. Let us then look to this, whether we can furnish any means sufficient for this end. For I assert, Clinias, that the Cnossians ought, in a manner superior to the other Cretans, not merely to go through a formal rite[1] respecting the country which is now being colonized, but to be strenuously careful that the first magistrates may stand[2] in the most secure and best manner possible. With respect to others, it is a shorter work; but it will be most necessary for us to choose the guardians of the laws with every care.

Clin. What road then and method[3] can we discover[4] for this?

Athen. This. I assert then, ye sons of Cretans, that the Cnossians, since they take the lead of the majority of cities, ought to choose in common with those who are going to this joint settlement, from themselves, and them, thirty-seven men in all; nineteen from the settlers, but the rest from Cnossus itself; and let the Cnossians give up these to your state, and for yourself to be a member of this colony and one of the eighteen men; and this, either by employing persuasion or moderate force.

Clin. But why do not you, O guest, and Megillus, share with us in this polity?

[2.] *Athen.* Athens, O Clinias, has a high opinion of herself, and so too has Sparta, and each have their dwellings far off. But to you and the other settlers there is a care on all points, the same as what we were just now saying respecting

[1] On this meaning of the word *ἀφοσιοῦσθαι* Ast refers to Maussac on Harpocration, p. 259, Valckenaer on Herodotus iv. 149, and Wyttenbach on Phædon, p. 127.

[2] In lieu of *στῶσι* one would have expected *καταστῶσι*, similar to "constituantur" in Ficinus.

[3] From the reply in *τόνδε* it is evident that Plato did not write *πόρον καὶ λόγον*. But he might have written, what he probably did, *πόρον κατὰ λόγον*—"a road according to reason—"

[4] Ficinus has "faciemus,"—as if his MS. read *Τίν' ἂν οὖν—ἀνευρίσκοιμεν* for *Τίνα οὖν—ἀνευρίσκομεν*.

you. [1]Let it then be held to have been stated how these things may, from what is at present in our power, take place in the most likely manner.[1] But as time progresses, and the form of polity continues, let the choice of them (the magistrates) be something in this way. In the election of magistrates let all take a share who bear arms, either as horse-soldiers or foot-soldiers, and who have taken a part in war according to their respective ability in age; and let the election take place in whatever temple the state holds in the highest veneration; and let each person bring to the altar of the god a small tablet, on which he has written the name of his father,[2] and parish, and ward where he is a liveryman;[3] [4]and let him write thus his own name in the same manner.[4] But let it be lawful for any one to take away the tablet, which appears to him to be not properly[5] written, and to place it in the Agora, (there to remain[6]) for not less than thirty days. Of the tablets let the magistrates exhibit to the view of the whole city up to three hundred, that have been judged to be amongst the first; and from these in a similar manner let the city vote whomsoever each person pleases; and let (the magistrates) exhibit again to all one hundred of those selected out of them a second time; and out of the hundred let any one vote a third time for whom he pleases, going [7]through cuttings.[7] But the thirty-seven, who

[1]—[1] All the words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor. Ficinus has "et quæ tibi et illis hac tempestate convenientissime fieri possunt."

[2] I have translated as if the Greek were not *πατρόθεν*, but *πατρός θ' ἅμα*, to which *πρόσθεν* in one MS. seems to lead. Plato could hardly have said *πατρόθεν*. For children in Greece were seldom called after their father. They got their name either from some accidental circumstance, or else from their grandfather.

[3] This seems to be the exact meaning of *δημοτεύεσθαι*, explained by Hesychius, *τὸ μετέχειν δήμου καὶ πολιτείας κατὰ νόμον*.

[4]—[4] The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, either because they were wanting in his MS., or because he knew that, as *παρεγγράφειν* means to "introduce improperly into a writing," it would be here inadmissible; and hence too just before he has "nomen suum et patris," as if his MS. read *αὐτοῦ τε τοὔνομα πατρός θ' ἅμα*—

[5] So Taylor from "non recte" in Ficinus; who either found in his MS., or wished to read, *κατὰ νόμον* in lieu of *κατὰ νοῦν*—

[6] Ficinus, whom Taylor follows, has "ubi—permaneat," as if *ὂν* had been found in his MS. after *ἔλαττον*, or *μένον* after *ἡμερῶν*.

[7]—[7] Such is the literal translation of *διὰ τομίων*, with which words Ficinus was probably so dissatisfied as to omit entirely *διὰ τομίων πορευόμενος*. One MS. has *τομιώνων*. From "per eosdem" in Cornarius, Stephens

may have the greatest number of votes, let some persons deciding declare to be the magistrates. Who then, Clinias and Megillus, shall appoint all these things for us in the state, respecting magistrates and the testing of them? Do we not perceive, that in states, so united from the first, there must be some; [1] but who they would be, it is not the province of all magistrates?[1] It is however necessary (that there should be some), and these too men of not an inferior kind, but as much as possible at the very summit. For the beginning, according to the proverb,[2] is the half of the whole; and all men praise a good commencement. But this, as it seems to me, is more than the half; nor has any one sufficiently praised it, when it has taken place correctly.

Clin. You speak most correctly.

Athen. Let us then, since we know it, not pass it by untold, by making nothing clear to ourselves as to the manner in which it exists. For my part I have it not in my power to say but one word necessary for, and conducive to, the present purpose.

Clin. What is it?

[3.] *Athen.* I assert that to this state, which we are about to settle, there is not, as it were, a father and mother except the city which colonizes it. Nor am I ignorant that oftentimes some differences have arisen, and will arise, between colonies and their parent countries. At present then, as a child, although it is about to be at variance with its parents, through its present want of instruction, loves and is beloved by them, and is constantly flying to its relations, finds allies in

seems to have introduced *τῶν αὐτῶν*— Plato wrote, I suspect, *διὰ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἅμα τομεῖ πορευόμενος*, "going through the names with a cutting instrument—" Cousin translates "procédant de divisions en divisions—" But what can be the meaning of those words here he does not say.

[1]—[1] Here again a literal version best shows that the Greek is unintelligible; where in lieu of *πρὸς πασῶν*, Ast has edited *πρὸ πασῶν*, from "ante magistratus," in Cornarius; while one MS. has *ἐκ*, from which nothing, as far as I can see, is gained. Ficinus was equally at a loss; whose words are, "qui vero ex omnibus magistratibus deligantur, in eis nequaquam reperientur," partially adopted by Taylor, "but that they will never be found among those that are chosen for magistrates." Cousin gives in his Notes a paraphrase in the place of a literal translation.

[2] The proverb alluded to is in Hesiod, and quoted in iii. 9. Ovid too says, "Dimidium facti, qui bene cœpit, habet."

them alone, which[1] I assert has now taken place[2] readily to the Cnossians through their care for the new city, and to the new (city through their care) for the Cnossians. I repeat then, as I have just now said,[3]—for what is well said it does no harm (to say) twice—that the Cnossians ought to have a care over all these particulars in common, by selecting from those, who are departing for the colony, the oldest and best possible,[4] not less than one hundred, and let there be another hundred from the Cnossians themselves. I say too, that these should, on coming to the new city, be careful how the magistrates are appointed according to the laws, and after being appointed undergo a scrutiny. And on this taking place, let the Cnossians dwell in[5] Cnossus; and let the new city endeavour to preserve itself and become prosperous. Let then those numbered amongst the thirty-seven men be held to have been chosen both now and for all time to come for these purposes. First, let them be guardians of the laws; next, of those writings (in) which[6] every one shall write down for the magistrates the amount of his property, except[7] the person who has the greatest valuation of four minæ,[8] and the second of three, and the third of two [minæ];[9]

[1] Instead of ἃ one would have expected τοῖα, on account of the preceding καθάπερ— Hence Ficinus has "ita quoque."

[2] This past time seems very strange here, as if the colony had been already settled.

[3] Ficinus has "non enim nocet bis dicere, quod bene dicitur," who either found in his MS., or supplied from his head, λέγειν or εἰπεῖν after βλάπτει. To the same proverb there is an allusion in xii. 8, p. 957, A., and in Phileb. p. 59, E. § 140, and Gorg. p. 498, E. § 117.

[4] Before μὴ ἔλαττον there is inserted ἑλομένους, which could not thus be repeated after the preceding προσελομένους.

[5] Ficinus has "Gnosum Gnosii redeant—" as if his MS. read τὴν μὲν Κνωσὸν τοὺς Κνωσίους ἥκειν αὖ— which is far preferable to οἰκεῖν— Cousin is content with οἰκεῖν, which he renders, "resteront chez eux," and explains it by saying, "c'est à dire ne se méleront plus que de leurs propres affairs." But how οἰκεῖν can have such a meaning he does not state, nor do I see.

[6] Stephens would insert δὲ before ὧν, from "ubi" in Ficinus.

[7] The word πλὴν, which I cannot understand, nor could, I think, Ficinus, as he has omitted it, Ast renders "verumtamen," a meaning that I am not aware it ever has elsewhere.

[8] Ast says that after ὁ μὲν μέγιστον ἔχων τεττάρων μνῶν, is to be supplied τίμημα ἐχέτω. But how this could be, I confess I cannot understand. Ficinus has, what is perfectly intelligible, "sitque maximus census minarum quatuor."

[9] The insertion of μναῖν here, after its omission in the preceding clause, seems very strange.

but the fourth of (one)[1] mina. But if any one shall be shown to possess any thing else beyond what has been written down, let all this become public property; and, besides this, let him [2]undergo a punishment, through any one bringing him to trial, neither honourable nor with a good name, but disgraceful,[2] should he be convicted of despising the laws through the love of gain. Let then any one indict him for being addicted to a disgraceful love of gain, and follow up the charge by a trial before the guardians of the laws. And if the defendant is condemned to pay a fine, let him have no share in the public property; and when any distribution takes place in the state, let him be without a share, except as regards his (first)[3] allotment; and let him be written down, where any one who wishes may read it, as a person condemned, as long as he lives. Let not the guardian of the laws be in office more than twenty years; and let him not be inducted into his office, if he is less than fifty years of age. But if he is sixty years old when he is inducted into it, let him hold it for ten years; and according to this ratio let it be, that he, who has passed beyond seventy years, shall not imagine that he holds an office of such importance amongst those who are holding it.

[4.] Let then these three ordinances be considered to have been stated, touching the guardians of the laws. But as the laws progress, each one may enjoin upon these men, what matters they ought to attend to, in addition to what have been detailed already.

And now we will speak in order about the election of other magistrates. For after this it is necessary to elect Generals, and such as minister to them in war, such as the [4]Hip-

[1] One MS. has *μιᾶς* for *μνᾶς*. Plato probably wrote both, *μιᾶς δὲ μνᾶς ὁ τέταρτος*.

[2—2] Ficinus, unable, it would seem, to understand the Greek, is content to give the general meaning, "præterea reus sit volentis eum tanquam infamem accusare." Cornarius, more closely, "ad hoc autem judicium subeat—non honestum neque illustre sed turpe." But *εὐώνυμος* never elsewhere does or could mean "illustre." Ast renders it by "faustum." But what is "judicium faustum" he does not explain, nor can I tell.

[3] Ficinus alone has "præter sortem primam."

[4—4] In using the words Hipparch, Phylarch, and Taxiarch, Plato merely adopted the custom of his own country, as may be inferred from Demosth. Phil. i. where they are similarly united. By Hipparch was meant the commander-in-chief of the cavalry; by Phylarch, the commander of the cavalry of each Phyle, with which may be compared the cavalry in England, called Fencibles, and with the infantry of the Phyle the regiment of Militia, belonging to each county.

parchs and the Phylarchs, and those who drill the foot-soldiers of the Phyle,[4] to whom would be very fitting the name of Taxiarchs, as the common people call them. [1]Of these let the guardians of the laws propose for Generals from this very state itself;[1] and from those so proposed let all, who have taken a part in war at their proper age, or are in the act of doing so on each occasion,[2] make the selection. But if it shall appear to any one that some one of those, who have not been proposed, is superior to some of those, who have been proposed, let him name the person, whom he proposes, in the place of some one, and, taking an oath touching this very matter, let him bring forward the other party; and which ever shall be voted by a show of hands, let him be decreed as belonging to the selection. And let the three, who have the greatest number of votes for them to be Generals and to have the care of the war department, undergo a scrutiny, as the guardians of the law (underwent). And let the twelve elected Generals propose twelve Taxiarchs for themselves, for each tribe one;[3] and let there be a preference nomination, as occurred in the case of the Generals, done in the same manner, respecting the Taxiarchs, and a second show of hands and a decision. And let the guardians of the laws, after they have brought together an assembly at a place the most holy and most convenient, cause to sit, before the Prytanes and Council have been chosen, the heavy-armed apart, and apart too the cavalry, and the third in order after these the whole of those employed in war. And let all hold up their hands for the Generals and Hipparchs; but for the Taxiarchs those who carry shields; but let all the cavalry choose for itself[4] Phylarchs; but let the Generals appoint for themselves the officers

[1]—[1] The words between the numerals I cannot understand; nor could, I think, Ficinus, whose version is, "Igitur ipsi custodes legum hujusmodi exercitus duces futuros aliquos civitatis hujus cives proponant," as if he had found in his MS. *οὕτω δὴ στρατηγοὺς μὲν τοιαύτης ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως στρατειᾶς πολίτας τινας αὐτοὶ οἱ νομοφύλακες. προβαλλέσθων—*

[2] I hardly perceive the meaning of *ἑκάστοτε* here, omitted by Ficinus.

[3] Ficinus alone has "unum cuilibet tribui," for he found, no doubt, in his MS. *ἕνα* between *δώδεκα* and *ἑκάστῃ*— On the loss of *εἷς* and its cases before *ἕκαστος*, see my Poppo's Prolegom. p. 226, and to the passages quoted there I could now add many more.

[4] Instead of *αὖ τούτοις* Ast has suggested, what I have adopted, *αὐτοῖς*—

over the light-armed soldiers, or archers, and the rest of those employed in war. There still remains for us the appointment of the Hipparchs. These then let those propose, who proposed the Generals; and let the election and the preference nomination[1] take place, as it occurred in the case of the Generals. And let the cavalry hold up their hands for them in the presence of the infantry looking upon them; and let the two, who have the greatest show of hands, be the commanders of all the cavalry; and let the disputes about the show of hands[2] take place up to twice; but if any one doubts about them a third time, let those determine the votes,[3] whose province it is to fix the measure of voting.[3]

[5.] The Council shall consist of thirty dozen; for three hundred and sixty would be suited to the distributions; and by dividing that number into four parts, (each) ninety, from each portion of the census ninety councillors would give (their vote.)[4] And in the first place let all those of the largest valuation give their vote; or the person who disobeys (the law) will be fined [5]according to the fine decreed,[5] and [6]when they shall have been carried in, let a person put a mark against them. On the following day let those of the second class give (their vote), as on the former (day); and on the third day let any one of the third class bring (his vote). In the case of those belonging to these three classes, let it be compulsory[7]

[1] I have with Bekker adopted Ast's emendation, *ἀντιπροβολὴν*, in lieu of *ἀντιβολὴν*—

[2] Ficinus has "pronominationem bis fieri liceat," as if he had found in his MS. not *τῶν χειροτονιῶν*, but *τῶν προβολῶν*, which he constantly renders "pronominationem," and *ἐξεῖναι* in lieu of *εἶναι*.

[3—3] Such is Taylor's translation of the Greek *οἵσπερ τῆς χειροτονίας μέτρον ἑκάστοις ἕκαστον ἦν*, which Ast confesses to be obscure, but has been unable, I conceive, to throw any light upon the subject. Ficinus too was equally at a loss; whose version is, "qui comitiorum modum in singulos statuere," which Ast says he cannot understand, nor can I. Did Plato write, *οἵσπερ τὰ τῆς χειροτονίας μετρεῖν ἐν ἑκάστοις ἑκάστοτ' ἦν*— "to whom it is ever the business to take the measure of the voting on each matter."

[4] So Ast understands *φέρειν*, with the ellipse of *ψῆφον*.

[5—5] Such is the literal version of *τῇ δοξάσῃ ζημίᾳ*. Ficinus has "pro arbitrio condemnetur."

[6—6] Such is the Greek literally. Ficinus has "postquam vero delati sunt, conscribantur." By comparing what Plato says a little below, it would seem that a mark was placed against the names of those who declined to vote, and that the list of them was laid before the rulers.

[7] This law was introduced by Plato, perhaps in imitation of the enact-

to give (a vote); but let the fourth and smallest class be dismissed exempt from fine, should any one belonging to it be unwilling to give (a vote). On the fourth day let all belonging to the fourth and smallest class give (their votes); but let him, who belonging to the third and fourth class, is unwilling to give (a vote) be exempt from a fine. But let him, who, belonging to the second and first class, does not give a vote, be fined; he, who belongs to the second rank, be fined the triple of the first fine;[1] and he, who belongs to the first, quadruple. On the fifth day let the rulers bring out for all the citizens to see the names that have a mark against them; and let every man of them give (a vote) or be fined with the first fine. And after selecting one hundred and eighty out of each class, let them, after choosing by ballot one half of them, make a scrutiny of them, and these shall form the council for one year.

The election taking place in this manner, would be a medium between a monarchy and a democracy; which medium a polity ought always to preserve. For slaves and masters can never become friends, nor the depraved and worthy, when proclaimed[2] with equal honours. For through things, that are unequal, those that are equal will become unequal, unless they partake of moderation; for, through both of those (inequalities) polities are filled with seditions. For the old saw, being true, that equality produces friendship,[3] has been asserted very correctly[4] and carefully. But through its not being very evident what the equality is, which is able to effect this, it

ment of Solon, who would not permit persons to be neutral during public commotions; for he knew that they merely waited till the opposing parties were exhausted, and could thus secure the prize for which both were contending.

[1] By the first fine is intended what is called above "the fine decreed by law." Ast.

[2] In lieu of *διαγορευόμενοι*, Stobæus has *διαγενόμενοι*; from which Ast would elicit *διαγόμενοι*, "living." But *διάγεσθαι* is not found, I believe, in that sense any where. The passage produced by Ast from vi. 6, p. 758, is not in point.

[3] This saying is similar to that quoted by the Scholiast on Phædrus, p. 240, C. § 37, Ἥλιξ ἥλικ' ἔτερπε, γέρων δέ γ' ἔτερπε γέροντα, and the other passages collected there by Ast, and on Sympos. p. 195, B. § 21.

[4] The expression *μάλα ὀρθῶς* is plainly superfluous after *ἀληθὴς ὢν*— For if a saying be true, it must be said correctly. Perhaps Plato wrote *ἀηθὴς ὢν νῦν*, "being unusual at present—" On the confusion between *ἀηθὴς* and *ἀληθὴς*, see at Euthyd. § 16, p. 60.

throws us into great trouble. For, as there are two equalities,[1] of the same name, but in reality nearly contrary to each other on many points, every state and every legislator is competent to introduce one of these in the case of honours by regulating, as regards the distribution by means of the ballot, the equality consisting in measure, weight, and number; but it is not easy for every one to perceive the most true and the best equality.[2] For it is the decision of Zeus;[3] and it furnishes[4] but little at all times to men; although as much as it does furnish to states or private persons, it works out every good. For it distributes more to the greater, and less to the smaller,[5] imparting to each what is moderate according to its nature. Moreover it distributes greater honours to those who are even greater in virtue, [6]but to those who have (less) of virtue and education (it distributes) less (honours), as being suited[6] to each according to reason. For this surely is justice itself even in politics, at which we ought at present to grasp, and, looking to this equality, Clinias, to settle our now rising state. And should any one settle any other (state), he ought to give laws, with his mind turned to this point, and not to a few tyrants, or one, or to any power of the people, but always to justice itself. And this is what has just now been stated, namely, the distributing what is according to nature, equal to unequals.

[1] The two equalities alluded to are the arithmetic and geometric, as shown by Plato in Gorg. p. 508, A. § 136. Aristoph. Nicomach. v. 4, and Plutarch. Sympos. Problem. viii. 2, p. 719, B., quoted by Ast.

[2] See Aristot. Polit. vi. 3, *περὶ μὲν τοῦ ἴσου καὶ τοῦ δικαίου—πάνυ χαλεπὸν εὑρεῖν.*

[3] According to the Scholiast on Gorg. p. 508, A., the decision of Zeus is *δικαιοσύνη*, another name for geometric analogy. For Plato, says Plutarch, in Sympos. viii. 2, p. 718, R., *γνώμην ἀπεφήνατο γεωμετρεῖν τὸν θεόν.* But he adds, *εἴ γε δὴ θετέον εἶναι τὴν ἀπόφασιν ταύτην* Πλάτωνος.

[4] This is the usual meaning of *ἐπαρκεῖν*. But the sense requires rather "it is used by—"

[5] Plato is here speaking of a geometric equality, according to which the merits of individuals are to be estimated; so that as merit is to merit, so should gift be to gift. T.

[6]—[6] The Greek is *τοῖς δὲ τοὐναντίον ἔχουσιν ἀρετῆς καὶ παιδείας τὸ πρέπον.* But Ficinus has "minoribus autem virtute et disciplina minores, et—quod decet." From whence Stephens was led to suspect that something had dropt out to answer to the preceding *μείζους*. Perhaps Plato wrote *μείζους, μείους δὲ τοῖς μεῖόν τι ἔχουσιν ἀρετῆς καὶ παιδείας, ἅτε πρέπον*— as I have translated.

It is necessary however for every state to make use of these (two)[1] equalities in name, if it is about not to have a share in seditions in any degree. [2]For the easy and lenient temper of what is perfect and accurate contrary to justice the correct is improperly broken down when it takes place.[2] Hence it is perhaps necessary to make use in addition of the equality by ballot, on account of the moroseness of the multitude; and afterwards to invite by prayers a god and good fortune to direct the ballot to what is most just. In this manner then it is necessary to use both the equalities; but the one which is in need of good fortune on the very fewest occasions.

[6.] These things, and in this way, and for these reasons, it is necessary, friends, for that state to do, which is about to be preserved. But since both a ship, while sailing on the sea, requires constantly a watch both night and day, and in like manner a state dwells,[3] while driven along by the storm of other states, and running the risk of being caught by all kinds of plots, it is requisite through the day to night, and from night to day, for the rulers to join with rulers, and watchers

[1] Ficinus alone has, what is more intelligible, "his duabus æqualitatibus," as if his MS. read *ταύταις δυσὶ παρωνύμοις ἰσότησι*.

[2]—[2] Such is the literal version of the Greek, *τὸ γὰρ ἐπιεικὲς καὶ ξύγγνωμον τοῦ τελέου καὶ ἀκριβοῦς παρὰ δίκην τὴν ὀρθὴν ἐστι παρατεθρανσμένον, ὅταν γίγνηται*, which I cannot understand; nor could, I think, Ficinus, whose paraphrastic version is "æquabilitas enim illa laudabilis et æqua dijudicatio perfecti atque exacti, cum præter rectum judicium fit, violatur et frangitur." Taylor has more closely, "the equitable and lenient judgment of the perfect and accurate." But the genitives *τοῦ τελέου καὶ ἀκριβοῦς* could not thus follow *τὸ ἐπιεικὲς καὶ ξύγγνωμον*. Of this Ast seems to have been aware. Hence his rendering is "perfecti et exacti dissolutio et depravatio;" and he makes *τοῦ τελέου καὶ ἀκριβοῦς* to depend upon *παρατεθρανσμένον*, observing that the participle is in the place of a noun. But no perfect participle passive can stand for a noun, except when it is united to an article. Schneider too has been at a loss here; for his version is "infracti juris et recti violatio," as if he wished to read *παρατεθρανσμένου*. In this mass of difficulties it seems almost hopeless to suggest any thing certain. But to my mind the train of ideas would lead to something like this—"For what is easy and lenient is, when it exists to any person, broken down by the complete and exact relating to justice unbending—in Greek, *τὸ γὰρ ἐπιεικὲς καὶ ξύγγνωμον ὑπὸ τοῦ τελέου καὶ ἀκριβοῦς περὶ δίκην τὴν ὀρθὴν ἐστι παρατεθρανσμένον, ὅτῳ ἂν γίγνηται*. With regard to the union of *ἐπιεικὲς* and *ξύγγνωμον*, it will be sufficient to refer to Aristot. Ethic. vi. 11, *τὸν γὰρ ἐπιεικῆ φαμὲν εἶναι συγγνωμονικὸν, καὶ ἐπιεικὲς τὸ ἔχειν περὶ ἔνια συγγνώμην*.

[3] In lieu of *οἰκεῖ*, which I cannot understand, Plato wrote, I suspect, *ὀκνεῖ*, "is in fear—"

with watchers, and to succeed each other constantly, and never to cease handing over (their power). But the multitude is not able to do any of these things quickly. And it is necessary to permit the majority of the counsellors to remain for the greatest part of their time properly managing their own private affairs; but that a twelfth part of them should distribute themselves over the twelve months, so as to furnish a watch, one part for one month, and [1] to be in readiness for any thing [1] in the case of any one coming from any where else, or from the city itself for any purpose, whether a person should be desirous of telling or hearing aught respecting what it is fitting for one state to give an answer to other states, or by putting questions to others to receive replies; and moreover for the sake of those innovations of all kinds which are wont to happen perpetually, in order especially that they may not occur; or, if they have occurred, that the consequences may be cured as quickly as possible, after the state shall have become acquainted with them. Hence that portion, which presides over the state, ought to be the master of public meetings and their dissolutions, which take place both according to law and on a sudden. All these matters it should be for the twelfth part of the council to arrange, who are to be at rest for eleven parts of the year. But this part of the Council ought always to keep these watchings over the state in common with the other magistrates.

Such then being the state of affairs as regards the state, they may be put into order with moderation. But what care, and what order, will there be in all the rest of the country? Must there not, since all the city, and the whole country, is distributed into twelve parts, be shown to be Commissioners of the roads, and dwellings, and buildings, and harbours, and of the market-place, and fountains, and moreover of sacred groves, and temples, and all other things of this kind belonging to the state?

Clin. How not?

[7.] *Athen.* Let us say then, that there ought to be persons to cleanse the temples, and priests and priestesses; and that it is meet to choose three kinds of officers over roads and

[1]—[1] The Greek is ἑτοίμως ἐπιτυχεῖν, which I cannot understand, nor could Ast; for he proposes to read ἐντυχεῖν. Plato probably wrote ἑτοίμως ἐπί τι ἔχειν, and so I have translated.

buildings, and the ornaments belonging to things of this kind, and over human beings that they may do no injury, and over the rest of wild beasts,[1] in the very encircling enclosure and suburb of the city, in order that every thing may take place befitting cities; and that as regards the duty just now stated, it is meet to call them City-Stewards,[2] but as regards the market, Market-Stewards, and as regards the temples, Priests. But let us not disturb those, with whom, as priests or priestesses, the sacred office is hereditary. But if, as is likely to happen to those first settled, nothing has been laid down respecting holy[3] things of this kind in favour of any body or only a few, one must appoint priests and priestesses to be the cleansers of the temples of the gods. But of all these things some are to be in their appointment by election, and some by lot, through those that are and are not Wardsmen mingling in a friendly manner with each other in every district and town, in order that they may be as much as possible of one mind. To commit then what relates to sacred rites to the god himself, let it be an act of gratification to him, and to allow divine fortune to settle by lot. But the party who has happened to obtain the lot, (it is meet) to subject to a scrutiny first, whether he is of a sound body and lawfully begotten; next of a family as pure as possible, and unpolluted himself by blood and all crimes of such a kind against the gods, and whether his father and mother have lived in a similar manner. And it is meet to bring from Delphi the laws relating to all divine things, and, after appointing interpreters for them,

[1] To avoid the strange notion of thus uniting human beings with the rest of wild beasts, Ast translates *ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων θηρίων*, "not only men, but wild beasts likewise." I suspect, however, that Plato wrote *περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτ' ἀπανθρώπων τε καὶ τινων ἀνελευθέρων*— For he had probably in mind the mutilation of the Hermæ, which took place at Athens at the hands of some persons not human and of a not gentlemanly conduct. In Greek, *ἀνελεύθερος* means frequently what is understood in English by "ungentlemanly." On the loss or corruption of *ἀπανθρώπων* see my Poppo's Prolegom. p. 220.

[2] The officers called *ἀστύνομοι* in Greece corresponded to those called Ædiles in Italy.

[3] I have adopted Orelli's emendation of *ὅσια* for *οἷς*, to which Stephens was the first to object, and to correct it by reading *ὀλιγίστοις*, in lieu of *ὀλίγοις οἷς*— Ficinus has "si vero aut nullis aut paucis aliqua hujusmodi sunt—ubi hæc desunt," which would lead to *εἰ δὲ—πάρεστι τὰ τοιαῦτα ἢ μηδενὶ ἢ τισιν ὀλίγοις, οἷς μὴ*—instead of *περὶ τὰ*— But the other method is preferable.

to make use of them. And let the priestly office be for a year, and not longer; and let the person be not less than sixty years of age, who is, according to holy laws, to attend for us sufficiently to divine matters. And let there be the same[1] laws relating to priestesses. And let [2] the thrice four tribes bring (to the vote) thrice four interpreters,[2] each (one) from themselves; and after scrutinizing the three who have the greatest number of votes, (it is meet) to send the other nine to Delphi, for the god to designate by an oracle one out of each triad; and let the scrutiny relating to these, and their age, be as in the case of the priests,[3] and let these be interpreters for life; and let the four[4] wards [5]elect in the place of him, who may have left (life), (another)[5] from the ward where there is a deficiency. (It is meet) too to choose Stewards for the sacred money in each of the temples, with full powers over the sacred groves and their produce, and the leasing (of the property), and three for the largest temples out of those with the largest estates; but two for the smaller temples, and one for the most moderate;[6] and let the choice and scrutiny of these be in the same manner as the election of the Generals was made. And let what relates to sacred things take place in this way.

[8.] But let nothing be as far as possible without a guard.

[1] Ficinus has "eademque—statuta." For his MS. read not *ταῦτα*, but *ταὐτὰ*— Perhaps Plato wrote *τὰ δ' αὐτὰ ταῦτα*— "the very same laws."

[2—2] I have adopted, what Ast suggested, *φερέτωσαν μὲν τρὶς τέτταρας αἱ τρὶς τέτταρες φυλαὶ*— in lieu of *τρὶς φερέτωσαν μὲν αἱ τέτταρες φυλαὶ τέτταρας*, for the parishes were twelve, and each parish had its own Interpreter on sacred matters. Ficinus too found something similar in his MS., as shown by his version, "interpretes autem ter quatuor ferant tribus ipsæ quatuor, ex earum ordine unaquæque tres." But why Plato should thus employ *τρὶς τέτταρες* instead of *δώδεκα* I confess I cannot explain.

[3] Ficinus, whom Taylor follows, "qualis et sacerdotum dicta est," as if his MS. read *καθάπερ εἴρηται καὶ περὶ τῶν ἱερέων*.

[4] Ast would expunge *τέτταρες*, or read as before *αἱ τρὶς τέτταρες*. Cousin renders *αἱ τέτταρες φυλαὶ* by "les tribus, divisées quatre par quatre."

[5—5] The Greek is *τὸν δέ γε λιπόντα προαιρεσθωσαν*—where must be supplied *βίον* after *λιπόντα*, and *ἕτερον* after *προαιρέσθωσαν*, to suit the sense in the version of Ficinus, "et in defuncti vicem—alium eligant." But even thus the syntax would be incorrect, which would require *ἀντὶ τοῦ λιπόντος*—

[6] So Ast translates *ἐμμελέστατα*. Ficinus, as usual in doubtful passages, employs two words, "mediis maximeque concinnis."

Let the guards of the city be in this way, through the Generals, and Taxiarchs, and Hipparchs, and Phylarchs, and the Prytanes, and moreover the City-Stewards and Market-Stewards, attending to their (respective) duties, after they have been chosen and appointed sufficiently; but the whole of the rest of the country (it is meet) to guard in this way. The whole country has been divided by us into twelve parts as nearly as possible equal. Let then, one Phylé (ward), after being allotted to each portion, furnish for the year five, as it were, Rural-Stewards and Phylarchs.[1] And let it be for these to choose, each of [2]the five,[2] out of their own Phylé, twelve from the young men not less than five-and-twenty years of age, and not more than thirty. To these let there be allotted portions of the country during a month, each for each, so that all of them may have a practical knowledge of every part of the country. But let the government and guardianship continue to the guards and governors for two years; and let those, who[3] first obtain by lot their respective portions, the guard-officers lead out, changing the places of the country constantly, (by going) [4]to the place next in order towards[4] the right in a circle, and let the right be that which is in the east. But as the year comes round, in the second year,[5] in order that the greatest portion of the guards may become acquainted with the country, not only during one season of the year, but that as many as possible may know thoroughly, in addition to the country, at the same time what occurs relating to each spot in the country at each season, let the then

[1] Cousin, and after him, C. F. Hermann, would read *Φρουράρχους* instead of *Φυλάρχους*, as shown by *ἀγρονόμους—καὶ φρουράρχους*, shortly afterwards. And so too Sydenham in Not. MSS.

[2—2] Ficinus omits *τῶν πέντε*—and so after him did Taylor.

[3] Ast renders *ὅπως ἂν*—"quomodocunque—" For he did not perceive that Plato wrote *ὅτοις ἂν*—where *ὅτοις*, Attic for *οἷστισι*, depends upon *ἡγεῖσθαι* a little below, and *ὅτοις* is put by attraction for *τισιν, οἷ*—On similar errors arising from *ὅτων* and *ὅτοις* being corrupted into *ὅπως*, see myself on Æsch. Eum. 282.

[4—4] Bekker, whom Ast and Stalbaum follow, has edited tacitly *τὸν ἐξῆς τόπον* instead of *τῶν ἑξῆς τόπων*, which Stephens had preserved from Ald., for he doubtless knew that *μεταλλάττειν* is united to an accusative and genitive, and not to two accusatives; or else we must read *ἀεὶ ἐπὶ τὸν—ἑξῆς—ἡγεῖσθαι*—as I have translated: for *ἐπὶ* might easily have dropt out between *ἀεὶ* and *τὸν*—

[5] This use of *ἔτει* after *ἐνιαυτοῦ* seems to be supported by *ἐν ὥραις ἐτῶν καὶ ἐνιαυτῶν* in Rep. x. p. 906, C.

officers lead them out again to the left, [1]constantly changing the place, until they go through the second year.[1] In the third year, (it is meet) to choose other Rural-Stewards and guard-officers as the five curators of the twelve young men; and in their occupations attention should be given of some such kind as this to each place. First that the country may be as much as possible well fortified against the enemy, [2] by trenching and digging out[2] wherever it is requisite, and with buildings restraining, as far as they can, those endeavouring to injure in any way the country and its possessions; and by making use of animals under the yoke, and the servants in each place, for these purposes, [3]doing through them, standing over them, selecting as much as possible their own employment in their own works,[3] to render every place difficult for the enemy to pass, but as easy as possible for friends, and animals under the yoke and cattle; and by taking care [4] of the roads that they may be in the most quiet state,[4] and of the waters from Zeus,[5] that they may not injure the country, but benefit it rather, when descending from high grounds into hollow places in the mountains,[6] and by restraining the outlets of the waters with buildings and ditches, such hollows may, by receiving and drinking up the waters from Zeus, produce streams and fountains for the fields below them and for all places,[7] and thus cause the

[1]—[1] The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor.

[2]—[2] Ficinus has "foveis—effossis," as if his MS. omitted *καὶ ἀποσκάπτοντας*, an evident explanation of *ταφρεύοντας*.

[3]—[3] Such is the literal translation of the text. How much more elegant is the version of Ficinus, adopted to the letter by Taylor, "ad hæc utique facienda subjugalibus servisque indigenis utantur, quando minime in suis operibus occupantur, nonnullos ipsis præficientes—" From whence it is evident that in his MS. some words were transposed, and others, in which the difficulty lies, omitted. Plato wrote, I suspect, something to this effect, *χρωμένους——πρὸς ταῦτα τῶν οἰκείων ἔργων ἐνιαυτοῦ ἐναργίαις ὅτι μάλιστα ἐκλυομένοις, ἃ δεῖ ἀόκνως ποιοῦντας αὐτοὺς, ἐκείνοις τε ἐπιστατοῦντας*—" employing for these purposes (those), when released during the idle time of the year from their own occupations, and doing themselves what is requisite, and superintending the others unhesitatingly." It is not then without some advantage that one MS. omits *αὐτῶν*, and another reads *ἐκλεγομένοις* and four *ἐν τοῖς*—

[4]—[4] The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor.

[5] So rain water was called. Hence the title of *Ζεὺς ὄμβριος*.

[6] Such hollow places are frequent in all mountainous districts.

[7] I cannot believe that Plato wrote *ἀγροῖς τε καὶ τόποις πᾶσι*. Ficinus

most dry places to possess water plentiful and good. And let them, by ornamenting the water from fountains, whether it is a river or its source, with plantations and buildings,[1] render it more beautiful, and bringing all the streams together make them abundant by means of [2]mine-like tunnels and surface-irrigations, according to each season,[2] if perchance there may have been a grove or sacred precinct about those very streams dedicated to a deity,[3] and by sending which[4] to those spots they may adorn the holy places of the gods.[5] By all means too in spots of this kind it is necessary for youths to fit up places for naked exercises for themselves, and old men's baths, and

has "inferioribus locis agrisque omnibus." But though this is somewhat less objectionable, yet *τόποις* would hardly thus precede the repeated *τόπους*. I should prefer *πίστροις*, "water-troughs." Compare Eurip. Cycl. 45, *ποιηρὰ βοτάνα, δινῶέν θ' ὕδωρ ποταμῶν ἐν πίστραις κεῖται.*

[1] Juvenal, however, in ii. 18, objects to the buildings placed round the fountain of Egeria, which he says was more beautiful in its natural state than when decked with marble. Plato had probably in mind the fountain of Callirhoé at Athens, which was built over by the Peisistratidæ, as we learn from Thucyd. ii. 15.

[2]—[2] Such seems to be the meaning of *μεταλλείαις—ὑδρείαις τε καθ' ἑκάστας τὰς ὥρας*, where Bekker, whom Stalbaum follows, has edited *ὑδρείας τε*, which I confess I cannot understand; and still less *καθ' ἑκάστας τὰς ὥρας*: as if irrigations took place at any fixed season. Hence I suspect that Plato wrote *συνάγοντες εἰς μισγαγκείας νάματα πάντα, ἄφθονα ποιῶσιν εἰς ὑδρείας τὰς κατὰ καυστικὰς τὰς ὥρας*. For thus there would be an allusion to the Homeric *μισγάγκεια*, and to the line of another poet, *Ἐς μισγάγκειαν συνάγοντες νάματα πάντα*, and the irrigations be said to take place, as they should, during seasons of excessive heat. Ficinus, unable, it would seem, to translate the whole passage literally, has thought proper to remodel it— "lucos quin etiam jugi irrigatione et dedicatos Diis agros aquis immissis pinguefacere curent et metallis humorem scatebrasque adhibeant," omitting entirely *καθ' ἑκάστας τὰς ὥρας*.

[3] Instead of *ἀφειμένον*, defended by Winckelmann on Plutarch Erotic. p. 230, Ast suggested *ἀνειμένον*, which he doubtless got from "dedicatos" in Ficinus. But *ἀνειμένος* neither is, nor could be, applied in this sense to a thing, only to a person or animal. Hence I should prefer *καθήμενον*, "situated—" Sydenham in Not. MSS. suggested *ἀφιδρυμένον—*

[4] I have translated as if the Greek were, not *ῥεύματα ἀφιέντες εἰς αὐτὰ*, but *ῥεύματα, ἃ ἐφιέντες εἰς αὐτὰ*, where *ἃ* refers to *ῥεύματα*, and *αὐτὰ* to *ἄλσος ἢ τέμενος*.

[5] Plato seems to have had in mind the celebrated passage in the Hippolytus of Euripides, as supplied by myself in The Surplice, No. 22, *Αἰδὼς δὲ ποταμίαισιν οὐ πλημμυρίσιν Ἀλλ' ἄλσος ἀμιάντοισι κηπεύει δρόσοις.*

making them warm for the aged, by placing wood [1] dry and dry[1] for the benefit of those labouring under diseases, [2] and receiving kindly bodies worn down by rustic labours, and a habit (of body) much better than that of a medical practitioner not very skilful.[2]

[9.] All these things then, and of this kind, would be to such places an ornament and use, in conjunction with sport by no means unpleasant. But let the serious attention relating to these things be this.—Let the sixty[3] defend, each their own place, not only on account of enemies, but for the sake of those, who call themselves friends. But if any one, whether he is a slave or a free-man, injure his neighbour, or any other citizen, let those five rulers act as judges in the case of the party asserting that he has been injured, with respect to trifling matters; but where one person brings a charge against another on greater matters, let the seventeen, together with the twelve, on questions up to three minæ. No judge or magistrate ought to be exempt from giving an account of his conduct as judge or magistrate, except such as, like kings, put the finish to suits. Moreover as regards the Rural-Stewards if they behave insolently to those, of whom they are the guardians, by enjoining unequal tasks, or by attempting to seize and carry off any thing from those, employed in agriculture, not having previously persuaded them (to give it up); and if they receive aught from those, who offer it to curry favour; or if they give their decisions unjustly, through yielding to adulation; let them bear off as their reward the reproach of the whole state. But for the other wrongs, which they may

[1]—[1] That Plato wrote *αὖην καὶ ξηρὰν* no man can for a moment believe. One word is plainly enough an explanation of the other; but which is which it is impossible to decide. Ficinus has "copiose siccis," answering to *αὖην* or *ξηρὰν—ἄφθονον*, but not to both.

[2]—[2] Such is the literal translation of a mass of Greek words, where Stephens confesses himself to be quite in the dark; and so too am I; although Ast conceived he had restored the passage by simply omitting *δ'* between *ἰατροῦ* and *ἕξιν*. But Winckelmann would read *δέξιν*, to correspond with *δεχομένους*, and similar to *Δεξόμεθα δέξιν, ἥν σε δέξασθαι χρεών*, in Eurip. Iph. 1182. Ficinus has, what is at least intelligible, "ut et remedium ægrotantibus, et lenimen labore defessis benevole afferatur; quæ sane curatio longe melior est quam medici parum periti medela."

[3] "The sixty" are made of the five Rural-Stewards, which each of the twelve wards is supposed to have chosen in § 8.

do to those in their district, let them voluntarily undergo a fine, as far as one mina, imposed by the villagers and neighbours. But for greater or smaller injuries, on each occasion, if they are not willing to pay, through their trusting to being removed monthly to another place, and thus escaping, although pursued by law, in such cases the injured party is to have the chance of a trial at common law; and if he obtains a verdict, let him demand of the defendant to pay [1] a double fine,[1] and [2] having been unwilling,[2] to undergo punishment willingly.

And let the rulers and the Rural-Stewards have their dietary for the space of two years in some such manner as this. First let there be in the different places a common table,[3] [4] [at which they must all make a common table].[4] And let the person, who is absent from table, and sleeps out for one day or night, without orders from the rulers, or [5] some every necessity [5] falling upon him, if the five inform against him, and, after writing the indictment, place it in the market-place, to the effect that he has broken through his guardianship, let him bear the disgrace of having on his part betrayed the constitution, and be chastised with stripes by any one, who meets him, and is willing (to do so) with impunity. And if any one of the rulers themselves is doing any thing of this kind himself, it is necessary for all the sixty to direct their care to such

[1]—[1] By "a double fine" is meant the double of what the defendant would otherwise have paid, had he not compelled the plaintiff to sue him. This double sum was no doubt ordained to prevent defendants from compelling plaintiffs to undergo the expense of a lawsuit to obtain justice. For a similar reason in England a verdict in favour of the plaintiff generally carries with it costs. See Taylor on Lysias, T. v. p. 34, R.

[2]—[2] The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor; for they were perhaps considered unintelligible by them, as they certainly are by me. I could have understood *ὡς μὴ ἐθελήσαντα ὑποσχεῖν, ἣν ἑκόντ' ἔδει, τιμωρίαν*, "as not having been willing to undergo the punishment, which he should have done willingly." There are indeed a few passages in Sophocles and Xenophon that seem to give some support to the common text here; but they only seem; for they are in reality corrupt, as I could easily show, were this the place for doing so.

[3] Plato in his *Συσσίτια* has adopted what took place at Sparta.

[4]—[4] All the words between the brackets are omitted by Ficinus, whom Taylor has followed, correctly; for they are evidently an explanation of *εἶναι συσσίτια*.

[5]—[5] The Greek is *πάσης τινος ἀνάγκης*. But though *πᾶσα ἀνάγκη* is perfectly correct, *πᾶσά τις ἀνάγκη* is by no means so. Plato wrote, I suspect, *ἐκ βίας ἤ τινος ἀνάγκης*, i. e. "by force, or some necessity."

a person; and let him who perceives or hears of it, but does not bring him to trial, be amenable to the same laws [1] (as the party offending);[1] and let him be punished with a greater fine than the young men,[2] (and)[3] be held dishonoured with respect to all the rule over young men.

Of these doings likewise let the guardians of the laws be the inspectors, in order that either they may not take place at all, or, taking place, meet with condign punishment. Now it is meet for every man to bear in mind touching all men, that [4] he, who has never been a servant, will never be a master worthy of praise;[4] and it is requisite to pride oneself rather upon acting properly the slave, than on acting properly the master, first towards the laws, since this is being a servant to the gods; next towards elders and the young persons[5] who have lived with honour. After this it is meet for the person, who has been one of the Rural-Stewards, to taste during these two years daily food of a humble and poor kind. For, after the twelve magistrates shall have been enrolled,[6] let them come together with the five and take counsel, that, like domestics, they will not have other persons to be domestics and slaves to them, nor will they from the household of other farmers and villagers use their attendants for their own concerns, but only so far as relates to the public at large; but in other matters let them consider that they are to live, dependent themselves on themselves, and ministering to, and ministered by, themselves; and in addition to this, searching through the whole country, summer and winter, in arms, for the sake of guarding and knowing thoroughly all places, that successively present themselves. For it appears that for all to know accurately

[1]—[1] Ficinus alone has, what the sense requires, "qua (lege) qui peccavit."

[2] As nothing has been said of the fine imposed upon young men, this allusion to them seems to be here out of place. Cousin understands by τῶν νέων "les simples games, lesquels sont des jeunes gens de vingt cinq à trente ans."

[3] Ficinus has "et," for his MS. probably read περί τε τὰς— not περὶ τὰς— Ast however says that the conjunction is unnecessary.

[4]—[4] To this sentiment of Plato Cicero alludes, De Legg. ii. 2, 5, "Qui bene imperat, paruerit aliquando necesse est."

[5] I have translated as if the Greek were, τοῖς νέοις, not τοὺς νέους, omitted by Ficinus, for he was probably at a loss.

[6] Ficinus omits καταλεγῶσιν, not knowing that it is the aor. 2 pass., or else his MS. read καταγελῶσιν with two others, out of which it is impossible to elicit a particle of sense

their own country is a piece of learning inferior to none. For the sake of which it behoves a person at the period of youth to attend to hunting by dogs and to other kinds of catching wild beasts, no less than for the sake of any other [1] pleasure and profit at the same time, which results through these means to all. [2] These very pursuits [2] then let every man to the utmost of his power readily pursue, whether a person delights to call them [3] concealments, or rural stewardships,[3] or by any other name, if they are about to preserve sufficiently their own state.

[10.] After this there follows the subject relating to the election of those acting as rulers, both Market-Stewards, and City-Stewards. Upon the Rural-Stewards, sixty in number, there should follow three City-Stewards, dividing the twelve parts of the city into three; and in imitation of those (the Rural-Stewards) they should have the care of the path-ways, and of the city, and the public roads, that respectively stretch from the country to the city, and of the buildings likewise, so that all of them are made according to law; and moreover of the streams of water, [4] which those, who watch them, send to them and deliver, after being attended to,[4] in order that they may pass on to the fountains, sufficient in quantity and clear, and adorn at once and benefit the city. These too ought to be

[1] I have translated as if the Greek were *ἄλλης τινος*, not *τῆς ἄλλης*—Ficinus, "alterius—"

[2—2] I cannot see to what *τούτους—αὐτοὺς* can be referred. Ast says that persons are put here for things. How much easier it is to read *ταύτας—αὐτὰς*, and to supply *ἐπιτηδεύσεις* from *ἐπιτηδευέτω*, as I have translated.

[3—3] The Greek is *κρυπτοὺς εἴτε ἀγρονόμους*, where Ast would erase *κρυπτοὺς*, and says that one would have expected *φρουροὺς* or *φύλακας*: and so too remarks Stalb., but without mentioning Ast's name. Orelli suggests *Ἱππαγρέτας*, a name given at Sparta to officers over the youths, called *Ἱππεῖς*. To myself however the error seems to be in *ἀγρονόμους*, for which I would read *ἀγρονομίας*, and *κρυπτείας* likewise, similar to "studio illo—quod ab occultando—appellatur, sive sic, sive agri custodia sit appellanda," in Ficinus.

[4—4] Ficinus has merely "quas custodes deduci in urbem curant—" for he could not understand, nor can I, the Greek, *ὁπόσ' ἂν αὐτοῖς πέμπωσι καὶ παραδίδωσιν οἱ φρουροῦντες τεθεραπευμένα*. For by the verb *πέμπωσι*, it would seem that the water was sent in casks placed on carts, and by *τεθεραπευμένα*, that it had undergone some filtering process; neither of which were likely to have been thought of in his day; to say nothing of the guards appointed to watch the waters; as if persons were wont, except during a war, to defile the waters or to divert their course. To my mind the whole passage is in a very imperfect state.

persons of influence, and at leisure to pay attention to public affairs. On this account let every man propose as a City-Steward whomsoever he wishes out of those with the largest property. [1] And when (all) have had hands held up for them, and those are reduced to six,[1] to whom the most (votes)[2] have been given, let those, who are to have this charge, select by ballot the three, and after they have undergone a scrutiny, let them be in office according to the laws laid down for them. Next in order after these (it is meet) to choose Market-Stewards, five in number, out of those with the valuation of the second and first class; but in other respects let their election be in the same manner as for the City-Stewards. [3] (For it is meet) that ten out of all the rest, having had hands held up for them, should ballot for the five,[3] and declare them, after undergoing a scrutiny, to be the persons in power. And let every one hold up his hand [4] for ten in all.[4] But let him, who is unwilling to vote, if informed against before the rulers, be fined fifty drachms, in addition to his being held to be a bad man. And let any one who wishes go to the public assembly and common meeting; and let it be compulsory on him, who belongs to the second and first class of property, to be fined ten drachms, if he is not present and mustered at the conventions; but it shall not be compulsory on the third and fourth class of property; but let such a person be dismissed without a fine, unless the rulers give an order for all to be present in consequence of some (urgent) necessity.

[1]—[1] Here again Ficinus, whom Taylor follows, has been content to give the general meaning in his version, "et de sex, qui suffragio ceteros superabunt," instead of translating literally the Greek—*διαχειροτονηθέντων δὲ καὶ ἀφικομένων εἰς ἕξ, οἷς ἂν πλεῖσται γίγνωνται*—where Heindorf, with whom Ast agrees, would insert *εἰς κρίσιν* after *ἀφικομένων*, similar to *ἀφικομένων εἰς κρίσιν* in § 11. Winckelmann suggests *εἰς ἐξέτασιν*. I have translated as if *πάντων* had dropt out after *χειροτονηθέντων δὲ*—

[2] The ellipse of *ψῆφοι* is supplied in § 12.

[3]—[3] Here too Ficinus has given what he conceived to be the sense, instead of sticking close to the Greek—*δέκα ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων χειροτονηθέντας τοὺς πέντε ἀποκληρῶσαι*—where since all the MSS. but one read *δέκα ἢ τῶν*, which is perfectly unintelligible, Ficinus has, with reference to what goes before, translated thus, "quippe de decem, qui ceteros suffragio superarint, quinque sorte designentur—" which Taylor has adopted to the letter.

[4]—[4] Instead of *πᾶς πάντα* one MS. has *πᾶσι πάντα*, which leads to *πᾶς ī πάντας*: where *ī* means "ten." On corruptions arising from letters indicative of numbers, see my Poppo's Proleg. p. 224.

And (it is meet) for the Market-Stewards to preserve the orderly arrangement enjoined by the laws relating to the market-place; and to take care of the temples and fountains in the market-place, so that no one injures them; and to punish the party so injuring with stripes and bonds, if a slave and a stranger; but if a native acts in a disorderly manner with respect to things of this kind, let them be authorized, after a trial, to fix a fine up to one hundred drachms in money, but to fine up to the double of this sum the offending party, if they are sitting in judgment in common with the City-Stewards. Let there be the same power to fine and punish allowed to the City-Stewards in their own department, so as to fine offenders up to a mina themselves, but the double of this sum in conjunction with the Market-Stewards.

[11.] After this it will be proper for the leaders in Music and Gymnastics to be established, two kinds of each; some of them for the sake of instruction, and others for the sake of contesting. Now in the case of instruction, the law relating to Gymnasia and schools means to speak of those, who have the care of orderly arrangement and instruction to boot, and of the attention paid to such matters, and of the frequenting and staying at schools on the part of young persons, both male and female: but in the case of contesting, (it means to speak of) those who assign the prizes to competitors in Gymnastics and Music; and these two are two-fold; one employed on Music, and the other on Gymnastics.[1] Now in the contests of men and horses,[2] it would be proper for the same persons to assign the prizes; but in those of Music, for some to do so in the case of solo-singing and the imitative art,[3] such as the rhapsodists, and all of this kind; but others over chorus-singing and players on the harp and hautboy. First then with regard to the amusement of the choirs of boys and men, and girls (exercised) in dancing, and in the whole order of music, it is surely requisite to elect their leaders. Now one leader, not

[1] I have adopted Sydenham's *ἀγωνιστικὴν* in lieu of *ἀγωνίαν*—

[2] To explain this reference to horses, Ast refers to Plutarch in Problem. Sympos. ii. 5, p. 639, E., who says that to the horse alone of all animals there was a participation in a crown and contest; since he alone, both by nature and art, is wont to be present with man and to fight on his side.

[3] Under the imitative art was included the Drama, as we learn from Aristotle's Poetics. For otherwise one can hardly understand why any allusion was made to it.

less than forty years old, will surely suffice for these. One too not less than thirty years old will suffice for solo-singing, and to be the introducer of, and to give a judgment sufficiently upon, the competitors. Now the leader and regulator of the choir it is requisite to choose in some such manner as this. Let those, who have a friendly feeling towards such matters, go to the meeting, subject to a fine if they do not go, and of this let the guardians of the law be the judges; but upon the rest, if they are not willing, let there be nothing compulsory. And let the person, who makes the nomination, select one out of those who are skilful; and in the scrutiny let there be only this one charge and denial, on the part of some, that the person, who has obtained the lot, is unskilled, but on the part of others, that he is skilled; and let the person who, out of ten previously voted for, has obtained singly the lot, be, after undergoing a scrutiny, the leader of the choirs according to the law for one year. In the same manner as these, let him who, out of those that come to a trial, in this way obtains the lot,[1] be the leader for that year of the [3] solo-singing, and concert-singing,[3] after giving, as the party so obtaining the lot,[2] to the judges the power to decide. After this it is necessary to choose from the persons belonging to the third and even second class of property, the assigners of prizes in the contest relating to the exercises of horses and men. Now to the election let it be compulsory upon the three classes to go, but let the smallest class be dismissed without a fine; and let there be three who obtain the lot, twenty having previously had hands held up for them, but three of the twenty obtaining the lot, whom the vote of the examiners shall approve of. But if any one is rejected through any balloting or decision whatever of a magistrate, let another be chosen in his stead, and the scrutiny take place in the same manner respecting him.

[12.] There remains now the ruler relating to what has been mentioned by us before, namely, the party to take care

[1, 2] As the words ὁ λαχὼν are repeated in each clause, Ast, whom Stalbaum follows, would reject it here as an interpolation; but the subject ought to be found rather in the first clause than the second. Hence too Orelli suggested ἀποδιδοὺς ὅλων τὴν κρίσιν— But ὅλων could not stand here without the article τῶν—

[3—3] By μονῳδία was meant singing without an accompaniment either on or off the stage; by συναυλία, a playing on more instruments than one, with or without a vocal accompaniment.

of the whole instruction of females and males. Let the person who is to rule over these be, according to the laws, not less than fifty years old, and the father of children lawfully begotten, males and females especially, but if not, of either sex. And let both him, who selects, and him, who is selected, consider that this office is by far the greatest of the chief offices in the state. For the first budding of every plant, when it runs in a beautiful manner to the excellence of its nature, is the most powerful to put a suitable finish [1] of other plants,[1] and of animals tame and wild and men. Now man we say is a tame animal; and when he meets with proper instruction and a fortunate nature, is wont to become an animal the most divine and tame; but when he is not sufficiently or not properly brought up, he is the most savage of all the animals, which the earth produces. On which account the legislator ought not to suffer the bringing up of children to be a secondary thing, or as a by-work. [2] But it is necessary to begin from the first step, by the person,[2] who is about to have the care of them, being selected, who is the best in all respects of those in the state; [3] and by the legislator ordering that person to be by all possible means set over [3] and to take care of them. Let all the magistrates, therefore, except the Counsellors and Prytanes, go to the temple of Apollo and give, unknown to the guardians of the laws, their votes for him, whom each conceives would rule the best

[1—1] That Plato would thus repeat *τῶν τε ἄλλων φυτῶν* after the preceding *παντὸς δὴ φυτοῦ*, I will never believe; and still less, when the genitive *τῶν ἄλλων φυτῶν* is without regimen; for it cannot be taken absolutely, nor can it depend upon *πρόσφορον*. To avoid the difficulty in the syntax, Ficinus has "quod et in plantis evenit—" adopted by Taylor, who however omits *καὶ ἀνθρώπων*. What Plato really wrote it is impossible to state positively; but it was, I suspect, something to this effect—*τέλος ἐπιθεῖναί ποτε πρόσφορον ἑαυτῷ· ταὐτὸ δὲ ἄλλων φατέον πέρι*, i. e. "to put at some time a finish suitable to itself; and the same remark is to be made respecting other things—" where *ἑαυτῷ* is confirmed by "sibi" in Ficinus.

[2—2] The Greek is *πρῶτον δὲ ἄρξασθαι χρεὼν τὸν μέλλοντα—αἱρεθῆναι—* I have translated as if it were *ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου δὲ ἄρξασθαι χρεὼν τοῦ τὸν*—remembering the expression in Eurip. Med. 475, *Ἐκ τῶν δὲ πρώτων πρῶτον ἄρξομαι λέγειν.*

[3—3] Ficinus, apparently unable to understand *καθιστάντα*, has rendered it, as if his MS. read *καταστάντα*, found in Stobæus; while to avoid the want of connexion likewise, I have translated, as if the Greek were *καὶ τοῦτον—καταστάντα αὐτὸν προστάττειν*, where *τοῦτον* would refer to the teacher selected, and *αὐτὸν* to the lawgiver selecting, and *προστάττειν* be read with all the MSS. in lieu of *προστάτην καὶ—*

amongst those conversant with education. And let him, for whom the most votes come together, after he has been scrutinized by the other magistrates, who, with the exception of the guardians of the laws, have chosen him, enter upon his office for five years; but in the sixth year, let another be chosen to the office in a similar manner.

[13.] But if any ruler dies while employed in a public situation before the term of office shall have expired, wanting more than thirty days, let those, to whom this duty belongs, appoint another in the same manner to the office. And if any one, who is a guardian to orphans, dies, let the relations on both the father's and mother's side, as far as the cousins, who may at that time be in the country, appoint another within ten days, or let each be fined a drachm a day, until they shall have appointed the guardian [1] for the children.[1]

Now every state will surely become no state,[2] in which courts of justice are not properly established; and on the other hand a voiceless judge, and who, in the preliminary proceedings,[3] does not speak more than the litigants, as in the case of arbitrators,[4] will never be sufficient for the purpose of deciding justly. On this account, it is not easy, when there are either many or few indifferent characters, to have a fair trial. But it is necessary for the matter in dispute to be clearly stated by each party; and time too and the sifting slowly and frequently a question conduce to the rendering a doubtful point clear. On this account it is meet for those, who complain of each other, to betake themselves first to their neighbours and friends, and those the most conversant with the subject of dispute. But if a party is unable to obtain a satisfactory decision from them, let him go to another tribunal; but if those two cannot bring about a reconciliation, let the third put an end to the suit. In

[1]—[1] The words τοῖς παισὶ, answering to "orphanis" in Ficinus, have been found in five MSS., and, though rejected by Bekker, are adopted by Stalbaum.

[2] The oxymoron πόλις ἄπολις is found in Æsch. Eum. 435.

[3] The technical word Ἀνάκρισις is explained by Harpocration as an inquiry instituted before the Archons previous to a trial. It may be compared with the examination of a case made in England before a Police Magistrate, or the Grand Jury.

[4] From this it would appear that the arbitrators at Athens had no power to examine witnesses, only to decide upon the case as laid before them by the contending parties. According to Aristotle in Rhetor. i. 13, quoted by Ast, a judge looks to the law, an arbitrator to equity.

a certain respect, indeed, the establishment of courts of justice depends on the choice of magistrates; for every magistrate is necessarily a judge of certain things; but every judge[1] is not a magistrate, although, in a certain respect, during the day in which he is deciding a suit, he is no mean a magistrate. Considering, then, the judges likewise as magistrates, let us state which of them would be proper, and of what matters they are to be the judges, and how many for each suit. Let then that tribunal be of the highest authority, [2]which each show forth, themselves to themselves, after having chosen certain persons in common.[2] But as regards the rest, let there be two tribunals; one, when a private person accusing another private person of doing him a wrong, shall bring him to trial, and be willing for the suit to be decided; the other, when any one conceives that the public has been injured by some of the citizens, and is willing to aid the community at large. Let us state then [3]of what kind are the judges, and who.[3]

In the first place then, let a tribunal common to all, who are contending for the third time, as private persons with each other, exist in this manner. All the magistrates that are in office for a year, and those for a longer period, ought, when the new year is about to commence in the month that succeeds the summer solstice,[4] to come on the day, before that very[5] day of the month, together to one temple, and, swearing by the god, to take, as it were, for the initiatory rite[6] of every

[1] The word δικαστὴς answers not only to a judge, but to a juryman, both of which were united in the same person at Athens.

[2—2] I confess I am at a loss here. For there is nothing to which ἕκαστοι and τινας can be referred. Ficinus—"quod sibimet aliqui præfecerunt, communi sensu judicem eligentes," as if his MS. read ὅπερ ἂν αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοῖς ἀποφήνωσί τινες, δικαστὰς κοινῇ ἑλόμενοι, in lieu of —ἀποφήνωσιν ἕκαστοι κοινῇ τινας ἑλόμενοι.

[3—3] Ficinus has, what is far preferable, and has been adopted by Taylor, "quos et quales judices esse oporteat—"

[4] Plato follows here the custom of his country, where the civil year, which was, as amongst the Jews, lunar, commenced on the first new moon after the summer solstice, just as the University year does in England, in the month Hecatombæon, answering to the last half of June and the first half of July.

[5] Instead of ταύτης Ficinus seems to have found in his MS. ᾱ της, i. e. πρώτης, for his version is "pridie kalendas." Respecting the confusion of α της, αὐτῆς, and πρώτης, see my Poppo's Prolegom. p. 223.

[6] On the initiatory rite, expressed by ἀπάρχεσθαι, and κατάρχεσθαι, see the Commentators on Eurip. Alc. 75. Iph. T. 56. El. 91.

office, one judge, who shall be deemed to be the best in each office, and appear likely to decide in the best and most holy manner lawsuits amongst his fellow-citizens[1] during the ensuing year. When the judges are chosen, let a scrutiny take place by the very persons who have chosen them; and if any one is rejected, let them choose another in the same manner; but let the persons approved of act as judges in the case of those, [2]who have fled from the other courts of justice,[2] and let them give their vote openly. The Counsellors, however, and the other officials, who chose them, must of necessity be the hearers and spectators of these decisions; and other persons too, whoever wish it. But if any one accuses any person of having willingly decided a suit unjustly, let him go and make the accusation before the guardians of the law; and let the party found guilty undergo a punishment of this kind, namely, to pay half of the damage done to the injured party; but if he shall appear to deserve a greater fine, let those, who tried the suit, fix what additional punishment he ought to suffer (in person), or to pay either to the public treasury, or [3]to the person who has suffered the injury.[3] But with respect to public accusations, it is necessary in the first place for the multitude to participate in the decision. For all are injured, when any one does wrong to the state; and hence the multitude would justly take it ill, if they had no share in such decisions; but both the beginning and the end of such a suit it is requisite to refer to the people; but the inquiry into it, to the three greatest magistrates, whom both the defendant and plaintiff agree in acknowledging; but if they are unable to participate in such agreement themselves, let the Council decide upon the choice[4]

[1] I have translated *τοῖς πολίταις αὐτῷ*, "his fellow-citizens." For Ast says that *αὐτῷ* is here put for *αὐτοῦ*. Ficinus omits *αὐτῷ* entirely.

[2—2] Ficinus has, what is more intelligible, "qui per præcedentia reconciliati non sunt."

[3—3] So Taylor translates the version of Ficinus, "injuriam passo." But such could not be the meaning of *τὴν δίκην δικασαμένῳ*, but of *τὴν δίκην καταδικασαμένῳ*, found in xi. p. 928, C. § 8. Plato wrote, I suspect, *τὴν δίκην ἀδικίας αἰτιασαμένῳ*, to answer to the preceding *ἐπαιτιᾶται—ἀδίκως κρῖναι τὴν δίκην*. For the sense would then be, as it should, "to the party accusing justice of injustice."

[4] Instead of *αἵρεσιν*, "choice," the sense evidently requires *διαίρεσιν*, "difference," i. e. the points where one party differed from the other. Ast however explains *τὴν αἵρεσιν ἑκατέρου* by "the choice, which each party would make of a person to act as judge."

of each of them. It is meet moreover for all to have a share as far as they can in private suits. For he, who has no share in the power of acting as a judge with others, conceives that he has in no respect a share in the state. On this account then it is necessary for the courts of justice to be according to the wards, and for the judges to give on the instant, uncorrupted by entreaties, their decision by ballot; and that of all such matters that tribunal is to give the final decision, which we say is established, as far as is possible by human power, the most incorruptible in the case of those, who are unable [1] to come to terms [1] either through their neighbours or the tribunals belonging to the wards.

[14.] Now in truth, respecting courts of justice, of which we said that a person speaking could not easily assert indubitably that they are offices of rule or not, this description, painted, as it were, in outline,[2] has asserted some things, and nearly left out others. For the exact laying down and at the same time the division of laws relating to suits[3] will take place by far the most correctly at the end of legislation. Let it then be told to those subjects to wait for us.[4] For the appointments relating to other magistrates have taken up nearly the greatest part of legislation. But the totality and exactness relating to one and all of the subjects connected with a state, and the whole of a state administration,[5] cannot become clear, until the digression shall arrive at the end, after having embraced [6] from the beginning portions of itself, the second and the middle and all. At present, however, as far as the choosing of magistrates has taken place, this would be a sufficient finish to what has been previously mentioned; while [7] the commence-

[1]—[1] I have translated as if the Greek were not *ἀπαλλάττεσθαι*, but *καταλλάττεσθαι*, similar to *διαλλάξαι* a little above.

[2] Ast aptly compares The Statesman, § 19, p. 277, E., *τὴν ἔξωθεν περιγραφήν*.

[3] Ast has adopted *δικανικῶν* for *δικῶν*, as suggested by Stephens from "judicialium" in Ficinus.

[4] Ficinus has "Quare ad idem tempus has differamus," from which it is impossible to discover what he found in his MS.

[5] I have adopted Ast's *διοίκησιν* in lieu of *διοικήσεων*, which would require the article *τῶν*, if it is the genitive after *πᾶσαν*.

[6] So Ficinus, from the natural train of thought, renders *ἀπολαβοῦσα*—which would otherwise mean "cut off."

[7]—[7] The Greek is *ἀρχὴ—ἅμα*. But one MS. has *ἀρχὴν*, and another *ἄρα*. Hence it is easy to see that Plato wrote *ἀρχὴ ἦν—ἄρα*.

ment of the laying down of laws is [7] requiring no longer a putting off and doubts.

Clin. Having spoken, O guest, what has gone before entirely to my mind, you have now said this, still more agreeably than those, by uniting the beginning with the end, touching both what has been, and is to be, said.

Athen. Thus far then will the game of prudent old men have been played by us in a becoming manner.

Clin. Beautiful is the serious pursuit of men, which you appear to show forth.

Athen. It is probable. But let us reflect whether this appears to you as it does to me.

Clin. What kind of thing? and about what?

Athen. You know that, as in painting to the life, the business appears never to have an end as regards each animal, but that by colouring, and decolouring, or by whatever name the sons of painters call a thing of this kind, it seems that it never would cease giving a fresh touch, so that what has been painted receives an increase towards becoming more beautiful and more clear.

Clin. I almost understand, by hearing, what you mean, although I am by no means conversant with this kind of art.

Athen. This will be no detriment to you. But let us employ the expression, which has occurred to us respecting the art, to this purpose, so that, if any one had an idea of painting a most beautiful animal, and to keep it for not a worse state, but a better one, as time was continually progressing, do you not perceive that, through his being a mortal, unless he left behind him a successor to set it to rights, should it make any slip through time, and [1] who would be able to add what, through his own weakness in the art, had been omitted,[1] and by giving a brilliancy cause it to improve, all his great labour would last but a short time?

Clin. True.

Athen. What then, does not this appear to you to be the intention of the legislator? First, to write down his laws as accurately as possible, (or)[2] sufficiently so? In the next place,

[1]—[1] I have translated as if the Greek were not *καὶ τὸ παραλειφθὲν—οἷός τε εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν ἔσται*, where I cannot understand *εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν*, but *καὶ ὃς τὸ παραλειφθὲν—οἷός τε ἔσται προσθεῖναι καὶ—* similar to "prætermissum adjicere possit atque—" in Ficinus.

[2] To avoid the absurdity in *πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν κατὰ δύναμιν ἱκανῶς*— for

do you think that in the course of time, and after making an actual trial of what has been decreed, any legislator has been so insane, as not to know that many things of this kind must necessarily be left out, which it is requisite for some successor to set to rights, in order that the polity and arrangement may by no means become worse, [1] (but always better and more adorned,) as regards the state settled by him? [1]

Clin. It is likely—(how not?)—that every (legislator) whatever intends a thing of this kind.

Athen. If then any (legislator) possesses any plan for this, in deed and in word, namely, by what method he could teach another, whether a greater person or less, to have his wits upon this point, how it is requisite to preserve laws and to set them to rights, he would never be tired of telling a thing of this kind, until he reached the end.

Clin. How should he?

Athen. Ought not this then to be done both by you and me at present?

Clin. Of what kind of thing are you speaking?

Athen. Since we are about to establish laws, and guardians of the laws have been chosen by us, but we are ourselves [2] at the sunset of life,[2] and the guardians are young men as compared with us, it is, as we have said, necessary for us at the same time to lay down laws, and to endeavour likewise to make these very (young) men, as much as possible, both legislators and guardians of the laws.

Clin. How not? since we are able to do so sufficiently.

Athen. Let us then make the attempt, and be eager (to do so).

Clin. How not?

Athen. Let us say to them—O friends, the preservers of the laws, we shall leave very many things relating to matters, the laws of which we have laid down; for it must needs be so; nevertheless we will not omit matters of not small moment, nor the whole as far as we can, undescribed, as it were, by some

what is done as accurately as possible is done more than sufficiently so—I have translated as if ἢ had dropt out before ἱκανῶς. Ficinus avoids the difficulty by rendering "sufficienter et exquisite pro viribus."

[1]—[1] The words between the lunes are inserted by Taylor from the Latin of Ficinus, "sed melior semper ornatiorque efficiatur:" while, since the next clause is omitted by Ficinus, it is omitted by Taylor likewise.

[2]—[2] According to Aristotle in Poetic 21, Plato got this metaphor from Empedocles.

sketch;[1] and what is so sketched, it will be requisite for you to fill up. But it is meet for you to hear by looking to what point you will accomplish a thing of this kind.

[15.] For Megillus, and myself, and Clinias have spoken upon these matters with each other not seldom, and we agree that it has been spoken correctly. And we are desirous for you to be at the same time indulgent to us, [2]and to become our disciples,[2] looking to those points, to which we have agreed among ourselves that a guardian of the laws and a legislator ought to look. Now this agreement has one head,[3] namely, how a man may become good by possessing that virtue of the soul, which is suited to his nature, either from a certain study, or some habit,[4] or from some kind of possession or desire or opinion, or from some kind of learning, whether the nature of those dwelling together is male or female, youthful or aged, in order that there may be, through the whole of life, every serious exertion directed[5] to that very same object, of which we are now speaking; but of all the rest, that are an impediment to these, there will appear not one person holding a single thing in greater honour; but that he will at length even die for[6] a state, rather than be willing to support the yoke of slavery, should there appear a necessity for it to be overthrown, and to be under the rule of worse men, or to quit it a not-state by flight;[7] since every thing of this kind

[1] Ficinus has "exteriore quadam circumscriptione," as if his MS. read *τινι περιγραφῇ ἔξωθεν*, similar to *περιγραφή τις ἔξωθεν* a little above, in § 14.

[2—2] Ficinus evidently found this passage more complete in his MS. For his version is, "et imitari, quasi discipuli, magistros velitis."

[3] Shakspeare uses "head" similarly in his expression in Othello—"The very head and front of my offending Is this."

[4] I have adopted *ἔθους*, found in three MSS., and similar to "usu" in Ficinus, in lieu of *ἤθους*.

[5] From "tendat" in Ficinus, Stephens, in lieu of *τεταγμένη*, preserved by Bekker, and defended by Winckelmann on Euthyd. p. 71, was the first to suggest *τεταμένη*, adopted by Ast and Stalbaum.

[6] The Greek is *πόλεως, ἐὰν*— But as there is nothing to govern the genitive, I have translated as if it were *πρὸ πόλεώς τις θανεῖν, ἐὰν*—similar to "pro patria—mori" in Ficinus. The attempt made by Ast to restore the passage, although it has met with the approval of Stalbaum, seems to myself any thing but a happy one.

[7] The Greek is *λείπειν φυγῇ τὴν πόλιν*. But *πόλιν* could hardly be thus repeated after *πόλεως*. Correctly then has Ficinus "fuga ipsam deserere," which leads to *λείπειν φυγῇ αὐτὴν ἄπολιν*: where *ἄπολιν* is similar to *πόλις ἄπολις* in § 13, p. 767, D.

is to be endured by those who are suffering, before they take in exchange that polity, which naturally makes men worse. On these points we have previously agreed; and do you now, looking to both of these, praise and blame the laws; blaming[1] such as are not able to effect these objects;[2] but, embracing and receiving with a kind feeling such as are able, do live[3] ye in them; but to other pursuits, and many[4] of those called good, it is meet for you to bid a farewell.

Let this then be to us the beginning of the subsequent laws, commencing from things holy. For we ought in the first place to resume the number five thousand and forty, because it had and has now convenient distributions, both the whole number, and that which was assigned to the wards; which we laid down as the twelfth part of the whole, being exactly four hundred and twenty. And as the whole number has twelve divisions, so also has that of the wards. Now it is meet to consider each division as a sacred gift of a deity, through its following both (the order of) the months and the revolutions of the universe.[5] Hence that which is inherent[6] leads every state, making them[7] holy. Some persons indeed have perhaps made a more correct distribution than others, and with better fortune have dedicated the distribution to the gods. But we now assert, that the number five thousand and forty has been chosen most correctly, as it has all divisions as far as twelve, beginning from one, except that by eleven; and this has the slightest correction.[8] For it becomes whole,

[1] Ficinus alone has "eas, inquam, vituperate," from whence Stephens introduced *ψέγετε μὲν*, omitted in all the MSS.

[2] i. e. To be a good man.

[3] Instead of *ζητεῖτε* Cornarius suggested *ζῆτε*, found subsequently in all the MSS. but one, from "vitam agite" in Ficinus.

[4] The Greek is *ἄλλα*—which Ficinus, unable to understand, renders "alio—" But that would be *ἄλλοσε*— I have therefore translated, as if Plato had written *πολλὰ*—

[5] By this is meant, says Ast, the twelve signs of the Zodiac.

[6] I hardly understand *ξύμφυτον*, whether it is rendered "cognate" or "innate." Cousin explains *τὸ ξύμφυτον* by "la divinité locale—"

[7] Ast refers *αὐτὰς* to the plural, implied in *πᾶσαν πόλιν*.

[8] The word "correction" is the proper translation of *ἴαμα* taken in its arithmetical, not medical, sense. For 5040 dividedby 11 is $458\frac{2}{11}$, a sum that is only not an integer. Cousin's note is—"En divisant 5040 par 11, on a pour quotient $458\frac{2}{11}$ de sorte, que, si on retranche deux unites de 5040, 11, et 458, en sont les divisions exactes."

[1] if two hearths are distributed to the other parts.[1] Now that these things are true, a tale not very long would show at leisure. Believing then for the present in the present tradition[2] and story, let us distribute this number; and dedicating to a god, or a son of gods, each portion, and giving the altars, and the things pertaining to them, let us institute monthly two meetings relating to sacrifices, twelve according to the division of the wards, and twelve to that of the city; the first, for the sake of the favour of the gods, and of things pertaining to the gods; the second, for the sake of our relationship and acquaintanceship with each other, and for the sake of every kind, as we should say, of intercourse. For as regards the communion in, and mixture of, marriages, it is necessary to take away the ignorance as to the parties from whom a person leads home (a wife), and what (woman)[3] he is giving in marriage and to whom, deeming it of every importance that there should be in matters of this kind as far as is possible no mistake at all. For the sake then of a serious object of this kind it is necessary for youths and maidens to make for themselves sports by dancing together, and at the same time seeing and being seen by each other, [4] rationally, and at an age that has a fair pretext,[4] being both often naked as far as a prudent feeling of modesty exists in each party. Of all these let the rulers of the choirs be the guardians and

[1]—[1] Such is the literal version of the Greek—*δυοῖν ἑστίαιν ἀπονεμηθείσαιν*— Now though *ἑστία* means, like "focus," what is called geometrically "the focus" of an ellipse, yet here such a meaning would be unintelligible, where the sense requires the mention of "a fraction." Did Plato, write *δυοῖν ἑνὸς τομαῖν*, "two sections of one integer"? But there is still a difficulty in *ἐπὶ θάτερα*: where however one might read *ἐπὶ θ ἑτέρας*, "to nine other sections"— For thus 2+9 = 11. Cornarius was the first to confess himself at a loss here, and to suggest *ἀποτμηθείσαιν* for *ἀπονεμηθείσαιν*, adopted by Grou and Ast.

[2] I have adopted Ast's *ἣν* for *ἃ*, suggested by "quam" in Ficinus. Cousin says that "*καὶ ἃ* semble estrange—J' ai su ici un hellenisme, une redondance et une repetition des formes pour dire seulement *καὶ οἷς ἐκδίδωσι ἃ ἐκδίδωσι* quels sont ceux, aux quels on donne, ce qu' on donne—"

[3] Cousin says that "Il n' est pas ici question de la tradition mais d' arithmetique seulement; et cette arithmetique est prise mystiquement—*φήμη* dit la meme chose que *λόγος* avec une certaine idée de saintété attachée aux nombres, selon la doctrine Pythagoricienne, dont l' esprit est manifeste dans tout cet endroit."

[4]—[4] All the words between the numerals should be inserted above, after *παιδιὰς ποιεῖσθαι*: for Plato meant to confine the sports within the boundaries of reason and of a suitable time of life.

arrangers and the legislators likewise, together with the guardians of the laws, by ordaining what we may have left out. But it is necessary, as we have said, that, as regards all such matters, the legislator should leave out all that are small and numerous; but that those, who become in succession during the year experienced by learning from their use, [1]be arranged and being corrected move yearly,[1] until there shall appear to have been made a sufficient limit[2] to such legal enactments and pursuits. Now the space of ten years will, when applied to all and each, be at the same time moderate and sufficient for an experience [3]in sacrifices and choirs,[3] [4]a legislator, who had arranged, living in common,[4] but coming to his end, let each of the magistrates themselves, bringing before the guardians of the laws, what is omitted in their own office, be corrected,[5] until

[1]—[1] Such is the literal translation of *τάττεσθαι καὶ ἐπανορθουμένους κινεῖν κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν*, which I cannot understand; nor could, I suspect, Ficinus; whose version of the whole clause is—"quæ magistratus sequentes, usu rerum commoniti, quotannis movebunt et corrigent." He has thus avoided not only the objectionable repetition of *κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν*, but the difficulty of taking *τάττεσθαι* in either a passive or middle sense, and of knowing to what *αὐτῶν* is to be referred. What Plato really wrote I think I could discover; for though it seems that, contrary to the genius of the language, he has shortly afterwards taken *ἐπανορθοῦσθαι* in an active sense, yet it only seems; for the passage is corrupt.

[2] In lieu of *ὅρος* Ficinus found in his MS. *χρόνος*. For his version is "donec tempus illud venerit."

[3]—[3] This mention of sacrifices and dances seems very strange to Ast, and justly so; for the question is here about the manner of reforming laws.

[4]—[4] Here again I am completely at a loss in the words *ζῶντος μὲν τοῦ τάξαντος νομοθέτου κοινῇ*; for *κοινῇ* could not be found thus by itself; and hence probably Ast was led to unite *κοινῇ* with *ἐπανορθοῦσθαι*, found towards the end of the sentence. Ficinus has, what is more intelligible, "quæ quidem per experientiam emendatio, vivente legum latore, communiter cum illo fiat." But *τάττειν* never does, nor could, signify by itself, "to emend," and least of all in a place where its usual sense, "to arrange" or "order," is seen in the words *οὓς ἔταξε κατ' ἀρχὰς ὁ θεὶς αὐτοῖς νομοθέτης*.

[5] I have said just above that *ἐπανορθοῦσθαι* only seems to mean "to correct." The fact is that *δι'* has dropt out before *αὐτὰς*, and *ἐπανορθοῦσθαι* is to be taken in a passive sense, and to be united to *τὸ παραλειπόμενον* as its subject; while to avoid the difficulty in *κοινῇ*, I would suggest that *τάξαντος κοινῇ* be altered into *τάξοντας κοινῇ*, and be placed after *τοὺς νομοφύλακας*: for the sense would be, "while the law-giver is living; but at his decease, through each of the magistrates bringing before the guardians of the laws, who are to arrange the matter in common, what is deficient in their own offices, let it be corrected."

each thing shall appear to have attained the end of having been done properly. And then, after laying them down as immovable, let them use them in conjunction with the other laws, which the legislator, who laid them down,[1] ordained at the beginning; [2]of which it is becoming[2] for them to change voluntarily not a single thing at any time. But should perchance any necessity seem to lay hold of them, it is requisite for all the magistrates and all the people to consult together, and to go to all the oracles of the gods; (and) should all these accord, then to disturb (the laws), but by no means otherwise; but let the person, who prevents (a change), ever be, according to law, the superior.

[16.] Whenever then at whatever period a person amongst those of five-and-twenty years old believes that he has, after [3]seeing and being seen[3] by others, found some one[4] to his mind and fitted for a communion in, and procreation of, children, let him marry when he is within thirty-five years of age; but how it is requisite to seek the becoming and fitting, let him first hear. For it is meet, as Clinias says, to lay down before each law a prelude relating to it.

Clin. You have very properly reminded us, guest; and you have seized upon the opportunity of a discourse, that appears to me to be extremely well-timed.

Athen. You speak well. Let us then say to a person born of good parents—It is meet, O boy, to contract those marriages, which appear correct amongst thinking men; who would advise you neither to avoid a marriage with poor persons, nor to pursue pre-eminently one with the rich; but, if all the other things are equal, to always honour the inferior, and to enter into a communion with it. For this[5] would be

[1] The Greek is *οὓς* (*νόμους*)— *ὁ θεὶς αὐτοῖς νομοθέτης*—where it is strange that no critic has yet remarked that *νομοθέτης* is an evident interpolation; and that, although *αὐτοῖς* might end a sentence, Plato probably wrote here *ἀστοῖς*.

[2]—[2] Instead of *ὧν πέρι*, where the preposition has no meaning, I have translated as if the Greek were *ὧν πρέπει*—

[3]—[3] This use of *σκοπεῖν* "to see" in a bodily, instead of a mental sense, is very rare. Compare, however, below, § 18, and xii. p. 963, B § 11.

[4] Ast vainly endeavours to defend *πρέποντα* applied to a woman, through not seeing that *τινα* had dropt out.

[5] Ficinus found in his MS. *τοῦτο*, not *ταύτῃ*, as shown by his version, "id conducit."

advantageous both to the city and the hearths which come together. For the equable and commensurate infinitely surpass the immoderate with respect to virtue. He therefore, who is conscious of being rather headstrong, and carried away more than is fitting towards all kinds of actions, ought to be eager to become the relation of parents of orderly manners: but he, who is naturally of a contrary disposition, ought to proceed to an alliance of a contrary kind. And in every case, let there be one story[1] respecting marriage. For it is meet that each person should be a suitor in a marriage that is beneficial to the state, and not what is the most pleasant to himself. For all are naturally carried to that, which is the most like to themselves; from whence the whole state becomes in an anomalous position as regards wealth and manners; through which those things, that we do not wish to happen to ourselves, happen especially to the majority of states. Now in our system to order by law that the rich are not to marry with the rich, or the party, who has much power, not to do so with another such, but to compel the quicker in their habits to go by a community of marriage to the more slow, and the slower to the quicker, would, in addition to its being ridiculous, excite a feeling of anger with the many. For it is easy to understand that a city ought not to be mixed like a cup,[2] in which the maddened wine, when poured forth, effervesces; but one that, being corrected by another and a sober deity,[3] does, after receiving a beautiful commingling, produce a good and moderate drink. But not one, so to say, is able to clearly see this taking place in the mingling (of the sexes) with respect to children. On this account it is necessary to leave alone things of this kind in a law; and to endea-

[1] In lieu of *μῦθος* one would prefer *θεσμὸς*, similar to "ratio" in Ficinus.

[2] Donaldson in The New Cratylus, p. 370, ed. 1, seems to think that an Iambic verse lies hid here—*Πόλις δίκην κρατῆρος ἣν κεκραμένη*. But he might have elicited without much difficulty some Trochaic tetrameters —*ῥᾴδιον Ἦν, δίκην κρατῆρος ἐγκεκραμένου, πόλιν νοεῖν. Οὗ μὲν οἶνος ἐγκεχυμένος ζεῖ, στόμ' ὡς μανίας, ἀφρῷ· Ὑπὸ δὲ θεοῦ νήφοντος εἰ κολάζεται, κοινωνίαν Λαμβάνει καλὴν, ποιεῖ τε πῶμα μέτριον κἀγαθόν*: where I have inserted *στόμ' ὡς μανίας ἀφρῷ*, remembering the expression in Eurip. Med. 1174, *κατὰ στόμα—ἀφρὸν*, and in Iph. T. 308, *στάζων ἀφρῷ*, both applied to the foam from the mouth of a person in a state of madness, but here to the froth of wine, similar to Champagne.

[3] By "the sober deity" was meant water. On this celebrated passage, see Athenæus x. c. 61, and Longinus § 32, quoted by Ast.

vour by charms to persuade [1]each person to set a greater value upon the equality in their children, themselves to themselves, than in the equality of marriages, insatiable of wealth,[1] and by reproaches to turn aside him, who makes riches the object of his pursuit in marriage, but not to compel him by a written law.

[17.] Let these then be the exhortations respecting marriages, and those too, which have been mentioned previous to these,[2] that it is requisite to hold fast to ever-producing nature, by leaving behind children of children, and to deliver them over continually as servants of god in the place of ourselves. All this then, and still more, a person may say respecting marriages, how they ought to take place, and may make use of a prelude correctly. But if any one cannot be persuaded willingly, but keeps himself in the city estranged and without connexion, and remains unmarried for five and thirty years, let him be fined every year, if he possesses property of the largest class, one hundred drachms; if of the second, seventy; if of the third, sixty; but if of the fourth, thirty; and let the fine be sacred to Juno.[3] And let him, who does not pay every year, be made a debtor tenfold; and let the Steward of the goddess exact the fine; and if he does not exact it, let him be the debtor. [4]And let every (Steward) in the passing of his accounts give a statement relating to (debts) of this kind.[4] Let him then, who is unwilling to marry, be thus punished as regards money; and of all honour from juniors let him be deprived: nor let any young man voluntarily obey him in any thing; and, if he attempts to chastise any one, let any one assist and defend the injured person; and let him, who when present does not assist, be pronounced by the law to be both a cowardly and a bad citizen. Concerning the marriage portion we have spoken before; and let it be said again, [5]that equal things are in return for equal

[1]—[1] Such is the literal translation of the Greek, which I confess I cannot understand; nor could Ast, I suspect; who is content to produce the version of Cornarius—"Ut quisque pluris faciat liberorum inter se æqualitatem, quam nuptiarum æqualitatem pecuniis inexplebilem—" which to me at least is quite as unintelligible as the Greek. Ficinus has "ut æqualem temperatamque liberorum suorum generationem pluris faciant, quam opulentissimæ affinitatis æqualitatem."

[2] See iv. § 11.

[3] For she was the goddess who presided over marriages.

[4]—[4] All the words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor.

[5]—[5] Such is the literal version of the Greek; out of which I cannot make

things, by neither the poor receiving nor bestowing through want of money to grow old.[5] For the necessaries of life exist to all of those in this state; and to wives, there will be less of insolence, and to the men who marry for money, (less of) humble and illiberal slavery.[1] And he who is obedient (to this law) will perform one of the things that are beautiful. But let him, who is not obedient, and either gives or receives more than the worth of fifty drachms [2]for the sake of a garment,[2] pay [3]one mina, or three half-minæ, or two minæ;[3] but let him who has the largest property, pay another such sum to the public treasury; and let whatever has been given or received be held as sacred to [4]Juno and Zeus,[4] and let the Stewards of those deities exact the fine, just as was stated in the case of those who did not marry, that the Stewards of Juno were on each occasion to exact the fine, [5]or each of them to pay it themselves.[5] With respect

any sense, nor could Cornarius, nor Ast, nor Wyttenbach; all of whom have suggested emendations, from which nothing is gained, even if we adopt *διδάσκειν* found in Ald., but not in the MS. Ξ. from which Aldus printed, in lieu of *γηράσκειν*. I could have understood the Greek, had it been *ὡς ἴσα παντὶ ἴσῳ ἔσται τῷ μήτε λαμβάνειν τι μήτε ἐκδιδόναι τι· διὰ γὰρ χρημάτων ἀπορίαν οὐ τι δέος γηράσκειν τοὺς πένητας*—in English—"that equal things will be to every one on an equality by neither receiving nor giving aught; for there is no fear of the poor growing old from the want of means"—where *λαμβάνειν τι μήτε ἐκδιδόναι τι* is due to Cornarius.

[1] Ast aptly refers to Eurip. Phæthon, Fr., of which the sense is,

> Who for a dowry has his body sold,
> Is, though free-born, still of a wife the slave.

[2—2] Ast alone has objected justly to *ἐσθῆτος χάριν*. But he did not see that Plato probably wrote *εἰς θήλεος χάριν*—"for the gratification of a female;" although it is true that persons did in former times, as they do now, make presents of parts of a dress to gratify those, whom they were courting, as shown by Aristoph. Plut. 983, where an Old Girl, speaking of her young lover, says,

> "Some twenty silver drachmas he would ask
> For a cloak, and for a pair of sandals eight."

[3—3] As there were four classes of property, the fines of 1, 1½, 2, and 4 minæ belong to them respectively. Hence if we insert *δὲ* between *ὁ* and *τὸ μέγιστον*, and refer *τοσοῦτον ἕτερον* to the last-mentioned *δυεῖν μναῖν*, there will be no need of adopting Ast's notion, that all the words from *ἐσθῆτος* to *μναῖν* are an interpolation; while to meet the objection, that *μνᾶς* and the other genitives are without regimen, we may elicit *ὄφλησιν ὀφειλέτω* from *ὀφλήσει ὀφειλέτω* in one MS.

[4—4] Zeus, like Juno, presided over marriage. See Hesych. *Ζύγιος Ζεύς*.

[5—5] The Greek is *ἢ παρ' αὐτῶν ἑκάστους τὴν ζημίαν ἐκτίνειν*. Ficinus,

to the power of betrothal, let the first be in the father, the second in the grandfather, and the third in that of brothers by the same father. But if there be none of these, let the right rest afterwards in a similar manner on the mother's side; but should an unusual misfortune[1] occur, let the nearest of kin have the power together with the guardians. But whatever are the rites before marriage or any other sacred act, relating to things future, present, or past, and fitting to be done, it is requisite to inquire of the interpreters, and for each person to consider that, by obeying them, every thing will take place in moderation in his behalf. [18.] With respect to (nuptial)[2] feasts, it is meet to invite together not more than five male and five female friends; and as many of both sexes of kindred and familiars; and let the expense be not more than is according to any one's substance; a mina to him of the largest property; to another, the half of that sum; and so to another in succession, according as the value of his property decreases. And it is requisite for all to praise the person who obeys the law; but let the guardians of the law punish the disobedient, as being a person unskilled in what is becoming, and uneducated in the laws relating to marriage songs. To drink, however, to intoxication, is never at any place becoming, except in the festivals of the god who is the giver of wine; nor is it safe [3]for a person seriously occupied about a marriage;[3] at which it is becoming for the bride and bridegroom to be particularly prudent, as making no small change in their life, and at the same time, that the offspring may always be produced as much as possible from prudent parents. For it is nearly uncertain what kind[4] of night or day will in conjunction with a deity

whom Taylor follows, has "qui si neglexerint, de suo persolvant—" as if his MS. read *ἢ παρ' αὐτῶν τῶν παριέντων ἐκπράττειν ἑκάστους*—

[1] Ficinus has "desolatio," as if his MS. read *ἐρημία τύχῃ*— "a desolation by accident." For *ἄρα* would thus be the remnant of *ἐρημία*.

[2] The word "nuptial" Taylor took from "nuptiale" in Ficinus, who introduced it to suit the train of thought; for *ἑστίασις* means "the feast" that takes place at the hearth of any one.

[3—3] The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus; who probably could not understand *οὔτ' οὖν δὴ—ἐσπουδακότα*, nor see that Plato wrote *οὔτ' ἀσφαλὲς ἐστ' ἀναίδεια τῷ περὶ*—not *οὔτ' ἀσφαλὲς οὔτ' οὖν δὴ περὶ— ἐσπουδακότι*. For the sense would thus be, as it should, "nor is shamelessness a safe thing for the person seriously occupied about a marriage."

[4] I cannot understand *ὁποία* applied to the night or day. I could have understood *ὁποῖον* applied to the offspring.

produce. And moreover it is meet for the work of procreation to take place, not when bodies are relaxed by drinking, [1] but for what is born to stand together compact, not wandering and quiet in fate.[1] But he, who is filled with wine, is carried along every where, and carries (others)[2] along, maddened both in body and soul. Hence he, who is drunk, is [3]at the same time beside himself,[3] and bad to sow seed; so that it is probable he would beget offspring anomalous, and not trustworthy, and with a habit of body and mind not straightforward. Hence,[4] it is requisite [5]through the whole year, and life more, but mostly during the time of procreation, to be careful,[5] and not to do willingly such things as produce disease, or such as are close upon conduct riotous or unjust. For it must needs be, that what is squeezed out into the souls and bodies of what is being born, should be moulded into a form, and produce things in every respect inferior. But preeminently is it requisite to abstain from what is related to such things on that day and night. For the principle and deity[6] seated in man preserves all things, if it obtains the honour, suited to it, from those, who make use of it. And it is requisite for the bridegroom to consider that one of [7]the two dwellings assigned by lot[7] is for the procreation and bringing up of, as it were, fledgelings; and that, separated

[1]—[1] Such is the literal version of the Greek; which Cornarius could not understand, nor can I; although it would be not difficult to carry out the correction first proposed by that scholar, and to restore what Plato wrote.

[2] The syntax, as regards *φέρει*, and the antithesis, as regards *αὐτὸς*, show that *ἄλλους* has dropt out between *φέρει* and *λυττῶν*—

[3]—[3] Ficinus has "tanquam mente captus—" as if his MS. read *ἅτε παράφορος ὤν, κακὸς*—not *παράφορος ἅμα καὶ*—

[4] In lieu of *οὐδὲν εὐθύπορον ἦθος οὐδε σῶμα*, Plato wrote, I suspect, *οὐδὲ εὐθὺ ἦθος οὐδὲ σῶμα εὔπορον*—

[5]—[5] Ficinus has, what is far more intelligible, "per totam quidem vitam—abstinebit quisque," thus avoiding all the difficulty in the Greek, *μᾶλλον μὲν ὅλον τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν καὶ βίον—εὐλαβεῖσθαι*: where *ἐνιαυτὸν καὶ βίον* are thus strangely united, instead of being thus written, *ὅλον τιν' ἐνιαυτὸν μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ βίον*, to say nothing of *εὐλαβεῖσθαι* standing alone. What the train of thought evidently requires is something to this effect, *διὸ φιαλῶν μὲν ὅλον τὸν βίον ἀμίαντον χρὴ*—

[6] By "deity" Taylor understands "the intellect." Plato wrote, I suspect, not *καὶ θεὸς*, but *κατὰ θεὸν*—Ast suggests *ὡς θεὸς*, "as a god."

[7]—[7] By "the two dwellings" Ast says we are to understand those mentioned in § 14, as being one near to, and the other distant from, the city.

from his father and mother, he is to make his marriage there, and have it as his own residence and the nurture-place of his children. For where in friendships[1] there exists a feeling of desire, it glues together and binds all habits; but where intercourse becomes satiated, and has no retaining power, it causes the desire, that existed for a time for each other, to glide away through excess of repletion. On which account it is meet for husbands to give up to mother, and father, and the relations of the wife their own dwellings, as if they were departing for a colony, and to live [2]observing at the same time and observed,[2] while begetting and rearing children, and handing in succession from some to others life, like a torch,[3] and ever paying, according to law, worship to the gods.

[19.] [4](We must consider)[4] after this by having what possessions would a person keep his substance in the most careful order. The majority indeed it is not difficult to imagine or possess; but in the case of domestic servants there is a difficulty on every side. Now the reason for this we can assign in a certain manner not correctly, and again in a certain manner correctly; for we consider what is said respecting slaves to be contrary, and yet according to, the use of them.

Megil. How can we say this?[5] For we do not, O guest, understand at all what you are asserting at present.

[1] This mention of "friendships" seems very strange here; as if friendships could exist where there is no feeling of desire. One would expect rather *θηλείαις*. For Plato seems to have had in his mind a dramatic pentastich, *Γαμεταῖσι θηλείαις τις ἄν γ' ἐνῇ πόθος, Κολλᾷ τε καὶ συνδεῖ τὰ πάντ' ἤθη δόμων· Ξυνουσία δὲ κατακορὴς αὖ τὸν πόθον, Δία χρόνον οὐκ ἴσχουσ', ἀπ' ἀλλήλων πάλιν Ἐπόησ' ἀπορρεῖν πλησμονῆς ὑπερβολαῖς.*

[2]—[2] I confess I hardly understand these words; nor could, I think, Ficinus; whose version is "ac vicissim, se ipsos respicientes." I could have understood *ἐπισκοτοῦντάς τε πολλὰ καὶ ἐπισκοτουμένους*, "throwing a darkness over many things, and being in the dark themselves;" where *πολλὰ* is still seen in *ἄλλα*, read in one MS. for *ἅμα*.

[3] From this allusion to the game at Athens, called *Λαμπαδηφορία*, where persons carried lighted torches, and, while running, handed them from one to another, Lucretius is supposed to have borrowed the idea in his well-known verses—"Inque brevi spatio mutantur secla animantum, Et, quasi cursores, vitai lampada tradunt."

[4]—[4] Ficinus alone has "Considerandum est," to supply the necessary connexion. Perhaps Plato wrote *Κτήματα δὲ δεῖ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτ' εἰπεῖν ποῖα*—not *Κτήματα δὲ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ποῖα*—

[5] The Greek is *πῶς δ' αὖ τοῦτο λέγομεν*. But as *αὖ* has no meaning here, we must read, *πῶς δ' ἂν τοῦτο λέγοιμεν*—

Athen. And very reasonably so, Megillus. For the Helot state amongst the Lacedæmonians would give rise to the greatest doubt and contention to nearly all the Greeks, to some as being well introduced, but to others, not; [1] but a less contention would the enslaving of the Marianduni by the Heracleotes furnish, and the clan of the Penestæ under the dominion of the Thessalians.[1] Looking to which and every thing of that kind, what ought we to do with respect to the possession of servants? a subject, that I happened to pass by in my discourse, when I was speaking; and as you have very properly asked me, what I meant, (I say) it is this. We know, that we should all assert, that it is requisite to possess slaves of the kindest and best dispositions. For many slaves, by conducting themselves with respect to all virtue better towards some persons than brothers and sons, have preserved their masters, and their possessions and the whole of their dwellings; for we surely know that these things have been said of slaves.

Megil. How not?

Athen. And is not the contrary likewise (said), that, as there is nothing healthy in the soul of a slave, it behoves a person, who possesses any intellect, never to trust at all to that race. The wisest too of poets has given this opinion, when speaking of Zeus, he says, (Od. xvii. 332,)

> "Half of their minds wide-seeing Jove has ta'en
> From men, whose doom has slavery's day brought on."

Since then each person has got such notions in his mind, some place no confidence at all in the race of slaves, but with goads and whips, not thrice alone, but often, cause the souls of their domestics, as if they had the nature of wild beasts, to become slavish; but others on the other hand do what is quite the contrary.

[2] *Megil.* How not?

[1]—[1] Such is the interpretation of this passage given by Ruhnken on Timæus, p. 215. But to get at it we must transpose some words, despite the fact that the common order is found in Athenæus, vi. p. 264, E., and read ἐλάττω δὲ ἥ τε ὑπὸ Ἡρακλεωτῶν δούλεια τῶν Μαριανδύνων ἔριν ἂν ἔχοι, τό τε ὑπὸ τῆς καταδουλώσεως Θετταλῶν τὸ Πενεστικὸν ἔθνος. For whatever Ast may say, δούλεια, "slavery," never does nor could mean "mastery;" and least of all in a place where καταδούλωσις has the same meaning. With regard to the double insertion of ὑπὸ, the preposition could not be omitted without destroying the perspicuity of the whole account.

[2]—[2] I have with Stalbaum adopted the arrangement of the speeches suggested by Ast.

Clin.[2] How then must we act, since persons thus differ, in the case of our land, touching the possession, and at the same time the punishment of slaves.

Athen. How, Clinias, is it not[1] evident that, since man is an animal ill-tempered, he is by no means willing to be easily got under hand[2] for the purpose of a compulsory definition, namely, to define in reality a slave, [a free-man,][3] and a master?

Clin. So indeed he appears to be a thing difficult to have and hold.

Athen. (True.) For it has been often proved by facts in the case of the frequent revolts of the Messenians, that have been wont to occur, and of the cities of those, who possess many servants, speaking one language, how many mischiefs happen; and further still, (by)[4] the doings and sufferings of all kinds of the thieves, called "Prædones,"[5] who exist round Italy. By looking to all of which a person would doubt what he ought to do in all matters of this kind. Two methods then alone are left, namely, for those, who are to act rather easily as slaves, to be not of the same country with each other, and, as much as possible, not of the same language; [6]but to bring them up correctly, and to hold them in honour, not only for their sakes, but much more for the sake of themselves.[6] Now the proper

[1] The Greek is Τί δ', ὦ Κλεινία; δῆλον ὡς—I have translated, as if the Greek were Τί δ' οὐ, Κλεινία, δῆλον, ὡς—

[2] Instead of εὔχρηστον ἐθέλει εἶναί τε καὶ γίγνεσθαι; Φαίνεται· Χαλεπὸν δὴ τὸ κτῆμα—where εὔχρηστον is scarcely intelligible, and καὶ γίγνεσθαι superfluous after εἶναι, I have translated, as if the Greek were εὐχείριστον ἐθέλει εἶναι. Οὕτω γὰρ γίγνεσθαι φαίνεται χαλεπὸν δὴ τὸ κτῆμα— where Ast would, I think, be pleased with εὐχείριστον, for it suits better with the sense, "tractabile," which he has given to εὔχρηστον. Stobæus, however, in lx. p. 385, acknowledges the common reading.

[3] As the question is between δοῦλος and δεσπότης, this introduction of ἐλεύθερος seems to be rather irrelevant.

[4] To preserve the syntax we must suppose that either περὶ or διὰ has dropt out between ἔτι and τὰ— Ast would supply δείκνυσι, to be got out out of ἐπιδεδείκται.

[5] In the strange word περίδεινων, explained by the Schol. πειρατῶν, evidently lies hid the Latin "prædonum," written in Greek πραιδώνων: and hence for κλοπῶν we must read κλώπων, an explanation of πραιδώνων. Ast indeed says that by κλοπῶν ἔργα are meant "thefts." But ἔργα could be thus united only to persons, not to things. Cousin observes that "λεγομένων indique que l'epithete περιδίνων était passée en surnom à des esclaves fugitifs, qui, à ce qu' il parait, infestaient alors l' Italie sur terre ou sur mer."

[6]—[6] The Greek is τρέφειν δὲ αὐτοὺς ὀρθῶς, μὴ μόνον ἐκείνων ἕνεκα, πλέον

education of such persons is in not behaving insolently towards domestics, but in acting less unjustly towards them, if possible, than towards one's equals. For he is quite clearly a person reverencing justice naturally and not fictitiously, who truly hates what is unjust as regards those human beings, amongst whom it is easy for him to do a wrong. He then, who is with respect to the habits and doings of slaves undefiled by an unjust and unholy manner,[1] will be the most competent to sow what is[2] suited for the springing up of virtue. The very same thing one may correctly assert, when speaking at the same time of a despot and a tyrant, and of any person exercising authority of any kind over a party weaker than himself. It is however necessary[3] to punish slaves,[4] and not to make them conceited by admonishing them, as if they were free-men; and the address to a slave ought to be entirely (or) nearly a command; nor should persons ever in any respect jest with them, whether males or females—acts which many persons do very foolishly towards their slaves—and by making them conceited, render it more difficult during life for their slaves to be governed, and for themselves to govern.

Clin. You speak correctly.

Athen. When then a person has become furnished with domestics to the best of his power, as regards their number and fitness to assist in each employment, is it not requisite after this to describe the dwellings?

Clin. Entirely so.

[20.] *Athen.* And of the entire, so to say, house-building, it appears we ought, as regards a new city and one never before inhabited, to have a care, in what manner each, as respects the temples and walls, ought to be. The buildings ought[5] in-

δὲ αὐτῶν προτιμῶντας: where αὐτοὺς and ἐκείνων are improperly applied to the same persons, whatever Heindorf and Ast may say to the contrary, and there is nothing to which αὐτῶν and προτιμῶντας can be referred. Opportunely then has Ficinus "educenturque recte, non solum, ipsorum gratia, sed dominorum multo magis," adopted to the letter by Taylor, although no notice is taken of the omission of προτιμῶντας. Plato wrote, I suspect, τρέφειν δὲ δεσπότας τοὺς τοιούτους ὀρθῶς— "but for masters to bring up such kind of persons correctly—"

[1] By the aid of "manner" in Taylor's translation, I have been led to suggest τρόπου for πέρι, which is scarcely intelligible.

[2] I have translated as if τὰ had dropt out between σπείρειν and εἰς—

[3] Ast was the first to restore from Athenæus δεῖ for ἀεί—

[4] To this doctrine Aristotle objects in Polit. i.8.

[5] The Greek is γάμων δ' ἦν ἔμπροσθεν ταῦτα. But Ficinus has

deed, Clinias, to precede the marriages. But now, since it exists only in word, it is all very well for matters to stand as they do at present. When however it shall exist in reality, we will, if god wills, make these (the walls) before the marriages, and then put those things, that are requisite,[1] to a finish after all matters of this kind. But at present let us go through in a few words some model merely.

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. The temples, then, it is necessary to build around all the market-place, and about the whole city in a circle upon elevated spots, for the sake of defence and purity.[2] And hard by them the dwellings of the rulers, and the courts of justice;[3] in which, as being most holy, they shall inflict and undergo punishments;[4] partly, as being about holy matters, and partly, [5] the seats established of such kind of gods;[5] and in these[6] courts of

"quæ sane nuptias præcedere debebant," as if his MS. read, *γάμων δὲ δέον ἦν ἔμπροσθεν εἶναι ταῦτα*—

[1] To defend the hyperbaton in *ἤδη τότε*, Ast refers to Theætet. p. 165, E. § 59, *ἤδη ἂν τότε ἐλύτρου*. But there the three oldest MSS. read *γε*: while here it is easy to read, as I have translated, *ἃ δεῖ, τότε*— On the impropriety of *ἤδη τότε* see at Phileb. § 18, n. 64.

[2] So Aristotle, in Polit. vii. 12, says, *Ἀγορὰν δεῖ καθαρὰν εἶναι τῶν ὠνίων πάντων*.

[3] I have translated as if the Greek were *δικαστήρια*, not *δικαστηρίων*, which Ast vainly endeavours to explain.

[4] From this it would seem that the rulers were to undergo their punishments, when convicted of any crime, in the very courts of law where they had presided. Ficinus indeed renders *τὰς δίκας—λήψονταί τε καὶ δώσουσι*, "justam et accipient et ferent sententiam." But such is never the meaning of *δίκην διδόναι*. And should it be said that *δίκας* means here "lawsuits," it may be replied that *δίκας λαμβάνειν* is not elsewhere found united in any legal sense. I suspect that Plato wrote *τοὺς εἰς τὰς δίκας ὅρκους—λήψονται καὶ δώσουσι*, i. e. "they shall receive and tender the oaths relating to lawsuits." For not only has Pollux in iv. 30, *ὅρκους—δοῦναι καὶ λαβεῖν*, but the phrase is found in Eurip. Suppl. 1187, *Πρῶτον λάβ' ὅρκον*. 1231, *Ὅρκια δῶμεν τῷ δ' ἀνδρὶ πόλει τε*. Instead however of *λαμβάνειν*, Plato uses its synonyme, *δέχεσθαι τε ὅρκους παρ' ἀλλήλων—καὶ διδόναι κυρίους*, in Legg. xii. p. 949, B.

[5—5] Such is the literal version of the Greek, *τὰ δὲ καὶ τοιούτων θεῶν ἱδρύματα*, which Ast would explain by saying that *τοιούτων* is to be referred to *ὁσίων*—as if the gods were ever called *ὅσιοι*—and by supplying *ὄντα* after *ἱδρύματα*, and thus considering *τὰ μὲν—ἱδρύματα* as an absolute sentence. Ficinus has "partim quidem tanquam de rebus sacris judicaturi, partim vero tanquam judicantium deorum ibi sint delubra," which is evidently an attempt to make something like sense out of words he could not understand literally.

[6—6] The words *δικαστήρια ἐν οἷς* have been evidently repeated by some

justice, in which[6] there shall be fitting suits relating to murders and whatever crimes are worthy of death. With respect to the walls, Megillus, I would agree with Sparta, to let them lie sleeping on the earth,[1] and not raise them up on this account.[2] For well is hymned that poetical saying respecting them, that "walls ought to be [3]of brass and iron,[3] rather than made of earth." But our plan, in addition to this, of sending young men every year into the country to dig out the earth and make trenches, and by means of buildings to keep off the enemy, [4]as if forsooth not suffering them to put their foot on the boundaries of the land,[4] would justly pay the forfeit of very great ridicule. For we throw round a wall, which in the first place by no means contributes to the health of the citizens; and moreover it is wont to produce a cowardly habit in the souls of the inhabitants, by inviting them to fly to it, and not to repel the enemy, nor to find their safety in some persons in the city ever guarding it both night and day, but to fancy that, while they are hedged in with walls and gates and asleep, they will in reality possess the means of safety, as if they were born not to labour, nor knew that an easy life is the result of labour; but that, as I conceive,[5] from a disgraceful inactivity and easy temper[6] labours naturally result again. But if there is any need to men of walls, it must needs be that the buildings of private dwellings be so laid down from the commencement, that the whole city may be one wall through the equality and similarity of all the dwellings, possessing, as regards the roads, a good fortified position; and by the city having thus the form of one house, it would be not unpleasant to look upon;

fault of transcription, which both here and just before only a better MS. than any hitherto collated will enable us to correct.

[1] On this celebrated passage relating to Sparta being without walls see Longinus § 4, and Aristotle in Polit. vii. 11, who ridicules the notion as being antiquated and silly.

[2] The words *τῶνδε εἵνεκα* are omitted by Ficinus. Ast attempts to explain them in a way, I confess, I cannot understand.

[3—3] By walls of brass and iron were meant the bodies of men clothed in armour.

[4—4] All the words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor.

[5] Ficinus justly omits *οἶμαι*—unless *δε γε οιμαι της* conceal *δ' αὖ καὶ γαμέταις*, so that *καὶ γαμέταις αἰσχρᾶς* may mean "disgraceful even for married persons."

[6] Ast would reject *καὶ ῥᾳθυμίας* as a gl. for *ῥᾳστώνης*.

and it would be in every respect pre-eminently adapted to the case of its guards, and the safety of the garrison. To these points it should be particularly incumbent on those, who are to dwell in it, to direct their care, until those at the commencement are built up, and that the City-Stewards should look to it, and compel the party, who pays no attention, by imposing a fine; and they ought to have a care with respect to the purity of every thing in the city; and that no private person seizes upon any public property, either by buildings or diggings; and moreover it is requisite to take care that the waters from Zeus (i. e. rain water) may run off easily; and that every part, both within and without the city, may be fit for dwelling in. And let the guardians of the laws, knowing all this by experience, lay down additional laws on all these points, and on such others as the law may from its want of power have omitted. But since both these matters and the buildings about the market-place, and the particulars relating to the gymnasia,[1] (have been gone through,)[2] and the schools, that have been prepared, and the theatres too, are waiting for scholars and spectators, let us now proceed to what is consequent upon marriages, and keep close to the business of legislation next in order.

Clin. By all means.

Athen. [3]Let then marriages be considered, Clinias, by us to exist.[3] But the mode of living prior to child-getting should subsist for not less than a year [4]after this;[4] but in what

[1] After *γυμνάσια καὶ* are found the Greek words *πάντα ὅσα*, which, I confess, I cannot understand; and in one MS. *πάντα τἄλλα ὅσα*, which is not more intelligible. I could have understood *καὶ πάντα τά τ' ἀνα καὶ ὅσια*, i. e. "and all matters of a human and holy kind." Ficinus has what, I suspect, he conceived the sense required, rather than what he found in his MS.—"et gymnasia et theatra spectantium, et docentium discentiumque domicilia disposita sunt"— Ast too evidently found some difficulty here; but his method of meeting it is by no means satisfactory.

[2] I have added the words between the lunes to supply what I conceive to have been lost.

[3—3] Ficinus—"De nuptiis igitur ita, ut diximus, O Clinia, res se habeat."

[4—4] Although the formula *τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο* is frequently found, and is elsewhere perfectly intelligible, yet here I must leave for others to see its beauty. Ficinus has "vivendi regula, quæ—præcedit,—sequitur," as if his MS. read *δίαιτα δὲ, ἢ—γίγνοιτ' ἂν, ἕπεται μετὰ τοῦτο*— Plato wrote, I suspect, *δίαιταν δὲ, ἢ—γίγνοιτ' ἂν, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτ' ἀκουστέον*—or something similar.

manner it is requisite for a bride and bridegroom to live in a city, which is [1]about to be pre-eminent[1] above the majority of cities—[2]a point which is close upon what has been mentioned already[2]—is a thing not the most easy of all to state. But though not a few of what have gone before are of such a kind, this will be still more difficult than all of those for the many to take in. Nevertheless, Clinias, that which appears to be right and true must be mentioned.

Clin. By all means.

[21.] *Athen.* He then, who thinks to promulgate laws for states, as to what manner citizens[3] should live and perform their public and common duties, but of their private concerns [4]such as necessity does not bind down ought to be let loose,[4] and that there should be a license for each person to live as they please each day, and no need for every thing to take place by an order, and [thinks][5] that by leaving private matters not regulated by law, persons will be willing, as regards public and common concerns, to live according to law, (he) does not think correctly. Now on what account has this been asserted? On this; that we shall lay down that the bridegrooms ought neither pre-eminently more[6] or less, than during the time previous to marriage, to have their living at the com-

[1]—[1] I do not remember to have met with a phrase similar to *διαφερούσῃ —ἐσομένῃ*. The verb substantive is united to a participle, as shown by Porson on Hec. 1169, and Paley on Æsch. Suppl. 454, *τήνδε γηρυθεῖσ' ἔσει*, who refers to Œd. C. 816, Œd. T. 1146, Antig. 1067, and Plato Apolog. *πεπονθὼς ἔσομαι*, Xenoph. K. A. *κατακτανόντες ἔσεσθε*: and the participle *οὖσιν* is found with *κεκιβδηλευμένοις* in Aristoph. Βατρ. 720, but not the future, as here, with the present.

[2]—[2] The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus and Taylor.

[3] The Greek is *αὐτοὺς*— But the preceding *πόλεσι* requires *ἀστοὺς*-- Cousin refers *αὐτοὺς* to *πολίτας*, understood in *πόλεσι*.

[4]—[4] The text is *τῶν δὲ ἰδίων ὅσον ἀνάγκη μηδὲ οἴεται δεῖν*: where the genitive is without regimen, and *οἴεται* repeated unnecessarily after the preceding *διανοεῖται*: to say nothing of the negative *μὴ*, which ought to precede, not follow, *ἀνάγκη*, unless the verb be introduced, as in Phædon, p. 64, E., *καθόσον μὴ πολλὴ ἀνάγκη (ᾖ) μετέχειν αὐτῶν*. To meet all the difficulties, I have translated as if the Greek were *τῶν δὲ ἰδίων, ὅσ' ἂν ἀνάγκη μὴ δέῃ, ἀνετὰ δεῖν εἶναι*, where there would be a play in *δέῃ*, "bind," and *ἀνετὰ δεῖν εἶναι*, "ought to be let loose."

[5] The verb *ἡγεῖται*, like *οἴεται* just before, could not be thus foisted in between *διανοεῖται* at the beginning and end of the sentence. In *ἡγεῖται τά γε* lies hid *κατά γε τὰ*— For the preposition could not be omitted.

[6] The antithesis in *μηδὲ ἧττον* requires here *μᾶλλον*, not *ἡμῖν—μηδὲν—*

mon tables. Now this was[1] a wonderful thing when it took place at first in your country through some war, as it seems, or some other circumstance possessing the same power, establishing it legally over you,[2] when hampered during a paucity of people by a great want of means. But after you had tasted these common tables, and been compelled by necessity to make use of them, the law was deemed [3]to conduce very greatly[3] to your preservation; and in some such manner as this, the employment of common tables was established amongst you.

Clin. So it appears.

Athen. What I mentioned as being at that time[4] a thing wonderful and fearful for some to enjoin, it would not be now equally difficult for the person enjoining it to establish by law. But that which follows this, namely, that the thing naturally existing would exist in a proper manner, but not existing at all at present, [5]it would want but little to cause[5] the legislator, as the saying of persons in jest is, [6]to card wool for the fire,[6] and to do by labouring[7] in vain an infinity of things of this kind, it is [8]not easy to mention, nor, after mentioning, to accomplish.[8]

Clin. What is this, guest, which you appear, although attempting to mention, so vehemently to shrink from?

Athen. You shall hear, in order that there may be no longer needlessly a waste of time about it. For every thing, that in a state partakes of order and law, produces every good; but of things that are without order, or ordered badly, the majority

[1] I have adopted Ast's ἦν for ὃν—

[2] I have inserted ὑμῖν, required for the sense. It was lost through ἐν—

[3—3] The Greek is μέγα διαφέρειν. Plato wrote, I suspect, μέγιστα δὴ φέρειν, as I have translated. For the phrase is rather φέρειν εἰς τι than διαφέρειν εἰς τι: and, while δη and δια are constantly thus interchanged, δὴ is perpetually united to a superlative, as I have shown in my Poppo's Prolegom. p. 309.

[4] In lieu of πότε the sense requires τότε. Ficinus probably found in his MS. πρῶτον. For his version is "Mirum igitur id fuit, imperantique primo arduum."

[5—5] The sense and syntax require ὀλίγου δέον, ποιεῖν in lieu of ὀλίγου τε ποιοῦν—

[6—6] As wool is carded generally for the loom, to card it for the fire is in fact to do so for no useful purpose.

[7] I have adopted Ast's πονοῦντα for ποιοῦντα, who aptly compares ἀνήνυτα—πονῶν in Rep. vi. 2, p. 486, D.

[8—8] The words between the numerals are found in the version of Ficinus, at the commencement of the sentence, after "that which follows this—"

[1]loosens some of the well ordered, and destroys others:[1] which has[2] just now happened touching the matter under discussion. For in the case of your countrymen, Clinias and Megillus, the common tables relating to the men have been instituted in both a beautiful, and, as I have said, wonderful manner, from a certain divine necessity; but those relating to the women have been by no means correctly left unregulated by law; nor has the arrangement of their common tables been brought to light. But though[3] the female sex is really[4] rather more given to secrecy and stealth, on account of its weakness, than we men are, yet it is not properly dismissed, as being difficult to regulate in consequence of the legislator conceding this point. For, through this being neglected, many things have in your state glided by, which would have been far better than they at present are, had they met with laws. For the want of regulations[5] relating to women, is not, as it would seem, when disregarded, merely the half (of human concerns);[6] but, by how much the nature of women is worse than that of men, as regards virtue, by so much does it differ in being more than the double (as regards vice).[7] This therefore to take up again and to correct, and to arrange all pursuits in common for women and men, is better for the happiness of the state. But at present mankind is so led on in a manner by no means fortunate for this purpose, that it is the part of a person with mind not even to mention it in some other places and

[1]—[1] The Greek is λύει τὰ πολλὰ τῶν εὖ τεταγμένων ἄλλα ἕτερα, which I cannot understand; nor could Ficinus, who, in his version "quæ bene sunt ordinata, confundunt—" omits ἄλλα ἕτερα, in which the chief difficulty lies; while Ast's attempt to explain these words proves that he too was at a loss. I have translated as if the Greek were τὰ πολλὰ λύει τῶν εὖ τεταγμένων τινα ὀλλύει θ' ἕτερα. For there would be thus a play on λύει and ὀλλύει.

[2] The Greek is οὗ δὴ καὶ νῦν ἐφέστηκε πέρι, where Ast says that οὗ is governed by πέρι. But the preposition could not be thus separated from its case. I have therefore adopted ὃ, from "quod" in Ficinus.

[3] Although Bekker has adopted Ast's ἀλλ' ὅ, I confess I cannot understand it. The sense evidently requires, as I have translated, ἀλλ', εἰ—

[4] Ast would read ἄλλων for ἄλλως, not remembering that ἄλλως means "really," as shown by Ruhnken on Timæus, p. 199.

[5] I have adopted with Ast ἀκόσμητον in lieu of ἀκοσμήτως, similar to "res—inordinata" in Ficinus.

[6] Ficinus alone has "humanarum rerum," as if his MS. read τῶν ἀνειῶν, i. e. τῶν ἀνθρωπείων, after μόνον.

[7] I have supplied what the antithesis requires for the sense

states, where it has been voted that common tables shall not exist at all in a city. How then shall any one without being laughed at attempt in reality to compel women to make their consumption of meat and drink a conspicuous spectacle? For there is nothing which that sex would with more difficulty endure than this. For being accustomed to live in retirement[1] and obscurity it will, when brought by force into the light, make every possible resistance, and greatly overpower the legislator. This sex then, as I have said, would not elsewhere endure a reason urged even correctly, without making every kind of outcry; but in this state perhaps they would. If then it is agreeable to you, for the sake of conversation, that our reasoning, as regards every kind of polity, should not be imperfect,[2] I am desirous of telling you, how good and becoming a thing this is; if, as I said, it seems good to you to hear; but if not, to leave it alone.

Clin. But, O guest, it does seem by all means wonderfully good for us to hear.

[22.] *Athen.* Let us then hear it. But do not wonder, [3]if I appear to you to make an attempt from some source far back.[3] For we are now in the enjoyment of leisure, and there is nothing pressing us so as to prevent our seeing on every side and in every way what relate to the laws.

Clin. You have spoken correctly.

Athen. Let us then return to what was stated at first. For it is proper for every person to correctly understand so much as this, that the generation of men either never had any beginning at all, nor ever will have an end, but always was and always will be, [4]or that the length of time from which its

[1] I have adopted *δεδυκὸς*, suggested by Stephens, in lieu of *δεδοικὸς*, and confirmed not only by Plato in Rep. ix. p. 579, B., but by a MS. subsequently collated.

[2] In lieu of *ἀτυχῆ*, Ficinus, as shown by his version "manca," found in his MS. *ἀτελῆ*, as remarked by Faehse and adopted by Ast. Stalbaum prefers *ἀτυχῆ*. But *λόγος ἀτυχὴς* is not, I believe, found elsewhere in Greek.

[3—3] Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus has "si rem altius repetere visus fuero." If then he is to be depended upon, he must have found something in his MS. very different to what is read in other MSS.

[4—4] The Greek is *ἢ μῆκός τι τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀφ' οὗ γέγονεν ἀμήχανον ἂν χρόνον ὅσον γεγονὸς ἂν εἴη*. I have translated as if it were originally —*ἢ μῆκός τι, ἀφ' οὗ τὰ τῆς ἀρχῆς γέγονεν, ἀμήχανον ἦν χρόνου, ὅσον οὐδὲ Χρόνος ἂν γνοίη*: where *χρόνου* is due to Ast; who, with Stalbaum, gave up the correction of the passage as hopeless; for they did not per-

beginning took place, is so measureless, that even Time would not know it.[4]

Clin. How not?

Athen. What then, do we not think that there have been the establishment and subversion of cities, and all sorts of pursuits relating to order and disorder, and the use[1] of drink and food, (and) the desires of all kinds of those, mad in the affairs of love, and through all the earth, and all varieties in the alterations of seasons, in which it is likely that animals have undergone very many changes?

Clin. How not?

Athen. What then? Do we believe that vines appeared somehow, not having existed previously; and in a similar manner olives, and the gifts of Demeter and her virgin daughter; and that a certain Triptolemus was the minister of such powers; and do we not think that during the time, in which these did not exist, animals turned to devouring each other, as they do now?

Clin. How not?

Athen. But we see the custom remaining even now in many places of men sacrificing each other;[2] and we hear,

ceive that Plato had here probably played upon Χρόνος, as he has on Ἀνδρεία in Lach. § 23, ἵνα μὴ ἡμῶν αὐτὴ ἡ Ἀνδρεία καταγελάσῃ, ὅτι οὐκ ἀνδρείως αὐτὴν ζητοῦμεν: and on Μῶμος in Rep. vi. p. 487, A., οὐδ' ἂν ὁ Μῶμος τό γε τοιοῦτον μέμψαιτο: where he probably wrote μωμήσαιτο, as shown by the imitation of Aristænetus in i. 1, οὐδ' ἂν ὁ Μῶμος—μωμήσαιτο: and of an unknown writer in Suidas, Μῶμος—ὥστε μηδὲ ἂν τὸν Μῶμον αὐτὸν ἐπιμωμήσασθαι: to which may be added Strato in Athenæus ix. p. 383, τὸν δ' οὐκ ἂν ταχὺ Ἔπεισεν ἡ Πειθώ. Lucian in Hist. Conscrib. § 38, τὰ μὲν πραχθέντα οὐδὲ Κλωθὼ ἂν ἔτι ἀνακλώσειεν: and the passages quoted by Porson on Hec. 779, τίς οὕτω δυστυχὴς ἔφυ γυνή; Οὐκ ἔστιν· εἰ μὴ τὴν Τύχην αὐτὴν λέγεις: who might have added from Plautus in Captiv., "Neque jam servare Salus, si vult, me potest, nec copia est;" and from Mostellar., "Nec salus nobis Saluti jam esse, si cupiat, potest."

[1] In lieu of βρώσεως, which Ast considers an interpolation, Orelli suggested, with the approbation of Stalbaum, ἀφροδισίων, referring to the expression shortly afterwards—βρῶσιν μὲν ἐλέγομεν — καὶ πόσιν καὶ ἀφροδισίων—διαπτοίησιν. From whence I suspect that Plato wrote here ἐπιθυμήματά τε παντοδαπὰ τῶν δι' ἀφροδίσια πτοιούντων: while in βρώσεως evidently lies hid χρήσεως, as shown by "cibi potique—usus" in Ficinus; and so I have translated. Subsequently Orelli proposed ἀβρότητος.

[2] By the human sacrifices, to which Plato alludes as existing in his time, are perhaps meant those, that took place at Carthage, of which country the Athenians had begun to know so much, through their connexion with Sicily and their attack upon Syracuse, as to enable Aris-

on the contrary, that in others we did not dare to taste the flesh even of oxen, and that the sacrifices to the gods were not animals, but [1]cakes moistened with honey, and fruits,[1] and other innocent offerings[2] of a similar kind; and that we entirely abstained from flesh, as it was unholy to eat it, and to defile the altars of the gods with blood; and that there existed, what is called the Orphic[3] life amongst persons of that period, keeping fast to all things without life, but abstaining on the contrary from all that had life.

Clin. What you say is greatly bruited abroad, and is very easy to be believed.

Athen. But for what purpose, some one may say, has all this been mentioned now?

Clin. You very correctly understand, O guest, the matter.

Athen. I shall endeavour therefore, Clinias, to state, if I can, what follows in order upon this.

Clin. Speak then.

Athen. I perceive that all things in the case of man hang from a threefold want and desire; through which virtue results to them, if they are properly led, but the contrary, if improperly. These are, immediately on being born, eating and drinking, for which every animal having an innate love, is full of a mad feeling, and a disinclination to hearken to him, who says that one must do something else than, by satisfying the pleasures and desires connected with such things, to be

totle shortly afterwards to give an account of the political constitution of that city.

[1]—[1] The Greek is *πέλανοι δὲ καὶ μέλιτι καρποὶ δεδεύμενοι.* But as we read no where else of fruits being moistened with honey, I have translated as if the words were—*Πέλανοι δὲ μέλιτι δεδευμένοι καὶ καρποὶ*—remembering the words of Horace in Epist. i. 10, 10, "Pane egeo jam mellitis potiore placentis." According to Pausanias viii. 2, the custom, first introduced by Cecrops, of offering cakes, called *πέλανοι*, to Zeus the Highest, had been preserved even to his day.

[2] In lieu of *θύματα*, which means sacrifices by fire, Orelli proposed to read *θύημα*, from Timæus. But *ἀγνὰ θύματα* is found Pollux i. 26, on which I have written something in Poppo's Prolegom. p, 176, and more in the Transactions of the Royal Society of Literature, vol. ii. p. 81, 2nd series; and I could now add not a little to supply what C. F. Hermann has omitted in Schneidewinn's Philologus, T. ii. p. 1—11.

[3] On the Orphic life, adopted by the Pythagoreans, relating to the abstinence from animal food, see the passages quoted by Ast here, and on Rep. x. § 3, from Eurip. Hipp. 946, Aristoph. Βατρ. 1064, Horace A. P. 391, and Porphyry "On Abstinence," ii. 6, 7.

ever[1] freeing oneself from all pain. But a third, and the greatest want, and a desire the most acute, comes rushing on the last, and causes men to be the most inflamed with all kinds[2] of madness, (I mean) that which is on fire with the very great[3] sexual passion for propagating the species. These three diseases it is meet to turn[4] from what is called the most pleasant[5] to the best,[4] and to endeavour to keep them down by the three greatest (bonds), fear, and law, and truthful reasoning; and by making use moreover of the Muses, and the gods who preside over contests,[6] to extinguish their increase and influx. [7]But after marriages let us place the procreation of children, and after procreation their nurture and instruction. And by our discourse proceeding in this manner, each law will perhaps advance onwards to (our doctrine of) common tables; when, after arriving at communities of this kind, we shall perhaps see better[8] by approaching nearer to them, whether they ought to exist of women likewise, or of men alone; and by putting into order the institutions antecedent to these, which are at present not laid down by law, we will consider them previously; and, as has been just now said, we shall see them more accurately, and lay down laws more suited to them and becoming.[7]

[1] The Greek is *ἀεὶ δεῖν*, where Ast conceives that ΔΕΙΝ is only the repetition of ΑΕΙ, or else that it has been interpolated from the preceding *δεῖν*. Perhaps the words *ἀποπληροῦντα, οἷα λύκους, τῆς ἀπαστίας δδυνῶν* lie hid in *ἀποπληροῦνται* (so one MS.) *λύπης τῆς ἀπάσης ἀεὶ δεῖν*—i. e. "by satisfying ourselves, like wolves, to be free from the pain of not tasting food." For the wolf is known to be an animal, that remains the longest without food, and gorges himself the most when he gets plenty of it; and while *ἀπαστία* is found in Aristoph. Νεφ. 621, in the sense of *νηστεία* and *ἀσιτία*, the change of *λύκους* into *λύπης* would be owing to the common confusion of *κ* and *π*, as shown by myself on Æsch. Suppl. 927.

[2] In lieu of *πάντως* one would prefer, as I have translated, *παντοίαις*—

[3] Instead of *ὕβρει πλείστῃ*, Plato wrote, I suspect, either *ἀπλήστῃ*, "insatiable," or *ἀκολάστῃ*, "unchecked."

[4]—[4] Stephens, whom Ast has followed, was the first to alter *παρὰ τὸ λεγόμενον ἥδιστον* into *παρὰ τοῦ λεγομένου ἡδίστου*, from "ab eo quod jucundissimum dicitur," in Ficinus.

[5] In *μὲν*, which has no meaning here, lies hid *δεσμοῖς*—

[6] The gods who presided over contests were Jupiter, Neptune, Apollo, and Mercury, as shown by Æschylus in Suppl. 193.

[7]—[7] Stalbaum considers all between the numerals an interpolation; for according to two MSS. it was wanting in some copies.

[8] Instead of *μᾶλλον*, which came from *ἀκριβέστερον μᾶλλον*, just below, the sense requires *κάλλιον*, as I have translated.

Clin. You speak most correctly.

Athen. Let us then keep in recollection what has been just now said; for perhaps we shall have a need of it hereafter.

Clin. What do you bid us (remember)?

Athen. That which we defined by three words. For we surely spoke about eating, and secondly, drinking, and thirdly, a kind of madness in the matters of love.

Clin. We will by all means, O guest, recollect, [1]what you now bid us (to do).[1]

Athen. It is well. Let us proceed then to the affairs of marriage, and teach the parties how and in what manner they ought to get children; and, if we cannot persuade them, we will threaten them with certain laws.

Clin. How?

[23.] *Athen.* It is requisite for the bride and bridegroom to consider, that they are about to exhibit to the state children, the most beautiful and the best in their power. Now all persons, who share in any work, when they give their minds to themselves and the work, produce the whole beautiful and good; but the contrary, when they do not give their minds, or do not possess any. Let the bridegroom then give his mind both to the bride and to child-getting; and in the same way let the bride give her mind to the bridegroom preeminently at the time when children have not yet been born to them. And let the women, whom we have chosen, be the overseers of these matters, whether many or few, just as the rulers may order, as many and at what time they please; and let them assemble every day in the temple of Eileithuia,[2] and (continue there) for the third part of an hour;[3] where they shall, on being assembled, tell, if they have seen any man or woman, of those connected with child-getting, looking to any thing else than to what are ordained to be done during the sacrifices and sacred ceremonies pertaining to marriage. Let the procreation of children, and the supervision of those connected with child-getting above mentioned, continue for ten

[1]—[1] Ficinus has "quæ modo dicta sunt."

[2] The goddess called Eileithuia, who at Athens was Athéné, and elsewhere Artemis, was worshipped at Rome under the title of Juno Lucina.

[3] So Ficinus understands ὥρα; but Cornarius, "a day." Ast sides with Ficinus. But ὥρα rarely in Greek, if ever, means "an hour." It does however mean "a day," as shown by H. Stephens in Thes. L. Gr. Perhaps Plato wrote τριτημορίου, with the ellipse of ἡμέρας.

years, but not for a longer time, when there is a fecundity in generation. But should some continue unprolific for this space of time, let them, after having consulted with their kindred, and the women that are in power, be divorced for the benefit of each party. If however any dispute arises respecting what is proper and beneficial to each, let them select ten of the guardians of the law, [1]and abide by what they shall impose and ordain.[1] And let these women, entering into the houses of the young folks, partly by admonitions and partly by threats, cause them to cease from their error and ignorance. But if they are unable to do so, let them go and speak to the guardians of the law; and let these restrain the parties. If they too are unable to effect any thing, let them bring the matter before the public assembly, after having put up in writing the names of the parties, and made an affidavit that they are unable to make this or that person better. And let him, who is indicted, unless he can obtain a verdict in a court of law against the parties so putting up in writing his name, be disgraced on these points;[2] (namely), let him not go to weddings, nor to the rites solemnized for children;[3] and should he go, let any one who wishes scourge him with stripes with impunity. And let there be the same enactments in the case of a woman. For let her not share in female out-goings[4] and honours, and the visits made at weddings, and at the birth-rites[5] of children, if

[1]—[1] Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus has "cognoscant." Taylor, "shall take cognizance of and determine the affair." To avoid however the insufferable tautology in *ἐπιτρέψωσι* and *τάξωσι*, one may easily read, what the train of thought requires—*οἷς ἂν πᾶν ἐπιτρέψωσι, καὶ, ἃ οἵδε τάξωσι, τούτοις ἐμμενεῖν*—i. e. "to whom they may commit the whole affair, and to abide by what they may enjoin." Winckelmann suggests *ἃ οἷς ἂν ἐπιτρέψωσιν, οἵδε τάξουσι*—

[2] Ficinus omits *τῶνδε*, and so does one MS. subsequently collated.

[3] The Greek is *τὰς τῶν παίδων ἐπιτελειώσεις*: which Ast explains by saying that "there is an allusion to the sacred rites, which took place on the tenth day after the birth of a child, as we learn from Aristoph. *Ὄρν.* 493, and 923." For the ancients knew, as well as the moderns, that the critical period in childbirth was the ninth day; and that until it had well passed over, it was useless to make any rejoicing for the birth of the child.

[4] It is not easy to say what is meant by *ἔξοδοι*, unless it alludes to the circumstance that women, who were mothers, were permitted to go out of the house, where and when they pleased, which virgins were not; for a married woman without children, would be only another kind of virgin.

[5] In lieu of *γενέσεις*, Schneider suggested *γενέσια*; but Stalbaum has edited *γενεθλίων* from three MSS. On the difference between *γενέσια* and *γενέθλια* see Buttmann on Alcibiad. i. p. 121, D. There is likewise

she be indicted as acting disorderly, [1]and does not obtain a verdict.[1] But when they are begetting children according to law, if any man has a connexion with another woman for such a purpose, or a woman with another man, while such other parties are getting children, let the same fines be imposed upon them, as have been mentioned in the case of those [2]still getting them.[2] After this let the man and woman, who act temperately with respect to such points, be altogether in good repute, but those who act contrariwise be held in a contrary light, or dishonoured rather. And if the majority act with moderation in matters of this kind, let such points lie in silence without being established by law; but if they act disorderly, [3]let enactments be laid down in this way, and punishment enacted[3] according to the laws then laid down. The first year is the beginning of the whole of life to every one; which ought to be written in the temples of their fathers, as the beginning of life, both to a boy and girl. In every Phratria[4] too, let the number of the rulers[5] that are numbered for a year, be written on a whitened wall, and near to them the names of those still living in the Phratria be always written; but blot out those who have departed from life. Let the limits of a marriageable age for a female be from sixteen to twenty

a dissertation, "De Veterum Solennibus Natalibus," by Schöne, Halberstadt, 1832; but whether he has thrown any light on this passage I know not, as I have never seen it.

[1]—[1] Ficinus has strangely mistaken the sense of this passage; for his version is "si in judicium arcessitæ damnatæ etiam fuerint," translated by Taylor, "if they are similarly condemned in a court of justice."

[2]—[2] Such is the version of *ἔτι γεννωμένοις*. But this I cannot understand; nor could Taylor, whose version is—"when they did not beget children"— Two MSS. read *ἄρτι* for *ἔτι*, from which nothing is gained.

[3]—[3] Ficinus has more fully "legum circumscriptione declarentur et ad eorum normam de singulis hujusmodi judicetur atque agatur."

[4] The Phratria was one part out of three, into which the Phylé was divided.

[5] The persons called by Plato *ἄρχοντες* seem to be similar to the *Φρατρίαρχοι*, mentioned by Harpocration in *Φράτορες*: while from this passage it may be inferred that the officers of the Phratria at Athens were chosen annually, and that their names were written on the whitened part of the wall of a temple, just as the names of the newly appointed officers and common council of a ward in the city of London are pasted up annually on the outside of the parish church; and that the names of all belonging to the Phratria were written near those of the officers, just as the list of the names of those, who have been outlawed, or have taken out game-certificates, is affixed to church doors in England.

years of age—and let this be the longest definite time—but for a man from thirty to thirty-five; and let the time for any public office be, in the case of a woman, forty years of age; but in that of a man, thirty; but with respect to war, for a man from twenty to sixty years; but for a woman, should it appear necessary to employ her for warlike purposes, and after she shall have brought forth children, up to fifty years of age, enjoining what is possible and becoming for each.

BOOK VII.

CHILDREN then, both male and female, having been begotten, it will be most correct to speak next about their nurture and education; which it is perfectly impossible to be[1] not mentioned; and being mentioned it will appear to us to be rather like a kind of teaching and admonition than laws. For the numerous and trifling and not conspicuous matters, which happen to all privately, and in each family, since they easily take place through the pain, and pleasure, and desire of the respective individuals, will render, contrary to the advice of the legislator, the habits of the citizens all-various, and not similar to each other. Now this is an evil to states. For on account of their insignificance and frequency, to make them subject to a fine would be at the same time unbecoming and unseemly. But it destroys[2] even the laws already laid down in writing, if persons are accustomed to act contrary to law in things insignificant and numerous; so that it is difficult to lay down laws concerning them, and yet impossible to be silent. But what I mean to say, I must endeavour to show clearly by bringing, as it were, samples to the light; for there seems (to be) on what is now said in some respect a darkness.

Clin. You speak most truly.

Athen. Has not then this been rightly said, that a nurture perfectly correct ought to show itself able to render both bodies and souls the most beautiful and best?

Clin. How not?

[1] Ficinus has "silentio præterire"—which leads to ἐᾷν for εἶναι.

[2] Ficinus, whom Taylor follows, has "derogaret," as if his MS. read διαφθείροι δ' ἂν— in lieu of διαφθείρει—

Athen. Now the most beautiful bodies I conceive, (to speak) in the most simple style, ought, while boys are still young, to grow up in the most upright manner.

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. What then, do we not understand this, that the first shooting forth of every animal is produced the greatest and most abundant by far; so that it has given rise to a dispute amongst many, whether the length of human bodies does or does not become by increase from the age of five years doubled[1] in the remaining twenty-five?[2]

Clin. True.

Athen. What then, when a great increase flows on without much and commensurate exercise, do we not know that it produces ten thousand maladies in bodies?

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. There is need then of most exercise, when most nutriment is introduced into bodies.

Clin. What then, O guest, shall we enjoin upon the recently born, and the youngest, the greatest exertions?

Athen. By no means; but to those still prior, who are being nourished in the wombs of their mothers.

Clin. How say you, thou best (of men)? Are you speaking of those in a state of being conceived?

Athen. Yes. But it is not at all wonderful for you to be ignorant of the exercise of such as these; which, although it seems absurd, I am willing to render clear to you.

Clin. By all means (do so).

Athen. For us indeed a thing of this kind is more easy to understand through some persons playing there[3] sports more than is needful. For with us not only children, but some older men, bring up the young of birds,[4] and exercise such

[1] The modern theory is, that the body of a child at the end of the second year is generally the half of what it will be when grown up.

[2] Plato mentions thirty, because at that period the growth, as far as height is concerned, ceases; and he adds the "remaining," because thirty was supposed to be the average limit of human life.

[3] By *αὐτοθι*, "there," is meant Athens.

[4] Plato is supposed to allude here to the sport of quail-feeding and fighting, similar to cock-feeding and fighting in England. See at Alcibiad. i. § 34. According to Ælian in V. H. ii. 28, there was yearly a cock-fight in the theatre at Athens, to commemorate the victory gained over the Persians by the Athenians; whom Themistocles had urged to

kinds of wild animals[1] in fighting with each other, and they are far from thinking that the labours are moderate, in which by exercising they stir them up. For in addition to this, [2]each taking under their arms the smaller in their hands, and the larger under their arms within,[2] they walk about, going many stadia, and this, not for the sake of the good state of their own bodies, but for that of the birds. And thus much they signify to the person capable of learning, that all bodies are benefited by shakings and motion, [3]when moved without weariness, of all that[3] are moved by themselves, or by swings,[4] or carried on the sea,[5] or on horseback, or borne along in any manner soever by other bodies;[6] and through these getting the mastery over food and drink, they are able to impart to us health, and beauty, and [7]the rest of strength.[7]

[2.] Since then such is the case, what shall we say we ought to do after this? Are you willing for us to say with a laugh, that we are laying down laws for the pregnant woman

imitate the bravery of two cocks, whom the army happened to see fighting with each other.

[1] As *θηρίων* seems strangely applied to birds, one would suspect the existence of some error here. At all events the words *τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν θηρίων* are omitted by Ficinus.

[2]—[2] Such is the literal version of the Greek. But *ὑπὸ μάλης* and *ὑπὸ τὴν ἀγκάλην ἐντὸς* mean the same thing. Ficinus has more correctly—"minores in manibus, majores sub ulna capientes—" Hence it is easy to see that *ὑπὸ τὴν ἀγκάλην ἐντὸς* is an explanation of *ὑπὸ μάλης*, and that Plato wrote *λαβόντες ἕκαστος τοὺς μὲν ἐλάττονας εἰς τὰς χεῖρας, μείζους—δὲ ὑπὸ μάλης—* Ast indeed and Stalbaum after him explain *ὑπὸ μάλης* by "secretly." But as there could be no need of secrecy, such a meaning would be here quite out of place. The German translator Schulthes too considered *ὑπὸ μάλης* an interpolation.

[3]—[3] Here again a literal version best points out that something is incorrect in the Greek—*κινούμενα ἄκοπα ὀνίναται πάντων ὅσα τε*—where since two MSS. offer *καὶ κινούμενα* in the text, and one of them *κατακινούμενα* in the margin, and Stobæus *πάντως* for *πάντων*, one would prefer—*ὀνίναται, εἴ γε κινούμενα ἄκοπα πάντως ἔστι, εἴ τε ὑπὸ*—i. e. are benefited, if indeed, when moved, they are entirely without weariness, whether—

[4] The words *ἐν αἰώραις* are omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor.

[5] *κατὰ θάλατταν—ὀχουμένων—* Compare Æsch. Prom. 477.

[6] Instead of *σωμάτων*, which is not used indefinitely in Greek, as "body" is in English, to express any substance, one would prefer the more proper word, *χρημάτων*.

[7]—[7] As *τὴν ἄλλην ῥώμην* is strangely added to *ὑγίειαν καὶ κάλλος*, Ficinus, followed by Taylor, has omitted *τὴν ἄλλην*. It is however acknowledged by Stobæus. Perhaps Plato wrote *πολλὴν τὴν ῥώμην—*

to walk about, and to mould the infant as a thing of wax, while it is yet flexible, and to put it in swathing-clothes until it is two years old; and that we are moreover compelling the nurses by legal fines to carry the children either into the fields, or to the temples, or their acquaintance, until they are sufficiently able to stand alone; and then that they should be careful, lest by the limbs becoming distorted, while forcibly resting on them, being still young, to undergo the additional labour of carrying the infant, until it had completed its third year; and that the nurses ought to be as strong as possible; and, in addition, that unless these things take place to each child, we are to enact a fine upon those who do not act so? or is this far from being the case? For that, which has just now been mentioned, would happen to us without stint.[1]

Clin. What is that?

Athen. To pay the debt of abundant laughter, through[2] the womanlike and servile manners of the nurses being unwilling to obey us.[3]

Clin. But on what account then did we say that this ought to be stated?

Athen. On this. A person, on hearing[4] of the habits of masters and free persons in states, would perhaps come to the correct conception, that, without a proper administration of private concerns taking place in states, one would think there would be vainly any stability in the laying down of laws; and so thinking, he would make use of the laws just now mentioned; and using them correctly, he would by his administration render both his own household and the city happy.

Clin. You have spoken very reasonably.

Athen. Let us then not desist from the legislation of this kind, until we have given out the pursuits relating likewise to the souls of very young children in the same manner as we

[1] The Greek is *πολὺ καὶ ἄφθονον*. Ficinus avoids the tautology by translating "abunde," and so too does Taylor.

[2] I have adopted *πρὸς τὸ*, found in the two best MSS., in lieu of *πρὸς τῷ*—

[3] In *ἂν*, which is unnecessary here, lies hid *ἡμῖν*, answering to "nobis" in Ficinus.

[4] I have translated as if the Greek were *ἀκούσας τις εἰς*—not *ἀκούσαντα εἰς*— For although *τὰ τῶν δεσποτῶν* might be written for *οἱ δεσπόται*, yet *τὰ τῶν δεσποτῶν ἤθη* could not; and still less could *τὰ ἤθη* be said to hear and to come to a conception.

began to go through the subject, when the accounts were stated relating to the body.

Clin. Perfectly right.

Athen. Let us then receive this as an element with respect to both the circumstances, [1][the body and soul,][1] of the very young, that the nursing and motion, taking place as much as possible all the night and day, are profitable to all, and not the least [2] to the youngest; so that,[2] if it were possible, they may live as if always sailing on the sea. But now, [3](since this is impossible,)[3] it is requisite to act as near as possible to this with respect to [4] the newly born nurslings of children.[4] And [5](what ought to be done) one may conjecture[5] from this, that both the nurses of infants, and those who are initiated in the remedies [6] relating to the Corybantes,[6] have adopted this from experience, and know it to be useful. For, when mothers are desirous to put to sleep their children, who sleep with difficulty, they do not bring to them a state of quietness, but, on the contrary, of motion, by shaking them ever in their arms; nor yet that of silence, but that of singing to them; and they artlessly [7] soothe their children, as it were, by the sound of a pipe, and, as the remedies of the mad Bacchants are employed,[8] by making use, at the same time, of the movements in music and the dance.

Clin. What then, O guest, is especially the cause of this?

Athen. It is not very difficult to know.

[1]—[1] The words between the brackets are evidently an explanation of *ἀμφότερα*.

[2]—[2] The Greek is *τοῖς ὅτι νεωτάτοισι καὶ οἰκεῖν*, where not only is *ὅτι* absurdly placed before *νεωτάτοις*, but *οἰκεῖν* is without regimen. Ficinus has, "tenerrimis, ut, si fieri possit, sic habitent," which evidently leads to *τοῖς νεωτάτοις, ὥστε καὶ οἰκεῖν, εἰ δυνατὸν ἦν*—

[3]—[3] The words between the lunes are found only in Ficinus, whom Taylor follows tacitly, "quoniam autem fieri nequit—"

[4]—[4] The Greek is *τὰ νεογενῆ παίδων θρέμματα*. But *θρέμμα* is united to the word for the parent, not for that of the offspring. Hence for *παίδων* one would prefer *ἀπ' ὠδίνων*—

[5]—[5] The Greek is at present simply *τεκμαίρεσθαι χρή*. But it was more full in the MS. of Ficinus; at least his version is, "quod autem fieri oporteat, conjectare hinc licet," adopted tacitly by Taylor.

[6]—[6] I have adopted Cousin's interpretation.

[7] I have taken *ἀτέχνως* in its natural sense of "artlessly," not, as others, of "really," in Greek *ἀτεχνῶς*.

[8] Although *εἰσὶ* might be understood after *ἰάσεις*, yet, I suspect, *γίγνονται* lies hid in *ταύτῃ*.

Clin. How so?

Athen. Both these passions result from fear; and there are certain terrors through a depraved habit of the soul. When therefore any one brings from without an agitation to passions of this kind, that which is from without overcomes the dreadful and insane motion within; and after overcoming, it seems to have produced a calm in the soul, and a quietness in the leaping, which had been troublesome as regards the heart of each; [1](and) thus, (what is) altogether agreeable,[1] it causes some to obtain by lot[2] sleep; but others, who are awake, and dancing and soothed by the pipe under the influence of the divinities, to whom each may be supplicating and sacrificing, it causes to possess habits of sound sense in the place of a maddened state. Now this, to speak in brief, has in this way a certain probable reason.

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. Now if these things possess thus any such power, it is requisite to consider this point as connected with them, that every soul, which has been familiar with fear from youth, would be more accustomed to be conversant with fears.[3] But this every one will surely say is an exercise of timidity, and not of fortitude.

Clin. How not?

Athen. But the contrary pursuit we should say is that of fortitude, in the overcoming, even from youth, what falls upon us in the shape of fears and terrors.

Clin. Correctly so.

Athen. Let us say then, that this one thing, the all-perfect

[1]—[1] Stephens was the first to see that in *παντάπασιν ἀγαπητόν τι* there was something wanting. For he found in Ficinus, "atque ita;" as if his MS. had *καὶ οὕτως*, instead of *ἀγαπητόν τι*. I have translated, as if the Greek were *καὶ οὕτως, ὃ ἀγαπητόν ἐστί τι*, unless it be said that the words *παντάπασιν ἀγαπητόν τι* ought to follow *ὕπνου* in the next sentence.

[2] Instead of *λαγχάνειν* one would prefer *τυγχάνειν*. But the disorder lies somewhat deeper. For Plato probably wrote *ὕπνου λαμβάνειν ἄχνην*, remembering the expression in Aristoph. *Σφηκ.* 91, *ὕπνου—ἄχνην*, to which the Etymol. M. alludes in *Ἄχνη* after *Ἄχρι*—where *Ἄχνη* is quoted from Homer in the sense of sea-foam; from Hippocrates, of the fluff of flax; from Æschylus, of the lightness of smoke; and from Aristophanes, of the lightness of sleep; while, as regards the change of *λαμβάνειν* and *λαγχάνειν*, it will be sufficient to refer to Porson on Hec. 41.

[3] Instead of *γίγνεσθαι*, which Ast would defend by dissimilar passages, quoted by Valckenaer on Phœn. 482, Cornarius would read *κινεῖσθαι*, suggested by "ferri" in Ficinus.

gymnastic exercise of children in motion, greatly contributes to a part of virtue[1] in the soul.

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. And moreover, that a disposition, morose or not, in the soul [2]would become and be called[2] respectively no little part of cowardice or bravery.

Clin. How not?

Athen. In what manner then is to be implanted which of these we may wish in the newly born? We must endeavour to state how and to what extent a person may have an easy road in these matters.

Clin. How not?

[3.] *Athen.* I will mention then the fixed opinion with us, that luxury renders the manners of youth morose and irascible, and vehemently agitated by things of a trifling nature; but that an excessive and rustic servitude causes them to be contrary to this, abject and illiberal, and man-haters, and unfitting associates.

Clin. But how will the whole state be able to bring up those, who have as yet no perception of language, and are unable to have any taste for the rest of instruction?

Athen. Somehow in this way. Every animal, as soon as it is born, is wont to utter some sound with a loud cry, and not the least the human species; and more than the rest of animals it is affected in addition to its crying with the shedding of tears.

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. Now nurses, looking to what infants are desirous of, make a conjecture by their presenting to them something. For they think they correctly offer that, on which being presented the children are silent; but incorrectly that, at which it sheds tears and cries out. For in the case of children tears and cries are the indications of what they love and hate, (and are) signs by no means lucky. Now this period is not less than three years, a not small portion of life to pass through badly or not badly.

[1] So Fortitude is said to be one part of virtue in the soul, in Laches § 29, and in the Statesman § 44.

[2—2] I have translated as if the Greek were γιγνόμενον λέγοιτ' ἄν— Ast, however, refers to iii. 4, a passage which is equally faulty, and as easily emended.

Clin. You speak correctly.

Athen. Does not a person who is morose, and by no means good-tempered, appear to you to be for the most part given to lamentation and full of moanings more than is fitting for the good to be ?

Clin. It appears so to me.

Athen. What then, if a person were to endeavour, by bringing together every method, during those three years, that the nursling may be affected as little as possible with sorrow and fears and with every pains in our power, do we not think that we should render then the soul of the nursling more cheerful and kind ?

Clin. It is evident, O guest; and most of all, should any one supply it with many pleasures.

Athen. In this I cannot, O wondrous man, follow Clinias. For with us such conduct would be a destruction the greatest of all. [1] For it occurs perpetually at the commencement of nurture.[1] But let us see whether we are asserting any thing.

Clin. State what you mean.

Athen. That our discourse is at present about a not trifling matter. Do you then, Megillus, look to it, and decide between us. For my assertion is, that an upright life ought neither to pursue pleasures, nor entirely to avoid pain, but to embrace the medium between them, which I have just now denominated a favourable temper ; a disposition, of which, according to some voice of an oracle, we correctly speak as belonging to a deity.[2] This habit, I assert, that he amongst us ought to pursue, who would be divine ; nor let him go wholly headlong to pleasures ; for in this case he would not be free from pain ; nor let him permit any other person, old or young, male or female, to suffer [3] the

[1]—[1] The words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor. Ficinus has, what is more intelligible, "nam talis educatio, cum in principio statim adhibeatur, omnium maxima pernicies est;" where ἑκάστοτε is omitted.

[2] This, as Ast remarks correctly, refers to the fact, that the word ἵλεως is generally applied to a deity; and he quotes very opportunely Euthydem. p. 273, F., ἵλεω εἴητον· ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ ἔγωγε σφὼ, ὥσπερ θεὼ, προσαγορεύω.

[3]—[3] Ast, unable to understand to what the words ταὐτὸ τοῦθ' ἡμῶν, omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor, are to be referred, would read αὐτὸ τοῦθ' ἡμῶν, where αὐτὸ τοῦτο would allude, he says, to τὸ προπετῆ γίγνεσθαι, and ἡμῶν to ἄλλον.

same thing with us,[3] and, as far as he is able, the newly born the least of all. For all the manners are, through custom, implanted in all the most powerfully at that period. And further still, if I were not about to appear to be jesting, I would say, that one ought to attend to women, who are carrying any thing in the womb, the most of all during that very year, so that the person pregnant may neither enjoy pleasures numerous and violent, nor, on the other hand, feel pains, but live through that period, preserving a line of conduct benignant, and good-tempered, and mild.

Clin. There was no need, O guest, of your asking Megillus, which of us spoke in the more proper manner; for I agree with you, that all persons ought to avoid a life of unmingled pleasure and pain, and that they should always pursue a certain middle course. You have, therefore, both spoken and heard in a proper manner.

Athen. Very properly so, Clinias. But, in addition to these points, let us all three consider this likewise.

Clin. What?

[4.] *Athen.* That all these matters, which we are now going through, are by the many called unwritten laws; and that those, which they call the laws of the country, are no other than of such a kind; and further still, that the discourse, which has just now flowed upon us, how that we ought not either to call them laws, or to permit them to be unmentioned, has been spoken correctly. For these are the bonds of all polity, existing in a middle state between all laws that have been, and are, and will be hereafter, laid down in writing; and being, as it were, altogether the laws of a country, and ancient in every respect, and which, when laid down correctly and have become a custom, have invested the written laws with every kind of security; but should they advance improperly beyond what is right, they cause, like supports placed by carpenters in the buildings of houses, and gliding away from the centre, every thing to fall together to the same point, and to lie, some under others, both themselves and what has been subsequently built upon them, after the old portions have secretly given way. Reflecting upon which, it is necessary for us, O Clinias, to bind together your city new on all sides, and to the utmost of our power to omit nothing great or small which a person may call laws, or manners, or pursuits; for

by all things of this kind a state is bound together; but none of these can be stable without each other; so that one need not wonder, if many and at the same time trifling things, appearing to us to be enactments, or even customs, should, when flowing to the same point, cause the laws to become of a greater length.

Clin. Both you speak properly yourself, and we too shall reflect in this manner.

Athen. If then, in the case of a boy and girl of three years old, any one should bring these matters accurately to an end, and make use of what has been said in not a careless manner, they will be of no small advantage to those recently brought up. But there will be a need of sports[1] for the habits of the soul at three, and four, and five, and even six years of age. But we must already remove them from luxury, by chastising them, not in an ignominious manner, but, as we said on the subject of slaves, by chastising not with insults so as to encourage an angry feeling in them, when so chastised, nor a feeling for licentiousness by suffering them to go unpunished, we must do the same in the case of the free-born. Now the sports of persons of that age are self-produced; and which, when they come together, they almost invent themselves.[2] All children then of this kind ought to come together at the temples distributed through the villages, from three to six years of age, each of those belonging to the same village to the same spot in common; and let the nurses take cognizance of their orderly behaviour and licentiousness; [3] but of the nurses themselves and their whole pack, let one of the twelve women be appointed to each to regulate for the space of a year, of those

[1] Both Ast and Stalbaum have adopted *παιδιῶν* for *παιδίων*, as suggested by the German translator Schulthes.

[2] Such may have been the case in Greece, and in the time of Plato. But in other countries and more recent periods the sports of children, so far from being invented by themselves, have been handed down from age to age; and, as Paley once remarked, while empires have flourished and decayed, the sports of children have remained unchanged by time; for they still ride on sticks, and play at odd and even, as Horace tells us they did in his day; and make horses and carts out of orange peels, as Aristophanes states they did more than 2000 years ago.

[3]—[3] Such is the literal version of the unintelligible original; where it is not easy to say to what "each" belongs. Ast understands by it *τῇ ἀγέλῃ τῶν τροφῶν τε καὶ παίδων*. For he had read in Ficinus, "et cuique cætui nutricibusque una quædam præsit de mulieribus duodecim, annuo

of the before-mentioned, whom the guardians of the law may have ordained.[3] And let the women, who have full powers over the care of marriages, choose them, one out of each ward, and of the same age with themselves; and let her, who is appointed, perform her office, by going each day to the temple, and ever punishing the person who does wrong, a male and female slave, and a stranger, male or female, herself, (or)[1] by means of certain domestics[2] of the state; and let her take a citizen, when disputing about his punishment, before the City-Stewards for trial; but let her punish herself, even a citizen, when there is no dispute. After six years of age, let each sex be separated; and let boys pass their time with boys, and girls in like manner with each other; and it is meet for each to be turned to learning, the males from the teachers of horsemanship, and archery, and the hurling of darts, and the using of slings, and the females too, if they consent so far as to learn especially what relates to the use of arms. But what is at present established on matters of this kind, is unknown to nearly all.

Clin. What is that?

[5.] *Athen.* That what relates to the right and the left hand differs naturally,[3] with respect to their use in the several actions pertaining to the hands; especially since there appears in what relates to the feet and the lower limbs no difference as regards labour. But in the case of hands we each of us

tempore imperatura, prout legum custodes ordinaverint;" as if he had found in his MS. *τῶν δὲ τροφῶν καὶ ἀγέλης, ἑκάστης ἐκ τῶν δώδεκα γυναικῶν μίαν τετάχθαι κοσμοῦσαν κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν, ὡς ἂν τάξωσιν οἱ νομοφύλακες*, with the omission of *ξυμπάσης* after *ἀγέλης*, and *τῶν προειρημένων* after *ἐνιαυτὸν*, and the change of *ἃς*, found in six MSS., into *ὡς*, read in one. What Plato in reality wrote might perhaps be recovered by merely rearranging the different members of the sentence. Cousin however has penned a long note here, but produced nothing satisfactory.

[1] All the MSS. but one read *αὐτὴ* for *αὐτὴν*, in which lies hid *αὐτῇ ἢ*, as I have translated.

[2] Instead of the strange expression *τινων τῆς πόλεως οἰκετῶν*, one would have expected *ὑπηρετῶν*: or, as they were called at Athens, *τοξότων*, similar to the "tipstaffs," or rather "javelin-men," that still attend upon the High Sheriff of a county in England.

[3] How Plato could say that the right and left hand differ naturally, one cannot understand. Perhaps he wrote *ἔσθ' ὃς, ὃ θαῦμ' ἦν, φησὶν, ἡμῶν*— not *ἐσθ' ἡμῶν φύσει*, i. e. "there is one, who says, what is wonderful," probably Protagoras; whose doctrine Aristotle has supported in the passages quoted by Ast here, and by Gataker on Marc. Anton. xii. 6.

become, as it were, lame, through the (folly and)[1] ignorance of our nurses and mothers. For while the nature of our limbs on each side[2] is nearly balanced, we have ourselves, by not using them correctly, made them, through habit,[3] different. In such employments as where there is no great difference, it is of no consequence, whether a person makes use of a lyre with his left hand and of the plectrum[4] with his right, and whatever else is of a similar kind. But to make use of these examples in other cases, [5]where there is no need of using it,[5] is nearly a folly. This fact has the law of the Scythians pointed out, where a person does not push from him the bow with his left hand (merely), and draw to himself the arrow with his right merely, but he makes use of either similarly for both purposes. And there are very many other examples of this kind in charioteering and other things. From which one may learn, that those, who make the left hand weaker than the right, act contrary to nature. This, as I have said, is of no great moment in the case of plectra made of horn, and such like instruments; but in war, when it is necessary to use weapons of iron, and bows, and spears, [6]and each of these,[6] it matters much; but it is of the greatest moment by far, when it is necessary to use shields against shields. There is too a great difference between a person learning and one not learning, and between one, who exercises himself, and one, who is not exercised. For as he, who is perfectly exercised in the pan-

[1] As some MSS. read *ἀνοίᾳ*, and others *ἀγνοίᾳ*, I suspect that Plato wrote both, as I have translated.

[2] I have translated, as if the Greek were *ἑκατέρωθεν*, similar to "in utramque partem," in Ficinus, not *ἑκατέρων*, which to me at least is unintelligible.

[3] I have adopted, with Stephens and others, *ἔθη* for *ἤθη*, suggested by "consuetudinem," in Ficinus.

[4] The "plectrum," used for the lyre, answered the purpose of the quill, by which the string was struck in the old-fashioned harpsichord; while from a subsequent remark it appears it was made of horn.

[5—5] The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor.

[6—6] The words between the numerals, not very easy to understand, are omitted by Taylor. Ficinus has what is more intelligible, "cæterisque hujusmodi," unless it be said that the correct translation is, "But when it is requisite to make use in war both of bows and javelins, and each of these made of iron."

cratium,[1] or in boxing, or wrestling, is incapable of combating with his left-hand limbs, and becomes lame, and drags himself along in a superfluous manner,[2] when any one, causing him to change his position, compels him to exert himself on the other side, so the same thing, I conceive, one must expect in the case of shields, and in all the rest of weapons, that it behoves him, who possesses doubly the arms by which he can defend himself and attack others, not to suffer, to the utmost of his power, either[3] of these to remain idle, and without skill ;[4] but if any one were born, possessing the nature of Geryon or Briareus,[5] he ought to be able with their hundred hands to hurl a hundred darts. Of all these matters it is meet for the care to be under the female and male rulers ; the former being superintendents over the sports and nurture (of the children), but the latter over their education, in order that all the boys and girls by having the perfect use of their feet and their hands may do, to the best of their power, no injury to their natures by their habits.

[6.] [6]But a twofold education, so to say, it will happen to make use of ;[6] one, of gymnastics, relating to the body ; the other, of music, for the sake of a good state of the soul. Again, those of the gymnastics are twofold ; one dancing and the other wrestling. And of dancing one kind imitates the

[1] The pancratium was a contest of boxing and wrestling united.

[2] This is perhaps the best rendering of *πλημμελῶν*. Ficinus, unable, it would seem, to understand *χωλαίνει δὲ καὶ ἐφέλκεται πλημμελῶν*, has given a sense out of his own head, " præsto se accommodat :" while Taylor translates *ἐφέλκεται πλημμελῶν* by " is confused in his notions." I suspect, however, that Plato wrote something very different from what is in the text.

[3] In lieu of *μηδὲν* the sense requires *μηδέτερον*, " neither," as translated by Taylor.

[4] To avoid the violent prosopopœia in *ἀνεπιστῆμον*, applied to a weapon, one would prefer *εἰς μηδέτερον ἀργὸν αὐτὸν μηδὲ ἀνεπιστήμον' ἐᾷν εἶναι*— in lieu of *μηδὲν—τούτων—ἀνεπιστῆμον*—for *εἰς* might easily have dropt out after *ἄλλοις*.

[5] These two giant sons of Heaven and Earth are similarly united in Euthyd. p. 299, C.

[6]—[6] In the words *τὰ δὲ μαθήματά που διττά, ὥς γ' εἰπεῖν, χρήσασθαι ξυμβαίνοι ἄν*, Ast says there are two constructions blended into one. But even this method of explaining away a faulty syntax, does not touch the difficulty in *ὡς εἰπεῖν*, which is quite useless here, nor supply the subject required by *χρήσασθαι*. Hence I suspect that Plato wrote, *ὥστε χρήσασθαι, παντὶ ξυμβαίνοι ἄν—*

diction of the Muse,[1] preserving the gorgeous at the same time with the liberal; but another kind is for the sake of a good habit of body, and lightness, and the beauty of its limbs and parts, their own harmonious motion being imparted to each, (according to)[2] what is becoming in their bending and extending, [3]and, at the same time, scattered through and following upon every kind of dancing sufficiently.[3] The wrestling, however, which Antæus[4] or Cercyon[5] placed among their arts, for the sake of useless contention, or the boxing, which Epeius[6] or Amycus[7] did likewise, do not deserve to be graced by a discourse, as being of no use in the fellowship of war. But what relates to a stand-up wrestling, and the untwisting of the neck, and the hands, and the sides, when the labour is accompanied with a spirit for contention and a well-framed arrangement of body, for the sake of strength and health, these, as they are useful in every way, are not to be omitted; but we must enjoin upon disciples and masters at the same time, that when we come to that point of our laws, the latter are to impart with a good will all information of this kind, and the former to receive it with thanks. Nor must we omit such imitations in dances as are fit to be imitated; as regards this place, the armed sports of the Curetes;[8] and, as regards Lacedæmon,

[1] Dancing amongst the ancients was, like the ballets of modern times, pantomimic, and suited to words at first actually written, but afterwards supposed to be so.

[2] I have translated as if *καὶ*, preserved in five MSS. after *ἐκτάσεως*, were a corruption of *κατὰ*, and had dropt out before *τὸ προσῆκον*.

[3—3] Others may, but I cannot, understand all between the numerals. Plato wrote, I suspect, *Αἰδοῦς πορευομένης καὶ ξυνακολουθούσης—διακονικῶς*—similar to the expression in Tibullus, "quoquo vestigia vertit. Componit furtim subsequiturque Pudor." To this emendation I have been led by *διασπειρωμένης*, read in two MSS., in lieu of *διασπειρομένης*, while *διακονικῶς* might easily have been corrupted into *ἱκανῶς*.

[4] To this Antæus, a king of Libya, celebrated as a wrestler, and vanquished by Hercules, there is an allusion in Theætet. p. 169, B.

[5] On this Cercyon, who lived in the Isthmus of Corinth, and compelled all who passed near his dwelling to wrestle with him, but was overcome eventually by Theseus, see Diodor. Sic. iv. 61; Plutarch. Thes. i. p. 5; and Pausan. Attic. i. 39, quoted by Ast.

[6] Epeius, the maker of the Trojan horse, was the victor in boxing at the funeral games in honour of Patroclus.

[7] Amycus, the son of Neptune, was beaten by Pollux, as we learn from the spirited account given by Theocritus, in Id. 22.

[8] These were called the Pyrrich dances; see the authors quoted by Ast.

those of the Dioscuri.[1] Our virgin too and mistress (Athéné) being delighted with the amusement of the dance, does not think fit to sport with empty hands; but, being adorned with a complete suit of armour, goes in this manner through the dance;[2] which acts it will be proper for the boys and girls to imitate, and to do honour to the kindness of the goddess shown during the needs of war, and in behalf of festive days. It will likewise be proper for the boys forthwith,[3] and for as long a time as they shall not have gone out to war, to make to all the gods processions and pomps, with the adornment of arms and horses, and to perform their supplications to the gods and the sons of the gods, swifter and slower, with dances and marches; and to enter into contests, and preludes of contests, if for any purpose, for not other than these. For these, both in peace and war, are useful for a polity and private households. But the rest of labours, and sports, and pursuits relating to the body are not, Megillus and Clinias, suited to free-men. And thus the gymnastic, which I said in our former discourse ought to be gone through, I have almost gone through at the present moment, and the subject is finished. But if you have any thing better than this, lay it down as a common topic and speak upon it.

Clin. It is not easy, O guest, to put these on one side, and to have any thing better to say about gymnastics and contests.

Athen. With regard then to the gifts of the Muses and Apollo, which is the sequel to the preceding, we formerly thought that, as having said [4] all correctly [4] (about them), we should have to leave only the subject relating to gymnastics;

[1] The twin sons of Zeus were Castor and Pollux, the tutelary deities of Laconia, in whose honour was a dance, mentioned by Lucian, Περὶ Ὀρχησ. § 10.

[2] From this passage it would seem that at Athens, during probably the greater Panathenaic festival, a virgin was dressed up to imitate the goddess, and who danced in armour during a part of the procession; just as, during the early part of the French Revolution a female, nearly naked, was paraded through Paris, as a representation of the goddess of Liberty. For most assuredly Athéné herself did not appear in person, nor was she even thought to do so.

[3] I scarcely understand εὐθὺς thus by itself. It is omitted by Ficinus.

[4]—[4] I have translated, as if the Greek were εὖ πάντα, not ἅπαντα. Ficinus has "de quibus ita satis dictum esse putabamus;" as if his MS. read εἰρηκότες ἱκανῶς, without ἅπαντα—

but now it is evident that there is something which should be first mentioned before all. Let us then speak of it in order.

Clin. It must by all means be spoken of.

Athen. Hear me then, although you have heard previously. Nevertheless it is requisite for both the speaker and hearer to be cautious as to what is very strange and unusual; and now too, although I am going to tell a tale not to be spoken without fear, I will nevertheless take courage, and not stand aloof.

Clin. What mean you, O guest, by this?

[7.] *Athen.* I mean that in all states it is a thing unknown to all, that the family of games is of the greatest power in the laying down of laws, as to whether what are laid down will remain or not. [1] For if it is so ordered, that the same persons shall always use the same (sports),[1] and according to the same, and in a similar manner,[2] and be delighted with the same playthings, it permits the institutions laid down with seriousness to remain quiet. But when the sports are disturbed, and innovations made in them, and they are affected constantly by changes, the young never speaking of the same things as being dear to them, and neither in the bearing of their own bodies, nor in the rest of their dresses, the becoming and the unbecoming are laid down as acknowledged by them, and when the person, who is ever making some innovation, and introducing something different from what is customary, as regards shape and colour, and every thing of that kind, is pre-eminently held in honour, we should, by saying that no greater bane could happen to a state than by such a thing, speak most correctly; for he is secretly changing the morals of the young, and causing what is old to be dishonoured, and what is novel to be held in honour. Than this, both an assertion and a fixed

[1]—[1] Such is the literal version of the Latin of Ficinus, "quippe si hoc ita ordinatum fuerit, ut iisdem ludis—iidem homines semper utantur," who has thus omitted the words *καὶ μετάσχον* after *ταχθὲν μὲν αὐτὸ*; out of which he could not make, I suspect, the least sense or syntax; nor can I; nor do I see how *αὐτὸ*, the family of games, could be ordered to do any thing by any power. There is some deep-seated disorder here, which would require perhaps a violent remedy.

[2] On the phrase *τὰ αὐτὰ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ ἀεὶ*, expressive of what exists for ever and the same and under similar circumstances, Ast refers to Wyttenbach on Phædon, p. 198.

opinion, I assert again, there is not a greater bane to all states. Hear, then, how great an evil do I say it is.

Clin. Do you mean the circumstance, that what is old in states is found fault with?

Athen. Entirely so.

Clin. You will then have in us no ordinary auditors, with respect to this very discourse, but the best disposed possible.

Athen. It is likely.

Clin. Only speak then.

Athen. Come then, let us hear it [1]more attentively than we usually do,[1] and thus speak to each other. For we shall discover that a change in all things, except the bad, causes us to stumble the most, in the case of all seasons, [2] and winds,[2] and in the diet of bodies, and in the manners of souls, and not merely, so to say, [3]in some, but not in others,[3] but in what[4] I have just now said, in things bad. [5]So that (any one will see), if he looks to[5] bodies, how, being accustomed to all kinds of food and all kinds of drink and labours, they do, although they are at first disturbed by them, in time generate from those very substances flesh, kindred to such substances, and by becoming friendly and accustomed to, and acquainted with, all that diet, they exist in the best way as regards pleasure and health. But if at any time a person[6] is compelled by necessity to change any part of the approved diet, he is at first disturbed by diseases, and with difficulty is set on his legs

[1]—[1] This is the proper rendering of *μειζόνως ἡμῶν αὐτῶν*.

[2]—[2] The words *ἐν πνεύμασιν* are omitted by Taylor. For finding in Ficinus "inventis," and not looking to the Greek, he did not see that "inventis" did not mean "in inventions," as he probably fancied, but "in winds."

[3]—[3] On the phrase *οὐ τοῖς μὲν, τοῖς δ' οὔ*, see at Phileb. § 32, n. [8]—[8].

[4] I have adopted *οἷσπερ* in lieu of *ὅτι περ*, as suggested by Bekker, for the sake of the syntax.

[5]—[5] The Greek is *ὥστε, εἴτις ἀποβλέψειε πρὸς σώματα*, where Ficinus has omitted all but *σώματα*. For those words were either wanting in his MS., or, what is more likely, he saw that, if they were retained, there would be required something to complete the sense, in some other part of the sentences following. I have therefore translated, as if the Greek were *ὥστ' εἴσεταί τις, εἰ ἀποβλέψειε*— For *ὥστ' εἴσεταί τις εἰ* might have been easily corrupted into *ὥστε εἴ τις*—

[6] It is evident that *τις* has dropt out after *αὖθις*, for otherwise *συνταραχθεὶς* and *ἀπολαβὼν* would be without regimen.

again,[1] [2]after acquiring again a familiarity with his food.[2] The same thing, it is meet to think, takes place as regards the ideas of men, and the nature of their souls. For every soul has a reverence for the laws in which it may have been brought up,[3] and which have, by a certain divine good fortune, remained undisturbed [4]through time (so) long and much, that[4] no one either recollects or has ever heard of their having been otherwise than they are at present, and it fears to disturb any of those then existing. The legislator then ought to devise from some quarter a plan as to the manner in which this may take place in a state. In this way then do I discover it. All men, as I have said before, consider the sports of youth, when they are disturbed, to be in reality sports, and not that the greatest seriousness and mischief arise out of them; so that they do not avert (the change,)[5] but comply with and yield to it; nor do they consider this, [6]that the children, who engage in these new sports, must necessarily become men different from those who were children in the former period;[6] and that, becoming different, they will seek a different life; and so seeking will be desirous of other pursuits and laws; and no one fears that, after this, there will come upon states what has been just now called the greatest evil. But other changes would effect lesser evils;[7] such at least as relate to fashions would suffer a thing of this

[1] Such is the exact meaning of *κάτεστη*.

[2]—[2] Ficinus has "antequam novo victui consuescant," translated by Taylor, "until they are accustomed to the new food."

[3] Instead of *ἐντραφῶσι*, both sense and syntax require *ἐντραφεῖσ' ᾖ*, as I have translated.

[4]—[4] The Greek is *γένωνται μακρῶν καὶ πολλῶν χρόνων, ὡς*— But though *χρόνος* may be united to *μακρὸς* or *πολὺς* singly, it cannot to both at once. Moreover, *ὥστε*, not *ὡς*, is thus joined to an infinitive. Plato wrote, I suspect, *γένωνται οὕτω μακραιώνων χρόνων, ὥστε*— while *καὶ* (or *ἢ*) *πολλῶν* would be the explanation of *μακραιώνων*. Ficinus has simply "longis temporibus."

[5] Ficinus alone has, what the sense requires, "mutationem hanc innovationemque," where the two words show, as usual, that he found only one in the Greek, probably *τὰ κεκαινοτομημένα*, similar to *κινούμενα—καὶ καινοτομούμενα*, a little above in p. 797, B.

[6]—[6] For the sake of perspicuity, Ficinus has supplied some words wanting in the Greek. His version is, "quod necesse est, pueros diversis ac priores ludis gaudentes diversos differentesque a prioribus vivis fieri."

[7] The Greek is *ὅσα περὶ σχήματα πάσχει*— But one MS. has *πάσχοι*, which leads to *ὅσα γε περὶ σχήματ' ἂν πάσχοι*— as I have translated.

kind. But whatever alterations occur frequently with respect to praise and blame, touching the question of manners, these would, I think, be the greatest of all, and require the most caution.

Clin. How not?

[8.] *Athen.* What then, do we still believe in our former assertion, in which we stated that the matters relating to rhythm and every kind of music are imitations of the manners of men better and worse? Or how?

Clin. Our fixed opinion would be in no respect otherwise than this.

Athen. We assert then, that we must contrive every kind of plan in order that the children in our state may not hanker after other imitations in dancing and singing, nor any one persuade them (to an innovation)[1] by introducing pleasures of various kinds.

Clin. You speak most correctly.

Athen. Has then any one of us any art better for this purpose than that of the Egyptians?

Clin. What art do you mean?

Athen. Of making holy every kind of dancing and melody, by ordaining, in the first place, festivals, after calculating[2] for the year, what ought to take place, and at what time, and in honour of what gods respectively, and the sons of gods, and dæmons; and after this, what ode ought to be hymned at each sacrifice of the gods, and with what dances to honour the then sacrifice: [3]which when they are ordained,[3] (it is meet to) ordain some other things, so that all the citizens may in common make sacrifices (and)[4] libations to the Fates, and to all the other deities, (and) consecrate their several odes to the gods severally, and to the others.[5] But if any person intro-

[1] Ficinus alone has "ad novitatem," adopted by Taylor.

[2] Ficinus omits *συλλογισαμένους*, and so, after him, does Taylor.

[3—3] Before the words *ἃ δ' ἂν ταχθῇ* the text has *τάξαι μὲν πρῶτον τίνος*, out of which as Ficinus could make no sense, he has omitted them; and so, after him, has Taylor. Stephens too was at a loss; and hence he proposed to read *τινας*, suggested by "aliquas" in Cornarius. Plato wrote, I suspect, *ἃ δ' ἂν ταχθῇ, τάξαι μὲν ἕτερ' αὖ τιν', ὥστε*— as I have translated.

[4] I have inserted "and"; for *καὶ* might easily have dropt out before *σπένδοντας*.

[5] Ficinus has, instead of *καὶ τῶν ἄλλων*, "eorumve filiis et dæmo-

duces in honour of any god other hymns and dances besides those which are instituted by law, let the priests and priestesses, together with the guardians of the laws, restrain him in a holy manner, and according to law; and let him, who is restrained, if he is not willingly restrained, (suffer) the punishment of his impiety through the whole of life from any one who is willing to inflict it.

Clin. Right.

Athen. But since we are now engaged on this subject, let us be affected in a manner befitting us.

Clin. About what are you speaking?

Athen. Every young person, not merely the old, on seeing or hearing any thing out of the way, and by no means customary, would not immediately [1]run thus[1] and concede what is the doubtful point respecting them, but he would stand still; and, as if being where three roads meet, and not knowing very well the road, whether he happened to be travelling alone, or in company with others, he would inquire of himself and the others, and not proceed before he had settled the question in his mind, as to whither the road would lead him. And we must act in a similar manner at present. For a strange conversation having now fallen upon us on the subject of laws, we ought necessarily to make every inquiry; and, being of such an age, to speak not readily on matters of such moment, insisting with vehemence, that we have it in our power to say something clearly on the instant.

Clin. You speak most truly.

Athen. We will, therefore, give the subject time, and decide then firmly upon it, when we shall have considered it sufficiently. But in order that we may not be prevented from going through in vain the arrangement consequent upon the laws, let us proceed to the end of them. For, perhaps, if god wills, this very digression will obtain wholly its completion, and point out sufficiently what is at present a matter of doubt.

Clin. You speak most excellently, O guest, and we will do as you say.

nibus," found just before. Taylor's translation is "and their attendants," which he got from I know not whence.

[1]—[1] I cannot understand ἐπιδραμὼν οὕτως— I could have understood ἐπιδραμὼν ἀνοήτως, i. e. "run thoughtlessly towards—" For thus "the running towards" would be opposed to "the standing still."

Athen. Let then, we say, this strange thing be decreed, that odes exist for us as laws, [and][1] just as the ancients gave such a name, as it seems, formerly [2] with respect to playing on the harp;[2] so that, perhaps, not even they would have entirely dissented from what is said by us at present; and some one has surely, as if either in a night dream or with his eyes open in the day, imagined and prophesied this. Let this then be the decree respecting it. Let no one utter any song besides the public and sacred songs, or move in any dance, contrary to the whole dancing of the young men, any more than (he would act) contrary to any other law: and let him, who is such,[3] be dismissed without a fine; but let, as was said just now, the guardians of the laws, and the priests and priestesses, chastise him, who does not obey. Let then this be held to be laid down by us in our discourse.

Clin. Let it be laid down.

[9.] *Athen.* But in what manner can any one, so laying them down as laws, not be altogether a laughing-stock? [4]Let us still consider something of this kind respecting them.[4] It is the safest course to mould for them, as it were, certain impressions in our discourse. Now I assert that one of the impressions is something of this kind. The sacrifice having taken place and the victims burnt according to law, if some person, a son, we say, or a brother, should[5] as a private person stand by the altars and sacred rites, and blaspheme with every kind of blasphemy, should we not say that he gave vent to a want of thought, and imposed an evil omen and prophecy both against his father and the rest of his kindred?

Clin. How not.

Athen. [6]Now this is occurring in the places with us, the

[1] The word *καὶ*, which has no meaning here, is properly omitted by Ficinus.

[2]—[2] Not only formerly, but in more modern times, the same word has been taken in a legal and musical sense. Thus the French "loix," a law, and "lais," a tale or song, are evidently of the same origin, and derived from the Latin "leg-o," I read, either letters or notes.

[3] Ficinus has, more intelligibly, "qui paret," adopted by Taylor.

[4]—[4] All between the numerals is omitted by Taylor.

[5] The Greek is *φαμὲν*, which is quite unnecessary, not to say absurd, before the subsequent *φαῖμεν ἂν*— From the following *ἀθυμίαν*, one would suspect that Plato wrote *ἄθυμος ὢν*—

[6]—[6] The Greek is *ἐν τοίνυν τοῖς παρ' ἡμῖν τόποις τοῦτ' ἐστι ταῖς πόλεσι γιγνόμενον ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν σχεδὸν ὀλίγου πάσαις*. But *ταῖς πόλεσι*

states, so to say, nearly all by a little.[6] For when any magistrate shall have performed any sacrifice publicly, after this there comes not one choir, but a multitude of choirs; and standing not far from the altars, but sometimes close to them, they pour forth every kind of blasphemy against things sacred, putting on the stretch[1] the souls of the hearers with words, and rhythms, and the most doleful harmonies; and he who causes the city, after it has made the sacrifice, to weep the most on the instant, carries off the victory.[2] Do we not reject by our votes this law? And if at any time it is requisite for the citizens to hear sorrows of this kind, it should be, not when the days are clear of any stain, but of an inauspicious[3] kind rather; and then it is proper for some dancers (and)[4] singers to be hired from abroad, just as those, who are hired at funerals,[5] send forward[6] the dead[7] with some Carian strain. A thing of this kind would properly take place about such odes[8] as these. Moreover a robe will be proper for funeral odes,[9]

could not thus follow τοῖς τόποις, nor ὀλίγου be united, after ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, to σχεδὸν and πάσαις. Plato probably wrote τοῖς τε παρ' ἡμῖν— ταῖς τε ἄλλαις πόλεσι—ὀλίγου πάσαις: while σχεδὸν would be the explanation of ὀλίγου, although σχεδὸν ὀλίγου πᾶσα is found in p. 805, A. § 11. Ficinus avoids all the difficulty by his version, "In nostris civitatibus ferme omnibus, ut breviter dicam, hoc ita fit."

[1] Ficinus has "inficiunt," as if his MS. read some other word in lieu of συντείνοντες.

[2] In the preceding words there is evidently an allusion to the tragedies performed at or near temples, in which the characters, especially in the plays of Euripides, frequently gave vent to blasphemous expressions.

[3] The Greek word ἀποφράδες is said by the Schol. to be applied to the days in which either no ordinary business was done, or only of a melancholy kind. It answers to the Latin "nefastus," or "nefandus," in Horace.

[4] Ficinus alone has "externique cantores," who found, no doubt, καὶ before ᾠδοὺς in his MS.

[5, 6] I cannot believe that Plato wrote περὶ τοὺς τελευτήσαντας— τοὺς τελευτήσαντας. He might have written, περιττῶς τέλη λύσαντας, i. e. "having paid sums extravagantly," and inserted those words after προπέμπουσι.

[7] A similar custom of hiring mourners still exists in England, while the Carian howl of sorrow was no doubt the counterpart of the wake at an Irish funeral.

[8] In lieu of ᾠδὰς, which is evidently an absurdity, and omitted in one MS., Plato wrote as evidently ὥρας, "seasons."

[9] Here too ᾠδαῖς has again ousted the correct word ἀηδὴς— For it should be told, of what kind was the robe. Hence Ficinus, who acknowledges ᾠδαῖς, inserted, probably out of his own head, "lugubris" before "vestis."

and not crowns, or golden ornaments, but every thing the contrary, that I may be freed as quickly as possible from speaking on these matters. But thus much do I ask of you again, whether of the impressions relating to odes it is agreeable[1] to you for this first one to be laid down ?[2]

Clin. Of what kind.

Athen. As a good omen; and moreover, let the genus of the ode be every where, and in every respect, a good omen to us. Or shall I not ask you at all, but lay it down thus?

Clin. Lay it down by all means; for by all votes this law is the victor.

Athen. What then, after this good omen, shall be the second law of music? Will it not be for prayers to be (offered) to the gods, to whom we on each occasion sacrifice?

Clin. How not?

Athen. But the third law, I think, will be, that it behoves poets, when they know that [3]prayers are requests from men to the gods,[3] ever[4] to direct their mind very carefully to this point,[5] that they may not unconsciously ask for what is an evil, as if it were a good.[6] For the condition of a prayer of this kind taking place, would, I think, be ridiculous.

Clin. How not?

Athen. Were we not a little while ago convinced, that a Plutus, neither of silver nor of gold, ought to dwell in a state, as if settled there?

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. Of what then shall we say that this discourse has been spoken as the pattern? Is it not of this, that not every race of poets is competent to know thoroughly things good and evil? Some poet then surely, having composed either in

[1, 2] The Greek is *ἀρέσκον κείσθω*. But the imperative could not thus follow—*ἐπανερωτῶ—εἰ*— The syntax evidently requires, as I have translated, *ἀρέσκοι κεῖσθαι*—similar to "utrum placeat—adhiberi"—in Ficinus.

[3—3] The Greek is *εὐχαὶ παρὰ θεῶν αἰτήσεις εἰσὶ*—which is evidently incorrect. Ficinus has "preces ipsas petitiones hominum a diis"—who found in his MS *εὐχαὶ αὐταὶ παρ' ἀνῶν θεῶν αἰτήσεις εἰσὶ*—as I have translated, omitting *αὐταὶ*, which is unnecessary.

[4] I have translated as if the Greek were AEI, not ΔEI.

[5] In lieu of *αὐτοὺς* one MS. has *αὐτοῖς*, which seems to lead to *τούτοις*.

[6] On mistakes of this kind, see Alcibiad. ii. § 1.

prose or [1]verse, on a mistaken subject,[1] (so that)[2] our citizens make their prayers not correct respecting matters of the greatest moment, [3]will not do all with impunity,[3] especially since, as we have already said, we shall not find many mistakes greater than this. Let us then lay down this as one of the laws and forms respecting the Muse.

Clin. What one? Speak to us more clearly.

Athen. That a poet shall not compose any thing, either beautiful or good, contrary to what is lawful and just in the state; nor shall he be permitted to show what he has composed to any private person, before it shall have been shown to the judges and guardians of the law, appointed for this purpose, and approved of by them. Now they have been almost marked out, whom we have chosen as the lawgivers relating to music, and the guardian likewise of education. What then, as I have often asked, shall this be laid down[4] as a law, and a type, and a third impression? Or how seems it?

Clin. Let it be laid down; how not?

[10.] *Athen.* After these there should be sung hymns to, and praises of, the gods accompanied with prayers; and after the gods in like manner, there should be prayers with praises to the dæmons and heroes, and suited to all of them.

Clin. How not?

Athen. And after these there should take place this law without any stint. Such of the citizens as may have come to the end of life, after having performed works honourable and laborious relating to the body and soul, and have been obedient to the laws, it shall be fitting for these to meet with praises.

Clin. How not?

Athen. But to honour those still living with praises and

[1]—[1] I have translated as if the Greek were *μέλος τι, τὸ ἡμαρτημένον*, not *μέλος τοῦτο τὸ ἡμαρτημένον*—

[2] To support the syntax, which Ast has been unable to explain satisfactorily, I have supposed that *ὥστε* has dropt out.

[3]—[3] From the words *τἀναντία ποιήσει*, which I cannot understand, one may elicit *πᾶν ἀνατὶ οὐ ποιήσει*—as I have translated. Ficinus has "quare, si quisquam poetarum verbis aut cantu præter ipsam rationem preces non rectas nobis tradiderit, is contraria in rebus maximis petere cives faciet," as if he had found in his MS. *κατὰ τὸ ἡμαρτημένον*—

[4] The Greek is *κείσθω*— I have translated as if it were *κείσεται*— For an imperative cannot be used interrogatively, although a future indicative can.

hymns, it is not safe, [1]before a person after having run through the whole of life, shall stand (still) at an honourable end.[1] Let all these be common to men and women, who have been conspicuously virtuous. But it is necessary for odes and dancings to be established in this manner. There are many ancient and beautiful poems of old writers relating to music, and similarly to dancing for bodies.[2] Against choosing out of these what is becoming and suited to an established polity, there is no objection. Of these let the persons selected[3] as examiners, being not less than fifty years old, make a selection. And let them select whatever of the ancient poems appears to be all-sufficient; but whatever is defective, or altogether unsuitable, let it be rejected entirely; or let them take poets and musicians, and employing their powers of poetry, adapt it to a new rhythm after it is corrected;[4] but let them not give way to pleasure or desire, except in some few cases; but, interpreting the intention of the legislator, establish dancing and singing, and every dancing[5] according to their own good sense. For every occupation relating to music, which adopts order, is infinitely better than that without order,[6] even when the pleasant in music is not added. Now the pleasant is common to all music. For that music, with which a person has lived from childhood to a staid and intelligent age, [7](he considers to be pleasant,)[7] inasmuch as it is temperate and in order. But on hearing a

[1]—[1] Plato alludes, as remarked by Ast, to the celebrated saying of Solon, recorded by Herodotus, i. 32, or to a similar sentiment promulgated by Sophocles in Œd. T. 1515, and other poets.

[2] This introduction of "bodies" seems very strange, and has been omitted by Ficinus.

[3] In lieu of ἑλομένους, one MS. has ἐνημένους, which leads evidently to ᾑρημένους—as I have translated.

[4] Instead of ἐπανερομένους in Ald., all the MSS. read ἐπανερόμενον: from which Ast happily elicited ἐπανορθούμενον, similar to "corrigant" in Ficinus.

[5] As no one, I suspect, can explain the difference between ὄρχησιν and χορείαν, I cannot believe that Plato wrote here χορείαν, in lieu of which one would prefer χαρὰν, "joyousness."

[6] The Greek is ἄτακτός γε— But two MSS. read ἀτάκτως γε— Hence, since Ficinus has "quam cum est sine ordine," Ast suggested ἀτάκτου— He should have proposed ἀτάκτου ἐστὶ—for γε has no meaning here.

[7]—[7] The words between the numerals, absolutely requisite for the sense, are found in Ficinus, whom Taylor has tacitly followed, "eam jucundam arbitratur." Ast too remarks that after διαβιῷ there ought to follow—ταύτην ἐπαινεῖ τε καὶ ἡδεῖαν εἶναί φησιν.

contrary kind, he dislikes it, and calls it illiberal. But if he has been brought up in that, which is pleasant and common, he says that the contrary to this is frigid and unpleasant. So that, as I just now said, [1] what relates to the pleasant or the unpleasant does not exist about either as a superabundance, but from a superfluity the one makes those, who have been brought up in it on each occasion better, the other worse.[1]

Clin. You have spoken well.

Athen. Further still, it will be meet to separate the songs suited to females and males, by defining them under a certain type, and necessary moreover to adapt them to harmonies and rhythms. For it is a shocking thing for the whole of harmony to be a discord, or rhythm to be out of tune, and thus to attribute to melodies nothing adapted to each of them. [2] It is necessary then to lay down by a law the figures of these. And it is necessary to attribute both constrained to both, but those of the females, by the difference of the nature of each, by this it is meet to mark out clearly.[2] Now that which is gorgeous and verges to fortitude, must be called manly; but that which more inclines to the ornamental and the moderate, must be handed down, both in law and in discourse, as more feminine. This, then, is the order. After this, let the teaching and handing down of them be detailed, as to the manner how, and the persons by whom, and the time when it is requisite to perform them. (And) as a shipwright, [3] when he lays down the keel timbers, as the commencement of the ship-building, draws the form of vessels,[3] I appear to myself to do the same thing,

[1]—[1] Such is the literal translation of the Greek, which I confess I cannot understand. How much more intelligible is the Latin of Ficinus, adopted by Taylor, "jucunditatis et molestiæ in utraque pro consuetudine nostra par ratio est; sed emolumenti et detrimenti ratio impar; nempe altera meliores, altera deteriores facit utentes."

[2]—[2] Such is the literal version of a passage which, as Sydenham and Ast truly observe, is evidently corrupt; but which neither have been able to correct satisfactorily. Ficinus has, what is adopted by Taylor, and is indeed intelligible; but it cannot be got out of the Greek, as existing at present—"Horum igitur formæ necessario legibus statuendæ sunt, utrisque convenienter attribuendæ; et quid virum quidve mulierem, deceat, ex ipsa utriusque naturæ differentia declarare."

[3]—[3] Such is the literal version of the original. One would however have expected to find *καταβάλλεται—ὑπογραφόμενος*— for the sense would then have been—"after drawing the forms of vessels, lays down the keel-timbers as the commencement of the ship-building." Ficinus

by endeavouring to distinguish the figures of lives according to the manners of souls, (and) in reality to lay down their keel-timbers, (and) very properly to consider by what device, and after what manner, we may live together and be carried the best during this voyage [1] of life. Human affairs, indeed, are not worthy of great attention; yet it is necessary to attend to them. This indeed is not a fortunate circumstance. But since we are here, if we can somehow accomplish this in a fitting manner, it will perhaps be within our measure. [2]But what am I saying? This very point perhaps some one would take up, and rightly so.[2]

Clin. And very much so.

Athen. I say then, that to a serious thing we ought to pay a serious attention, but to a not serious one none at all; and that the deity is naturally worthy of every blessed [3] attention, but that man, as I said before,[4] has been devised as the plaything of a deity, and this is truly his best attribute. It is necessary then for every man and woman to pursue this mode, and, by engaging in the most beautiful sports, to pass thus through life with thoughts the reverse of what they think at present.

Clin. How?

Athen. At present indeed they think that serious pursuits ought to exist for the sake of sports. For they consider that they ought to well dispose the serious pursuits relating to war for the sake of peace. But in war there never has been naturally either sport or instruction worthy of mention, nor is there, nor will there be. But this we say is a thing to us the most serious, (that) every one ought to pass through life for the most part and the best in peace. What then is the proper manner, (in which) [5] a person may pass through life in sport? and what are the sports for a person to engage in, while sacrificing

avoids the difficulty by his abridged version, "quemadmodum vero navium faber carinulas primum ad navis formam supponit."

[1] Ficinus, followed by Taylor, has "per hæc maria."

[2]—[2] Ficinus, whom Taylor follows implicitly, has "sed quid dicam, recte fortassis aliquis quæret."

[3] I hardly understand *μακαρίου* here.

[4] In i. § 13.

[5] The Bipont editor was the first to insert here *ἢ* for the sake of the sense and syntax; and so after him Ast, to whom Stalbaum attributes the correction. Winckelmann, with Stephens, prefers *τί παίζοντα*—

and singing and dancing, so as to be able to render the gods propitious to him, and to repel foes, and to be the victor in battle? Now by what singing and dancing a person may accomplish both these things, a portion of the type has been detailed, and the paths, as it were, have been cut, in which the person is to proceed, who thinks that the poet has well said, (in Od. iii. 26,)

> "Some things, Telemachus, thou wilt thyself
> Find in thy heart; but others will a god
> Suggest; for I do not conceive thou hast
> Been born or brought up 'gainst the will of gods."

The same ought our nurslings likewise to bear in mind, and to consider that some things have been stated sufficiently, but that others a dæmon and a deity will suggest to them respecting sacrifices and dances in honour of what divinities and at what time they will by playing, each for each, render them propitious, and live themselves according to the manner of their nature, while they are for the most part things to stare at, yet partake in certain small particles of truth.

Megil. You are vilifying, O guest, in every respect the human race.

Athen. Do not wonder, Megillus, but pardon me. For, looking to the deity, and being affected (somewhat),[1] I have said what I have just [now][2] said. But let our race be not a vile thing, if it so please you, but worthy of some serious attention.

[11.] With regard to the subject next in order after these, mention has been made[3] of public schools, situate in a tripartite manner in the middle of the city; but out of and around the city the exercising grounds for horses have been (assigned) in a tripartite manner, and ample places put into order for the sake of the young men, learning and practising themselves in archery and other hurlings of missiles. But if they were not then spoken of sufficiently, let them now be mentioned in our discourse together with the laws.

In all these cases let masters in each art be induced by

[1] I have adopted Stalbaum's suggestion, that τι has dropt out before παθὼν, although παθεῖν τι is generally an euphemism for "to die."

[2] In the formula εἶπον, ὅπερ εἴρηκα, there is not elsewhere found νῦν. See a host of examples collected by Abresch and Blomfield on Agam. 67, to which I could add as many more.

[3] In vi. § 11.

wages to reside as strangers, and to teach every one, who frequents their school, the learning that relates to war, and likewise to music; not only the youth, who comes to school, because his father wishes it, but him too who, because (his father) does not (wish), neglects his education, but, as the saying is,[1] every man and boy must by compulsion be instructed as well as they can, since they belong rather to the state than their parents. The very same things my law would mention relating to females, as it does to males. [2](For) it it is meet[2] to exercise equally the females likewise. And I should fear to say respecting this subject of horsemanship and gymnastics, that they are becoming indeed to men, but not to women. For by hearing stories of the olden time have I been persuaded. And even at present, I know that there are, so to say,[3] countless myriads of women about Pontus, whom they call Sauromatides,[4] on whom there has been enjoined an exercise in common with, and perhaps equal to, that of men not only upon horses, but in bows likewise, and in the rest of arms. But I have, moreover, a reason for this, of some such kind as this. I say then, that if it is possible for these things to happen in this manner, of all things is that, which now takes place in our countries, the most silly, in the men not pursuing all together, and with all their might, and with one mind, the same pursuits as the women. For thus the whole state is and becomes but the half, instead of being the double, from the same expense and labour. And wonderful would this very error be to (any) legislator.

[1] With this saying Ast compares the one found at the end of the Euthydemus, *τὸ λεγόμενον δὴ τοῦτο, αὐτός τε καὶ τὰ παιδία*. But the passages quoted there are scarcely in point. I suspect that, as we meet in the next § with the expression *τὸ λεγόμενον, πάντα χρήματα*, the whole saying alluded to was a verse in Comedy—*Πάνθ' ἅμ' ἄνδρα, πάντα παῖδα, πάντα χρήματ' ἐξολῶ*, spoken by some general of an army, when threatening with utter destruction a city, that had refused to open its gates. Compare Plato in *Ἑλλαδ.* Fr. iii. *Εἰ μὲν οὖν σὺ τὴν θάλασσαν ἀποδώσεις καὶ γῆν ἑκών· Εἰ δὲ μή, τὰ πάντα πάντως σοῦ τριαινῶν ἀπολέσω*, supposed to be spoken by Xerxes to an ambassador from Athens.

[2]—[2] The Greek is *ἴσα καὶ—δεῖν*. But I have translated as if it were *ἴσα γὰρ καὶ—δεῖ*, where *δεῖ* is due to one MS.

[3] Ficinus omitted *ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν*, for he did not remark that the phrase is to be referred to *μυριάδες ἀναρίθμητοι*.

[4] The women called here Sauromatides are better known by the name of Amazons. See Herodotus iv. 11, and the other authors quoted by Ast.

Clin. It seems so. Very much however of what has been asserted by us at present is, O guest, contrary to customary polities.

Athen. But I have said[1] that it is meet to permit[2] (us) to go through the discourse properly, and, when we have gone through[3] it, to select [4]thus what seems (the best).[4]

Clin. You have spoken very elegantly, and caused me to reproach myself for what I just now said. Speak therefore on this point whatever is agreeable to yourself.

[12.] *Athen.* This very thing (is agreeable)[5] to me, Clinias, what I said above, that, if these matters are not sufficiently proved by deeds, that they can take place, it would be possible perhaps to gainsay them by words. But now something else must be sought for by him, who does not admit this law at all; but our exhortation will not in this case be extinguished, so that we should say that the female sex ought not to partake as much as possible in education and other studies in common with the male sex. For it is required that we[6] think on these points in some such way as this. Say then, if women do not share in common with men in the whole of life, is it not necessary for some other arrangement to be assigned to them?

Clin. It is necessary.

Athen. What arrangement[7] then among those, which are exhibited at present, shall we assign them in preference to this very partnership, which we are assigning to them? Is it

[1] All the MSS. read *εἰπὼν* in lieu of *εἶπον*, found only in Ald., as required by the sense. What the MS. of Ficinus had, is not known. For he omits entirely *ἀλλὰ γὰρ εἶπον*.

[2] In lieu of *ἐᾶσαι* one MS. has *ἰᾶται*: which seems to lead to *πάντα*, found perhaps in the MS. of Ficinus. For his version is, "totam disputationem," from whence Ast was led to say that if *πάντα* had been confirmed by a MS. he would have adopted it.

[3] Instead of *διελθόντος*, which is without regimen, Ast would read, what I have adopted, *διελθόντας*, agreeing with *ἡμᾶς* understood.

[4—4] The Greek is *οὕτω αἱρεῖσθαι τὸ δοκοῦν*: where I cannot understand *οὕτω*, nor could Ficinus, who has omitted it in his version, "quod potissimum videtur, eligere," and added, what the sense requires, "potissimum."

[5] Ficinus alone has "Hoc ipsum mihi placet."

[6] I have adopted *ἡμῖν*, read in one MS., instead of *οὖν*.

[7] Ficinus has "quem alium—potius," as if his MS. read *τιν' οὖν ἄλλην πρόσθεν*—and correctly so, as regards *πρόσθεν*: for *ἔμπροσθεν* is never, I believe, united to a genitive.

that, in which the Thracians and many other nations employ their women, to cultivate the ground, and to tend cattle and sheep, and to minister to them in no way different from slaves? Or, as we do ourselves, and all around that place?[1] [2]for what happens at present with us, is in this way.[2] For having brought together into one dwelling, according to the saying, [3]all our chattels,[3] we hand over to the women the power to act as stewards, and to rule over the shuttles and all kinds of working in wool. Or shall we, Megillus, speak of a medium between these, adopted in Laconia? so that the virgins should live, partaking in gymnastic exercises and music, but the married women be unemployed in wool-work,[4] but, weaving a kind of active life and in no respect mean or worthless, arrive at some middle point in the duties of attendants and stewards and bringers up of children; but not to take a part in warlike concerns, so as not to fight, even should a necessity arise from any accident to do so, in behalf of their city and children, nor be able with skill to take a part in the use of bows, like certain Amazons, or in any other kind of dart-hurling;[5] nor yet, seizing the spear and shield, to imitate the goddess, and standing up nobly for their country, while it is laid waste, [6]strike terror at least, if able to do[6] nothing more, into the foe, when they are seen drawn up in a kind of array. And yet living even in this manner, they would not dare to imitate at all the Sauromatides, who would appear, as compared with them, to be men. Let then the person, who is willing to praise your legislators on these points, praise them; but my opinion will not be given otherwise. For a legislator ought be a perfect and not a half one, who permits the female sex to

[1] Ficinus, unable perhaps to understand *τὸν τόπον ἐκεῖνον*, has "vicinique nostri," adopted by Taylor.

[2]—[2] The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor.

[3]—[3] See in § 11, n.

[4] I have adopted the interpretation suggested by Ast, who might have remarked that in *διαπλέκειν βίον* there is a concealed play on *ἀργοὺς ταλασίας*; for *ἀργοὺς* means in fact *οὐ πλεκούσας*.

[5] Ast correctly observes, that Plato meant to say that the women at Sparta did not lead as idle a life as they did at Athens, nor so laborious a one as they did in Thrace.

[6]—[6] The Greek is *φόβον γε, εἰ μηδὲν μεῖζον, πολεμίοισι δύνασθαι παρασχεῖν*—I have translated, as if it were—*μεῖζον δύνασθαι, πολεμίοισι παρασχεῖν*.

indulge in luxury and waste by making use of an unregulated living, and who, by taking a complete care of the male sex, leaves to the state nearly the half instead of the double of a happy life.

Megil. What shall we do, Clinias? Shall we permit our guest thus to run down our Sparta?

Clin. Certainly. For, since a liberty of speech has been given to him, we must permit him, until we shall in every way have gone through the laws sufficiently.

Megil. You speak correctly.

Athen. Is it not then nearly my business to endeavour to unfold what follows upon this?

Clin. How not?

[13.] *Athen.* What then will be the mode of life amongst men, for whom what is necessary may be procured in moderation, and the affairs of art handed over to others, and agriculture committed to slaves, who are to pay the first-fruits of the earth, sufficient for persons who live in a moderate manner; and common meals adopted, the men being placed apart, but their household kept near them, [1] and the female children likewise,[1] and their mothers; and where all these common meals are regulated by male and female governors, so that, after having inspected them daily, and seen the behaviour of those taking the common meals,[2] [3] they may on each occasion dismiss them; [3] and after this, that the governor and the rest, after making libations to the gods, to whom that day or night is dedicated, may go home [4] thus in this manner.[4] By per-

[1]—[1] Such is the literal version of the original. One would however expect that, as the girls are mentioned with their mothers, so would the boys, after a certain age, be with their fathers. Hence Plato wrote, I suspect, *τὰ τῶν ἀνδρῶν παίδων τ' ἐν ἥβῃ ἐγγὺς, ἐχόμενα δὲ τὰ τῶν αὐτοῖς οἰκείων θηλειῶν τε*, in lieu of *παίδων τε ἅμα θηλειῶν*— And thus too we shall get rid of the tautology in *ἐγγὺς ἐχόμενα*, to which Ast justly objects.

[2] In lieu of *συσσιτίων*, Schulthes first proposed *συσσίτων*, similar to "those that eat in common," in Taylor's translation.

[3]—[3] The words *λύειν ταῦτ' ἑκάστοις* are without regimen placed between *προστεταγμένα* and *τὰ ξυσσίτια*— Ficinus found them transposed in his MS. after *συσσιτίων*, as shown by his version, "in eis observent quotidie animadvertentque singula, deinde cætus ipsos dissolvant—" Hence, to complete the sense and syntax, I have translated as if the Greek were, *ὥστε, τὰ ξυσσίτια—ξυσσίτων, λύειν ταῦτα ἑκάστοτε*—

[4]—[4] In the words *κατὰ ταῦτα οὕτως*, omitted by Ficinus, as being with-

sons under such regulations no work that is necessary, and in every way fitting, is left undone. But must each of them live after the manner of cattle, and grow fat? This, we say, is neither just nor honourable; nor is it possible for a man, who lives in this manner, not to fail in what is fitting. But it is fitting for an animal idle and grown fat through indolence to be almost torn to pieces by another animal amongst those greatly worn down by fortitude [1] and labours to boot.[1] If then we investigate these matters with sufficient accuracy, as we are doing now, they will perhaps never take place, as long as women, and children, and dwellings [2] remain private property, and every thing else is made such by each of us.[2] But those things, which have just now been mentioned as secondary to these, if they take place at all, would take place in a very moderate manner. We say then that to those, who live thus, there is left a work, neither the least nor vilest, but the greatest of all ordained by a just law. [3] For while the life of him, who is eager for victory in the Pythian or Olympian games, supplies a want of leisure for all other business,[3] that life is filled with a double, or more than a double want of leisure, [4] which has chosen most correctly the care of the body and soul altogether relating to virtue,[4] for there ought to be nothing in the shape of a by-work as an impediment to the other works suited to the body, as regards the emolument [5] from labours

out any definite meaning, lies hid, I suspect, *κατὰ πάντα εὐτάκτως*, "in every respect in good order."

[1—1] Instead of *τετρυχωμένων μετὰ ἀνδρίας*, which I cannot understand, I must leave for others to discover what the author wrote.

[2—2] Ficinus has briefly "et reliqua propria cuique erunt?" For he could not perhaps understand, nor can I, *ἴδιαι καὶ ἰδίως ἅπαντ' ᾖ*— I have therefore translated as if the Greek were *ἴδιαι οὐσίαι ὥσι καὶ πάντ' ᾖ*—

[3—3] Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus has "nam cum singuli vivendi modi a ceteris omnibus operibus distrahant, ut si quis Pythia vel Olympia vincere studeat, is aliis rebus vacare nequeat." He must therefore have found in his MS. something in the Greek answering to "cum singuli—distrahant," all of which Taylor has omitted, although he has adopted to the letter the latter half of the Latin version.

[4—4] I have adopted the correction proposed by Ast, *ὁ τὴν περὶ τοῦ σώματος πάντως καὶ ψυχῆς εἰς ἀρετὴν ἐπιμέλειαν βίος ᾠρημένος ὀρθότατα*, and suggested by the version of Cornarius, "vita, quæ rectissime totius corporis ac animæ curam ad virtutem elegit," in lieu of *ὁ περὶ τὴν τοῦ—εἰς ἀρετῆς ἐπιμέλειαν—εἰρημένος*, out of which I can make nothing; nor could Ficinus, as shown by his abridged version, "qui recte animi corporisque virtuti vacat."

[5] In lieu of *ἀπόδοσιν*, Stephens testifies to the existence of another

and bringing up, nor in the case of the soul, from education and habits. Indeed the whole of the night and day is scarcely sufficient for a person, who is doing this very thing, to extract from them what is perfect, [1] or even something sufficient.[1] Since then such is naturally the case, there ought to be to all free-men an order in the employment of all time, beginning almost [2]from the morning until the other, ever continually both morning and sunrise.[2] A lawgiver would indeed appear to be ill-conditioned, who speaks of many and frequent and trifling matters relating to the management of an household, [3]and the other things and whatever about sleeplessness[3] it is becoming for those, who are about to watch completely over the state carefully. For that any citizen whatever should pass the whole of any night whatever in sleep, and not be seen by all his domestics, as being awake and getting up the first, this ought to be considered by all a disgraceful act, and not that of a free-man, whether it is meet to call it a law or a fashion. So too for a mistress to be called up by any servants, and

reading, *ἐπίδοσιν*, which was evidently the conjecture of some scholar, probably Victorius; from which however nothing is gained. Opportunely then does one MS. offer *ἀπόδον*: from which and *ἀπόδοσιν* united it is easy to elicit *πρόσοδον ἀπὸ*—as I have translated, similar to the subsequent *ἐκλαμβάνειν*. From the loose translation of Ficinus it is impossible, as remarked by Stephens, to ascertain what he found in his MS. His words are, "nihil enim exercitationis corporeæ, nihil doctrinarum animi morumque propter alia negotia negligendum est."

[1]—[1] To avoid the absurdity of *τέλεόν τε καὶ ἱκανὸν*—I have translated as if the Greek were *τέλεον ἤ τι καὶ ἱκανὸν*—

[2]—[2] Such is the literal version of the Greek—*ἐξ ἕω μέχρι τῆς ἑτέρας ἀεὶ ξυνεχῶς ἕως τε καὶ ἡλίου ἀνατολῆς*: where since *ἡλίου ἀνατολῆς* is the same as *ἕω*, it is manifest that Plato did not write *ἕω τε καὶ ἡλίου ἀνατολῆς*, but he might have written, and probably did, what is obvious to common sense—*ἐξ ἕω μέχρι τῆς ἑσπέρας ἀεὶ καὶ ξυνεχῶς αὖ ἐκ νυκτὸς εἰς ἡλίου ἀνατολήν*—i. e. "from morning to evening constantly, and continuously again from night to the rising of the sun." Ficinus has, what is at least intelligible—"ab ortu solis perpetuus ad alterum solis ortum."

[3]—[3] Here again a literal version proves the original to be unintelligible. The Greek is *τά τε ἄλλα καὶ ὅσα νύκτωρ ἀϋπνίας πέρι*—which Ficinus renders "cum in aliis, tum etiam in nocturna vigilia"—thus evading all the difficulty in *πέρι*, which is omitted in one MS., while another reads *ἀϋπνεί*. Plato wrote, I suspect, *τὰ δὲ μεγάλα καὶ ἃ ἐστι νυκτὶ πρῳ τ' ἀϋπνίας γέρα*, i. e. "but things of moment and what are the rewards of sleeplessness during the night and early dawn—" For thus the *μεγάλα* answers to the *σμικρά*; and while the "night and dawn" follow up the idea of the preceding *ἐκ νυκτος εἰς ἡλίου ἀνατολήν*, the words *Ἃ νυκτί τ' ἐστὶ πρῳ τ' ἀϋπνίας γέρα* would be the quotation from some drama.

not for herself to first call up them, it is meet for the male and female slaves and house-lad to speak of amongst themselves, and, if it were possible, the whole household together, as a disgraceful thing. It is meet then for all to get up by night, and to perform their many parts in the business of the state and household; the rulers, as regards the city, and the mistresses and masters in their own families. For much sleep is not naturally suited to our bodies or souls, or to the actions relating to them. For he, who is asleep, is not of any more worth at all than he, who is not alive. But whoever amongst us is careful to live (well),[1] and to be the most wise, keeps awake for the greatest part of his time, reserving only what is necessary for his health. But [2]it is not much going well to a habit.[2] Now magistrates, who are awake by night in states, are a terror to evil-doers, whether enemies or citizens, but are admired and honoured by the just and the wise, and a benefit both to themselves and to the whole state.

[14.] The night, when passed through in this manner, supplies, in addition to all the above-mentioned (advantages), a certain fortitude to the souls of each of those who are in the state. But on the return of day and the early dawn, it is requisite for the boys to turn their steps to their teachers. For neither sheep nor any thing else ought to live without a shepherd, nor boys without some boy-leaders, nor slaves without masters. Now a boy is of all wild beasts the most difficult to manage. For by how much the more he has the fountain of prudence not yet fitted up,[3] he becomes crafty and keen, and the most insolent of wild beasts. On this account it is necessary to bind him, as it were, with many chains;[4] first by

[1] I have inserted "well," conceiving that *εὖ* has dropt out after *τοῦ*—

[2—2] Ficinus has—"ad hanc vero non multo opus est somno, si bene assueveris." The Greek is *ἐστι δ' οὐ πολὺ καλῶς εἰς ἔθος ἰόν*: it was, I think, *ὃ ἐστὶ δὴ οὐ πολύ, εἰ καλῶς τις εἰς ἔθος ἴοι*— i. e. "which is not much if a person gets well into a habit."

[3] The Greek word *κατηρτυμένην* seems to be applied to *πηγὴν* with reference to the fact, that in hot countries fountains are generally protected by brick or stone work, to prevent the water from being dried up as it would be if exposed to the heat of the sun, or rendered unfit for use by cattle coming to drink and making it muddy. Ficinus has "perfectum," from which Cornarius elicited *κατηρτισμένην*. One MS. however reads *κατειρτημένην*, which seems to lead to *κατειργμένην*—"restrained," as indeed Ast renders *κατηρτυμένην*—What Plato however really wrote it is difficult to discover.

[4] To this passage Cebes refers in the Picture of Life, § 33, quoted by Ast.

boy-leaders, as soon as he is freed from his nurse and mother, [1] on account of his childishness and infantine state;[1] and still again by those who teach him [2]any thing whatever, and by instructions[2] as a free-born youth; but as being a slave, let it be lawful for any free-born man to punish the child, boy-instructor, and master, whenever any one of these commits any sin. But if any one, who happens to be present, does not punish the offenders according to justice, let him in the first place be subject to the greatest reproach; and let that one of the guardians of the law, who has been chosen to preside over the boys, look to the party who was present at the deeds of which we have spoken, and did not chastise (the offenders) when it was fit to chastise them, or did not chastise them in a proper manner; and looking with a keen eye, and pre-eminently regarding the bringing up of the boys, let him regulate their dispositions, by ever turning them to what is good according to the laws. But how shall our law itself sufficiently instruct that very person? For this it has not at present stated at all in a clear and sufficient manner, but only in some things, and some not. It is however necessary, to the utmost of our power to leave nothing for him (to do); but to explain the whole reason, in order that he may be to others both an interpreter and a bringer up. Now something has been already said about a [3]choir, and melodies, and dancing,[3] and possessing what type they are to be selected, and corrected, and made holy. But as regards what is written out of metre, we have not stated of what kind and in what manner it is meet for the boys brought up under thee, thou best guardian of the boys, to handle them. And yet you understand by our discourse what subjects relating to war it is meet for them to learn and to practise; but

[1]—[1] Displeased it would seem with the tautology in *παιδίας καὶ νηπιότητος*, Ficinus has "ad puerilem lasciviam regendam."

[2]—[2] This *καὶ ὁτιοῦν* seems very strange, as regards the sense, and so too does *καὶ μαθήμασιν*, as regards the syntax. Ficinus has "doctrinarum potissimum gratia—" as if his MS. read *ἕνεκα μαθήσεων*: to which *μάθησιν* in another MS. would appear to lead. Plato wrote, I suspect, *καλόν τι, οὗ ἕνεκα μάθημα ὀνίνησ' ἐλεύθερον*—i. e. "something honourable, on account of which instruction benefits a free-born lad." This at least would be worthy of the author, which the present text is not.

[3]—[3] This passage seems at first sight to defend *χορείας* and *ὀρχήσεις* in § 10, unless it be said that *καὶ* is to be struck out, so that *μελῶν ὀρχήσεως* may mean "the melodies for dancing."

what relates to letters first and secondly [1]to the lyre, and about calculations, of which we said there is a need, and whatever it is requisite for each to learn relating to war, and house-regulation; and the administration, as respects the state, and relating to the very same things still useful of those in the revolutions of divine things, and respecting the stars, and sun, and moon, whatever it is necessary to regulate about these things in every state. But of what things am I speaking? Of the order of days according to the revolutions of months, and of months according to each year, in order that seasons, and sacrifices, and festivals, receiving each what is suited to them, by being celebrated according to nature, may render the city alive and awake, and pay to the gods the honours due, and cause men to be more intelligent respecting them[1]—all these matters, my friend, have been thus[2] sufficiently discussed for you by the legislator. Direct therefore your mind to what is about to be said after this. Now we have said that you do not sufficiently understand what is the first thing respecting letters,[3] while we were finding some fault with the conversation on this point, that it has not been as yet clearly stated to you, whether he, who is about to become a moderate citizen, should betake himself to an accuracy in learning, or not betake himself at all. And so too in the case of the lyre. [4]We say then that he ought to betake himself.[4] For learning

[1]—[1] Such is the literal version of the mass of incoherent words existing at present in the Greek text; of which it would have been impossible to guess even at the meaning, had not Ficinus fortunately made his translation from a MS. far superior to any collated subsequent to his time; unless it be said, that he not only cut out, what he could not understand, but inserted out of his own head, what he conceived to be necessary for the sense. His version, adopted partially by Taylor, is to this effect—"quæ ad lyram, a legislatore dictum est, præter ea quæ ad computationem numerorum spectant, quibus opus esse diximus; et omnino quæcunque ad bellum ac rem familiarem publicamque conducunt; item quæ ad divinorum, astrorum, solis lunæque circuitum perquirendum, ut universa civitas non ignoret ordinem dierum in mensem mensiumque in annum; atque ita tempora, solemnitates, sacrificia, ut decet disposita naturali quodam ductu, vivam civitatem vigilantemque reddant, et diis honorem tribuant et homines ad hæc prudentiores efficiant."

[2] Cousin would read with one MS. *οὔπω* in lieu of *οὕτω*—

[3] By *γράμματα* in Greek was meant not simply letters or writing, but both united, what we call "reading and writing."

[4]—[4] The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor.

to read and write three years would do for a boy ten years old. But to those, who are thirteen, three years for handling the lyre would be a moderate time. Nor let it be lawful for [1] a father (to permit), or his son of his own act[1] to make his application to these studies more or less, and for more or less years than these [2] whether desirous to learn or hating it.[2] And let him, who disobeys (the law), be deprived of those youthful honours, which are to be mentioned shortly afterwards. But hear this first, what the youths ought to learn during this period, and what the masters to teach. They ought to labour at letters until they are able to write and read. But let us leave those unregarded, whom nature has not urged on to become, [3] with respect to quickness and beauty,[3] proficients within the years enjoined. But in the case of the lyreless learning[4] of poets preserved in writings, some in metre, and others without metrical[5] divisions, [6] which are called merely compositions in prose[6] destitute of rhythm and harmony, there have been left to us unsafe writings [7] by some such men, the majority[7] of

[1]—[1] The Greek is *πατρὶ μήτ' αὐτῷ*—out of which neither Stephens nor Ast could make any thing satisfactory to themselves or to others. Bekker has edited *πατρὶ μηδ' αὐτῷ*—" to not even a father himself," which Stalbaum calls an egregious emendation; but which I confess I cannot understand, even if *ποιεῖσθαι* be taken in the sense of *διδάσκεσθαι*, " to put out to learn—" For in that case the pronoun *αὐτῷ* would be superfluous, while the mention of the son could not be dispensed with. The paraphrase of Ficinus gives, what the train of thought evidently requires, " nec liceat aut patri plus vel minus in his liberos detinere, aut liberis, sive tædio affectis, citra id tempus, sive desiderio compulsis ultra his rebus, contempta lege, vacare." By the aid of which it is easy to elicit, as I have translated, *πατρὶ ἐᾶν μέτε υἱεῖ αὐτῷ*— On the loss or corruption of *ἐᾶν* see my Poppo's Prolegom. p. 121.

[2]—[2] The Greek is *φιλομαθοῦντι—μισοῦντι*. But Plato wrote *φιλοῦντι μαθεῖν—μισοῦντι*.

[3]—[3] On the phrase *πρὸς τάχος* or *πρὸς κάλλος* with *γράφειν*, see the Commentators on Thom. Mag. p. 274, with whose notes had Badham been conversant, he would not have proposed in Præf. Iph. T. p. 19, to read *εἰς καλὰς τυχὰς* for *εἰς κάλλος τύχας* in Eurip. Troj. 1202.

[4] Ficinus, followed by Taylor, has " monumenta," as if his MS. read *μνήματα* instead of *μαθήματα*.

[5] I have adopted *ῥυθμικῶν* for *ῥυθμῶν*, proposed by the Bipont editor.

[6]—[6] The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, who is followed by Taylor. They are evidently an interpolation.

[7]—[7] Such is the literal version of the Greek *παράτινων τῶν πολλῶν τοιούτων ἀνθρώπων*: which I cannot understand, nor could Ficinus; who omits *τῶν πολλῶν*— Perhaps Plato wrote *παρά τινών ὄντως ἁπλῶν*

which, ye best of all guardians of the laws, how will ye make any use? Or how would a lawgiver, ordering you to use them, correctly order? I expect he would be much at a loss.

Clin. [1]What is this, guest, which you seem to say, as regards yourself, as being in reality at a loss.[1]

Athen. You have taken me up correctly, Clinias. But before you, who are associates with me on the subject of laws, it is necessary for me to state [2]what seems to be an easy matter, and what does not.[2]

Clin. What then, do you now say, [3]and what has been your state,[3] with respect to these matters?

Athen. I will tell you. For it is by no means easy to speak what is opposed to many myriads of mouths.

Clin. But what, does it (not)[4] seem to you that the few and trifling matters, previously mentioned by us relating to laws, are somewhat opposed to the multitude?

Athen. You have spoken this with the greatest truth. [5]For, as it seems to me, you are exhorting me to proceed confidently in this road, although it is arduous and odious to many, and to advance through the path of laws, which our present discourse has laid open, without omitting any particular, when perhaps a journey of this kind will be pleasing to others not fewer in number, and, if fewer, not worse.[5]

ἀνοήτων τ' ἀνθρώπων, i. e. "by some persons really simpletons and unintellectual."

[1]—[1] Ficinus has merely "Quid, hospes, tecum ita dubitasti?"

[2]—[2] Ficinus, followed by Taylor, almost literally, has "quæ certa et quæ dubia mihi videntur."

[3]—[3] Here again Taylor has followed Ficinus, "quid te movit."

[4] In lieu of *ὀλίγα* four MSS. offer *ὀλίγου*, which evidently leads to *ὀλιγ' οὐ—*

[5]—[5] From this version made by Taylor, it is shown beyond all doubt that he looked merely to the Latin of Ficinus, and not to the Greek; which is literally—"For you are indeed exhorting me, as it seems to me, while the same road has become hateful to many, and perhaps agreeable to others not fewer, and if fewer, not the worse at least, with whom you are exhorting me to run a risk, and with confidence to march along the road of legislation, now cut out by the present conversation, and to be remiss in nothing." Here although Ast would supply the want of the apodosis in the latter part of the sentence by repeating *διακέλευει* after *κελεύει*, yet Ruhnken on Timæus, 128, felt disposed to adopt the correction of a critic in Miscell. Observ. ii. 2, p. 307, who proposed to read, what the sense requires in part, *ὁδοῦ ἔχεσθαι ἐχθοδοποῦ*—while no one has hitherto seen that Plato certainly wrote *ταυτῆς τῆς ὁδοῦ*, "this road," not *τῆς*

Clin. How not?

[15.] *Athen.* I am not then remiss. I assert indeed, that there are very many writers of poetry amongst us, in hexameters and trimeters, [1]and all the so-called measures,[1] some having aimed at seriousness, others at fun; in whose writings very many myriads assert that we ought to bring up such of the youths as are properly instructed, and to render them full even to satiety, by making them to be frequent hearers at the reading of them, and very learned in them, through having got whole poets by heart. But others say that, selecting the heads from all, and bringing to the same point entire sentences, they ought to learn them well[2] by committing them to memory, if any one among us is about to be a good man and wise through much experience and much learning. Do you, then, exhort me with a freedom of speech to show to them what they say correctly or not?

Clin. How not?

Athen. By saying what then upon all these points shall I in one word say what is sufficient? I think it nearly something of this kind, in which every one would agree with me, that each of those[3] (the poets) have said many things beautifully, and many the reverse. And if this be the case, I assert, that much learning is bringing danger to youth.[4]

Clin. How then, and what would you advise the guardian of the law to do?

Athen. Of what are you speaking?

Clin. By looking to the pattern of what thing would he permit all the youths to learn one subject and forbid them another? Speak, and do not shrink from speaking.

αὐτῆς ὁδοῦ, "the same road," and probably *ἔχεσθαι ἀηδοῦς πολύ*, to balance the subsequent *προσφιλοῦς*, and *διὰ καλοῦ δεῖ*, in lieu of *διακελεύει*: for thus *πορεύεσθαι* would be governed by *δεῖ*, and *διὰ καλοῦ* show that the march was for the sake of what is honourable.

[1]—[1] The words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor, who followed Grynæus, who threw them out of the translation of Ficinus, because there was nothing to answer to them in the then existing Greek text, which has been subsequently supplied by six MSS.

[2] As *ἐκμανθάνειν* means by itself "to learn by heart," to avoid the tautology in *εἰς μνήμην τιθεμένους*, I have translated as if the Greek were *εὖ μανθάνειν*—

[3] Ficinus has "poetis," as if his MS. read *τῶν ποιητῶν*, not *τούτων*—

[4] This was the doctrine of Heracleitus, who said *ἡ πολυμαθίη νόον οὐ διδάσκει*.

Athen. My good Clinias, I seem almost in a certain manner to have been fortunate.

Clin. About what?

Athen. In not being entirely in want of a pattern. For now, after looking to the discourse, which we have gone through, from the morning up to the present moment, not without the inspiration of some god, as we appear to myself, [1]I fancy, by Zeus, that something has been said by a person in his senses[1] altogether similar to a kind of poetry. Nor has perhaps any wonderful event fallen upon me, in being delighted with looking upon our own discourse, as being collected together.[2] For of the very many discourses in poems, or spoken thus in prose, which I have learnt and heard, they have appeared to me to be the most moderate of all, and the most fit for youths to hear. Hence I conceive I could not have to mention to a guardian of the laws and an instructor a pattern better than this, or to exhort the masters to teach boys these subjects, and what are next and similar to these, whether a person happens to be going through the compositions of poets, or what has been written in prose, or spoken thus nakedly, without being written, as being the brothers of these discourses, so as not to neglect them in any way, but to write them down; and in the first place to compel the teachers themselves to learn and praise them; [3]and not to employ as co-workers the teachers, to whom they are not acceptable; but that such as a person may find giving their votes for praise, let him make use of these, and hand over to them the youths to teach and to instruct. Here then and thus let my tale be brought to an end, after having been told as regards the teachers of letters and letters likewise.[3]

Clin. [4]As regards the argument,[4] stranger, we do not ap-

[1]—[1] The Greek is *ἔδοξαν δ' οὖν μοι παντάπασι*, from which I have elicited *ἔδοξα νὴ Δί' ἔννῳ τι παντάπασι*— For thus *ἀποβλέψας* will recover, what it wants at present, its verb.

[2] I must leave for others to understand, what I cannot, *οἷον ἀθρόους*. From the preceding allusion to the inspiration of some god, it is quite evident, to myself at least, that Plato wrote *οἷον ἐνθέους*—"as if god-inspired." On the corruption of *ἔνθεος* see myself on Eumen. 17.

[3]—[3] Of this needlessly prolix matter Ficinus has given this abridgment, adopted in part by Taylor, "et eos, qui non probent, repellat; his vero, qui probant, erudiendos instituendosque adolescentes, committat. Sed de literis eorumque magistris jam satis."

[4]—[4] The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor.

pear to myself at least to have wandered from the subject proposed. But whether we are right upon the whole or not, it is perhaps difficult to assert positively.

Athen. But this, Clinias, will then become more clear, as is reasonable, when, as we have often said, we arrive at the end of this digression respecting the laws.

Clin. True.

[16.] *Athen.* After the grammar-master is not the harp-master to be spoken of?

Clin. How not?

Athen. I fancy that, if we recollect our previous discourse, we assigned to the harp-masters what was suited to the teaching and the whole of education in things of such a kind.

Clin. Of what kind of things are you speaking?

Athen. We said, I think, that the Dionysiacal singers of sixty years of age[1] ought to have pre-eminently a fine perception of rhythms, and the compositions of harmonies, in order that [2](some one, through knowing well) the imitation by melodies, when it is well or ill done, at what time an affection how violent soever may happen to the soul,[2] may thus,[3] by being able to select the resemblances of the good (soul) and those of the contrary one, reject the latter, but bring forward the former, and [4]hymn to and enchant the souls of the young,[4] and invite each of them, while following him on account of the imitations, to be led on[5] to the possession of virtue.

Clin. You speak most truly.

Athen. For the sake then of these matters, it is requisite

[1] This mention of singers of sixty years old, having a fine perception of rhythms, seems very strange. For at that period of life all the finer perceptions have generally ceased to exist, at least in northern climates, and still more in the southern; where the faculties of man are more early developed, and more early decay. In ii. p. 670, B. § 11, the age is fifty years.

[2—2] For the sake of the syntax, without which it is impossible to get satisfactorily at the sense of an ancient author, I have translated as if, instead of *ἐν τοῖς παθήμασιν ὅταν ψυχῇ γίγνηται*—the Greek were originally *εὖγνοὺς, πάθημ' ὅσον ὅταν ἐν ψυχῇ γίγνηται*—

[3] In lieu of *ὧν τις*, the sense seems to lead, as I have translated, to *ὧν, οὕτως*—

[4—4] The Greek is *ὑμνῇ καὶ ἐπᾴδῃ ταῖς τῶν νέων ψυχαῖς*. Ficinus has "adolescentium auribus concinant trahantque eorum animos—"

[5] The Greek is *ἕπεσθαι—συνακολοθοῦντας*— But as Ficinus has "imitatione quadam perductos," I suspect he found in his MS. *ἄγεσθαι*, as I have translated.

for both the harper and his pupil to use the sounds of the lyre, [1] for the sake of the clearness of the chords, by bringing out sounds in accordance with sounds.[1] But (as regards) the difference and variety of the sounds of the lyre—the chords producing some melodies, and the poet who composes the strain others — and moreover[2] others by their making the thick[3] and the thin, the swift and the slow, the sharp and the flat, agree with or opposed to each other respectively, and by adapting similarly all the varieties of rhythms to the sounds of the lyre, it is not lawful[4] to bring all such things as these before those, who are about to extract quickly in three years what is useful in music. For contraries, confusing each other, produce a difficulty in learning. But it is requisite that the young should be as quick as possible to learn. For the subjects of education enjoined upon them are of necessity not trifling or few. However, our discourse, as it proceeds, will, together with time, point them out. To such matters relating to music, let the teacher thus attend. But the melodies and words, of what kind and what it is meet for the choir-masters to teach, have been all previously discussed; and we have said that, by being consecrated and adapted each to festivals, they ought to be of service to the state, by contributing to a pleasure of a happy kind.[5]

Clin. And this too have [6]you discussed with truth.

Athen. Most truly indeed.[6] And let him, who is chosen the ruler as regards music, receive these rules from us, and let him

[1—1] I confess I hardly understand what Plato is aiming at. Ficinus has "expressionis gratia, quæ ex canoris fidibus provenit, et vocibus voces consonas reddere." Ast refers to Histoire de l'Academie des Inscript. T. iii. p. 199. Cousin adds T. 8, p. 9, and 35, and T. 37.

[2] From the words *καὶ δὴ καὶ* is evident that some participle has dropt out of the sentences preceding.

[3] By *πυκνότης* is meant, says Martianus Capella, ix. p. 320, quoted by Ast, "a certain quality composed of three sounds," which I must leave for musical Greek scholars to explain.

[4] The Greek is *πάντ' οὖν τὰ τοιαῦτα μὴ*— But one MS. for *μὴ* reads *μὲν*—where *νόμιμον* lies hid; and hence I have altered *οὖν* into *οὐ*—

[5] I scarcely understand *ἡδονὴν εὐτυχῆ*—unless it be said that, to use the language of Horace, there is a "voluptas, empta dolore," which "nocet."

[6—6] The words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor; Ficinus has "Hæc itaque vere distincta electus ad musam magistratus suscipiat," as if his MS. read *ἀληθέστατά τοί νυν ταῦτα παραλαβὼν ὁ περὶ τὴν μοῦσαν ἄρχων αἱρεθεὶς*, without *καὶ* and *ἡμῶν*.

attend to them with a kind fortune. [1]But let us deliver them relating to dancing and the whole of the gymnastics pertaining to the body, in addition to what has been stated previously; (and) as we have delivered the instruction, that remained respecting music, let us act in a similar manner with regard to gymnastics. For it is meet for boys and girls to learn to dance and to practise gymnastics likewise.[1] Is it not?

Clin. Certainly.

Athen. Now for the boys dancing-masters, but for the girls dancing-mistresses, would be the better fitted[2] for going through the occupation.

Clin. Be it so.

Athen. Again, let us call the man, who has the most to do, the curator of youth; and who, since he attends to the subjects relating to music and gymnastics, will not have much leisure.

Clin. How then is it possible for a person, advanced in years, to attend to so many things?

Athen. Easily, my friend. For the law has allowed and will allow him to take to himself as his associates[3] in such an employment, whomever of the male and female citizens he pleases; and he will know whom he ought (to take); and he will be desirous [4]not to do wrong in these matters[4] while [5]prudently knowing and reverencing the importance of his office, and[5] being conversant with the reasoning[6] that, when youths

[1—1] Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus has thus transposed the sentences, "nos vero, sicut musicæ docendi modum, qui restabat, adjecimus, ita nunc saltationi et universæ corporis gymnasticæ, cum idem reliquum sit, idem quoque adjiciamus:" while Taylor has adopted the transposition and thus abridged the original, "But as we have delivered what remained to be discussed respecting music, we shall do the same respecting dancing, and the whole of the gymnastic pertaining to the body."

[2] I have translated as if the Greek were *ἀνεπιτηδείοτεροι*, not *ἀνεπιτηδείοτερον*.

[3] On this sense of *προσλαμβάνειν*, see at Æsch. Prom. 225.

[4—4] The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor.

[5—5] I have followed, as Taylor does likewise, Ficinus in transposing the order of the words *αἰδούμενος ἐμφρόνως καὶ γιγνώσκων* into *γιγνώσκων ἐμφρόνως καὶ αἰδούμενος*.

[6] The Greek is *λογισμῷ — ξυνὼν*, where Ast would read *ξυνιεὶς* — Ficinus has "ignoret." Taylor, "being well convinced."

have been and are properly brought up, every thing will sail on prosperously [1](over the sea of life);[1] but if not,[2] it is not fit to state, nor do we state (what will follow)[3] through our venerating the great lovers of prophets in a new city.[4]

[17.] Much then has been said by us on the subjects relating to dancing and all the movements of gymnastics. For under gymnastics we place all the exercises relating to war in archery and every kind of hurling, and the use of the small shield, and all the fighting with the large shield, and the tactics of sallying out, and all the marching of armies, and their conduct in camps, and whatever relates to cavalry regulations. For all these subjects there ought to be teachers in common, obtaining their pay from the state, and having both men and boys as their pupils, and girls and women skilled in all these matters—those who are still virgins practising every kind of dancing, and fighting in armour, but the women laying hold of the science of sallying out,[5] and of laying down and taking up arms, if for nothing else,[6] at least for this, that should there be a necessity at any time for those, who had been guarding[7] the children and the rest of the city, to leave the town with their whole force,[8] and to march to a distance from it, the women may be sufficient for so much[9] as this. Or, on the contrary,

[1]—[1] Taylor has introduced "the sea of life," from "in vita" in Ficinus.

[2] The Greek is πλεῖ, μὴ δὲ—But an aposiopesis cannot be expressed by a prohibitive formula. Plato wrote πλεῖ, εἰ δὲ μὴ—as I have translated.

[3] Ficinus adds, what the sense requires, "quid sequatur," as if his MS. read τὸ ἑπιὸν for ἐπὶ before καινῇ πόλει.

[4] Here again Ficinus has, what is better suited to common sense, "perniciosum in civitatem novam omen fugientes." For why there should be in a new state persons more fond of prophets than in an old one, it is not easy to understand.

[5] The Greek is διεξόδων καὶ τάξεων. It should be διεξόδων τακτικῶν, as just before.

[6] Ficinus, "si nullius rei alterius gratia, attamen," as if his MS. read εἰ μηδενὸς ἕνεκα ἄλλου, ἀλλ —as remarked by Stephens.

[7] I have adopted φυλάξαντας, found in four MSS., in lieu of φυλάξοντας, which Ast says may be referred to the women. But then Plato would assuredly have written φυλαξούσας. Ficinus has, in an abridged form, "si res cogat, ut in militiam viri omnes proficiscantur, possint ipsæ interim, si quid adversi acciderit, civitatem defendere."

[8] Unless I am greatly mistaken, πάσῃ τῇ δυνάμει is an explanation of πανδημεί.

[9] As to defend the town.

(should it happen,)[1] [2] what is not at all denied to be possible,[2] that enemies from without fall upon it with some mighty power and force, whether Greeks or Barbarians, and furnish the necessity for a battle to take place for the state itself, it would surely be a great fault in a polity for the women to have been brought up in so shameful a manner, as not to fight, as even birds do in behalf of their offspring with the strongest of wild animals,[3] nor to be willing to die, and to expose themselves to every danger; but straightway to hurry[4] to sacred places, and to fill all the altars and temples, and to bring down upon the race of women the bad repute[5] of being the most cowardly of all animals.

Clin. [6] By Zeus, O guest, this would be by no means seemly, independent of the cowardice, in any state, where it might take place.[6]

Athen. Let us then lay down the law so far as this at least, that warlike concerns ought not to be neglected by women, but that all the citizens, both male and female, ought to attend to them.

Clin. I agree with you.

Athen. With respect to wrestling, then, we have said something; but that which is, as I should say, the greatest thing, we have not spoken of; nor is it easy to speak of it, without pointing it out with the body, as well as by word of mouth. This then we will determine, when our language, following out acts, shall indicate something clear about the other points of which we have spoken; and that such a wrestling is in reality of all motions allied the nearest to a personal encounter in battle; and, moreover, that it is requisite to attend to this for the sake of that, but not that for the sake of this.

[1] Stephens was the first to see, that as there is nothing to govern the infinitive *παρασχεῖν* something has dropt out here. The missing word was, I suspect, *τυχὸν*, as I have translated.

[2]—[2] So Ast explains *ἀπώμοτον*. With regard to the syntax in *ὧν οὐδὲν ἀπώμοτον*, Stephens suggested, what Ast has adopted, *ὃν οὐδὲν ἀπώμοτον*. But the sense requires rather *ὃ οὐδάμ' ἀπώμοτον*—

[3] With this sentiment Ast compares a similar one in Lycurgus c. Leocrat. T. iv. p. 229, and Musonius in Wyttenbach. Philomath. i. p. 159.

[4] Faehse aptly compares Æsch. S. Th. 165.

[5] The Greek is *καὶ δόξαν*. I have translated as if it were, *καὶ ἀδοξίαν*, similar to *αἶσχος ἔχενε* in Hom. Οδ. Λ. 432, and the passages quoted on Menexenus, § 14.

[6]—[6] Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus, whom Taylor follows to the letter, has, "Per Jovem, hospes, et dedecori hoc et detrimento est civitati."

Clin. Beautifully indeed do you say this.

[18.] *Athen.* Let then thus much be held to have been said up to the present moment on the subject of wrestling. But with respect to the other motions of the whole body, the greatest part of which a person would, by calling it a certain dancing, call it correctly, it is proper to consider as of two kinds; one imitating the solemn in the more beautiful bodies, but the other the depraved in baser bodies. And again, of the depraved there are two species, and two of the serious. Of the serious motion one kind exists, when bodies of beauty and a soul of bravery become implicated in war and violent exertions: but the other, when a temperate soul (being mixed up) with a prosperous state and moderate pleasures. Now he who calls a dancing of this kind pacific, calls it according to its nature. [1] But the warlike, on the other hand,[1] which is entirely different from the pacific, a person would correctly call Pyrrhic; which imitates the careful guarding against all blows and hurlings by leanings away,[2] and by every kind of yielding and leapings on high, together with a lowering of the body; and the contrary to these, which are borne along to active gestures in the shooting of arrows, and the hurling of javelins, and which attempt to imitate the infliction [3] of all kinds of blows. [4] But that which is erect and braced up in these, when an imitation takes place of good bodies and souls, becoming straightforward for the most part of the limbs of the body, receiving a thing of this kind as right, but the contrary as not

[1]—[1] The Greek is *τὴν πολεμικὴν δὴ τούτων*: where I cannot understand *τούτων*, nor could Ficinus, who has omitted it. For his version is, "illum vero a pacifico diversum, Pyrrichen recte quisque vocabit." I have translated as if the Greek were *τὴν πολεμικὴν δ' αὖ, τὸ πᾶν ἄλλην*, where *δ'* is due to Ast.

[2] Ast and others explain *ἐκνεύσεσι* by "inclinings away." But that would be *ἀπονεύσεσι*: and so perhaps Plato wrote. For *ἐκ* and *ἀπ* are constantly confounded in MSS. See Porson Miscell. Crit. p. 181.

[3] I have translated as if the Greek were *ἐμβλήματα*, not *μιμήματα*, which I cannot understand, despite the references to Lucretius ii. 40, Virgil Æn. v. 585, and Livy xxix. 22, made by Ast. Ficinus has simply "cædendo," omitting *πασῶν πληγῶν μιμήματα ἐπιχειρούσας μιμεῖσθαι*.

[4]—[4] Such is the literal translation of the Greek, out of which Ast has been unable to make any thing satisfactory; and I am equally in the dark. Ficinus has "in his omnibus arbitrari oportet, quando intrepidus et constans habitus in membrorum rectitudine et fortitudine adhibetur, recte fieri; quando vero, non recte." What Plato wrote, might, however, be

right.[4] In this way, on the other hand, we must look upon the pacific dancing of each,[1] whether a person lays hold or not of the beautiful dancing, and conducts himself in a becoming manner in the dances of men, acting according to law. It is necessary, then, to separate first the dancing about which there is a doubt from that about which there is not a doubt. Now what is this? And how must we separate them? Such then as is Bacchic, and belongs to those that follow the Bacchants, whom some persons, [2]calling by the name of Nymphs, Pans, Silenuses, and Satyrs, say that they imitate, and,[2] drunk with wine, perform[3] purifications and certain mystic rites, the whole of this kind of dancing it is not easy to define, as being neither pacific, nor adapted to war, or (to say) what it means. But it seems to me that it is nearly the most correct to define it in this way, by placing the warlike dancing apart, and apart too the pacific, and to assert that this kind of dancing is not adapted to a civil[4] life. Leaving it, therefore, to lie down lying there,[5] let us return to the warlike and pacific dancing, as being indubitably ours. Now the kind of the unwarlike Muse, and that which honours[6] the gods and the sons of the gods by dancing, [7]will become altogether one kind,[7] when it takes place in the reputation[8] of doing well. And we could

recovered by a bold conjecture, which it is unnecessary to bring forward.

[1] In lieu of *ἑκάστων*, which Ast could not understand, nor can I, he suggested *ἑκάστοτε*. Stalbaum says that *ἑκάστων* is to be referred to *τῶν ὀρχουμένων*. But neither Plato nor any other sensible writer is wont to omit words absolutely requisite for the sense and syntax.

[2]—[2] In lieu of *ἐπονομάζοντες ὡς φασι μιμοῦνται*, where *ὡς* is omitted by Ficinus, I have translated as if the Greek were, *ἐπονομάζοντές τινες, φασὶν ὅτι μιμοῦνται, καὶ*—

[3] From *ἀποτελουμένων*, in which, as there is no syntax, there can be no sense, it is easy to elicit *ἀποτελεῖν, τὸ*— as I have translated, and to change the following *τὸ* into *γε*—

[4] Instead of *πολιτικοῦ*, Taylor has "to war," misled by the preceding *πολεμικοῦ*.

[5] Since *κείμενον—κεῖσθαι* are not, I believe, thus united elsewhere, in *δε κείμενον* lies hid perhaps *δ' ἐκβαλλόμενον*, "rejected." Compare Axioch. § 12, *δήμου παίγνιον ἐκβαλλόμενον*.

[6] I have with Stalb. adopted *τιμῶν*, first suggested by Stephens, and subsequently found in five MSS.

[7]—[7] The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor.

[8] The expression *ἐν δόξῃ*, whether *δόξῃ* means "opinion," or "reputation," or "glory," is to my mind perfectly unintelligible; and so to Fici-

make of this a twofold division; the one, possessing greater pleasures, after we have escaped [1] from certain labours there [1] and dangers to what is good; but the other, when there is a preservation and increase of former good things, possessing pleasures milder than them;[2] since in matters of this kind, every one is affected with greater movements in the body, when the pleasures are greater, but with less, when they are less; and he, who is more orderly, and more exercised in fortitude, exhibits less changes of movement; but he, who is timid, and unexercised in temperance, the more vehement; and generally every one, who emits a sound, whether in singing or in speaking, is not entirely able to exhibit tranquillity in his body. Hence an imitation of what has been said, taking place by gestures has produced the whole of the art of dancing. In all these occasions, one person amongst us moves elegantly, but another inelegantly. Now it is fitting for him, who reflects, to praise many others of the old names, as being assigned correctly, and according to nature; and to one of them, relating to the dancings [3] of those who are doing well, and are moderate in their pleasures,[3] how correctly and at the same time musically did he, whoever he was, give a name. For [4] assigning to them taken all together a name according to rea-

nus was, I suspect, the whole passage from *τὸ δή τῆς ἀπολέμου* to *διαιροῖμεν ἄν*. For he has thus abridged it in his version, "genus autem illud musæ, quo in pace et prosperitatis opinione utimur, deos deorumque filios honorantes, bipartito distinguitur."

[1—1] Here again I am at a loss in understanding *τινῶν αὐτοῦ*: and so too was Stephens, as regards *αὐτοῦ*; for which he proposed to read *αὐτῶν*, unless *αὐτοῦ* is to be united, he says, to *τὸ μὲν*; from which, however, it would be more distant than is customary. The idea is nevertheless caught at by Ast, despite the fact that *αὐτοῦ* could not be united to *τὸ μὲν*, with *ἐκ πόνων τινῶν* interposed; and even if it could, in the formula *τὸ μὲν—τὸ δὲ* the pronoun is never thus introduced. Both *τινῶν* and *αὐτοῦ* are omitted by Ficinus in his version, "alterum enim, cum pericula laboresque evasimus et bona adepti sumus," as if his MS. read *ἐκ μὲν κινδύνων καὶ πόνων ἡμῶν διαπεφευγότων*.

[2] Here too Ficinus appears to have been in the dark, and so am I, as to the meaning of *ἐκείνων*: which he has omitted, and supplied the words "peragi solet," wanting to complete the sense, as if his MS. read *κινοῖτ' ἄν* in lieu of *ἐκείνων*.

[3—3] Ficinus has "quod saltationes cunctas moderatorum hominum, in rebus secundis temperate gaudentium," as if his MS. read *περὶ πάσας τὰς ὀρχήσεις τῶν μετρίων, ἐχόντων δὲ μετρίως πρὸς τὰς ἡδονὰς τῶν εὖ πράττόντων*, which makes a much neater sense.

[4] After *καὶ* there is evidently wanting *γὰρ*—

son, he called it Emmeleia,[1] and established two kinds of beautiful dancings, one warlike, called Pyrrhic, the other pacific, called Emmeleia, assigning to each a becoming and fitting appellation. These matters it behoves the lawgiver to explain by types, but the guardian of the laws to seek out; and having sought out, to combine dancing with the rest of music, and to distribute at all festivals that which is suited to each of the sacrifices; and having thus made them all holy in their order, hereafter to disturb nothing connected with dancing or singing. [2] For it is requisite that the same city and the same citizens should pass their time as far as possible equally in the same pleasures,[2] and live really[3] well and happily.

[19.] The matters then relating to the dancings of beautiful bodies and souls, of what kind it has been said they ought to be, have been gone through. But it is necessary to look into and know those relating to disagreeable bodies and thoughts, and of those that are directed to the comicalities of laughter, as regards the language, and the song, and the dance, and the imitations of all these, done in a comical way. For it is not possible to learn serious things without the laughable, nor the converse of any thing without its contrary, if a person is about to be intellectual; but to do both it would be not possible, if a person is on the other hand about to have even a little share of virtue. But it is meet to learn them for the sake [4] of this very thing,[4] namely, the not doing or saying at any time through ignorance what is ridiculous, when there is

[1] I have preserved the Greek word Ἐμμέλεια, in which there is an allusion to μέλος, "a melody," and ἐμμελ-ής, "elegant," derived from ἐν-μέλειν, "to have a care in," and hence ἐμμέλεια means "an elegance in melody," an appellation given to tragedy; while κόρδαξ was that given to comedy, and σικιννὶς to farce, as we learn from Athenæus i. p. 20, E.

[2—2] I have adopted for the most part the version of Ficinus, "sed in iisdem voluptatibus civitas eadem perseverans, civesque iidem similes semper pro viribus permanentes," who probably found in his MS. ἐν δὲ ταῖς αὐταῖς ἡδοναῖς τὴν αὐτὴν πόλιν καὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς πολίτας διάγοντας ὁμοίως—εἰς δύναμιν, instead of ἐν ταῖς δ' αὐταῖς ἡδοναῖς ὡσαύτως τὴν αὐτὴν πόλιν καὶ πολίτας διάγοντας: ὁμοίους where since ὡσαύτως is without sense, and διάγοντας without syntax, I have translated as if the Greek were, ἐν γὰρ ταῖς αὐταῖς—τοὺς αὐτοὺς—δεῖ ἄγοντας ὁμοίως—

[3] In lieu of ὄντας, which is superfluous after διάγοντας, Plato probably wrote, what I have translated, ὄντως—

[4—4] Ficinus has "hujus—" For his MS. read αὐτοῦ—τούτου, more correctly than αὐτῶν—τούτων—

no need of it; but (it is proper)[1] to order slaves and hired strangers to imitate things of this kind; but for no serious study of them to exist at any time, or for any free person, either woman or man, to be seen learning them, [2] but for some novelty of imitations about them to always appear.[2] Thus then let whatever are the sports pertaining to laughter, which we all call comedy, be laid down both by our language and law. But should any of the serious poets, who, they say, are occupied on tragedies, come to us and ask—Shall we, O strangers, come to your city and country, or not, and bring our poetry and act[3] it? or how is it decreed for you to do in matters of this kind? what answer to this should we correctly give to these divine men? This to myself indeed it seems good to say—O most excellent of strangers, we are ourselves, to the utmost of our power, poets of a tragedy the most beautiful and best. For the whole of our polity consists in an imitation of a life the most beautiful and best, which we say is in reality the truest tragedy. You, therefore, are poets, and we too are poets of the same kind, being your opponents in art, and antagonists in the most beautiful drama, which true law alone has naturally completed,[4] as is the hope in us. But do not think that we shall so easily suffer you to fix your scenes in

[1] I have inserted *δεῖ*, which might have been easily lost after *δὲ*—

[2]—[2] Such is the literal version of the Greek, *καινὸν δὲ ἀεί τι περὶ αὐτὰ γίγνεσθαι τῶν μιμημάτων*: where since *τῶν μιμημάτων* is plainly superfluous after *αὐτὰ*, Plato wrote, I suspect, *καινὸν δὲ ἀεί ποτε περὶ αὐτὰ γίγνεσθαι, ὅτων μιμήματ' ᾖ*: i. e. "but to ever appear new to the subjects of which these are imitations;" where *καινὸν* would apply to a person and not to a thing. Ast indeed says that the reason for the novelty in the imitations is, that, if the same subjects were repeated, people would become accustomed to them; for he perhaps remembered the lines of Pope, who says that,

> "Vice is a monster of such hideous mien,
> That to be hated it needs but be seen;
> But seen too oft, familiar with its face,
> We first endure, admire, and then embrace."

But so far was Plato from patronizing any novelty in ludicrous imitations of comedy, that he would not admit even the serious ones of tragedy.

[3] Ast has mistaken the meaning of *ἄγειν* here, as shown by his reference to Xenoph. K. Π. iii. 3, 2, *φέροντας καὶ ἄγοντας*, where the expression is in its usual military sense of carrying off dead plunder, and driving off the living.

[4] Instead of *ἀποτελεῖν πέφυκεν*, one would have expected *ἀποτελεῖν κατὰ φύσιν ἔχει*, similar to "potest perficere" in Ficinus.

our place of meeting, and, introducing players with beautiful voices, and who talk louder than we do, to speak in public before our children and wives and all the masses not the same things as we do about pursuits, but for the most part even the most contrary. For we should be ourselves nearly quite mad, and the whole state too, should it permit you to do what has been just now mentioned, before the magistrates shall have decided whether you have composed what is to be spoken and fit to be brought forward or not. Now then, ye children,[1] offspring of the tender Muses, we will, after first showing your odes[2] by the side of ours to the rulers grant you a Chorus; if what has been said by you shall appear to be the same as, or better than[3] that by us, but if not, we shall never, friends, be able to do so. Let then these be the customs, ordained by laws, relating to all kind of dancing and the teaching of them, that separate are the affairs of slaves, and separate those of masters, if so it seems good to you.

Clin. How does not this seem good, at least for the present?

[20.] *Athen.* Three things however still remain for the free-born to learn; one is computation, and what relates to numbers; but that, which measures length, breadth, and depth, is a second one;[4] and the third that, which (measures) the orbits of the stars, (and) how they naturally march with re-

[1] Ficinus has "viri," either because his MS. read *ὦνδρες* instead of *παῖδες*, or because he disliked with the tautology in *παῖδες—ἔκγονοι*.

[2] As the Athenian speaker and his friends were not the Archons, they could not say of themselves that they would grant the writers of tragedy a chorus, or refuse one. Hence there is evidently some error in *δώσομεν* and *δυναίμεθα*: which it is easy to correct, if we bear in mind that Plato has merely put into prose, what he found in verse, probably in the Μαλθακοὶ of Cratinus, to this effect: Νῦν δ' ἴτε, παῖδες μαλακῶν Μουσῶν, Ἐπιδείξαντες τοῖς ἄρχουσιν Πρῶτον τὰς ὑμετέρας ᾠδάς· Κἂν μὲν ταῦτ' ἢ καὶ βελτίω Τὰ παρ' ὑμῶν λεχθέντα γένηται, Δώσουσ' ὑμῖν χορόν· εἰ δ' αὖ μή, Διδόναι ποτ' ἂν οὐχὶ δύναιντ' ἄν: where most opportunely one MS. according to Bekker reads *γένηται* in lieu of *φαίνεται*, and another according to Stalbaum omits *λεγόμενα*. The verses of Cratinus were spoken probably by the Chorus at the end of the play, where the author anticipated a victory, and gave the audience to understand that he had ready for production other comedies as good as, if not better than, the present one.

[3] Ficinus alone has what the sense requires, "nostris," i. e. *βελτίω ἢ τὰ παρ' ἡμῶν*, instead of *βελτίω τὰ παρ' ὑμῶν*.

[4] The Greek is *ἓν αὖ δεύτερον*. But *εἷς δεύτερος* could not be thus united. Plato wrote *ὡς ὂν αὖ δεύτερον*— For *ὡς* is thus perpetually joined to a participle.

lation to each other. On all these it is not requisite for the many to labour to a nicety, but only some few; of whom, as we advance, we will speak towards the end (of our discussion). [1]For so it will be becoming.[1] But such as are necessary for the masses, it has been very correctly said even by boys,[2] that it is shameful for the many not to know. However it is neither easy nor altogether possible to search into all things accurately; but whatever is necessary among them, it is not possible to throw aside. And it seems that he,[3] who first spoke proverbially of the deity, that not even a god will ever at any time be seen contending against necessity, (said so) looking to this, namely, such necessities [4]as, I conceive, are at least[5] divine; since, (if he said so) of human necessities, to which the multitude look when, speaking in this manner, it would be the most stupid by far of all their speeches.

Clin. What then are those necessities for instruction, O guest, which are not such, but divine?

Athen. I think they are those, which he, who does not practise, nor in any respect learn, will never become either a god, a dæmon, or a hero among men, competent[6] to undertake the care seriously of mankind. And he would want much of being a divine man, who is unable to tell either one, or two, or three, or, in short, even and odd, or in any respect to know how to number, or to reckon nights and days, and is unskilled in the revolutions of the moon, the sun, and the other stars. There is then much folly in the notion that all this education is not necessary for him, who is about to know the most beautiful subjects of instruction. But of what kind is each of these, and how many they are, and when they are to be learnt, and what with some, and what apart from others,

[1]—[1] The words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor.

[2] In lieu of *καί πως*, to which Ast objects, I have translated as if the Greek were *καὶ παισὶν*— Compare "pueri ludentes, Rex eris, aiunt, Si recte facies," in Horace.

[3] Namely Simonides, as shown by iii. § 12, n.

[4]—[4] Stephens was the first to suggest *ἀναγκῶν*, subsequently found in two MSS., in lieu of *ἀναγκαίων*. For Ficinus has "divinis necessitatibus."

[5] Despite the attempt of Dorville on Chariton, p. 419, to defend *τε*, I have adopted *γε*, as proposed by Heindorf on Protag., § 87, which both Ast and Stalbaum have neglected to notice. Bekker considers *τε* as an interpolation.

[6] I have omitted *δυνατὸς*, which Ast acutely saw was the explanation of *οἷος*.

and the whole combination of them, these are the subjects, which a person ought to learn the first; and, with this instruction as the guide, to go on to the rest. For thus a necessity has overtaken him naturally, with which we say no divinity contests at present, or ever will contest.

Clin. What has been asserted at present, O guest, seems to have been somehow truly asserted, and you speak according to nature.

Athen. Such is the case, Clinias. But it is difficult for a person, who has previously arranged thus for himself, to lay down laws in this manner. But if it seems good to you, we will lay down laws for ourselves in a more accurate manner at some other time.

Clin. You seem to us, guest, to fear our habit of ignorance on matters of this kind. You do not, however, justly fear. Endeavour then to speak, concealing nothing on this account.

Athen. I fear the very things you are now speaking of; but I fear much more those, who have indeed laid hold of these points of education, but have laid hold of them improperly. For an ignorance of all things is by no means a dreadful thing nor slippery,[1] nor yet the greatest evil; but much skill and great learning united to an improper education, is a calamity much greater than these.[2]

Clin. You speak the truth.

[21.] *Athen.* It is necessary then to say that the free-born ought to learn of each of these subjects so much as the great mass of boys in Ægypt learn together with their letters. For, in the first place, the rules relating to reckoning have been so artlessly devised for children, that they learn it in sport, and with pleasure; (for there are)[3] distributions of certain apples

[1] I have translated as if the Greek were not ΣΦΟΔΡΟΝ, but ΣΦΑΛΕΡΟΝ.

[2] I cannot understand *τούτων*: nor could Ficinus, who has omitted it.

[3] In the whole of this description of the manner, in which the boys in Ægypt were taught numeration, there is a sad want of perspicuity; so much so that Athenæus, in xv. p. 671, F., has taken upon himself to solve what he calls a Platonic problem, by saying, that in the allusion to the apples and chaplets, the philosopher meant something of this kind: "He wanted to discover a number, by which all might have an equal share, until the last guest had entered, either of apples or chaplets. I assert then, that the number 60 divided into 6 fellow-drinkers, is able to complete the equality. For I know that towards the beginning (of our discourse), [i. p. 4, E.] we stated that not more than five persons supped

and chaplets, the [1] the same numbers being adapted to more and at the same time to fewer :[1] and in the case of pugilists and wrestlers, [2]the assessorships and co-allotments[2] [3]in turn and in successive order,[3] and [4]how they exist naturally;[4] and, moreover, when playing, [5]they mix phials of gold, and copper, and silver, and other things of this kind, and some distribute them whole,[5] adapting, as I said before, to their sports the use of necessary numbers; and thus they benefit those, who are learning to draw up and lead out armies, and to arrange encampments,[6] and to regulate a household, and cause in short the men[7] to be more useful

together; but that we are as many as the grains of sand, is evident. Now the number 60 will commence in this way, when the drinking party is filled up to six. The first comer to the meeting receives 60 chaplets, half of which he gives to the second, and each has therefore 30; and dividing them all again with the third comer, each has just 20; and, sharing again in like manner with the fourth, just 15; with the fifth, just 12; and with the sixth, just 10. And thus is completed the equality of the chaplets." In which passage I have every where changed EK into EIC, and omitted *γίγνονται* after *δεκαπέντε*. But as there is not a word in Plato about the number 60, the whole of this explanation is evidently the fanciful interpretation of some over-clever commentator. But for the express quotation in Athenæus of *μήλων τέ τινων διανομαὶ*, I should have said that Plato wrote *μήλων τετμημένων διανομαὶ καὶ στεφάνων ὅλων*. For thus the apples cut up and the whole chaplets would answer to numbers fractional and integral.

[1]—[1] I confess I do not exactly understand what is meant by the words between the numerals; I could have understood perfectly *πλείοσιν ἅμα καὶ ἐλάττοσιν ἁρμοττόντων ἀριθμῶν τῶν ἰόντων κοινῃ, καὶ*—i. e. "the numbers being adapted to the more and fewer likewise of those who had come in common."

[2]—[2] Ast says that in *ἐφεδρείας* and *ξυλλήξεως* there is an allusion to the custom of appointing by lot a third combatant, who was to contend with the conqueror in a preceding contest, as shown by Aristoph. in *Βατρ.* 791.

[3]—[3] The Greek is *ἐν μέρει καὶ ἐφεξῆς καὶ*— But one MS. omits *καὶ ἐφεξῆς* correctly. For the two expressions mean the same thing. Correctly too one MS. omits *καὶ*.

[4]—[4] How the *ἐφεδρεία* and *σύλληξις* can be said to take place naturally, I cannot understand.

[5]—[5] Here again I am at a loss. All would be intelligible, were we to read, what Plato probably wrote, *ἢ οὐ πλέας ἢ πλέας*, in lieu of *καὶ ὅλας πως*. For "the full" and "not full" would express whole and fractional quantities.

[6] In lieu of *καὶ στρατείας*, omitted by Ficinus, two MSS. read *στρατοπεδείας*, which leads to *στρατοπεδεύσεις*, as in p. 813, E.

[7] Here again Ficinus omits *τοὺς ἀνθρώπους*, as being superfluous at least, and scarcely intelligible. The antithesis in *ἐγρηγορότας* seems to lead to *μᾶλλον ἢ τοὺς νωθροτέρους*, "more than the indolent."

themselves to themselves, and awake; and after this in the case of measurements, relating to length, breadth, and depth, (since they say)[1] that there is naturally inherent in all men a certain ridiculous and disgraceful ignorance on all these points, they liberate them from this.

Clin. What and what kind of ignorance do you mean?

Athen. My dear Clinias, I too, having altogether late in life heard how we are affected on these points, have felt a wonder; and it seems to me, that it is the situation not of human beings, but rather of certain swine-like animals; and I have been ashamed not only of myself, but of all the Greeks.

Clin. About what? Tell us, guest, what you mean.

Athen. I will tell you; or, rather, I will point it out to you by asking a question. And do you give me a short answer. You surely know what length is?

Clin. How not?

Athen. And what breadth is?

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. And that there are these two things, and that a third of these [2] is depth?

Clin. How not?

Athen. Does it not, then, seem to you, that all these may be measured by each other?

Clin. Yes.

Athen. I mean length by length, and breadth by breadth; and that depth is naturally capable of being measured similarly?

Clin. Very much so.

Athen. But, if some of these can do this neither [3] violently nor quietly,[3] but some can, and others not,[4] and yet you imagine that all (can), how do you conceive yourself to be situated with respect to these?

Clin. Badly, it is evident.

[1] I have inserted "since they say," to complete the sense. The Greek is *περὶ ἅπαντα—φύσει*. But *ἐπεὶ* might easily have dropt out before *περὶ*, and *φασὶ* corrupted into *φύσει*.

[2] In lieu of *τούτων*, which I cannot understand, Plato wrote I imagine *ἔτι αὖ τι ὂν—*

[3—3] In *σφόδρα*, says Ast, there is an allusion to the same word in the answer of Clinias; and hence, to preserve the antithesis, Plato added *ἠρέμα*. For otherwise he would have written *μᾶλλον* and *ἧττον*.

[3] That is to say, some quantities are incommensurable, and others not. T.

Athen. But again, as regards length and breadth against depth, or length and breadth against each other, do not all of us the Greeks think, touching these questions, thus, that they can be measured against each other in some way?

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. But if this be at no time and by no means possible, and yet all the Greeks, as I have said, think it is possible, is it not fit, that, being ashamed of them all, we should thus address them,—O ye best of Greeks, this is one of the things, which we said it was base not to know. But is it not altogether beautiful to know things necessary (to be known)?

Clin. How not?

Athen. And in addition to these, there are other things allied to them, in which many errors, the sisters of those [errors],[1] are produced in us.

Clin. What are these?

Athen. Those relating to quantities that are commensurable and not commensurable, by what nature they exist. For it is necessary that he, who reflects upon them, should distinguish them, or be altogether a person of no mark; and it is meet[2] by throwing out problems to each other, and, being engaged in an amusement more agreeable than the pebble-game[3] of old men, to have a love for contention in a pursuit worthy of all attention.[4]

Clin. Perhaps so. At least it seems that the pebble-game and this education are very[5] different from each other.

Athen. These subjects then I assert, Clinias, the youths ought to learn. For they are neither hurtful nor difficult; and

[1] Ast has properly rejected ἁμαρτημάτων as an interpolation.

[2] In lieu of AEI the sense requires ΔEI, as I have translated.

[3] So I should have translated πεττεία at Charm. § 47, Alcib. i. § 15, and here in v. § 9. For though the modern draughts is the nearest approach to the Greek πεττεία, yet there seems to have been some difference in these two games. Wrongly therefore have I translated πεττείαν, "a game of dice," in the Statesman, § 38, as shown by Phædr. p. 274, D. πεττείας τε καὶ κυβείας.

[4] Instead of ταύτων, which I cannot understand, I have translated as if the Greek were πάντων—

[5] All the MSS. read οὐ πάμπολυ— Stephens was the first to suggest καὶ πάμπολυ, found subsequently, according to Stalbaum, in the margin of a solitary MS. For Ficinus omits the negative. But as καὶ has no meaning here, I should prefer που— On the confusion of ου and που see Porson at Hecub. 300. Winckelmann refers to his note on Plutarch Erot. p. 217, but what he says there I know not, for I have never seen the book.

when they are learnt, combined with sport, they will do a benefit, but never a hurt, to our state. But, if any one says otherwise, let us hear him.

Clin. How not?

Athen. If then these things appear to be so, it is evident that we shall decide in their favour; but appearing to be not so, they will be decided against.

Clin. Evidently so. How not?

Athen. Let then these be laid down as belonging to necessary instructions, in order that what relates to the laws may not be (done) by us in vain.

[1] *Clin.* Let them be laid down.[1]

Athen. [2](For they are) as it were pledges from the rest of the polity, which may be dissolved,[2] if they should in no respect receive kindly[3] us, who propose them, or you, who establish them.

Clin. The condition you propose is just.

[22.] *Athen.* After these then look to the instruction relating to the stars, whether this being chosen for youth pleases us, or the contrary.

Clin. Only speak.

Athen. And yet there is respecting them a subject of great marvel, and to be endured at no time and by no means.

Clin. What is this?

Athen. We say that we ought not to search after the greatest god,[4] and the whole order of the world, nor to be busy in explaining the causes (of things); for it is not holy. It seems indeed, that, if the very contrary took place, it would take place correctly.

Clin. How say you?

Athen. What is stated is a paradox, and some one may think it is not suited to old men; but when any one conceives

[1]—[1] I have assigned the words *κείσθω μέντοι* to Clinias. For *μέντοι*, following a word repeated, always indicates the assent of the party thus repeating the word, as I have shown on Hipp. Maj. § 12, n. 2.

[2]—[2] I confess I cannot understand the words between the numerals.

[3] Ast says that *φιλοφρονῆται* means "be agreeable." But *φιλοφρονεῖσθαι* has always elsewhere an active sense. Hence I am at a loss here for the real meaning of the whole sentence.

[4] On this celebrated saying of Plato Ast has referred to a host of writers, who have alluded to it, from Cicero De N. D. i. 12, to Theodoretus.

that instruction is something beautiful, and true, and advantageous to a city, and likewise in every respect acceptable to the deity, by no manner of means is it possible not to mention it.

Clin. You say what is reasonable. But shall we find an instruction of this kind in the case of the stars?

Athen. All we Greeks, so to say, tell, O ye good men, a falsehood respecting those mighty divinities the Sun and Moon.

Clin. Of what kind is the falsehood?

Athen. We say that they never proceed in the same path, and that there are some other stars with them, to which we give the name of planets.

Clin. By Zeus, you are saying, guest, the truth. For in the course of my life, I have often seen myself the morning and the evening star, and certain other stars, never proceeding along in the same track, but wandering entirely. And we all know that the Sun and Moon [1]are perpetually doing so.[1]

Athen. These then are the things, Megillus and Clinias, which I assert our citizens and youths ought to learn respecting the gods in heaven, so far as this [2]about all these matters, so far[2] for the sake of not blaspheming them, but of offering sacrifices ever with good-omened words, and piously in prayers approaching[3] them.

Clin. This indeed is right, if, first, it is possible to learn that, of which you are speaking; and next, if we are not at present speaking properly about them, yet after learning, we shall speak so of them. Thus much do I go along with you; and that a thing of this kind must be learnt. Do you, then, endeavour to explain entirely that these things are so, and we will together follow you as your disciples.

[1]—[1] The Greek is *δρῶντας ταῦθ' ἃ ἀεὶ*—which is perfectly unintelligible. Hence Ast would read *ταῦτα ἀεὶ*, similar to "semper hæc facere" in Cornarius. But Ficinus has "errare semper omnes cognovimus:" Plato wrote, I suspect, *ὁρῶντες ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα θεῖν*—i. e. "on looking at them we know that they run hither and thither." On the confusion of *ὁρῶντες* and *δρῶντες* see my remarks in Troad. Præf. p. xxiii., and on *ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα*, found in viii. § 5, p. 835, B., see at Eumen. 95.

[2]—[2] The Greek is *περὶ ἁπάντων τούτων μέχρι*—where *μέχρι* is repeated unnecessarily, whatever Ast may say to the contrary; and *περὶ ἁπάντων τούτων*, omitted by Ficinus, have nothing to which they can be referred. I suspect that we ought to transpose them after *εὐφημεῖν δὲ*, and read *περὶ ἁπάντων τούτων ἐν χαρᾷ*—

[3] I have translated as if the Greek word was formerly *ἐρχομένους*, not, as at present, *εὐχομένους*.

Athen. It is not easy to learn what I am saying, nor is it on the other hand altogether difficult, nor is it a matter of a very long time. And the proof is, that, although I myself have heard these things, neither recently [1] nor formerly, I am able to render them manifest in a little time. And yet had they been difficult, I, who am in years, would not have been able to explain them to you, who are in years.

Clin. You say what is true. But what is the instruction, which you call marvellous; but which you say it is fitting for the youths to learn, and yet we are ignorant of? Endeavour to speak about it, at least to this extent, with the utmost perspicuity.

Athen. I must endeavour. The notion then, thou best of men, respecting the Sun and Moon and the other stars, that they are planets, is not correct; but the very contrary is the case. For each of them perpetually traverses the same path, being not many, but one, in a circle; but they appear to traverse many. And that, which is the most swift of them, is not rightly thought to be [2] the slowest, and contrariwise the contrary. Now if such is the case naturally, but we do not think so, if we had such notions respecting the horses, that run at Olympia, or of men contesting in the long course, and we called the swiftest the slowest, and the slowest the swiftest, and, passing our encomiums, celebrated the vanquished as the victor, I think we should not attach our praises properly, nor in a manner agreeable to the racers, [3]being men.[3] But now, when we err in the very same manner respecting the gods, do we not think that, what,[4] when it took place there, would be then ridiculous and incorrect, takes place here at present (not well) in the case of the gods.

Clin. Ridiculous, I am aware, entirely.[5]

[1] From "nuper" in Ficinus, Stephens suggested *νέον*, found subsequently in one MS., in lieu of *νέος*: which should otherwise be *νέος ὤν*, to which *νέως* in three MSS. seems to lead, or else to *νεωστὶ*, which Winckelmann prefers.

[2] I have translated as if the Greek were *εἶναι*, not *αὖ*—

[3—3] The words between the numerals Ficinus, whom Taylor follows, has omitted; for he saw that *ἀνθρώποις* could scarcely thus be mentioned singly after the preceding *ἵππων* and *ἀνδρῶν*. Hence Plato wrote, I suspect, *ἀνθρώποις ἵπποις τε*, not *ἀνθρώποις οὖσι*.

[4] I have translated as if the Greek were *οἶδ'*, *ὅλως*, not *οὐδαμῶς*—

[5] I have adopted the notion of Ast, that Plato wrote *οἰομεθ' ὃ*—not *οἰόμεθα*—He should have elicited likewise *ἐντανθοῖ οὐκ εὖ* from *ἐντανθοῖ καὶ*—as I have translated.

Athen. It is not then an act acceptable to the divinity, when we hymn to the gods what is false.

Clin. Most true; if such is the case.

Athen. If then we can show that such is the case, all these subjects are up to this point to be learnt; but, if we cannot show it, we must dismiss them; and let this be thus laid down.

Clin. By all means.

[23.] *Athen.* It is then proper to say now, that the legal institutions relating to the instruction of childhood, have reached their end. And it is requisite to reflect in a similar manner upon hunting and every thing else of this kind. [1]For it appears that the office of a lawgiver is not merely that of laying down laws; but that he ought to make use of what is a mean between admonition and laws;[1] an idea that has often occurred to us during our discussion; for instance, (when we were speaking) about the bringing up of the very young. For we said there were things not to be mentioned; and that, speaking of them as laws laid down, we thought the notion[2] to be full[3] of folly; but laws having been written in this way, and the whole of a polity (laid down),[4] the praise of a citizen pre-eminent in virtue is not then perfect, when any one says that he, who ministers the best to the laws, and obeys them the most, is the good man; but this would be said more perfectly, that he is so, who leads a life without stain,[5] through being obedient to the writings of the party, who lays down the laws and distributes praise and blame. This is the most correct language for the praise of a

[1]—[1] Such is the literal translation of Ficinus. That of the Greek is less intelligible. "For it seems almost that, what is ordained by the lawgiver, is for some other purpose than for the lawgiver to be freed (from trouble), and that there is something else in addition to the laws, which is naturally something between admonition and laws." Instead however of *ἐπὶ μεῖζον εἶναι*, which Ast would defend, Stephens suggested *ἐπὶ μεῖζον ἰέναι*: while the Bipont editor prefers *ἔτι μεῖζον εἶναι*, obtained from the version of Cornarius.

[2] In lieu of *εἶναι*, which I cannot understand, nor could Ast, as is evident from his unsatisfactory explanation, I have translated as if the Greek were *ἔννοιαν*—For there would be thus a Platonic play upon *ἔννοιαν—ἀνοίας γέμειν*— See at Phileb. § 57, n. 56. Ficinus has, what Taylor adopted, "idque tentare dementis esse."

[3] This is the happy restoration by Cornarius of *γέμειν* for *γε μὴν*.

[4] Ficinus alone has "republica *constituta*," required by the sense.

[5] Ficinus omits *ἄκρατον*— Winckelmann suggests *ἀκρότατος*.

citizen; and the legislator in reality ought not only to write down his laws, but in addition to the laws to write down, interwoven with them,[1] what seems to him to be beautiful and not beautiful; and the tip-top citizen should establish firmly these no less than what are bound down by fines imposed by the law. And we adduce as a witness the subject of our present discussion; for it will show more clearly what we mean. For hunting is a thing of wide extent, comprehended at present under nearly one name. For there is much hunting of aquatic animals; much of those that fly; and still more of those on land, not only of wild beasts, but that which[2] it is fit to consider as the hunting of men, I mean[3] in war, and much too is the hunting in the way of friendship, of which one part brings praise, the other blame. The thefts too of robbers and armies are huntings. The legislator, therefore, who establishes laws about hunting, can neither leave these unnoticed, nor, by imposing regulations and fines on all, lay down laws of a menacing kind. What then is to be done in cases of this kind? [4]On the one hand, the legislator ought to praise and blame the business of hunting,[4] relating to the labours and pursuits of youth; and on the other hand, the young man ought to hear and obey, and neither pleasure nor labour ought to prevent him (from doing so); but let him honour what is mentioned with praise, rather than what has been laid down by law, and are accompanied with threats, united to fines relating to each, [5]and perform what is enjoined.[5] This being premised, the praise and blame of hunting will follow in a becoming manner. For that, which makes the souls of young men better, belongs to the person praising, but to the party blaming that, which (effects) the contrary. Let us then speak of what follows in order, addressing the young men by a prayer—O friends, never may any desire or love of fishing by sea, or of fishing with a hook, seize you; nor, generally, of labouring to catch

[1] Ficinus omits *νόμοις ἐμπεπλεγμένα*.

[2] I have translated as if the Greek were *ἣν*, what the syntax requires, not *τὴν*—

[3] Stephens correctly suggested *τήν γε*—in lieu of *τήν τε*—

[4]—[4] Ficinus, whom Taylor follows, has "oportet ut legislator, quæ in venatione, laudanda sunt, laudet; quæ contra, vituperet."

[5]—[5] The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor.

any aquatic animals with an osier net,[1] either when you are awake or asleep![2] May no desire ever come upon you to catch men at sea, nor to rob them, which would make you cruel and lawless hunters! And never may it come into your farthest thoughts[3] to commit thefts in the country and city; nor let a desire, [4]full of cleverness, but not a very liberal one,[4] come upon any young person to catch birds. The hunting then and catching of land animals alone remains for our athletes; of which, one kind, performed by those sleeping[5] ever[6] in turn, and called nocturnal, belongs to sluggish men, and is not worthy of praise; nor yet the other (of those awake),[7] which, enjoying a remission from labour, does by nets and snares, and not by the victory of a soul fond of labour, get the savage strength of wild beasts into its power. That hunting then of quadrupeds alone remains as the best of all, performed with horses and dogs, and by the bodies of the parties themselves; over all of which animals they get the mastery by running them down, and inflicting blows, and hurling darts, the parties themselves, to whom there is any care of possessing a godlike bravery, being engaged with their own hands in the hunt. Of all these matters then in the shape of praise or blame, let this discourse have been spoken; and and let this be the law. Let no one hinder these truly sacred hunters from hunting, wherever they please. But no one shall ever suffer any person at any place to engage in nocturnal hunting with dogs[8] and ropes. And let him not prevent

[1] The nets, to which Plato alludes, are still in use in England for catching eels especially, and are called eel-baskets.

[2] This allusion to catching fish, when the fisherman is asleep, will be best understood by knowing that nets are generally set over-night; when fish are more eager in their search for food than during the day.

[3] Ast, dissatisfied with *εἰς τὸν ἔσχατον νοῦν*, would reject those words as an interpolation; or, omitting only *νοῦν*, render *εἰς τὸν ἔσχατον* "to the man of lowest character," referring to Aristotle Polit. vii. 1. Stalb. would expel *εἰς* and *νοῦν*. I should prefer *εἰς τὸν τοῦ ἐσχάτου—νοῦν*. Ficinus omits *ἔσχατον* entirely. Winckelmann would read *εἰς τὸ ἔσχατον*, referring to Herodot. vii. 229.

[4—4] Ficinus has "jucunda venatio, servilis magis quam libera." But *αἰμύλος* is not "pleasant," but "crafty," as shown by myself on Æsch. Suppl. 1035.

[5] Ficinus seems to refer *τῶν εὐδόντων* to the animals.

[6] In the unmeaning *αὖ* lies hid *ἀεὶ*—as I have translated.

[7] Instead of *τῶν διαπαύματα*, Winckelmann suggests *τῶν ἐγρηγορότων διαπαύματα*—what I have adopted.

[8] In lieu of *κυσὶ* Grou proposed to read *ἄρκυσι*, whom Ast and the Zurich editors have followed.

fowling in uncultivated places and in mountains; but any one who may be present shall forbid it in cultivated and [1]sacred holy[1] places, and a person catching fish, except in ports or sacred rivers, and marshes or pools; but in other places let it be lawful for him to catch them, provided he does not use a mixture of juices.[2] Now, therefore, it is proper to say, that the legal institutions respecting education have arrived at their end.

Clin. You may well say so.

BOOK VIII.

[1.] CLOSE upon these it is for us to regulate and lay down by law, in conjunction with the Delphic oracles, festivals, (and)[3] what (are to be) the sacrifices and the divinities,[4] to whom it will be better and more advisable for the state to sacrifice, and at what time, and how many in number. Of these matters,[5] I think[6] it will be perhaps nearly our business to lay down some by law.

Clin. Perhaps so, as regards the number.

Athen. Let us then speak first as regards the number. [7]For let there be[7] of three hundred and sixty-five [8]nothing wanting;[8] so that some one[9] of the magistrates may always sacri-

[1—1] The Greek in one MS. is *ἱεροῖς ἁγίοις*: where Ast would reject *ἁγίοις* as a gl. The six others read *ἀγρίοις*: which seems to lead to *ἱεραῖς ὀργάσι*— On the word *ὀργὰς* see Ruhnken on Tim. p. 195.

[2] This is the earliest allusion to the custom, still prevalent in England, of catching fish by putting poisonous or stupifying drugs into the water.

[3] I have translated as if *καὶ* had dropt out before *αἵ τινες*, and thus met the objection first started by Stephens against the want of syntax.

[4] Although *θεοῖς οἵστισιν* might be defended by the passages produced by Lobeck on Ajac. 801, ed. 1, yet here one would prefer *θεοὶ, οἵστισιν* —and so in Aristoph. *Βατρ.* 889, *Ἕτεροι γάρ εἰσιν, οἵσιν εὔχομαι θεοῖς* —Brunck correctly adopted *θεοὶ*, found in some MSS.

[5] In lieu of *ἔνιά γ' αὐτων*, where *γε* is useless, Plato wrote, I suspect, *τούτων*, as I have translated.

[6] One MS. has *ἂν εἶναι νομοθετεῖν*, evidently an error for *ἂν οἶμαι νομοθετεῖν*, which I have adopted.

[7—7] Instead of *ἔστωσαν*, Ficinus has "oportere censeo," translated by Taylor, "I should establish."

[8—8] The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor.

[9] In lieu of *ὅπως ἂν μία γέ τις*, I should prefer *ὅπως ἂν ὁσημέραι τις*—

fice to some god or dæmon in behalf of the city, and the people,[1] and their property. And let the (holy) interpreters, and the priests, and the priestesses, and the prophets, being assembled together, with the guardians of the laws, ordain what it was necessary for the legislator to omit. [2]For it is requisite that these should take notice of things omitted.[2] For the law will say that there are twelve festivals to the twelve gods, from whom each tribe has its name, and that persons are to make to each of these monthly sacrifices, and dances, and musical contests, and to assign the gymnastic exercises, in a manner befitting both to the gods themselves, and the several seasons; and to distribute the female festivals likewise, such as ought to be separated from the men, and such as ought not. Moreover, the festivals of the gods below, and such as are to be called celestial, and what is attendant on these, must not be mixed together, but must be separated in the twelfth month, sacred to Pluto,[3] by persons paying rites according to law: nor must persons feel, like enemies, an ill will towards that god, but they must honour him, as being even the best to the race of men. [4]For the communion between soul and body is not better than the separation, as I affirm, speaking seriously.[4] Besides, it is re-

For Plato meant to say that there ought to be a sacrifice daily; for he knew that the year consisted of 365 days. With regard to the word *ὀσημέραι*, it is found twice in Aristophanes, and is to be restored again for *σήμερον*, as I remarked in the Cl. Jl., No. 37, p. 130, although *μία γε τις* might be supported by at least a dozen passages.

[1] Ficinus has "se ipsis," from whence Ast would read *αὐτῶν*. He should have suggested *ἀστῶν*, unless it be said that *αὐτῶν* agrees with *πολιτῶν*, to be got out of *πόλεως*. See Porson on Hec. 22.

[2—2] So Taylor translates the Latin of Ficinus, "nam derelictorum cognitores istos esse oportet." The Greek is *καὶ δὴ καὶ αὐτοῦ τούτου χρὴ γίγνεσθαι ἐπιγνώμονας τοῦ παραλειπομένου τούτους τοὺς αὐτοὺς*: where *καὶ δὴ καὶ*, "moreover," is an absurdity, for the sense requires *καὶ γὰρ*, and *τοῦ παραλειπομένου* is an evident explanation of *αὐτοῦ τούτου*: to say nothing of the unmeaning *τούτους τοὺς αὐτοὺς*, "these the same." Plato wrote in Greek *καὶ γὰρ αὐτοὺς τούτου χρὴ γίγνεσθαι ἐπιγνώμονας*—answering to the Latin of Ficinus.

[3] In like manner during the 12th month the Saturnalia were celebrated in ancient Rome.

[4—4] I must leave for others to explain the relevancy of the sentiment between the numerals. It is beyond my comprehension. Unless I am greatly mistaken, there is a lacuna here, in which it was shown that the union of body and soul was effected by the agency of the celestial gods, and the separation by that of the infernal; and that both were equally kind

quisite for those, who are about to distinguish these sufficiently, to have this notion, that this our city is such, as no one will find another like it, of those at present, as regards the leisurely employment of time, and the power over things necessary for existence. But it ought, like a single individual, to live well. Now to those living well, it is necessary for this to be present the first, namely, [1]that persons should neither injure others,[1] nor be injured by others. Now of these, the former is not very difficult ; but it is very difficult to possess the power of not being injured ; nor is it possible to perfectly acquire it otherwise than by becoming perfectly good.[2] The same thing also takes place in a city, to which, when it is good, there is a life of peace ; but of war from without and within, when it is wicked. And as this is the case nearly every where,[3] each must exercise themselves in war, not during a war, but during a life of peace. It is necessary then for a city, endued with intellect, to exercise itself in war, for not less than one day in each month, but for more as it may seem fit to the rulers, without taking thought of cold or heat, both the men, and the women and the boys, [4]in order that all may be prepared,[4] when it shall somehow[5] seem good to the rulers to lead forth the people in a mass, [6]and sometimes in portions.[6]

to man, while living and dead, if he only acted during life piously towards both. With regard to the sentiment that death is not inferior to life, Stobæus will furnish plenty of passages in Tit. cxx.

[1]—[1] I have adopted the reading found in the text of two MSS., and the margin of one, *μήτε αὐτοὺς ἀδικεῖν ἄλλους*, similar to "ut nec ipsi aliis nec alii ipsis injuriam inferant" in Ficinus, where *ἄλλους*, wanting in the rest, has been supplied, as required by the antithesis; on which see my Poppo's Prolegom. p. 157. Perhaps however Plato, *τὸ μήτ' ἀδικεῖν μήτ' ἀδικεῖσθαι*, as we find *Δάκνειν, δάκνεσθαι* in Aristoph. Βατρ. 886.

[2] For a perfectly good man cannot be injured ; because he, who is injured, is deprived of some good. Now virtue is the property of a perfectly good man ; but this cannot be taken away. T.

[3] I have translated as if the Greek were *πάντῃ*, not *ταύτῃ*—

[4]—[4] The words between the numerals have been adopted by Taylor from the Latin alone of Ficinus, "ut omnes parati sint."

[5] The Greek is *ὡς πανδημίαν* : where *ὡς* is unintelligible. Ficinus has "quodammodo—" which leads to *πως*. Winckelmann suggests *πανδημίᾳ*—

[6]—[6] The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor. The Greek is *τότε δὲ καὶ κατὰ μέρη* : where Stephens would read *τοτὲ*, adopted by Ast and Stalb. But though *τότε* is sometimes found in the second clause, with the omission of it in the first, yet here Plato wrote, I suspect, either *τότε δ' αὖ* or *ἐνίοτε*—

And it is meet[1] to devise some beautiful sports, together with sacrifices, that certain festival-battles[2] may take place, imitating as distinctly as possible the battles in war; and it is meet to distribute rewards of victory and valour to each of these, and to make encomiums upon, and abuse of, each other, according as each may conduct himself in the contests, and through the whole of life, [3]by decking the party, who has been thought to be the best, and dispraising him, who has not.[3] But, in the first place, let not every one be a poet on such subjects, but let him be a person not less than fifty years of age; nor, in the next place, such of those, as possess poetry and music sufficiently in themselves, but have never done any honourable and conspicuous act, but such as are good men themselves and held in honour by the state, and have been the doers of honourable deeds. (And)[4] let the compositions of such persons be sung, even although they may not be naturally musical. But let the decision on these matters be with the instructor of youth, and the other guardians of the laws; and let them[5] assign, as an honour to them[6] alone, a freedom of speech in songs; but to the others let there not be this liberty; nor let any one dare to sing a song, which has not been approved of by the guardians of the laws, who are to decide, not even if it be sweeter than the hymns of [7]Thamyris and Orpheus;[7] but such sacred poems as have, after being decided upon, been dedicated to the gods; and such as, being the poems of worthy men, scattering blame or praise on certain parties, have been adjudged to do a thing of this kind with moderation.

[2.] The same things, I assert, ought to take place similarly, both among men and women, respecting war, and the liberty of speech in poetry. But it is meet for the legislator to bring the question before himself, and to cast about it with this discourse—Come, what citizens shall I, after having

[1] I have translated as if the Greek were ΔΕΙ not ΑΕΙ.

[2] These festival-battles would be now called sham-fights, occurring on certain holy-days.

[3—3] The words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor.

[4] I have translated as if *καὶ* had dropt out after *καλῶν*—

[5] I have adopted *οὗτοι δὲ*, suggested by Ast, for *τοῦτο*—

[6] Ficinus has "probis viris," adopted by Taylor.

[7—7] In the time of Plato there was some poetry afloat, attributed to Orpheus: but this and another passage in Ion, § 4, are the only two, where a similar allusion is made to the existing poetry of Thamyris.

nourished the whole state properly, bring up? Ought they not to be the combatants in the greatest contests, to whom there are ten thousand antagonists? Entirely so, some one speaking with propriety may say. What then, if we had brought up boxers or combatants in boxing and wrestling united, or persons contending in any other contests of this kind, should we have met[1] them in the contest itself, not having ourselves fought with any one at a former time? Or, if we were pugilists, should we not have learned to fight many days previous to the contest, and laboured hard in imitating all such things as we should be about to adopt at that period,[2] when we were contending for victory? And should we not, with the view of coming the nearest possible to what is similar, have put on boxing-gloves[3] instead of the cestus, in order that the blows and the avoidance of blows might be practised as sufficiently as possible? And should there have happened to be a deficiency of fellow-combatants, should we not, through dreading the laughter of the senseless, have dared to hang up an inanimate image,[4] and practise ourselves against it? And if we were in want both of animate and inanimate adversaries, should we not have ventured, in some desert spot, to fight even with a shadow[5] against ourselves? Or, for what else would any one say that this practice in moving the hand took place?

Clin. For nearly nothing else, O guest, than the very one you have just now mentioned.

Athen. What then, will the warlike portion of the city dare

[1] Ficinus, mistaking the meaning of *ἀπήντων*, has rendered the passage "itane in ipsum certamen educeremus, ut cum nullo antea unquam pugnaverint:" and his mistake is followed to the letter by Taylor.

[2] Instead of *εἰς τότε*, Ficinus seems to have found in his MS. *ἐν τῷ ὄντι*, for his version is "in vero certamine," adopted by Taylor.

[3] The Greek is *σφαίρας*, literally "balls," from which it is evident, that by *σφαῖραι* were meant what we call in England "boxing-gloves," that have on the outside a semi-spherical projection; while by the word *ἱμὰς*, literally, "a thong," was meant "a leather strap, studded with iron nails," called in Latin "cestus," which, as we learn from Theocritus, Id. xx. 3, was put round the knuckles, not only to protect them, but to cause the blow to be heavier.

[4] Such was the practice of the Romans, as we learn from Juvenal vi. 246, Senec. Epist. xviii. 6, and Vegetius de Re Milit. i. 11, ii. 23, quoted by Ast; who might have referred to the Laches, § 1, where the fighting in armour was probably something of a similar kind.

[5] On this *σκιαμαχία*, Ast refers to Virgil, Æn. v. 376; Plato, Rep. vii. 5; Apolog. § 2; and Schol. on Philostratus Heroic. p. 393, ed. Boiss.

on each occasion to go to the greatest of contests, worse prepared than combatants of this kind, when it is about to fight for life, and for children, and property, and the whole of the state. And will not then the legislator, fearful lest these gymnastic exercises with each other should appear to some persons ridiculous, lay down a law, and ordain that persons are to act the soldier each day in a little way without arms, and cause the dances, and the whole of gymnastic exercise, to tend together to this point? and will he not likewise ordain that some of the gymnastic exercises for instance,[1] either greater or less, [2]are to last for not less than a month; and that persons are to enter[2] into contests with each other through the whole country in seizing upon places, and making ambuscades,[3] and by imitating the whole of war in reality,[4] to fight with boxing-gloves, and to make use of darts somewhat dangerous, and as near as possible to the hurling of real ones; in order that the sport may not be altogether without a fear from each other, but cause some terror, and thus, after a manner, show who is the man of mettle, and who is not; and by distributing correctly honours to some, and disgrace to others, he may render the whole state through its (whole) life useful for a real contest. And moreover, should any one happen to die in these contests, that, as the death was involuntary, he may lay down that the homicide shall, after being purified according to law, be pure in hand; reflecting that when not many men die, others will be born again not inferior; but when fear, as it were, dies, in all these cases he will no longer

[1] This is the only passage I remember to have met with, where *οἷον* or any word is introduced between *οἱ δὲ* and *τινες*—and even here it is omitted by Ficinus; whose version however is not sufficiently close to enable us to see what he found in his MS.

[2—2] Ast would reject *τε καὶ ἐλάττους*, as being not only at variance with the train of thought, but omitted likewise by Ficinus. But he forgot that in *μείζους καὶ ἐλάττους*, for *τε* is properly omitted by one MS., there is an allusion to the *πανδημίᾳ ἢ κατὰ μέρη* mentioned in § 1, and that *καὶ* is to be taken in the sense of *ἤ*, as shortly afterwards *καλλίω* [*τε*] *καὶ ἀσχημονεστέραν*. For other examples see my Poppo's Prolegom. p. 173.

[3] I have translated as if Plato wrote *ἀμίλλας—ἀμιλλωμένους—καὶ ποιουμένους ἐνέδρας*, not *ἀμίλλας—ποιουμένους—ἀμιλλωμένους καὶ ἐνέδρας—*

[4] In lieu of *ὄντως* one MS. has *ὄντος*. Neither word is acknowledged by Ficinus. One would prefer *οὕτως*, and unite it to *σφαιρομαχεῖν*.

be able to discover a test of the better and the worse; which is, in no small degree, a greater evil to a state than the other.[1]

Clin. We will agree with you, O guest, that he ought to lay down matters of this kind by law, and direct the attention of the whole state to them.

[3.] *Athen.* Do we then all of us know the reason, why in cities at present no such dancing and contest exist, scarcely at any time or in any manner, except to a very small extent? Shall we say that this happens through the ignorance of the masses, and of those who have laid down laws for them?

Clin. Perhaps so.

Athen. By no means, O blessed Clinias. But it is proper to say that there are two causes of this, and very sufficient too.

Clin. What are they?

Athen. One is, that, through the love of wealth making the whole of time to be without any leisure[2] for the care of other things except private property, on which the soul of every citizen is hanging, it can have no care for other things but of daily pecuniary gain; and whatever learning or pursuit leads to this, every one individually is most ready to learn and to practise, but he laughs down all the rest. It is proper therefore to mention this as one reason, why a state is unwilling to engage seriously in this or any other honourable and excellent pursuit; but through an insatiable desire of silver and gold is willing for every man to undergo every art and artifice, both the more beautiful and the more base,[3] if he is about to become wealthy, and to engage in a line of conduct holy and unholy, and thoroughly disgraceful, and to feel no annoyance, if only he possesses the power, like a wild beast,[4] to eat all

[1] Namely, "the involuntary destruction of a few individuals." T.

[2] From hence it is evident that the favourite doctrine of the Political Economists of the present day, that "time is money," is older than they are probably aware of.

[3] With this passage may be compared the celebrated one in Horace i. Ep. i. 65, "rem facias, rem, Si possis, recte; si non, quocunque modo, rem."

[4] Instead of θηρίῳ Stephens was the first to suggest θηρίον, adopted by Ast and Stalb. Winckelmann conceives that γαστρὶ has been erased before καθάπερ θηρίῳ, answering to "ventri" in Ficinus, "veluti pecora, ventri ac veneri serviant."

kinds of things, and drink likewise,[1] and to obtain all satiety in all forms of venereal enjoyments.

Clin. Right.

Athen. Let this then be put down as one reason, which I assign, as preventing states from practising[2] any thing else that is honourable or what relates to war sufficiently; but by causing the naturally well-ordered to become merchants, and ship-owners, and servile ministers, and the brave to be robbers, and house-breakers, and guilty of sacrilege, and fond of war, and tyrannical, it destroys, and greatly so[3] sometimes, those who were well-disposed but unfortunate.

Clin. How say you?

Athen. Why should I not call those in every respect unfortunate, to whom there is a necessity by feeling hungry through the whole of life and neglecting their own soul to be perpetually engaged in a contest?[4]

Clin. This, then, is one reason. But what do you assign, O guest, as the second?

Athen. You have very properly reminded me.

[5] *Clin.* This insatiable search (after wealth)[6] that makes each person to be without leisure, is, as you say, one impediment to each practising what relates to war. Be it so. But tell us the second.

Athen. Do I seem to have not spoken, but to have wasted time through a want of readiness?

Clin. You do not. But you seem to us to reprobate, as through hatred, a custom of this kind more than is becoming, [7] in the language which has just now fallen from you.[7]

[1] Although *ὡσαύτως* might perhaps stand, yet I should prefer *ἀσώτως*— "intemperately." See at viii. § 6.

[2] I have omitted here *ἐῶσα*, which is evidently out of its place, and translated as if *ἐῶσι*, "neglecting," followed *τὴν ψυχὴν ἀεὶ τὴν αὑτῶν* in the next speech of the Athenian.

[3—3] The Greek is *ποιοῦσα καὶ μάλ' ἐνίοτε*— But *ποιοῦσα* is evidently superfluous after the preceding *ἀπεργαζομένη*. Plato wrote, I suspect, what I have translated, *ἀπόλλυσι καὶ μάλα ἐνίοτε*—

[4] Instead of *διεξελθεῖν*, Ficinus found some word answering to his "cruciare," probably *διεξαθλεύειν*.

[5] This speech belongs rather to Megillus. For otherwise Clinias will be found to repeat his previous request.

[6] Ficinus alone has, what is required by the sense, "divitiarum—"

[7—7] The words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor.

Athen. You find fault with me, guests, most correctly; and you shall hear, as is reasonable, what is after this.

Clin. Only speak.

Athen. I say, then, that the not-polities, of which we have often spoken in our previous conversation, namely, a democracy, an oligarchy, and a tyranny, are the causes of this. For in these there is not a single polity; but all may most justly be called states of sedition. For not one willingly rules over the willing, but willingly over the unwilling, and this always with some compulsion. And as the governor fears the governed, he never at any time willingly permits a person to be handsome, or wealthy, or strong, or brave, or altogether warlike. [1] These two then are nearly pre-eminently the causes of all things, but of these they are really the pre-eminent.[1] But the polity for which we are now giving laws, avoids both these. For it leads a life of the greatest leisure; and (the people) are free from each other, and will, I think, become from these laws the lovers of money the least. So that such an establishment of a polity would alone of all existing at present, probably and according to reason receive at the same time the instruction that has been gone through, and the warlike sport, which has been perfected correctly at least by description.

Clin. Correctly (said).

[4.] *Athen.* Is it not then next in order to these for us to have a recollection of all gymnastic contests, so that we may attend to such of them as appertain to war, and lay down the rewards of victory, but to bid farewell to such, as do not appertain. But what they are, it is better for them to be detailed from the beginning, and to establish by law. And, first, must we not lay down what appertains to running and swiftness?

Clin. We must lay them down.

Athen. Now the quickness of the body is altogether of all things the most appertaining to war; one kind connected with the feet, and the other with the hands; that of the feet being required for running away and overtaking, but (of the hands)

[1]—[1] Such, according to Ast, is the literal translation of the Greek: but of their meaning he says nothing, nor can I explain what he understood by them. What Plato really wrote, might, I think, be recovered by a conjecture. To my mind he certainly did not write what is found in the text at present. Ficinus has "Hæ duæ omnium quidem quodammodo, horum certe præcipuæ causæ sunt."

[1] the fight in close conflict and the standing up together requiring strength and vigour.[1]

Clin. How not?

Athen. But neither of them without heavy arms possesses the greatest utility.

Clin. For how should they?

Athen. The crier, then, shall first invite the runner in the stadium, as he does now at the games. And the runner will enter, having a shield; for we do not put down rewards for the light-armed soldier. He, who is about to contend by running in the stadium, [2] will enter the first with his arms; but the second, he (who is to run) the doubled course; the third, he (who is to run) the horse course; the fourth, moreover, he (who is to run) the long course;[2] and the fifth, [3] whom we shall start the first with his arms on,[3] is to run a dis-

[1]—[1] Ast, justly objecting to the omission of χειρὸς or χειρῶν, required to balance ποδῶν, proposed to expel ἰσχύος, as being superfluous before ῥώμης, and to insert in its place χειρός. But Schæfer has shown that those two words are frequently united. To myself the error seems to be rather in μάχη καὶ σύντασις, for which I would read ἀψιμαχία καὶ σύστασις, where ἀψιμαχία would necessarily carry with it the idea of a fight at close quarters. Suidas has opportunely Ἀψιμαχία· συναφὴ μάχης. Ἀππιανός.

[2]—[2] According to Ast, the whole course was divided into four parts. The first was called the Στάδιον, consisting of 125 paces = 625 feet; the second was called Δίαυλος, because the distance being a straight line, like a pipe, was the double of the stadium, and persons run from the starting post of the stadium to its winning post, and back again; the third called Δόλιχος, was six times the length of the stadium, and sometimes seven, as may be inferred from Soph. El. 717; the fourth, Ἵππειος, was, according to Pausanias, twice the Διαυλος, or four times the length of the stadium. Now if such was the case, it seems strange that the Ἵππειος should be mentioned after the Δόλιχος, and still more strange that if the course was called Ἵππειος, as it seems to have been from Euripides in Electr. 824, that Plato should call it ἐφίππιον: from whence Ficinus was led to render καὶ τρίτος, ὁ τὸν ἐφίππιον, by "tertius, qui equis," as if the question were here about a person riding on horseback, as well as running on foot, an interpretation at variance with the whole train of thought.

[3]—[3] After "the fifth," Ficinus alone has, what is required by the sense, and adopted by Taylor, "qui leviori armatura ornatus," antithetical to the πάλιν βαρύτερον just afterwards. This however is not the only variation, for he thus transposes the next sentences, by writing after "ornatus"—"quem primum sexaginta stadiorum spatio ad aliquod templum Martis perventurum immittemus; alius etiam graviore armatus armatura, brevius ac planius spatium cursurus,"—where not only has he omitted ἐπονομάζοντες, which is here perfectly unintelligible, but inserted "alius," to

tance of sixty stadia[1] to a certain temple of Mars; and again calling by name (another) heavier armed to contend in a (shorter and) smoother road; and again, another who is an archer, and having all the dress of an archer, (to run) a hundred stadia while engaged in the contest, through mountains and all kinds of country, to a temple of Apollo and Artemis; and after establishing the contest, we will wait for them, until they arrive, and we will then bestow upon each victor the prize.

Clin. Right.

Athen. Let us then consider these contests as of three kinds; one of boys, another of beardless youths, and a third of men. And for the beardless youths we will lay down two thirds of the whole course; but for boys the halves of these, [2]when contending with archers and armed men.[2] With respect to females, for girls not yet arrived at puberty and undressed,[3] (we will establish) the stadium, and diaulum, [4]and horse-course, and the long course,[4] for them to contend[5] in the course itself, [6]but to those, who are thirteen years of age, the communion remaining until marriage, for a period not longer than twenty years, nor less than eighteen.[6] And clothed with a fitting dress let them descend to the contest in these courses.

And thus much concerning the contests of men and women

answer to the following *τὸν δὲ ἄλλον*, and "brevius,"—likewise, which if not absolutely necessary, certainly renders the sentence more elegant. With regard to Ast's explanation of the common text, it is not such as will, or indeed should, satisfy any one.

[1] To this passage Spanheim thinks that Callimachus had an eye, when he says in H. in Pall. 23, that the goddess had *δὶς ἑξήκοντα διαθρέξασα διαύλους*, to show her power to do twice as much as a mortal runner.

[2—2] The German translator Schulthes, as I learn from Ast, found some difficulty here, which Ast has endeavoured to master by rendering the Greek as if it were *εἴτε τοξόταις ὥς εἴτε καὶ ὁπλίταις ἁμιλλωμένοις*, i. e. "whether contending as archers or heavy-armed."

[3] From the expression in Eurip. Hec. 933, *μονόπεπλος—Δωρὶς ὡς κόρα*, one might infer that the girls were not completely naked; although the contrary would seem to be the case from the passages of Anacreon and Duris, quoted there by the Scholiast.

[4—4] I suspect the words between the numerals are an interpolation.

[5] I cannot understand *ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ δρόμῳ*. Plato probably wrote *ἐν αὐτῶν τῷ δρόμῳ*, "in their own course." From which it would be seen that the females had a course of their own.

[6—6] Such is the literal version of the Greek, which Ast has endeavoured vainly, I think, to explain. I cannot understand it.

in running. With regard to trials of strength, in the place of wrestling, and such things, we will establish what are now considered heavy contests, namely, the fighting in heavy armour, by one contending with one, and two with two, and up to ten with ten. But what and to what extent it is requisite for a person not to suffer, or to do, to gain the victory, just as recently in the case of wrestling, the parties conversant with that exercise have laid down laws, relating to what is the work of a person wrestling well, or not; so it is requisite to invite parties skilled in fighting with arms, and to request them to lay down laws, as to who is justly the victor in contests of this kind, and what regulation shall determine likewise the defeated party. And let the same laws be laid down respecting the females up to the time of marriage. And it is requisite for us to oppose to the contest in boxing and wrestling united the whole of the art of the light-shield soldier, where parties contend with bows, and light shields, and short spears, and in the hurling of stones from the hand and from slings; and to lay down laws on these matters, (and)[1] to distribute legal honours [2]and victories[2] to the party conducting himself[3] the best on these points. After this it would be in the order of events for laws to be laid down respecting equestrian contests. There is not, indeed, much need of horses, nor many of them, at least in Crete; so that of necessity there is less attention given to the rearing of horses, and the contests with them. For not one of you[4] is in any respect [5]the rearer of a chariot,[5] and there would be no ambition founded on reason to any one on this point: [6]so that for us to establish competitors in a pursuit, which does not belong to the country, would be for us to have no mind, and to seem not to possess it.[6] But by proposing rewards for single horse contests, and for colts, that have not shed their first teeth, and for those that are between

[1] I have translated as if *καὶ τοῦ* had dropt out between *νόμους* and *τῷ*—

[2—2] The words *καὶ τὰς νίκας* I suspect are an explanation of *τὰ γέρα*.

[3] I do not remember to have met with another passage, where *ἀποδιδόναι* has this meaning. Plato wrote, I suspect, *ἐπιδόντι*, "who had improved"—For such is the constant meaning of *ἐπιδιδόναι*.

[4] Stephens reads *ὑμῖν* for *ἡμῖν*, from "vestram" in Ficinus.

[5—5] To explain the strange expression *ἅρματος—τροφεὺς*, Ast says that *ἅρμα* is here used for "equus," as "currus" is in Latin. But the usage is found only in poetry.

[6—6] Taylor has merely, "So that it would be foolish to establish contests of this kind."

full-grown horses and colts, and to those that are full-grown, we should introduce an equestrian amusement, suited to the nature of the country. Let then there be on these points, according to law, a contest and a love of contests, and let there be granted to the Phylarchs and Hipparchs a decision in common respecting all the courses themselves and those, who descend into them as competitors with their arms on. But by establishing contests either in gymnastic exercises or for those without arms here, we shall not correctly lay down the law. But as an archer on horseback, or a javelin-hurler, a Cretan is not useless, so that there will be[1] for the sake of sport a strife and contest in these points. But it is not fit to force females by laws relating to these matters and by ordinances touching a sharing in common. But if from their previous education, proceeding to a habit, their nature admits of it, and there is no reluctance in boys[2] and virgins to take a share, (it is proper) to permit them and not to blame.

[5.] Here then has there now completely come to an end the plan for contending and the learning of gymnastics on such points, as we labour in contests, and such (as we learn) under[3] masters day by day. And of music, moreover, the greater part has been gone through in like manner, and the matters relating to the Rhapsodists, and those that follow after them, and whatever contests of choirs necessarily occur at festivals, and will be orderly arranged in the months, and on the days, and in the years,[4] assigned to the gods and those with them,[5] whether they are distributed into triennial periods, or quinquennial, or in whatever way or manner the gods have given an idea respecting their arrangement. At that period too it is meet to expect that the contests of music will take place, when ordered by the prize-distributers and the instructor of the youths, and the guardians of the laws; who, on meeting

[1] Since ὥστε cannot be united to an imperative, I have translated as if the Greek were ἔσται, not ἔστω. A few passages may indeed be produced to gainsay this canon. But they all admit of an easy correction.

[2] By παῖδες are meant here, what are called a little before ἄνηβοι.

[3] To support the syntax, Stephens was the first to read ὑπὸ διδασκάλων, suggested by "sub magistris," in Ficinus. The idea has been adopted by Ast and Stalb. I should prefer καθ' ἡμέραν ἐν διδασκάλων, with the usual ellipse of οἴκῳ. And so Winckelmann, who refers to Protagor. p. 325, F. and Alcibiad. i. p. 110, B.

[4] Ficinus has, what is more natural, "diebus mensibusque et annis."

[5] Instead of μετὰ θεῶν, Ficinus has "dæmonibus"—

together at a common spot, touching those very matters, shall become themselves the lawgivers, as to the time when, and the persons who, and with whom, they shall make the contests relating to all choirs and dancing. But of what kind each of these ought to be, both with respect to the language, and songs, and harmonies mingled with rhythms and dancing, has been often said by the first legislator; according to which the second legislators ought, by following in their steps, to distribute the contests in a manner befitting the several sacrifices at proper periods, and to permit the city to enjoy its festivals. With respect to these and other such like points, it is not difficult to know what kind of a lawful arrangement they should obtain by lot;[1] nor would the placing them here and there bring any great gain or loss to the state. But what is of no small consequence, and difficult to effect by persuasion, [2]would be the work especially of a god;[2] if indeed it is possible for the regulation to exist from him; but now there seems almost to be the need of some bold man to do honour pre-eminently to the liberty of speech, and to state what seems to be the best for a city and citizens, by enjoining upon souls, that have become corrupt, what is becoming and consequent upon the whole polity, and by speaking in opposition to the greatest desires, and this without having a human being as an ally, but solely following reason alone.

Clin. Of what reason are you now speaking, guest? for we do not understand you.

Athen. Very likely. But I will endeavour to speak to you in a yet clearer manner. For when I arrived in the discourse at education, I perceived the lads and lasses associating with each other in a friendly manner. And it came, as was natural, upon me to be alarmed, when I considered how a person would use a state of that kind, where young men and women are delicately brought up, and unoccupied in those violent and vulgar labours, which very greatly extinguish rudeness, and where sacrifices, and festivals, and choirs are a care to all through the whole of life. By what means then in such a state will they abstain from those desires, which hurl many men and many

[1] In lieu of λαγχάνειν one would prefer τυγχάνειν, "meet with." For the idea of obtaining by lot a lawful arrangement is scarcely intelligible.

[2]—[2] I have translated as if the Greek were θεοῦ μὲν μάλιστ' ἂν ἔργον εἴη, εἰ—not θεοῦ μάλιστα ἔργον, εἰ—

women into the worst state, [1] from which should reason order them to abstain, a law is attempting to become.[1] Indeed it is not wonderful, if the laws previously ordained obtained a mastery over the majority of desires. For the not permitting a person to be excessively wealthy, is a no trifling advantage towards being temperate; and the whole of education has adopted laws in moderation for objects of this kind. Added to this, the eye of the rulers is compelled not to look elsewhere, but to regard even the young. [2] These then, such at least as relate to man, possess moderation, as compared with the rest of desires.[2] But against the (unnatural)[3] love for boys and girls, and for women (as if they were)[4] men, and for men (as if they were)[5] women, whence innumerable evils[6] arise both to men individually and to whole cities, how can any one be on their guard? and [7] by cutting what remedy[7] for each of these will a person discover an escape from such a danger? This is by no means easy, Clinias. For in other things not a few the whole of Crete and Lacedæmon will properly[8] contribute no small assistance to us, while laying down laws alien to the manners of the majority; but in matters of love—since we are alone,[9]

[1]—[1] Such is the literal version of the unintelligible Greek. Ficinus has "ita ut ratio, quæ abstinere imperet, lex efficiatur," as if his MS. read *ὥστε ὁ λόγος, ὧν ἂν προστάττῃ ἀπέχεσθαι, νόμος ἐπιχειρεῖν γίγνεσθαι.* But this would be equally unintelligible. Taylor's translation seems to preserve the train of thought—"So that those things may be forbidden by law, which reason orders us to abstain from."

[2]—[2] Such is the version of the present text. But Ficinus, whom Ast has partially followed, seems to have found in his MS. *ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐπιθυμίαις, ὅσαι γε ἀνθρώπιναι, μέτρον παρέχει.* For his translation is "ceteris quidem humanis cupiditatibus modum adhibent." The reading is rejected by Stalbaum; for he was not aware that *ὅσα γε ἀνθρώπινα* could not be referred to *ταῦτα*, on account of the intervening *ἐπιθυμίας.*

[3] Ficinus alone inserts "contra naturam," requisite for the sense.

[4, 5] Ficinus has "pro feminis" and "pro viris," as if his MS. read *ἀντ' ἀνδρῶν* and *ἀντὶ γυναικῶν*, instead of *ἀνδρῶν* and *γυναικῶν* without the preposition.

[6] The word *κακὰ*, omitted in all the MSS., is found only in Ald., and acknowledged by "mala" in Ficinus. Ast refers to Propertius, i. 14.

[7]—[7] On the phrase *τέμνειν φάρμακον*, repeated in xi. § 4, p. 919, B., and Epist. vii. p. 353, E., see Blomfield on Æsch. Agam. 16.

[8] One MS., and Ficinus, and after him Taylor, omits *ἐπιεικῶς.*

[9] On the formula *αὐτοὶ γάρ ἐσμεν*, omitted here by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor, see at Menexenus § 5, n. 31, and the parallel passages quoted here by Ast; amongst which the most apt is that of Cicero de Divinat. ii. 12, "Sed soli sumus; licet verum exquirere sine invidia."

(I say it,) they are entirely opposed to us.[1] For, if any one, following nature, should lay down the law, which was prior to the time of Laïus,[2] and assert it was proper not to have an intercourse with men and boys, as if they were females, and bring forward as a witness the nature of wild beasts, and show that for such purposes the male does not touch the male, through its being unnatural, perhaps he would make use of a probable reason; but he would by no means accord with your cities. [3]Moreover he would not agree with them in that point,[3] which we have said the legislator ought always to observe. For we ever seek[4] in the laws laid down what contributes to virtue or not. Come then (say), should we agree that this may be at present laid down legally as something beautiful, or at least as not base, what part of it would aid us in the road to virtue? Whether, when it takes place, will the habit of fortitude be produced in the soul of him, who is persuaded? or a kind of a temperate form in the soul of him who persuades? Or would no one be persuaded on these points? but rather in every way the contrary of this. Will every one blame the soft disposition of him, who yields to pleasures, and is incapable of self-control? But will not every one blame on the other hand the likeness of the image in him, who proceeds to an imitation of the female sex? What man then will lay down as a law such a thing as this? Scarcely not one, who has true law in his mind. How then do we say that this is true? It is necessary for a person to see the nature of friendship and desire at the same time, and of the so-called loves, if he would reflect upon these matters correctly. For they are two, and there is another and a third kind arising from both, and which, comprehended under one name, produces every doubt and darkness.

Clin. How?

[1] Respecting the habits of the people in Crete and Lacedæmon in love affairs, Ast refers to Strabo x. p. 39, Cas., and Servius on Virgil Æn. x. 325. Add Hesych. in Κρῆτα τρόπον and Λακωνικὸν τρόπον.

[2] On the story of Laïus, see Valckenaer in Diatrib. p. 23.

[3—3] The Greek is πρὸς δὲ τούτοις—τοῦτο ἐν τούτοις οὐχ ὁμολογεῖ, where the same pronoun is repeated very inelegantly. Plato wrote, I suspect, τοῦτ' ἂν αὐτοῖς οὐχ ὁμολογοῖ—For Ficinus has "quod minime assequetur."

[4] Ficinus, followed by Taylor, has "semper enim observari oportet," as if his MS. read τηροῦμεν in lieu of ζητοῦμεν, a confusion of words found elsewhere, as I have shown on Eurip. Tro. 927.

[6.] *Athen.* We surely call a friend one, who is like to like and equal to equal, as regards virtue. [1]And on the other hand, a friendly thing that, which is in want of what has become wealthy, although it is the contrary in sex.[1] But when each of these friendships becomes vehement, we call it love.

Clin. Right.

Athen. The friendship, then, which arises from contraries is horrible and coarse, and does not often possess any thing in common; but that which arises from similars is mild and common to both parties through life. But as regards that, which is mixed up with these, it is not, in the first place, easy to learn thoroughly what the person, who possesses this third love, would wish to happen to himself; and, in the next place, being drawn by both to a contrary point, he is in a state of doubt; the one exhorting him to enjoy the prime of youth, and the other forbidding him. For he, who is a lover of the body and hungers after its [2]beauty, as if it were a ripe grape,[2] exhorts himself to be filled with it, and pays no honour to the moral feeling in the soul of his beloved. But he, who holds the desire of the body as a thing of secondary importance, and [3]looks rather than loves[3] with his soul, is wont, after feeling a desire for the soul in a becoming manner, to consider the satiety relating to the body[4] as an insult; but, reverencing, at the same time, and worshiping temperance, and fortitude, and what is highly becoming,[5] and prudence, he would wish to live ever chastely with the object of his love. But the love, which is mixed up with both these, is the love,

[1]—[1] In the words between the numerals Plato alludes to the love supposed to exist between those, who sell and who buy the beauty of body.

[2]—[2] On this comparison of beauty to a ripe grape, see my note on Æsch. Suppl. 994. Add Ælian. Epist. 8, *τὸ κάλλος τῶν σωμάτων ὀπώρᾳ ἔοικε*. Himerius, quoted by Photius, p. 1131, *ἀναμενεῖς τὴν ὥραν τὴν τῆς ὀπώρας ὀμώνυμον*.

[3]—[3] Ast has properly remarked the play on the words *ὁρῶν* and *ἐρῶν* here, and just before in *ὥρα* et *ὅπωρα*, which one cannot preserve in another language, although Ficinus has attempted to do so in part by his version—"considerat potius quam desiderat."

[4] I have followed Ast in rejecting *τοῦ σώματος* as an explanation of *τὴν περὶ τὸ σῶμα*. Perhaps however Plato wrote—*τὴν περὶ τὸ ἄσωτον τοῦ σώματος πλησμονήν*. See at viii. § 3.

[5] This introduction of *μεγαλοπρεπὲς* amongst the cardinal virtues seems very strange; and so does the union of *αἰδούμενος* and *σεβόμενος*. Hence I suspect that *τὸ μεγαλοπρεπὲς* ought to be inserted between *καὶ* and *σεβόμενος*.

which we have just now detailed as the third. Since then there are these so many in number,[1] ought the law to forbid all of them, and prevent them from subsisting in us? or, is it not manifest that we should wish for the love, which is of virtue, and which is desirous of a young person becoming the best possible, to exist in the state? and, if it were possible, that we would prevent the other two? Or how shall we say, friend Megillus?

Megil. You have spoken, guest, on these very matters in a manner perfectly beautiful.

Athen. I was likely, as I conjectured, friend, to meet with your accordance in sentiment. And there is no need for me to examine what your law intends on points of this kind, but for me to receive your agreement with my reasoning. But after this, I will again endeavour to persuade Clinias by a kind of enchantment[2] to be of our opinion. Let then, what has been conceded by you to me, be dismissed, and let us now go through entirely the laws.

Megil. You speak most correctly.

Athen. For laying down law itself[3] I possess a certain art, which at present is partly easy, and partly in every respect the most difficult possible.

Megil. How say you?

Athen. We know even at present very many men, who, although they act contrary to law, yet are restrained properly and carefully from an intercourse with beautiful persons, not unwillingly, but as much as possible willingly.

Megil. When, say you?

Athen. When any one has a beautiful brother or sister; and in the case of a son or daughter, the same law, although unwritten, defends as sufficiently as possible (a person)[4] from sleeping with (them) either openly or in secret, [5]or in any other way from embracing and touching them.[5] Nor does even the desire of this intercourse come at all upon the masses.

[1] Ficinus has "cum ergo tres sint amores," adopted by Taylor.

[2] Ficinus omits ἐπᾴδων, and so after him does Taylor.

[3] I have adopted αὐτοῦ, found in one MS., in lieu of τούτου.

[4] Ast says that συγκαθεύδοντα, and ἀσπαζόμενον are used indefinitely. But the mention of the son and daughter would require a distinct mention likewise of the parents, which Taylor has introduced.

[5—5] Ficinus, whom Taylor has followed as usual, has omitted the whole clause, because, I suspect, he could make no sense out of it. For he

Megil. True.

Athen. Does not then a small word extinguish all such pleasures?

Megil. What word do you mean?

Athen. The assertion that these acts are by no means holy, but hateful to the gods, and of [all][1] base acts the most base. And is not this the cause, that no one even speaks of them in other terms? but that each of us immediately from our birth[2] hear persons speaking of these acts at all times and in all places, both in fun and oftentimes in all the so-called seriousness of tragedy, when persons introduce [3]Thyesteses, or some Œdipuses or Macareuses,[3] who have had secretly a connexion with their sisters,[4] but on being detected have readily inflicted death as the punishment of their wickedness upon themselves?

Megil. You have spoken most truly so far as this, that fame[5] has some wonderful power, since no one attempts even to breathe in any other manner[6] contrary to law.

[7.] *Athen.* That, therefore, which we just now said was right, that for a legislator, desirous of bringing under subjection some one of those passions, which pre-eminently get the mastery of men, it is easy to know in what manner he should take this in hand. For by making this (evil) report a

doubtless knew that *πως ἄλλως* could not be written in the place of *ἄλλως πως*; and if it could, that there is nothing to which that phrase could be referred by way of an antithesis; and that *τούτων* could not be used for *αὐτῶν*, and still less for *ἑκατέρων*, what correct language would require. Perhaps Plato wrote *τὸν πατέρα, ἀσελγῶς ἀσπαζόμενον ἅπτεσθαι τοῦ ἢ τῆς*—i. e. "the father libidinously embracing and touching one or the other."

[1] Ficinus alone has "omnium," adopted by Taylor. But in the formula *αἰσχρῶν αἴσχιστα* the word *πάντων* is omitted, as shown by the passages quoted by myself on Æsch. Eum. 230.

[2] To avoid the absurdity of supposing, that persons from their birth understand what is spoken, Ficinus has "statim ab ineunte ætate."

[3—3] On such plural proper names see at Menexen. § 17.

[4] This assertion is applicable only to Macareus, who had a son by his sister Canacé. In the case of Thyestes, the act of incest was with his daughter; and in that of Œdipus, with his mother.

[5] I confess I cannot understand what fame has to do here. The sense requires rather the mention of a dispirited conscience, or evil report. Perhaps Plato wrote—*τῆς ἀθύμου συννοίας*—or rather *τῆς δυσφημίας*, which coincides better with the subsequent *ταύτην τὴν φήμην*.

[6] Instead of *ἄλλως*, which I cannot understand, Plato evidently wrote *ἀλοὺς*, similar to the preceding *ὀφθέντας*, and to *Μοῖχος γὰρ ἦν τύχῃς ἁλοὺς* in Aristoph. Νεφ. 1079.

holy thing amongst all the slaves and free-born and children [1] and women, and the whole city, he will [2]in the same manner[2] thus work out the greatest stability relating to this law.

Megil. Entirely so. But (consider) [3] how it will be possible to make all persons willingly speak in this manner.

Athen. You have taken me up correctly. For this is what was stated by myself, that I possess an art, relating to this law, of making use of an intercourse according to nature for the procreation of children, by persons abstaining from a connexion with males, and not designedly destroying the race of man, nor sowing upon rocks and stones that, which,[4] even if it takes root, will never obtain its naturally productive power; and by abstaining from every female field,[5] in which what is sown is unwilling to germinate. This law then, by becoming perpetual and in power at the same time, as it is now in power in the case of the intercourse amongst parents, would, [6]if it prevailed in other connexions justly,[6] produce[7] benefits innumerable. For, in the first place, it is laid down according to nature. And, next, it causes persons to restrain from the fury and madness of love, from all adulteries, and all the immoderate use of meats and drinks, and to be familiar with and friendly to their wives; and many other benefits would arise [8]if any one could be the master of this law.[8] But, perhaps, some violent and young man, who is brim-full of seed, would,

[1] In lieu of *παισὶ* Ficinus found in his MS. *ἀνδράσι*, as shown by his version, "masculos," adopted by Taylor.

[2—2] The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor.

[3] On the ellipse of *ὅρα* before *ὅπως ἔσται* see Matth. Gr. Gr. § 520, 4.

[4] Instead of *οὗ μήποτε*, which is without regimen, Ast suggested *οὗ οὐ μήποτε*— He should have elicited rather *ὅ γ' οὗ μήποτε* from *ὅ τι* in Clemens Alexandr. Pædag. ii. 10, p. 224, ed. Potter.

[5] On this metaphor Ast refers to numerous passages collected by himself and others. He has however neglected to observe that Plutarch in Præcept. Conjugal. § 42, alludes to this place in the words *ἐξ ὧν οὐδὲν αὐτοῖς φύεσθαι θέλωσιν.*

[6—6] Ficinus omits *ἐὰν—νικήσῃ δικαίως*—correctly.

[7] One MS. has *ἔχοι* instead of *ἔχει*. Hence we must read *μυρί' ἂν ἀγαθὰ ἔχοι*, similar to "innumerorum erit bonorum causa," in Ficinus.

[8—8] To avoid the manifest absurdity in the Greek—*εἰ τοῦ νόμου τις τούτου δύναιτο ἐγκρατὴς εἶναι*, Ficinus has "si apud quemque fuerit stabilita," which would lead to *εἰ τοῦ νόμου πᾶσι τοῦτου δύναιτο πᾶν κράτος εἶναι*, i. e. "if the whole strength of this law could be over all persons." Taylor has, what the sense requires, "If this law was diligently observed by every one."

on hearing this law laid down, immediately abuse (us) for framing laws foolish and impracticable, and would fill every place with his vociferations. It was then through looking to this, that I said I possessed a certain art, in part the easiest of all, and in part the most difficult, for perpetuating this very law, when laid down. For it is very easy to understand that this is possible, and in what way it is so. For we have said that, when this legal institution shall have been sufficiently made holy, it will bring under subjection every soul, and cause them through fear to be entirely obedient to the laws laid down. But matters at present have come to such a pass,[1] that it appears it never can take place; just as the practice of common meals is believed to be a thing impossible for a whole state to practise through its whole life and to exist;[2] and though it has been proved by the fact, that it does take place amongst you, yet as regards the female sex, it does not seem even in your states [3]to have the nature of being able to exist (for ever).[3] Hence through the strength of this unbelief, I said it was very difficult for both of these to remain according to law.

Megil. And you were right in saying so.

Athen. Since then it is not above the power of man, but it may indeed take place, are you willing that I should endeavour to tell a tale bordering on credibility?

Clin. How not?

Athen. Will then a person abstain more easily from venery and be willing to do, what is enjoined, respecting it, in a moderate manner, [4]when he has his body in a good condition, and not like an ordinary person,[4] or when in a bad one?

Clin. By much the most, when it is not like an ordinary person.

Athen. Do we then not know by hearsay of Iccus[5] of Taren-

[1] The Greek is *προβέβηκε νῦν*. One MS. has *προβέβηκεν αὖ νῦν*, which leads to *προβέβηκε τὰ νῦν*—

[2] I have omitted with Ficinus *δύνασθαι*, which could not be inserted after *μὴ δυνατὸν εἶναι*, whatever Ast may say to the contrary.

[3—3] The Greek is *φύσιν ἔχειν γίγνεσθαι*. Ficinus has "fieri posse putatur," from which it is evident that he found here *δύνασθαι γίγνεσθαι*. But the syntax requires *τοῦ* before *δύνασθαι*, and the sense *ἀεὶ* after *γίγνεσθαι*.

[4—4] As *ἰδιώτης* is opposed to *ἀσκητὴς* in Xenophon quoted by Ast, one would prefer here *ἀσκητικῶς τὸ σῶμα*, instead of *εὖ τὸ σῶμα*—

[5] This Iccus is spoken of again by Plato in Protagoras, p. 316, D., where the Scholiast brings forward the names of the three others men-

tium, how,[1] for the sake of his contests at Olympia and the rest,[2] he did, from his love of contest and his art and his possessing in his soul fortitude combined with temperance, never, as the story goes, touch any woman or a boy during the whole period of his practice.[3] And the same account is told of Crysson, and Astylus, and Diopompus, and very many others; although they were much worse educated as to their souls than my fellow-citizens and yours too, Clinias, and had their bodies swelling much more with carnal desires.

Clin. In this you speak the truth that, what has been stated by persons of old respecting those athletes, did really take place.

Athen. What then, did they for the sake of victory in wrestling, and in running, and such like things, dare to abstain from that, which is called happiness by the masses? and shall our youth be unable to have a mastery over themselves, for the sake of a far more excellent victory? which we tell them from their very childhood is the most beautiful, and in fables in prose, and by singing in verse, charm them, as is natural.

Clin. What victory?

Athen. The victory over pleasure; (so that)[4] by being masters of themselves they live happily; but by being mastered, the very reverse. In addition to this, will not the dread of its being at no time and by no means a holy act give them the power to be the masters over those things, which others, worse than them, have mastered?

Clin. It is probable.

[8.] *Athen.* Since then we have arrived thus far on the subject of this law, but have fallen into a difficulty through the wickedness of the many, I assert (with confidence),[5] [6]that

tioned here; of whom nothing seems to be known with the exception of Astylus, who Pausanias says, was a victor in the diaulum.

[1] I have adopted *ὡς* for *ὧν*, as suggested by Heindorf on Protagoras, p. 489.

[2] The Greek is *καὶ τούς τε ἄλλους*—where *καὶ*—*τε* could not thus follow *καὶ*— Plato wrote, I suspect, *καὶ πολλοὺς ἔτ' ἄλλοθι*—

[3] Ast quotes opportunely Horace in A. P. 412, "Qui studet optatam cursu contingere metam—Abstinuit Venere et vino."

[4] I have translated as if *ὥστε* had dropt out after *νίκης*—

[5] Ficinus, whom Taylor follows, has alone "audacter"—as if his MS. read *φημὶ θαῤῥῶν*—

[6]—[6] The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor.

our legal institution ought to march on without disguise, and to say on these points,[6] that our citizens ought not to be worse than birds, and many other wild animals; who, produced in large herds,[1] live without intercourse, and pure, and chaste, up to the time of procreation; but when they arrive at that period, the male for its gratification pairing with the female, and the female with the male, they live for the remainder of their time in a holy and just manner, firmly abiding in the first compacts of friendship. It is requisite then for them[2] to be better than wild beasts. If however they are corrupted by the other Greeks, and the greatest number of the Barbarians, and on seeing what is called the unregulated Aphrodité, and on hearing that it has the greatest power, are thus unable to have a mastery over it, there will be a need for the guardians of the laws to become legislators, and to devise for them a second law.

Clin. What law would you advise to be laid down for them, if the one now laid down escapes them?

Athen. Evidently, Clinias, that which follows upon this.

Clin. What law do you mean?

Athen. That they should especially cause the strength of pleasures to be not exercised, by turning, by means of labours, to other parts of the body the course of their overflow and feeding.[3] And this will take place, if in the use of venereal pleasures there is no shamelessness. For they, who, through shame, make a rare use of a thing of this kind, will have their mistress of less power, [4][by using it seldom].[4] [5]Let it then be held by custom and an unwritten law, that to do any of these lawful things secretly, is honourable; but not secretly, is disgraceful;[5] [6]but not to do it, not at all; thus this would lie

[1] Plato had perhaps in mind flocks of small birds and herds of wolves; although in the case of gregarious quadrupeds very few, I believe, are known to pair.

[2] Instead of *αὐτοὺς* I should prefer *ἀστοὺς*—"citizens."

[3] In lieu of *τροφὴν* one would have expected *τρυφὴν*, "luxuriousness."

[4—4] The words between the brackets are evidently superfluous, and correctly omitted by Ficinus, and tacitly after him by Taylor.

[5—5] Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus, whom Taylor follows implicitly, has—"Clam ergo consuetudo et lex non scripta hæc fieri suadeat, contra autem fieri, velut turpe, dissuadeat."

[6—6] Stephens was the first to see that the Greek, of which I have given a literal translation, concealed some error, which he confesses his

in our law as being disgraceful on the other hand, and honourable secondly possessing a second rectitude.[6] And thus one genus, comprehending three genera, would compel those, who are corrupted in their nature, (and) whom we have spoken of as being inferior to themselves, not to act contrary to the law.

Clin. What are these?

Athen. The god-worshipping (genus), and the honour-loving, and that which is produced from the desire not of beauties in the body but of those really existing in the manners of the soul. And these matters perhaps, now detailed by us, are like prayers[1] in a fable; but they will be by far the best, should they perchance exist in all states. Perhaps, too, if a god pleases, we may compel one of two things to take place in matters of love; either that no one shall dare to touch any free and well-born woman, besides his married wife, or sow the seed, for which there has been no sacrificial rite,[2] and which is illegitimate, amongst harlots, nor that, which is barren, amongst males, contrary to nature; or we will take away entirely the intercourse of males; but with respect to females, if any one has an intercourse with any one, except those who come to his house, together with the gods, and sacred marriages, whether such women are bought, or acquired by any other means, [3]and he does not lie hid from all men and women,[3] to such a person we should, if we caused him by law to be disfranchised of the privileges[4] in the state, perhaps appear to have acted by law correctly, as being one who is truly like a foreigner. Let this law, whether it is one, or we ought to call

inability to correct; and so do I; nor has the long note of Cousin thrown, I think, any light on the passage. Ast, however, has suggested some alterations, from which nothing appears to be gained. Ficinus, "turpeque sic non omnino agere; sic enim et secundo servabimus honestum loco."

[1] Compare v. § 8.

[2] This alludes to the fact that sacred rites preceded a marriage, as shown by *μετὰ θεῶν καὶ ἱερῶν γάμων*. Ast quotes opportunely Iamblich. Vit. Pythag. § 195, *ἄθυτος καὶ νόθη συνουσία*. But the *ἀθύτους τε καὶ ἀγάμους γάμους*, mentioned by Suidas in *Ἀθύτους* and *Διαξαίνειν*, related to what Persius calls "fœdos hymenæos," as may be inferred from the expression *τὴν ἀνδρῶν ἀπειπάμενος φύσιν*.

[3—3] I confess I hardly understand this clause.

[4] I do not remember to have met elsewhere with the phrase of *ἄτιμον ἐπαίνων*. Ficinus has "infamis lege omnibusque civitatis honoribus," as if his MS. read *ἄτιμον αὐτὸν πασῶν τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει τιμῶν*.

them two, be laid down respecting all venereal and amatory matters, which, through having an intercourse with each other from desires of such a kind, we transact both in a proper and improper manner.

Megil. Even now,[1] O guest, I would vehemently accept this law from you; but let Clinias here tell us himself, what he thinks on these points.

Clin. So shall it be, Megillus, when it appears to me that a fitting opportunity presents itself; but, for the present, permit our guest to proceed forward in the matter of his laws.

Megil. Right.

[9.] *Athen.* But having proceeded so far, we are almost at the establishment of common meals, which we said would with difficulty exist elsewhere; but in Crete no one else[2] would suppose that it ought to be adopted. But after what manner? whether as here, or as at Lacedæmon? or is there a third kind of common meals beside these, which would be better than both? This it seems to me it is not difficult to discover; and when discovered, to work out not a great good. For what has been now prepared is in an elegant condition.

Following upon these is the preparation for livelihood, [3]in what manner it ought to follow them.[3] Now a livelihood in other states would be of various kinds and many, and especially from the double sources of what there would be to these. For what relates to food is obtained by most of the Greeks from the earth and sea; but by these from the earth alone. This therefore will present a more easy task for the legislator. [4]For not only will half the laws be moderate, but much fewer,[4] and still befitting free-men. For the legislator

[1] I have translated as if the Greek were *καὶ τὰ νῦν*, not *καὶ τοίνυν*—

[2] Instead of *ἄλλως*, rendered "frustra" by Ficinus, all the other MSS. read *ἄλλος*—an error I presume for *ἄνος*, i. e. *ἄνθρωπος*. Taylor has "but no one will suppose but that it ought to be adopted in Crete." From which I have been led to suggest—*οὐδ' εἷς ἄλλ' ἢ ὡς δέον ὑπολάβοι ἂν γίγνεσθαι*: unless it be said that the sense is—"But in Crete no one would think that it is adopted in vain." But in that case *δεῖν* ought to be omitted.

[3]—[3] Such is the literal version of the Greek—*τίν' αὐτοῖς ἂν τρόπον ἔποιτο*. Ficinus—"quomodo haberi possit." But Taylor has, what the sense requires—"in what manner it should be procured for our citizens," which would be—*τίν' ἀστοῖς ἂν τρόπον ἔσοιτο*. This confusion of *ἔποιτο* and *ἔσοιτο* I have noted twice or thrice elsewhere.

[4]—[4] The Greek is *οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἡμισεῖς αὖ γίγνονται νόμοι μέτριοι*

of this state is freed for the most part from matters relating to ship-owners, and foreign merchants, and retail dealers, and inn-keepers, and tax-collectors, and miners, [1]and money-lenders, and usurers at compound interest,[1] and ten thousand other things of this kind, and bids them all go hang ; but he will lay down laws for the tillers of land, and shepherds, and the breeders of bees, and the guardianship and the superintendents of the operations connected with such matters, after having laid down laws on subjects of the greatest moment relating to marriages, and the procreation and the bringing up of children, and still further, their education, and the establishment of magistracies in the state. But at present it is necessary for the legislator to turn himself [2]to (the laws), relating to feeding[2] and to those, who labour for it. Let the laws then, called Agricultural, be first laid down. And let this be mentioned as the first law relating to Zeus, who presides over boundaries. Let no one remove the landmarks, either of a fellow-citizen, who is a friend, or of a neighbour, [3]while possessing himself at the extremities he is a neighbour to another stranger,[3] thinking that this is truly "To remove what is not to be removed."[4] But let every one be desirous to attempt to remove the greatest other[5] [except a boundary] stone[5] rather than a small stone, which is the boundary

πολὺ δ' ἐλάττους, which Ficinus, whom Taylor follows in part, has thus abridged, "multo enim major quam dimidia pars legum sufficiet." For he probably saw that αὖ had no meaning here, and knew that after οὐ μόνον correct Greek would require ἀλλὰ καὶ, not πολὺ δὲ—I have translated as if the words were ἂν γίγνοιντο : but I cannot correct the error in πολὺ δ' ἐλάττους.

[1]—[1] The Greek is—καὶ δανεισμῶν καὶ ἐπιτόκων τόκων. But one MS. has ἐπὶ τόκῳ, which shows that καὶ is an interpolation. On the expression ἐπὶ τόκῳ τόκου, Ast refers to Spanheim on Aristoph. Νεφ. 1155.

[2]—[2] I have translated as if the Greek were ἐπὶ τοὺς νόμους τὴν τροφὴν πέρι καὶ ὅσοι—and not ἐπὶ τοὺς τὴν τροφην καὶ ὅσοι περὶ—For Ficinus has "ad leges de victu deque iis qui—"

[3]—[3] Such is the literal version of the Greek—μήτε ὁμοτέρμονος, ἐπ' ἐσχατιᾶς κεκτημένος ἄλλῳ ξένῳ γειτονῶν—out of which, I confess, I can make nothing ; nor could Ficinus, whose abridged translation, adopted by Taylor, is "nec finitimi peregrini, si agri extrema possideat."

[4] On this saying see Ast at iii. § 6, p. 684, D.

[5]—[5] The words between the brackets are omitted by Ficinus, whom Ast has followed with the approbation of Stalbaum. One MS. likewise omits πλὴν ὅρον μᾶλλον. But unless I am mistaken, in the letters ἄλλον πλὴν ὅρον lie hid the names of two mountains, one in Crete, and the other in Laconia. Hence, instead of πλὴν ὅρον, I would read ἢ Ταίνα-

of friendship and hatred sworn before the gods. For Zeus, who presides over a kindred-clan, is the witness of the one, and he who presides over hospitality, of the other; which deities [1] are excited together with the most hateful wars.[1] Now he, who is obedient to the law, will have no perception of the ills, that come from it: but let him, who despises it, be exposed to a double punishment, one, and the first, from the gods, but the second, under the law. For let no one voluntarily remove the landmark of his neighbour; and against him, who does remove them, let any one, who is willing, inform the landowners; and let them bring him into court; and if any one has to pay damages on the charge of his having made privately and by force the land to be without a division, [2](respecting) the party so having to pay,[2] let the court fix the penalty, as to what he is to suffer (in person) or in purse after being defeated. After this, many and small injuries from neighbours do, through their frequency, beget a great weight of enmity, and cause a neighbourhood to be disagreeable and excessively bitter. Hence it is requisite for a neighbour to take every care not to cause any differences with his neighbour; and to be particularly cautious in other matters, and especially as regards the cultivation of grounds, which they have a mutual right to till. For to do an injury is by no means difficult, but is in the power of every man; but to do a benefit is not in the power of every one. Let him then, who, stepping over his own boundary, secretly tills[3] his neighbour's land, pay for the mischief done; and, on account of his shameless and sordid conduct, pay another sum, the double of the mischief to the injured party. Of these and all such like matters let the Land-Stewards take cognizance, and act as judges and fix the fine;

ρον, but what we are to read for ΑΛΛΟΝ, I am unable to state, unless it be ΙΔΑΙΟΝ. Cornarius has "quam terminum aut parvum lapidem," as if he wished to read *μᾶλλον τιν' ὅρον ἢ σμικρὸν λίθον*—

[1]—[1] The words between the numerals, I confess, I do not understand. Ficinus has—"qui hostili prœlio semper insurgunt," partially followed in Taylor's translation, "are roused in conjunction with the most hostile battles." If it were permissible to personify War here, one might fancy that Plato wrote *οἳ μάλιστα Πολέμῳ τῷ θεῶν ἐχθίστῳ ἐγείρονται.*

[2]—[2] Ast, whom Stalbaum follows, would reject *τοῦ ὀφλόντος*, as an interpolation. I have translated as if *περὶ* had dropt out between *ποιοῦντος* and *τοῦ ὀφλόντος*—

[3] Instead of *ἐπεργάζηται* one MS. reads *ἀπεργάζηται*: which evidently leads to *ὑπεργάζηται*, as I have translated.

and over the greater suits, as it has been stated before, let the whole order of the twelfth part (preside); but of the lesser, the chiefs of the guardians of these. And if any one [1]pastures his flocks over (his neighbours' grounds),[1] let those who witness the injury, decide upon it and fix the fine. And if a person appropriates to himself the swarms of bees belonging to another, [2]by following the pleasure of the bees, and making a noise, by beating them down[2] thus makes them his own, let him pay for the injury done. And if any one sets fire to his own wood, and takes no thought of his neighbour's, let him be fined according to the damage decided on by the rulers. And if in planting he does not leave a proper distance from his neighbour's land, (let him pay,)[3] as has been stated even by many legislators sufficiently;[4] of whose laws it is meet to make use, and not to think that the greater regulator of a state is to lay down laws for all matters, both great and small, and such as belong to a casual legislator. Since relating even to water laws of the olden time, and those beautiful too, have been laid for the tillers of the ground, which it is not proper [5]for us to use (like water-channels) in our discourse.[5] But let him, who will, lead water to his own ground, commencing from common streams, and not cutting off the sources, evidently belonging to a private person; and let him lead it

[1]—[1] Such is the meaning of ἐπινέμῃ, which Ficinus renders "pascuis noceat;" and Taylor, "distributes cattle—"

[2]—[2] Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus has, what is far preferable, "si aliena examina quis persequitur, atque æra pulsans delectatione apes ad se trahit." But whether he found in his MS. the counterpart of his translation is another question. By the aid however of the gl. in Photius and Suidas, Μελιττοπηχεῖν· τὸ κρούοντας ψόφον ποιεῖν, ἵνα μὴ αἱ μέλισσαι προπέτωνται, or as it should be read, Μελίττειόν τι ἠχεῖν —ἵνα μὴ—παραποπέτωνται, i. e. "To sound something suited to bees, in order that they may not fly away"—one may hazard a conjecture that Plato wrote something to this effect—τῇ τῶν μελιττῶν πτήσει συνεπόμενος, καὶ ἡδονῇ κατακηλῶν κρουομένου του αὐτὰς οὕτως οἰκειῶται, i. e. "by following the flight of the bees and charming them with the delight of something being beaten, thus make them his own."

[3] The words between the lunes are supplied by Ficinus alone, "ita plectatur," whom Taylor has followed. In two MSS. it is stated that ζημιούσθω is understood here.

[4] Plato is thought to allude here to Solon; who introduced a similar law at Athens, as we learn from Plutarch i. p. 91, D.

[5]—[5] I have introduced the words "like water-courses," to preserve the play in παροχετεύειν, applied here to both the course of the water and conversation.

where he likes, except through dwellings, or certain sacred (places) or tombs, and doing no damage, except what arises from[1] leading aside the water. But if the natural dryness of the ground in certain places should be incapable of retaining the waters from Zeus,[2] and there is a deficiency in necessary drink, let a person dig in his own ground, until he comes to the clay.[3] But if in this depth he does not meet with water, let him draw from his neighbours as much drink as is necessary for each of his domestics. But if there should be a scarcity[4] amongst his neighbours also, let him, after receiving an order from the Land-Stewards, take to himself the regulation-allowance each day, and thus have a share in the water of his neighbour. But if there be water from Zeus, and one of those on the lower ground does an injury to a farmer on the upper, or to the party dwelling near him, by not allowing an outlet to the water; or, on the contrary, if the party above carelessly permits the waters to run down, and does an injury to a party below; and (the two parties) are for this unwilling to communicate[5] with each other on these matters, let the party, who wishes it, bring in a City-Steward in the city, and in the country a Land-Steward, and let him regulate himself[6] what each ought to do; and let him, who does not abide by the regulation, undergo a punishment for his envious and at the same time morose temper, and let him, the verdict being against him, pay to the injured party the double

[1] To support the syntax we must insert either *δι'* or *ἀπ'* before *αὐτῆς*, similar to "ab ipso" in Ficinus.

[2] i. e. rain-water.

[3] To this passage Plutarch alludes in ii. p. 827, D., and from i. p. 91, it appears that Plato adopted merely a law of Solon.

[4] So Ast, after Ficinus, understands *δι' ἀκριβείας*—a meaning those words never did or could bear; and though Faehse has failed in successfully correcting them, he has happily suggested, what I have adopted, *δεξάμενος* in lieu of *ταξάμενος*—

[5] Ficinus renders *κοινωνεῖν* by "convenire," i. e. to come to terms; a meaning which that verb does not, if I rightly remember, have elsewhere.

[6] This seems a rather strange enactment. For the party, who is brought in, ought rather to appoint what each should do. To avoid this absurdity, Ficinus, whom Taylor has followed, omits *ἐπάγων ὁ βουλόμενος*, as shown by his version, "in urbe quidem ædilis, in agris vero, qui agris præest, modum imponat." Hence in lieu of *ἐπάγων—ταξάσθω τί*—one would prefer *ἐπαγέτω—τάξεις θήσοντα, τί*—i. e. let him bring a person to lay down regulations.

of his loss, [1] through not being willing to obey the person in office.[1]

[10.] It is meet likewise for all to have a communion in some such way as this of the fruits of autumn. [2] The goddess herself has a twofold gift of grace for us ;[2] one a Dionysal instruction,[3] not to be treasured up; the other, which is naturally suited for laying by. Let then this law be ordained respecting the fruits of autumn. Whoever tastes the rustic fruit, be it grapes or figs, before the season for gathering them, which falls in with the rising of Arcturus,[4] either in his own or the grounds of others, pay fifty drachms sacred to Dionysus, if he has plucked them from his own land; but if from his neighbour's, a mina ;[5] but if from that of others, two-thirds of a mina. But let him who wishes to gather the grape now called "well-born,"[6] or grapes called "well-born,"[7] if he takes them from his own ground, pluck them how and when he likes; but if from another's, let him, if he has not

[1]—[1] The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor.

[2]—[2] Such is the literal version of the Greek, *διττὰς ἡμῖν δωρεὰς ἡ θεὸς ἔχει χάριτος αὐτή*: but the goddess imparts rather than possesses gifts. Hence Ficinus translates *ἔχει* by "largitus," a meaning assigned elsewhere, but improperly, to *ἔχει*. Plato evidently wrote *διττῆς—δωρεᾶς—χέει χάριτας*, i. e. "pours out the favours of a double gift." On the confusion in *ἔχειν* and *χέειν*, see at Menexen. § 14, p. 82. Winckelmann suggests *χάρις τις αὕτη*, which I cannot understand.

[3] Here again is an error in the text, which, although it has baffled the ingenuity of Cornarius, Ast, and Stalbaum, it is not very difficult to correct. The Greek is *παιδείαν Διονυσιάδα*—where lies hid *ὀποῦ ἡδεῖαν Διονυσίου λίβα*—"the sweet flowing of the Dionysian juice," a quotation from some lyric poet; while in *ὀπὸς* there would be an allusion to *Ὄπωρα*, which, says the Etymol. M. in *Ὀπὸς*, is so called, *ὅτι ὀπὸς αὐτὴν ὠρεῖ, ὅ ἐστι φυλάττει*, or, as it should be read, *ὅτι ὀποὺς αὐτὴ ὠρεῖ*. With regard to *λίβα*, see at Æsch. Eum. 54, where I elicited *λίβα* from *διὰ*, adopted by every editor except Wellaver. Winckelmann refers here to something he has written on this passage in Act. Societat. Græc. ii. p. 17. But as I have never seen the work, I do not know what he has done for the correction or explanation of the passage.

[4] This star, at the tail of the Greater Bear, rises about the autumnal equinox.

[5] That is, double; for the mina contained 100 drachms.

[6] Although Eustathius on Iλ. E. p. 544 = 414, quotes from this passage *γενναίαν* and *γενναῖα*, yet Plato wrote, I suspect, the names of two places, where the grape and fig were grown to perfection.

[7] Ficinus adds here, "neque commode recondi possint."

persuaded (the owner), be fined [1]in that way ever[1] following out the law,[2] that a person is not to remove what he has not put down. But if a slave, not having persuaded the owner of the ground, gathers any fruit of this kind, let him be scourged with stripes equal in number to each grape on a bunch and fig on the tree. Let a foreign settler, who has bought the "well-born" autumnal fruit,[3] eat them if he pleases; but if a stranger sojourning in the land, as he passes along the road, (either alone)[4] or with one follower, desires to taste the autumnal fruit, let him taste the "well-born" fruit, receiving it as the gift of a host; but the law prohibits even a person of such a kind[5] from sharing in the fruit called rustic. If any one ignorantly tastes these, either himself or a slave, let a person punish the slave with stripes, but send away the free person after admonishing and teaching him that he may taste other autumnal fruits (unfit)[6] for laying by, but that those, belonging to raisins and wine and dry figs, are unfit for him to have. With respect to pears, and apples, and pomegranates, and all such fruits, let it not be held a disgraceful act to gather them secretly. But if a person under thirty years of age is detected (gathering them), let him be struck and repelled, but without wounds, but let there be no infliction of such like blows upon a free-man. And let it likewise be lawful for a stranger to be a partaker of these, as of the autumnal fruits.[7] But if any older person tastes of them, eating them on the spot, and secretly taking away none, let him partake of all such as a stranger does; but if he is not obedient to the law, let him run the risk of being no competitor for virtue, should any one at that time give information of such matters to the then judges.

[11.] Water for gardens is pre-eminently the most nutritive

[1]—[1] Ficinus, followed by Taylor, unable it seems to understand *ἐκείνως ἀεὶ*, has omitted those words; and so he has *ἐπόμενος*, for which Stephens suggested *ἐπομένως*, found in Timæus, p. 27, C.

[2] This too was a law of Solon, as we learn from Diogen. L. i. 57.

[3] Ficinus renders *τὴν γενναίαν*, by "ad repositionem ineptis," and shortly afterwards *τῆς γενναίας* by "fructus non reponendos—"

[4] Ficinus, followed by Taylor, has alone "si transeat solus."

[5] Instead of *τῶν τοιούτων*, all the MSS. have *τὸν τοιοῦτον*, answering to "peregrinos" in Ficinus.

[6] Ficinus has "ficus uvasque solum modo ad repositionem ineptas," who therefore found in his MS. *ἀνεπιτηδείου* after *εἰς ἀπόθεσιν*.

[7] Here too Ficinus has inserted "quos superius diximus repositioni ineptos."

of all things, but it is easily rendered corrupt. For it is not easy to corrupt either the earth, or the sun, or the air, which together with water are the nourishers of what springs up from the soil, either by drugs, or turnings aside, or thefts; but all such things as these can take place in the case of the nature of water; and hence it requires the assistance of law. Let this then be (the law) respecting it. If any one willingly corrupts the water of another by drugs, or diggings, or thefts, whether such water be from a spring or collected (in a tank), let the party injured have a trial before the City-Stewards, [1] and write down the estimated amount of the injury.[1] [2] And if any one be found guilty of having corrupted it by any drugs, let him, in addition to the fine, cleanse the spring or the tank of water in the way that the laws of the (holy) interpreters shall point out, how the cleansing ought to be done on each occasion, and by each person.[2]

With respect to the conveyance of all fruits in season, let it be lawful for any, who wishes, to carry home his own property through every place, wherever he shall do no damage to any one, or gain an advantage himself three times as much as the damage done to his neighbour. But of these questions let the magistrates take cognizance, and of all other injuries that one person wilfully commits by violence or secretly against another person unwillingly, either himself or his property, by means of the property of the former. And let the party (injured) lay all matters of this kind before the rulers, and receive compensation for the injury up to three minæ; but if the complaint of one person against another be of a higher amount, let him bring his suit before the common courts of justice, and let him have satisfaction against the party, who has done the injury. But if any magistrate shall be found to decide upon the damage with an unjust sentence, let him be considered as a debtor to the injured person for twice the loss sustained. And let any one, who wishes it, bring the unjust conduct of the magistrate before the common tribunals in each case [3] of complaint. But as there are ten thousand trifling

[1]—[1] The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor.

[2]—[2] In the place of all between the numerals Taylor has merely, "and if convicted he shall be punished adequately to his offence."

[3] I have translated as if the Greek were *ἐν ἑκάστῳ*, not *ἑκάστων*, which is without regimen.

things of law, according to which punishments ought to be inflicted, respecting the distribution of trials by lot, and the citations, and the persons citing, whether the citation ought to be made before two, or how many, and whatever else is of such a kind, these are not to be left unregulated by law, nor yet are they worthy of an aged legislator. Let young men, therefore, lay down the laws relating to these, [1] (by looking) to the enactments of their predecessors, and modelling trifling matters after great,[1] and by becoming experienced in the necessary use of them, till every thing shall appear to be sufficiently laid down. [2] And then rendering them immovable, let them live and use them as possessing a power in moderation.[2]

With respect to the other handicraft trades, it is requisite to act in this manner. In the first place, let no person of the country be one of those, who labour at handicraft trades, nor yet the domestic of a person of the country. For a citizen, who is to preserve and hold the arrangements of the state, common to all, is engaged in an art requiring much practice, and, at the same time, much learning, nor is he able[3] to attend to the pursuit as a by-work. Now to labour accurately in two pursuits, or two arts, scarcely not a single nature of man is sufficient. Nor is the same person sufficient[4] to exercise one art, and to superintend another person, exercising another. This therefore ought first of all to take place in a state. Let no coppersmith be at the same time a carpenter; nor let a carpenter attend more to others, who are coppersmiths, than to his own art, making as a pretext, that while he is attending to many servants, who are working for him, he very reasonably attends more to them, for the sake of greater gain accruing from thence to himself than from his own art; but let every artist in the state exercise one art alone, and from that obtain

[1]—[1] Such seems to be the meaning of the Greek, *πρὸς τὰ τῶν πρόσθεν νουθετήματα ἀπομιμούμενοι σμικρὰ πρὸς μεγάλα*, although *μιμεῖσθαι* and its compounds do not, as far as I know, mean "to cause to imitate."

[2]—[2] Ficinus has "deinde sufficienter, positis immobiliter, his utantur," as if his MS. read *μετρίως* in lieu of *μέτριον*, which can hardly stand here without *τι*— Baiter would read *μέτρον*, and refers to p. 836, A., 957, A., 959, A.

[3] I have translated as if the Greek were *οὐδ' ἐν παρέργῳ δυνάμενος ἐπιτηδεύειν*, not *δεόμενος*, which Ast is able to understand only by saying that *ἐπιτηδεύειν* is to be taken in a passive sense.

[4] The Greek is *αὐτὸς ἱκανῶς*. But five MSS. read *ἱκανὸς*, while *αὐτὸς* is plainly required by the sense.

his living. This law let the City-Stewards with all exertion preserve; and let them punish with disgrace and infamy any person of the country, if he inclines to any art more than to the attention to virtue, until they bring him to his own proper course. But if any stranger applies himself to two arts, let them, by punishing him with bonds, and fines, and expulsions from the city, compel him to be one person instead of being many. With respect to the wages of workmen, and the destruction[1] of their works, and[2] should any other person injure them, or they[3] any one else, let the City-Stewards pass a judgment as far as to fifty drachms; but beyond this, let the common tribunals decide according to law.

And let no person in the state pay any duty on exports and imports. But with respect to frankincense, and other foreign aromatics, for the gods, and purple, and other dyed colours, which this country does not produce, or with respect to any other art, requiring foreign articles to be imported, let no one introduce any of these without some necessity; nor, on the other hand, export any thing which it is necessary to remain in the country. On all these matters let the twelve guardians of the laws, five of the elder being excepted, take the cognizance and have the care. With respect to arms and all warlike instruments, if there should be a necessity for importing any foreign art, relating to plants,[4] [5]or metals, or chains,[5] or any animals, [6]on account of their use of such a kind,[6] let the Hipparchs and the Generals have full powers over the import and export of such articles, [7]the state

[1] This I cannot understand, nor could Ast, who thinks that something has been lost here. Ficinus has "de operis ipsorum approbatione aut improbatione."

[2] This "and" seems strangely introduced here.

[3] The Greek is *ἐάν τις αὐτοὺς ἕτερος ἢ ἐκεῖνοί τιν' ἄλλον ἀδικῶσι.* But in this antithetical formula, where *αὐτὸς* is found in the first clause, it is always repeated in the second. There is some error here; which might be corrected without much difficulty.

[4] The plants used for warlike purposes were, the ash made into spear handles, and other trees converted into shields and bows and arrows.

[5—5] The Greek is *ἢ μεταλλευτικοῦ κτήματος ἢ δεσμευτικοῦ.* Ficinus has "ænea instrumenta, funes—"

[6—6] Ficinus, followed by Taylor, has "quæ ad bellum conferant."

[7—7] The words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor. Ficinus fills out the sense in his version, "ut civitas invehendi evehendique simul, cum opus sit, facultate non privetur." What Plato wrote and meant to say, I confess myself unable to discover.

giving at the same and receiving;[7] but the guardians of the laws shall lay down, respecting these matters, laws becoming and sufficient. And let there be no higgling for the sake of money-making, [1]either by this person or any one else,[1] either in the whole country or city, or in any part.

[12.] With respect to food and the distribution of the produce of the country, the correctness of the method near to that laid down by the law in Crete, would seem, if adopted, to be adopted with reason. For it is meet that all should distribute into twelve parts the whole produce of the land, in which way also it is to be consumed. Let every twelfth part, for example, of wheat and barley, of which let all the rest of fruits be the followers, that are to be divided, and all the animals in each,[2] that are to be sold, be divided into three parts, according to a certain proportion; one being for free-men, another for their domestics, and the third for handicraftsmen and strangers generally, and such as are residing with the foreign settlers, in want of necessary sustenance, or are constantly arriving during the exigencies of the state, or any individual. Of all the necessaries (of life), let this third part so distributed be alone vendible from necessity; but of the two others let nothing be necessarily sold. How then would these be distributed most correctly? In the first place, it is evident that we should distribute[3] them partly equally, and partly unequally.

Clin. How say you?

Athen. It must needs be, that the land produces and brings up each of these things worse or better.

Clin. How not?

Athen. [4]In such a way then as this,[4] as there are three parts, let no part have more, when distributed, either (that)[5] for masters

[1]—[1] Here again I am in the dark, as to the person or thing meant by *τούτου* and *ἄλλου μηδενός*.

[2] Cousin understands after *ἑκάστοις* the words *μέρεσι τῆς χώρας*.

[3] In lieu of *νέμομεν*, one MS. has *νεμόμενα*: which leads to *νέμοιμεν ἄν*.

[4]—[4] The Greek is *Τῷ μὲν τοίνυν τοιούτῳ*, where Ast would read *τοῦ μὲν τοίνυν τοιούτου*. But to my mind nothing is gained by the change. In both cases I am equally in the dark. Ficinus renders *τῷ μὲν τοίνυν τοιούτῳ*, by "quoad hoc." But that would be in Greek, *τούτου γ' ἕνεκα*. Winckelmann suggests *τοιούτῳ τρόπῳ*, which I have adopted.

[5] Stephens and Ast would read *μήτε τὸ*—found subsequently in two MSS.

or slaves, nor, on the other hand, that for strangers; but let the distribution give [1]the equality of similitude,[1] the same to all. And let each citizen, on receiving his two parts, have the power to distribute both to slaves and free-men, as much of his share, and of what kind, as he pleases. [2]But the greater quantity of these[2] it is meet to be distributed by measure and number, in this way, (by a person) taking the number of all the animals to which there ought to be food from the earth and distributing it. After this it is meet for habitations to be separately assigned them in an orderly regulated manner. Now the following regulation is suited to matters of this kind. There ought to be twelve hamlets, one in the middle of each twelfth part; and in each hamlet, to be selected first a market-place, and temples for the gods and the dæmons, who follow the gods; and whether these are some local (heroes) amongst the Magnetes,[3] or the holy seat of other ancients, whose memory has been preserved, to these let persons pay the honours due to ancient men, and found every where temples to Vesta, and Zeus, and Athéné, and to him who may be the leader of the others, that belong to each twelfth part. And first (it is meet) for the buildings to be about these temples, where the ground is the highest, as receptacles the best protected possible for the garrison; but to prepare all the rest of the country, by distributing it into thirteen parts for the handicraftsmen; and to cause one portion of these to settle in the city, by distributing this portion amongst the twelve parts of the whole city; [4](but to have the other)[4] persons distributed out of the city, and in a circle about it; and every hamlet to cause the race of handicraftsmen to settle together, that are useful to the agriculturists; and of all these let the Land-Stewards have the care, and of how many and of what kind each place may require; and of the spots in which the handicraftsmen may dwell, and be the least annoyance, and the greatest benefit to the agricul-

[1]—[1] I must leave for others to explain what Plato meant by this expression; on which however Ficinus has thrown some light by his version, "æqualis eademque similiter sit omnibus distributio."

[2]—[2] Cousin translates *τὸ δὲ πλέον τούτων*—"pour le surplus."

[3] The Magnetes here alluded to were the inhabitants of Magnesia in Crete. For a list of other cities of the same name in the Troad, Lydia, and Macedonia, see Steph. Byz.

[4]—[4] Ficinus alone has, what is required by the sense, "*aliæ* exteriorem undique teneant locum," omitting however *καὶ ἐν κύκλῳ*.

turists; but of those in the city, let the City-Stewards in like manner have the care.[1] [13.] But to the City-Stewards each of the matters relating to the market-place must be a care. For after their inspection of the sacred things, let their attention (be given) to the matters of the market-place, [2]lest any one does wrong in what relates to the needs of man;[2] their second work would be to punish, as being the inspectors of temperance and insolence, the person requiring punishment; but such of the vendible articles, as the citizens are under regulations to sell, they must first look into, in behalf of the strangers, whether each article is according to the law. And let the law be this. On the new[3] day of each[4] month, let the superintendents[5] bring out a portion of what is to be sold to the foreigners; namely, a first twelfth part of the corn; and let the foreigner buy corn, and such things as pertain to corn, on the first market for the whole month. But on the twelfth[6] day of the month, let some make a selling, and others a buying of liquid articles, sufficient for the whole of the month. And on the twenty-third day (of the month), let there be a sale of such animals [7]as are to be sold by each party, or bought by those in want of them, and the sale of such chattels and goods as (suit) the agriculturists, such as of skins, and all kind of clothing, either woven or felt-like, or other things of such a kind;[7] [8] but it is necessary for foreigners to

[1] The Greek is *ἐπιμεληθῆναι καὶ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι*, which I cannot understand; nor could, I think, Ficinus, whom Taylor has followed in omitting *ἐπιμεληθῆναι καὶ*, properly wanting in one MS.

[2]—[2] Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus has "ne quis vendendo emendove injuriam faciat," adopted to the letter by Taylor.

[3] I do not remember to have met elsewhere with the word *νέᾳ* instead of *πρώτῃ*, and even here the Scholiast evidently read, *ἑνῃ καὶ νέᾳ*, by which was meant the last day of the old moon, and the first of the new.

[4] Bekker has *νόμος δὲ ἔστω, μηνὸς*— But six MSS., *νόμος δ' ἑκάστῳ μηνὸς*. Plato wrote *νόμος δέ ἔστω· ἑκάστου μηνὸς*, as shown by "mensis cujusque" in Ficinus, who however omits *νόμος δὲ ἔστω*.

[5] After *τοὺς ἐπιτρόπους*, the Greek text has *ὅσοι τοῖς ἀστοῖς ξένοι ἢ καὶ δοῦλοι ἐπιτροπεύουσι*, which Taylor has omitted with Ficinus, who probably could not understand those words; nor assuredly can I, even after Ast's attempt to explain them.

[6] All the MSS. read *δεκάτῃ*, answering to "decimo" in Ficinus.

[7]—[7] Ficinus has thus abridged all between the numerals, "quibus homines egent, supellectiliumque, ut corii vestiumque ac similium."

[8]—[8] Such is the literal version of the Greek, which I confess I cannot understand; nor, I think, could Ficinus, whose rendering is "necesse

acquire them by purchasing from others; but the retail dealing in these articles either barley or wheat, distributed in the form of meal, or any other food in general, for citizens and their slaves, let no one sell or buy from any person of this kind.[8] But in the markets for foreigners, let a foreigner (sell) to the handicraftsmen, and their slaves, [1]exchanging the sold articles for wine and food, which the majority call a retail trading; and let the cooks expose for sale portions of animals cut into pieces to foreigners and handicraftsmen and their domestics.[1] Let too a foreigner buy daily the whole of the materials for burning in a mass, from the superintendents of farms, and sell it again to other foreigners for as much as he pleases, and when he pleases. But of all other goods and chattels, as much as there is a need of them to each person, let (the foreigners) sell (any part)[2] at the common market, after bringing them to a place appointed[3] for each occasion,[4] [5]where they shall wait, having made a conjecture about fitting situations, until the guardians of the laws, and the Stewards of the market, with the City-Stewards, shall have marked out the limits of the sale-stands.[5] In these

autem est peregrinos omnia a possidentibus emere, ne cauponatio in tritico et hordeo circa farinam ac cætera alimenta ulla fiat; nec civibus nec servis eorum cauponari omnino liceat."

[1]—[1] Here again I am quite in the dark. Ficinus has "vinum cibumque commutare ac vendere carnesque coctas similiter; quæ res a plurimis cauponatio dicitur—" thus translated by Taylor, "exchange to artificers and their slaves wine and food, and in like manner distributed flesh."

[2] I have translated as if ὁτιοῦν, required to govern the genitive χρημάτων, had dropt out after πωλεῖν.

[3] Ficinus has "in locis determinatis," who therefore found in his MS. εἰς τακτὸν τόπον in lieu of εἰς τὸν τόπον, where the article has no meaning.

[4] Instead of ἕκαστον, which cannot follow εἰς τὸν τόπον ἕκαστον, whatever Ast may say to the contrary, I have translated as if the Greek were ἑκάστοτε—

[5]—[5] In this most intricate passage the Greek is at present ἐν οἷς ἂν νομοφύλακές τε καὶ ἀγορανόμοι μετ' ἀστυνόμων τεκμηράμενοι ἕδρας πρεπούσας ὅρους θῶνται τῶν ὠνίων. Ficinus has "ubi legum custodes censoresque una cum ædilibus locum designarint et pretia venalibus imposuerint." But τεκμαίρεσθαι never does and never could signify "to mark out," nor could ὅρους τῶν ὠνίων mean "pretia venalibus." Unless I am greatly mistaken the words τεκμηράμενοι ἕδρας πρεπούσας have been misplaced, and should follow ἵνα μενοῦσι, which I have elicited from ἐν οἷς ἂν— For Plato meant to say that the market people were to bring their goods and place them where they thought they would be allowed to have their stalls, as soon as the civic authorities had marked

places let a person exchange money for goods, and goods for money, one party not giving up to another the article of barter (without an equivalent).[1] But if a person does give it up in confidence, whether he recovers (its value) or not, let him rest contented; as there is no action relating to contracts of this kind. [2]But the article sold and bought, by how much the more it is, or at a greater (price) than according to the law, which has stated through how much its being increased and decreased it is meet to do neither of these acts;[2] let the greater be written up before the guardians of the laws, and the contrary expunged. Let the same take place respecting the foreign settlers with regard to the registering of their property.

And let any one, who wishes, come to the emigration on certain conditions, [3]as there is a location for any foreigner, who has the wish and the power to emigrate,[3] if he belongs to any craft; and if there is to him sojourning not more than twenty years from his enrolling himself, and paying no foreign settler's tax, ever so small, except that of living temperately, nor any other hawker's licence for the sake of buying and selling. But when the time (twenty years) shall have expired, let him take away his property and depart. [4]But if during these years it should happen to him to become a person of note through some sufficient acts of kindness done to the state, and he trusts he can persuade the Council and Assembly by making a request that a delay may take place in his quitting the country absolutely, or that he may stay there for the whole of life, let him go and persuade the city; (and) whatever he

out the boundaries for each kind of wares. It would seem however, from a passage just afterwards, that the magistrates had a power to fix a price upon different articles. But the words are too corrupt to lead to any positive conclusion.

[1] I have inserted the words between the lunes to fill up what I conceive to be the sense.

[2]—[2] Such is the literal version of the text. Ficinus has "si quid vero venditum emptumque pluris minorisve est, quam lex jusserit, qua rerum venalium mensuræ et pretia constituta sunt"—by the aid of which Ast would read πλέον ἂν ᾖ ἢ καὶ μεῖον instead of πλέον ἂν ᾖ καὶ πλεόνος—Cousin's version is "Si on vendait ou si on achetait une chose en plus grande quantité et plus cher qu' il n' est marquée par la loi—" thus applying πλέον to quantity, and πλέονος to price.

[3]—[3] All the words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor, who has just afterwards adopted from Ficinus—'quo in tempore incolendi vectigal nullum solvere cogatur."

[4]—[4] Here again Taylor has adopted almost to the letter the abridged

may persuade, let it be accomplished for him.[4] But in the case of the sons of foreign settlers, who are handicraftsmen and fifteen years of age, let the period of their settlement commence after their fifteenth year; and after these let a person remain twenty years, and then depart whither he pleases; but if he wishes to remain let him remain after having persuaded (the government) on the same grounds. [1]But let the person, who is leaving, go and expunge for himself the registrations, which have been written previously about him before the rulers.[1]

BOOK IX.

[1.] [2]AFTER these there would be law-suits, consequent upon all the preceding doings, according to the natural arrangement of laws. Now of the doings whatsoever, respecting which it is requisite for law-suits to take place, some have been mentioned, namely, those relating to agriculture, and what follow upon them; [3]but some of the greatest moment have not been mentioned at all; and each having been mentioned stated singly[3] what recompence it ought to receive,

translation of Ficinus—"Quod si magnum aliquod beneficium intra viginti annos civitati contulerit velitque plus temporis aut etiam per vitam in civitate manere, fiat sibi, quod petierit ratumque habeatur, si modo consilio concionique persuaserit."

[1]—[1] Such is the literal translation of the Greek. Ficinus has "qui autem recedit, oblita descriptione, quæ apud magistratus erat conscripta, sic abeat:" Taylor is content with the general sense. "But if they choose to leave the city, they may depart, after their registers, which were committed to the care of the magistrates, are obliterated."

[2] Ficinus has, "Judicia vero, si post hæc superioribus actionibus convenientia reddantur, naturalis utique ferendarum legum ordo servabitur," as if his MS. read *Δίκαι δὴ, αἱ τὰ—οὖσαι κατὰ φύσιν γίγνοιντ' ἂν—* But Ast says that *οὖσαι γίγνοιντ' ἂν* is merely a circumlocution for *γίγνοιντ' ἂν*.

[3]—[3] Such is the literal version of the unintelligible Greek, *τὰ δὲ μέγιστα οὔτε εἴρηταί πω, καθ' ἓν ἕκαστον τε λεγόμενον ῥηθὲν*, out of which Cornarius, Stephens, and Ast have been unable to elicit any thing satisfactory; while Ficinus has been content to give an abridgment of the whole passage in his version, "de maximis vero judiciis et judicibus sigillatim nondum diximus." What the train of thought requires might perhaps

and what judges to meet with, these are to be stated after those in order.

Clin. Right.

Athen. It were, however, after a manner disgraceful [1]to lay down all the laws, that we are now about to do,[1] in such a kind of state as we assert will be well regulated, and meet with every thing leading directly to the pursuit of virtue. For[2] ever to think that in such a state a man can be born, who will participate in the depravity [3]of the others, the greatest,[3] so that it is necessary to lay down laws by anticipation, and to put out threats, should such a character arise, and for the sake of averting these, when they do arise, to lay down against them laws of punishment, as if they would arise,[4] (this,) as I said, were after a manner disgraceful. But since we do not, as the ancient legislators did, give laws[5] to heroes the sons of gods, as the story now goes, and they who were born from gods, gave laws (to themselves)[6] and others, born themselves from such beings, but we do at present legislate as men for the seed of men, there is no dread of doing wrong in fearing that some of our citizens should be, as it were horn-struck,[7] and

be obtained, but not without alterations, which would appear too violent. In lieu of *ῥηθὲν*, which Ast would expunge, Winckelmann proposes *διαρρήδην*, Orelli, *ῥητὴν ἦν*—

[1]—[1] I have translated as if the Greek were, *ἦν νομοθετεῖν πάντα, ὁπόσα νῦν μέλλομεν, δρᾶν ταῦτα*, not *καὶ νομοθετεῖν πάντα, ὁπόσα νῦν μέλλομεν τοῦτο δρᾶν*, where Stephens and Ast have justly found fault with *τοῦτο δρᾷν*, and Stalbaum with *καὶ*— Ficinus has, "Turpe quodam modo videri potest leges de hujusmodi rebus, quales tractabimus, illi civitati tribuere," as if his MS. read *Αἰσχρὸν μὲν δή τινα τρόπον εἶναι ἔοικε νομοθετεῖν, ὅσα νῦν μέλλομεν δρᾶν, ταύτῃ τῇ πόλει*—

[2] The Greek is *ἐν δὲ*—The sense requires *ἐν γὰρ*—On the confusion of *δὲ* and *γὰρ*, see Schæfer's Index to Porson's Euripides in Γάρ.

[3]—[3] I cannot understand *τῶν ἄλλων—τῶν μεγίστων*, nor could Ast; who understands *ἀστῶν* after *τῶν ἄλλων*, and would insert *πέρι* after *τῶν μεγίστων*.

[4] I have adopted *ἐσομένοις*, suggested by Stephens, in lieu of *ἐσομένους*, which is without regimen.

[5] In lieu of *νομοθετούμενοι* we must read *νομοθετουμένοις*, or, what is preferable, omit the word altogether.

[6] I have inserted "themselves," absolutely requisite to balance *ἄλλοις*. For *αὐτοὶ αὐτοῖς τ'* might easily have been corrupted into *αὐτοί τ'*.

[7] In the word *κεράσβολος*, there is an allusion to the notion of some ancient agriculturists, that seeds which, when sown, had struck against the horn of a bull or cow, produced fruit so hard as to be cooked with difficulty, and in fact to never become tender. The notion was ridiculed

become naturally so hard, as not to be liquefied,[1] (and,) as those kinds of pulse are in the case of fire, so these persons should in the case of laws, although ever so strong, become not wasted.[2] [3]In favour of whom I will state what is no favour,[3] first a law relating to sacrilege, should any one dare to commit it. Now we would neither wish, nor is it to be very much feared, that any citizen amongst those, who have been properly brought up, will ever labour very greatly under this disease; but their domestics and strangers, and the slaves of strangers, would attempt many things of this kind. For the sake of whom especially, and at the same time being cautious of all the weakness of human nature, I shall mention the law relating to sacrilege,[4] and all the other matters of that kind, as are to be cured, or [5]not to be cured at all. The prelude, however, to these matters ought, according to what has been formerly agreed upon, to be as short as possible. Some one then would, conversing and at the same time admonishing, address him, whom an evil desire calls aside by day and excites by night, and leads him to plunder temples, in these words:—O wonderful man, no ill, either human or divine, stirs up that—which is now urging you to proceed to an act of sacrilege, but a certain madness, begotten in men from crimes of old date, and not yet cleansed, and which is carried round in the form of something to be expiated; and against which you ought, with all your might, to be on your guard. Learn, then, what this

by Theophrastus, quoted by Ruhnken on Timæus, p. 155, who has shown that *ἀτεράμων*, which was originally said of pulse that, like some kind of peas, does not become soft by boiling, was afterwards applied by Aristophanes and Plato to a person; and, he might have added, by Æschylus likewise in Prom. 198, and 1098.

[1, 2] Ast would read *τέγγεσθαι* and *ἄτεγκτοι* in lieu of *τήκεσθαι* and *ἄτηκτοι*. For the idea of wasting away is not applicable to pulse, but of becoming soft rather, as in Ælian, *ὥστε καὶ πάντας τοὺς ἀτέγκτους τε καὶ ἀτεράμονας τέγξαι*. Ficinus, not understanding, it would seem, the allusion to vegetables boiling over a fire, renders *ὅσπρια πυρὶ* by "legumina fulminis tactu," whom Taylor follows with his "leguminous substances, blasted by thunder."

[3—3] This is the only rendering I can give to *χάριν οὐκ ἐπίχαριν*, similar to *χάριν ἄχαριν* in Eurip. Iph. T. 566, and *δίκην ἄδικον* below, § 12, p. 873, C. Ast however would unite *οὐκ ἐπίχαριν* with *νόμον*, and so does Ficinus in his "legem—quamvis onerosam nobis atque molestam."

[4] In lieu of *ἱεροσύλων* Ast once wished to read correctly *ἱεροσυλιῶν*, similar to "sacrilegio" in Ficinus, whom Taylor and myself have followed.

[5] Ficinus has "aut vix aut nullo modo sanari possunt." He therefore found in his MS. *ἢ*, not *καὶ*, or perhaps both *ἢ καὶ*—

caution is. When any such idea comes upon you, betake yourself to expiatory rites; betake yourself, as a suppliant, to the temples of the gods who avert evils; (and) betake yourself to the society of men, who are called good, and partly hear, and partly endeavour yourself to say, that every man ought to honour what is beautiful and just. But fly, without turning back, from the society of the wicked. And if, while you are so doing, the disease becomes somewhat lighter, (it is well);[1] but if not, consider that death is more honourable than life, and free yourself from it.

[2.] Since, then, we have sung these preludes to those, who turn their thoughts to all such things as are unholy and destructive to the state, [2]it is meet for the law to be silent in the case of him who obeys:[2] but to him, who does not obey, to sing, after the prelude, loudly—He, who is detected in the act of sacrilege, if he is either a slave or a stranger, shall have the circumstance marked in his face and hands;[3] and after being scourged with as many stripes as the judges shall think proper, he shall be cast out naked beyond the boundaries of the country. For, perhaps, after suffering this punishment, he will, by being brought to his senses, become a better man. For punishment, taking place according to law, is not inflicted as an evil, but it nearly effects one of two things; for it makes him who suffers the punishment, either better or less depraved. If however any citizen shall appear to have done any thing of this kind, in the shape of a crime, considered one of the heinous and not to be mentioned,[4] relating to the gods, or parents, or the state, the judge shall consider such a person to

[1] On this ellipse, see Koen on Gregor. de Dialect. p. 48, ed. Schæf.

[2—2] I have translated as if the Greek were *τῷ μὲν πειθομένῳ τὸν νόμον εἶναι σιγηλὸν δεῖ*, not *τῷ μὲν πειθομένῳ τὸν νόμον ἐᾶν σιγῇ δεῖ*: where Stephens was the first to find a difficulty, but unable to master it; although he has quoted, very appositely, ix. p. 938, A., *πειθομένοις μὲν σιγὴ, ἀπειθοῦσι δὲ φωνὴ νόμου ἥδε*. The error arose from the similarity between *ἐᾶν* and *εἶναι*, and ΣΙΓΗΑΟΝΔΕΙ and ΣΙΓΗΔΕΙ. Ficinus, no doubt feeling himself at a loss, has given a paraphrase—"quicunque ex his paruerint, eos a lege liberos dimittemus."

[3] On the punishments inflicted upon sacrilegious persons, Ast refers to Meursius, Them. Attic. ii. 2, and Petit. Leg. Attic., p. 671. With regard to the marks on the hand, something similar was done formerly in England to persons found guilty of manslaughter.

[4] I have adopted the interpretation given by Dorville on Chariton, i. 5, in preference to that of Ast, who explains *ἀπορρήτων* by "forbidden."

be incurable, from reflecting that though he had met with an education and a bringing up of so excellent a kind, he had not kept himself from the greatest wickedness. Now to such a person death is the least of evils. But he will by his example benefit the rest, when he is held in dishonour, and is made to disappear,[1] and (is cast out) beyond the boundaries of the country. But to his children and race, if they avoid their father's habits, let there be glory and words of honour, inasmuch as they have well and bravely fled from evil to good. It will not, however, be becoming for the property of such person to be confiscated to the state, in which the same and equal allotments ought to remain for ever. But when any one shall be voted to have committed crimes worthy (of a loss) of property, let him pay [2]from his possession the fines,[2] if there be any overplus beyond his allotment properly furnished; and to this extent let him be fined, but not beyond. And let the guardians of the laws, looking into these matters accurately from the registers, ever give a clear statement to the judges, in order that no one may be idle,[3] with regard to his allotment, through the want of means. But should any one be voted to be worthy of a greater fine, and none of his friends be willing to be his surety, and, by paying jointly the fine, to procure his liberty, punish him with bonds for a length of time, and in public, and with some kind of ill-treatment;[4] and let no one for any offence be at any time without a punishment,[5] not even if he is driven over the boundaries;[6] but it is meet for the

[1] The verb *ἀφανίζειν* is an euphemism for *ἀποκτείνειν*.

[2]—[2] Although *ἐκτίσεις—ἐκτίνειν* would be correct Greek, yet I very much doubt whether *ζημίας ἐκτίσεις—ἐκτίνειν* be equally so. I have therefore translated, as if the text were *ζημίας ἐκ κτήσεως*—similar to *χρημάτων—ἐκτίσεις* shortly afterwards.

[3] As each allottee was required to cultivate his allotment, he would of necessity remain idle, if it were confiscated, and no provision made for its cultivation by another person; which could not take place in a state, where every one is supposed to be already occupied in some business.

[4] An English reader will perhaps better understand *τισι προπηλακισμοῖς*, by knowing that formerly, when persons were put into the pillory, they used to be pelted with mud, which is literally *προπηλακισμὸς* in Greek, and with rotten eggs. What, however, Plato meant specifically by that word, I do not know, nor has any one, I believe, been able to explain.

[5] This is a rare sense of *ἄτιμος*. Ast refers to Eustathius on *Οδ. Δ.* 32.

[6] So Ast explains *εἰς ὑπερορίαν φυγάδα*—where he has adopted *εἰς*, as suggested by Stephens. But then the article would be required, as shown

punishment to be either death, or bonds, or stripes, or certain [1] formless sittings or standings, or by-standings at temples,[1] at the extreme parts of the country, or, as we before stated, the payment of money; [2] and for the trial to take place in this way. Let then [2] the guardians of the laws be the judges of death; and let the tribunal consist of the last year's magistrates, selected for their excellence. But as regards the bringing (before the court) an accusation and the citing (the witnesses), and such like matters, and how they ought to take place, this must be the care of the junior legislators, but ours to lay down the law for regulating the manner of giving votes. Now let the vote be given openly; but, prior to this, let the judge be seated before the face of the accuser and defendant, [3] in order, as near as possible, according to old age;[3] and let all the citizens too, who are at leisure, diligently attend as the hearers of such causes; and let the accuser speak first one speech, and afterwards the defendant; and after these speeches, let the senior judge commence by his own inquiry [4] and proceed to a sufficient examination of what has been stated; and, after the elder judge, all the rest in order ought to go through whatever a person is [5] still desirous of being stated, or (regrets to have been) not stated[5] by each party. But let him,

by *εἰς τὴν ὑπερορίαν ἐκπέμπειν* in ix. p. 866, D., and xi. p. 936, C. Hence *ὑπερόριον*, proposed by Steph. and found in two MSS., is preferable.

[1]—[1] Such is the literal version of the Greek—*ἀμόρφους ἕδρας ἢ στάσεις ἢ παραστάσεις εἰς ἱερὰ*—where I cannot well understand *ἀμόρφους*; nor can I believe that Plato wrote *στάσεις ἢ παραστάσεις*, especially as Dio Cassius, iv. p. 790, quoted by Casaubon, on Suetonius August. c. 24, has *ἕδραι τε ἄτιμοι καὶ στάσεις ἐπονείδιστοι*— By comparing however Timæus Lex. in *Παράστασις· στάσις παρά τινα ἄτιμος*—(or, as it should be read, *παρ' ἱερά τινα*)—it would seem that *ἢ στάσεις* is a part of an explanation. Perhaps by *ἄμορφοι* or *ἄτιμοι ἕδραι* are to be understood sittings, where the party offending was placed in a corner or had a dress of dishonour put on him; while with the standing at the temple may be compared the custom in modern times of persons doing penance by standing in a church with a white sheet thrown over them.

[2]—[2] I have adopted, what Ast has suggested—*τὴν δὲ δίκην ταύτη γίγνεσθαι*, in lieu of *τὴν δίκην ταύτην γενέσθω*, which is without sense or syntax. To complete however the connexion of the sentences he should have suggested *δὴ* for *δὲ*—

[3]—[3] I confess I hardly understand *ἐξῆς ἐγγύτατα κατὰ πρέσβιν*—

[4] According to Harpocration, by *Ἀνάκρισις* was meant an inquiry by a magistrate previous to a trial. But here it must mean a sifting of the evidence of the opposite parties, after a trial had commenced.

[5]—[5] The Greek is *ῥηθὲν ἢ μὴ ῥηθὲν ἐπιποθῇ*— I have translated as if

who desires or regrets nothing, give up his right of inquiry to another. But of the matters mentioned, whatever may seem to be to the purpose, let persons affix a seal to the writings, and, after putting the marks of all the judges, place the document in the temple of Vesta; and again on the morrow, after coming together to the same place, let them inquire into and go through the suit, and again affix marks to what has been stated; and when they shall have done this thrice, after having sufficiently sifted the proofs and testimony, let each judge, carrying in his hand a sacred[1] pebble, undertake before Vesta,[2] to decide, as far as he can, justly and truly, and thus put an end to a suit of this kind.

[3.] After the offences relating to the gods, (let us speak)[3] of those, that relate to the dissolution of a polity. Now he, who brings a person into power and makes the laws slaves, and puts the state under the control of factious societies, and effects all this by force, and excites sedition, acts contrary to the law. Such a person it is meet to consider as the greatest enemy of all to the whole state. And it is meet to hold him as the second in wickedness,[4] who, although not taking any part in any of these acts, yet while he has a share in the greatest offices of the state, either lies hid from the knowledge of these matters,[5] or not lying hid does through cowardice not act the part of an avenger on behalf of his country. But let every

ἐπιποθῇ were written ἔτ ποθῇ, and ποθῇ taken in the double sense of desiring and regretting. But if this is not possible, we must omit ἢ μὴ ῥηθὲν, with two MSS., if ποθῇ means "be desirous;" but ῥηθὲν ἢ, if it means "regret."

[1] I do not know another place where mention is made of a holy pebble. By comparing φανερὰ ἡ ψῆφος just before, one would prefer φανερὰ to ἱερὰ—

[2] As Ficinus has "jurejurando per Vestam," Stephens suggested πρὸς τῆς Ἑστίας, adopted by Ast, and found afterwards in five MSS. But ὑπισχνεῖσθαι has not elsewhere in the sense of "to swear."

[3] Ficinus has alone "dicatur—"

[4] Unless κάκῃ is to be referred to δειλίᾳ, which can hardly be the case, one would prefer κακίᾳ—

[5] That Plato would thus brand with dishonour a person, who did not know what was going on in secret and factious associations, I cannot for a moment believe; unless the want of knowledge were a willing act. Hence I suspect he wrote λεληθότα τε πάντα ἐκόντα τὰ μὴ κεκευθότα—i. e. "and wilfully lying hid from all things not concealed—" To obviate the difficulty, Ast, whom Stalbaum follows, says that λεληθότα ταῦτα is put for λεληθότων τούτων.

one, who is of the smallest utility, lay an information before the magistrates,[1] and bring to trial the person who is plotting for a violent and at the same time an illegal change in the form of government. And let the judges for these be those in the cases of sacrilege; and let the whole process be conducted for the former in a similar manner as for the latter; and let the vote, [2]which is the superior in number, bring with it death.[2] And in one word,[3] let not the disgrace and punishment of the father follow upon any of the children, unless the father, grandfather, and great-grandfather of any one have in succession paid the penalty of death; and let the children keep their own property, except so much as belongs completely to the regulated allotment, and let the state send them away [4]to their ancient paternal land and state.[4] But as to those citizens, who shall happen to have more children than one, and these not less than ten years of age, let ten of them cast lots, whom the father or grandfather on the father's or mother's side shall mark out; and let the names of those who have obtained the lot be sent to Delphi; and whomsoever the god fixes upon, (it is meet to) appoint with a better fortune as the heir of the family of those who have left their home.

Clin. And properly so.

Athen. Let there be still a one-third[5] law in common, respecting the judges [6][who ought to judge for them],[6] and the mode of the suits, [7]in the case of those, against whom a person shall lay a charge of treason, and bring them before a court of justice.[7] In like manner, let there be in the case of their children this

[1] Ficinus has "judicibus," adopted tacitly by Taylor.

[2]—[2] This seems a rather strange law. Since even if the greater number of votes were for an acquittal, the party would still be put to death. But perhaps Plato meant to say, that if a bare majority of votes were given against the accused, he was to suffer death.

[3] This expression seems here perfectly out of place.

[4]—[4] The reader should bear in mind that the laws laid down by Plato were intended for a colony sent out from a mother country, and not for one existing already; where it would be in some cases impossible for them to be acted upon.

[5] To avoid the incorrect *τρίτος εἷς*, Sydenham suggests *ἐπὶ τρισὶν εἷς* —I should prefer *τρίτος οὗτος ἔστω ὁ νόμος*—

[6]—[6] The words between the brackets are omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor.

[7]—[7] Here again Ficinus has briefly "adversus eos, qui proditionis accusati sunt," followed tacitly by Taylor.

one law on all points[1] touching their remaining in, or departing from, their country, as regards the three, a traitor, and him who commits sacrilege, and him who by violence destroys the laws of the state. Against a thief too, whether he steals a thing great or small, let there be one law, and one punishment, after a trial[2] in all cases. For if any one is cast in a trial of this kind, and he has other property, beyond his allotment, sufficient to pay, he must in the first place pay double of what has been stolen; but if he has not, let him be put into bonds, until he either pays, or persuades the party, who has a verdict against him, (to forego his claim). But if any one is cast in a trial relating to a public theft, let him be freed from bonds, after he has either persuaded the state, or paid the double of the property stolen.

Clin. How say we, guest, that there is no difference in the case of a thief, who purloins a thing small or great, and from places sacred or not sacred; and in such other cases, as present a dissimilitude in the whole of thieving, which, as being various, the legislator ought to follow up by assigning punishments not similar at all?

Athen. You have, Clinias, in the best manner, nearly beaten me off, while I have been as it were carried along;[3] and after stirring me up, you have reminded me, although I had previously thought of it myself, that the matters relating to the laying down of laws have never at any time been by any means properly worked out, [4] as it has fallen out to speak of them at present.[4]

Clin. But how again say we this?

[4.] *Athen.* We did not make use of an incorrect image, when

[1] In lieu of *περὶ ταῦτα*, which is scarcely intelligible, I have translated as if the Greek were *περὶ πάντα*—

[2] I have translated as if the Greek were *ἐκ δίκης τιμωρία*, in lieu of *δίκη τιμωρία*, which is unintelligible; and hence Ast wished to read *δίκη τιμωρίας*, for he found *δίκη τιμωρίαις* as a var. lect. in two MSS. Ficinus omits *δίκη* in his version "una lex pœnaque—" Winckelmann suggests *Δίκη τιμωρός*—but that would be too poetical.

[3] The Greek is *ὥσπερ φερόμενον*. But *ὥσπερ* requires the mention of something to serve as a comparison. Perhaps Plato wrote *ὥσπερ θῆρα, φερόμενον*— For to a wild beast would well apply the verb *ἀνήγειρας*.

[4]—[4] I have translated as if the Greek were *ὡς γε ἐν τῳ νῦν παρόντι πέπτωκ' αὐτὰ λέγειν*, not *ὡς γε ἐν τῳ νῦν παραπεπτωκότι λέγειν*: which I cannot understand. Opportunely then do four MSS. offer *παρόντι*: which leads to *παρόντι πέπτωκ' αὐτὰ*—

we compared all those, who were now regulated by laws, to slaves under the care of slave-physicians. For it is meet to know a thing of this kind correctly, that if at any time one of those physicians, who handle the medical art from practice (alone) without theory, should come upon a free-born physician, discoursing with a free-born patient, and making use of theories bordering upon philosophy, and touching upon the disorder from its very commencement, and going back to the subject relating to (the whole) nature of bodies, he would quickly and greatly laugh, and speak no other language than is ready on such subjects to be addressed to the majority of the so-called physicians. For he would say—O stupid fellow, you are not curing the sick man, but you are almost giving him a lesson, as if he wanted to become a physician, and not to be in health.

Clin. And would he not speak properly in speaking so?

Athen. [1] And would not the same person deservedly object against us,[1] that whoever discusses laws, as we do now, gives the citizens lessons, but not laws?

[2] *Clin.* And would he not seem to say this too correctly?[2]

Athen. Perhaps so.[3] But at present a fortunate circumstance has occurred to us.

Clin. What is it?

Athen. That there is no necessity for us to lay down laws; but that, entering voluntarily upon an inquiry into all kinds of polity, we are endeavouring to perceive in what manner the best one and the most necessary may take place. And now, as it seems, it is permitted us, if we please, to consider what is the best, or, if we had rather, what is the most necessary on the question of laws. Let us choose, then, whichever it seems (is best).

Clin. We propose, O guest, a ridiculous choice, and we

[1]—[1] Such is the literal version of the Latin of Ficinus, "Nonne et nobis merito idem objiciet," who either did not find in his MS. the words *τάχ' ἂν εἰ προσδιανοοῖτό γε*, or else could not understand them a bit better than myself; although it is easy to see that they conceal something like *Τάχα δ' ἂν ὢν ἔτι παῖς διανοοῖτ' ἄν*, i. e. And perhaps even one still a boy would thoroughly understand.

[2]—[2] The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and after him tacitly by Taylor.

[3] The word *ἴσως* has been hitherto assigned to Clinias. Evidently incorrectly.

should become really similar to those legislators, who are compelled by some great necessity to give laws immediately, as being not permitted (to defer it) till the morrow. But it is lawful for us to speak with god's will, just as it is for masons, or those, who commence any other putting together of materials, to bring together for ourselves dispersedly, things out of which we may select what is suited to the combination which is to be, and to collect them at leisure. Let us then suppose ourselves to be for the present house-builders, not from necessity, but those, who at leisure put aside for their use some things, and put together others, so that we may have to say correctly, that some portions of the laws have been laid down, but others laid aside.

Athen. For thus, Clinias, our survey of the laws will be more natural. But, by the gods, let us consider some such thing as this, relating to legislators.

Clin. What?

Athen. There are writings and written discourses in cities by many other persons, and writings likewise and discourses by the legislator.

Clin. How not?

Athen. Whether then shall we direct our attention to the compositions of the rest of poets, and of such as in prose [1] and in verse,[1] [2] have put together their advice relating to life, to be remembered by their having written them down,[2] and by no means apply ourselves to the writings of legislators? Or (to the latter) most of all?

Clin. Very much so.

Athen. But surely it is not necessary for the legislator alone of those who write to give counsel about things beautiful, and good, and just, while teaching what they are, and how they ought to be studied by those, who are about to be happy.

Clin. How not?

Athen. But is it more disgraceful for Homer, and Tyrtæus, and the rest of poets, to have laid down in their writings what is incorrect, relating to life and its pursuits, and less so for Lycurgus, Solon, and such as, being legislators, have composed

[1]—[1] The words *καὶ μετὰ μέτρων* are properly omitted in the two best MSS., as being superfluous after *ποιητῶν*: unless it be said that *ποιητῶν καὶ* are to be omitted, as being scarcely intelligible after *τῶν ἄλλων*—

[2]—[2] Ficinus has "operibus de ratione vivendi compositis."

writings? Or is this correct, that of all writings in cities those relating to laws ought to appear, when unfolded,[1] the most beautiful and best; [2]but that those of the rest, either following after them, or at discordance with them, are to be laughed down?[2]

[3] *Clin.* Let us think in this way.

Athen. And[3] that with regard to the writing down of laws, it ought to take place in states, that the writings seem to be of persons, who, in the garb of a father or mother, have feelings of love, and possess a mind, [4]and not, like a tyrant[4] and despot, commanding and threatening, [5]and after writing (decrees) on walls, to depart.[5] Let us consider then, even now, whether we should, after thinking upon laws, endeavour to speak in this manner, whether we are able or not. Let us (gird up ourselves[6] for it), exhibiting at least an alacrity, and proceeding along this road, let us, if we must suffer aught, endure it. And may the attempt be fortunate; and (fortunate), if god pleases, it will be in this way.

Clin. You have spoken well. And let us do as you say.

[1] So I have translated *διαπτυττόμενα*, adopted from MSS. by Bekker and Stalbaum, in lieu of *διατυπούμενα*, got by Stephens from *διατυπώμενα*, the conjecture of Cornarius, instead of *διαπυττόμενα* in Ald. Ficinus, and Taylor after him, omit the word altogether.

[2]—[2] In the place of these unmeaning words Ficinus has, what is at least intelligible, "cæterorum vero scripta probari, si legibus consentanea sunt; sin dissona, derideri."

[3]—[3] The Greek is, *οὕτω διανοώμεθα περὶ νόμων δεῖν*—all put into the mouth of the Athenian. I have translated as if it were originally, ΚΛ. *οὕτω διανοώμεθα.* ΑΘ. *περὶ νόμων δὲ δεῖν*— Ficinus, to avoid the want of connexion in the sentences, and to conceal, probably, the difficulty in *οὕτω διανοώμεθα*, has given the general sense of the passage, "Sic igitur leges civitatibus conscribantur." Cornarius proposed to read, *Οὕτω διανοώμεθα περὶ νόμων, μῶν δεῖν*— but Ast, *πῶς δεῖ*, so that *γραφῆς* might be governed by *πῶς*, which he would defend by *πῶς—τῆς ξυμφωνίας*, in p. 860, C., and the other passages quoted by himself on *ναυπηγησίμης ὕλης—πῶς ἔχει*, in p. 705, C.

[4]—[4] I have translated as if the Greek were *καὶ μὴ*, not *ἢ*— Cousin says that the clause to which *ἢ* is to be referred, is *τὰ γεγραμμένα φαίνεσθαι ἐν σχήμασι πατρὸς*: but the laws would surely not be said to be as mild as a parent, or as severe as a tyrant.

[5]—[5] Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus has "rationem vero nullam penitus assignantis," with the omission of *ἀπηλλάχθαι*, neglected here by Taylor likewise.

[6] Ficinus alone supplies, what the sense requires, "accingamur," translated by Taylor, "let us attempt it."

[5.] *Athen.* In the first place then, let us accurately consider, as we have attempted to do, respecting those who commit sacrilege, and about every kind of theft, and injuries of all kinds. And let us not take it ill, if we lay down some, during our legislating, and deliberate about others. For we are becoming to be legislators, but are not yet so, although perhaps we soon shall be. But if it seems good to you, to consider about what I have said, let us, [1]as I have said,[1] consider.

Clin. By all means.

Athen. With regard to all things that are beautiful and just, let us endeavour to look in some such way as this, how we may for the present agree with, and how differ from ourselves; [2]who would say that we desire, if nothing else, to differ from the majority, and the majority too on the other hand with themselves.[2]

Clin. Of what kind of disagreement among ourselves are you speaking?

Athen. I will endeavour to state. On the question of justice generally, and of just men, and of things, and of actions, we all of us in a manner agree, that all these are beautiful;[3] so that if any one should strenuously affirm that just men are, through their most just habit, all-beautiful, although they should happen to be ugly in body, scarcely a single person would, by speaking thus, be thought to speak improperly. [4]Is not this true?

Clin. Perhaps so.

Athen. But let us see[4] that, if all things that border upon

[1]—[1] According to two MSS., *ὡς εἴρηκα* have been noted as spurious.

[2]—[2] Such is the literal version of the Greek; in lieu of which Taylor has, "for we acknowledge, that we desire, though we may not be able, to excel others." Ficinus, "qui in hoc maxime studere nos profitemur, ut a plurimis differamus, quo item alii a se ipsis dissentiunt—" by the aid of which one might read, *ἐν ᾧ οἱ πολλοί γε, αὐτοὶ πρὸς αὐτούς, οὔ*—"on a point, where the many differ, themselves from themselves, not at all."

[3] Ficinus, uncertain whether *καλὰ* means "honourable" or "beautiful," has expressed as usual both ideas, "honesta pulchraque."

[4]—[4] Such is Taylor's translation of *οὐκοῦν ὀρθῶς*. *Ἴσως*: who seems to have adopted the idea of Stephens, who says that after *οὐκοῦν ὀρθῶς* is to be supplied *ταῦτα καὶ σοὶ λέγεσθαι δοκεῖ*. But as such an ellipse is not to be found elsewhere, Bekker assigns *οὐκοῦν ὀρθῶς* to Clinias, as if *δόξειε λέγων* were to be understood. But to such a question the Athenian could not answer *ἴσως*, "perhaps," after he had stated distinctly what

justice are beautiful, [1]the sufferings of all of us are nearly equal to our doings.[1]

Clin. What then?

Athen. Whatever action is just, so far as it partakes of what is just, it nearly partakes of the beautiful likewise.

Clin. How not?

Athen. Whatever suffering then partakes of what is just, it would so far, by being confessed to be beautiful, exhibit a reasoning not discordant.

Clin. How not?

Athen. But if we should agree that a suffering is just, but not beautiful, the just and the beautiful would be discordant through things that are just being said to be the least beautiful.

Clin. How have you said this?

Athen. It is not difficult to understand. For the laws which have been laid down a little before, would seem to proclaim what is perfectly the contrary to our present assertions.

Clin. To what assertions?

Athen. We surely laid it down, that he, who committed sacrilege, would justly die, and he too, who is hostile to well-established laws; and, as we were about to lay down many other laws of this kind, we stopped short, on perceiving that these sufferings were infinite in multitude and magnitude; and that they were of all sufferings the most just, and of all the least beautiful. Will not then things just and beautiful appear in this manner at one time to be the same, and at another to be the most opposite?

Clin. There is a danger of it.

Athen. By the multitude, then, things beautiful and just,

his opinion was. To meet this difficulty, Ast would render ἴσως—"truly so." But such is not the meaning of ἴσως. Plato wrote, I suspect, ΚΛ. ἴσως. ΑΘ. *οὐκ οὖν ὀρθῶς ἴδοιμεν ἂν*—instead of *ἴδωμεν δὲ*—

[1]—[1] The meaning, says Ast, is—"Every thing that is just, is honourable and beautiful. Hence not only what we do justly, but what we suffer justly, must be beautiful; and hence no suffering that is just can be disgraceful." But this is rather the explanation of the next speech of the Athenian, than of the present one, where Plato asserts that what men suffer is nearly on a par with what they do, as regards the numbers of each set of events. But why this assertion thus follows the supposition, that all things, which border upon justice, are beautiful, I must confess my inability to explain.

which are so discordant [1] on these kind of points,[1] are addressed as things separate.

Clin. It appears so, guest.

Athen. Let us then, Clinias, view again our notions, as to how the accordance [2] exists on these very points.

Clin. Of what accordance, and with what,[2] are you speaking?

Athen. I think I have clearly stated in the previous discourse; [3] but if not before, suppose me saying it now.

Clin. What?[3]

Athen. That all wicked persons are in all things wicked involuntarily;[4] and that as this is the case, it is necessary for this inference to follow in order.

Clin. What (inference) do you mean?

Athen. That the unjust man is wicked; and that the wicked man is such involuntarily. Now there is no reason for a voluntary act to be ever done in an involuntary manner. He therefore, whoever acts unjustly, will appear to act so in an involuntary manner to him, who considers injustice to be an involuntary act. And this too must now be acknowledged by me. For I have agreed, that all men act unjustly involuntarily; and though some one, for the sake of contention or ambition, may say, that unjust men are involuntarily unjust, but yet many act unjustly voluntarily, the other is my assertion, and not this. In what way then should I agree with my own assertions, should ye, Clinias and Megillus, thus interrogate me—If these things are so, what would you, O guest, advise us respecting the legislation for the city of the Magnesians? To legislate for them, or not? [5] How not? I shall say.[5] Will you then separ-

[1]—[1] The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus. Taylor has "with each other."

[2]—[2] Ast was the first to object to *πρὸς ποίαν*—for there is nothing to which *ποίαν* can be referred; and he proposed to read *ποῖον*. He should have suggested *ποῖα*, as Baiter has done, answering to *ταῦτα* in the speech of the Athenian, and either *περὶ* here or *πρὸς* there, to preserve the balance of the sentences. Ficinus, unable perhaps to understand *πρὸς ποίαν*, has omitted those words.

[3]—[3] The words between the numerals have been translated by Taylor, from the Latin of Ficinus: "*Athen.* In superioribus manifeste mihi dictum arbitror. *Clin.* Quo pacto? *Athen.* Quod si supra dictum non est, nunc saltem me dicere existimate. *Clin.* Quidnam?"

[4] On this doctrine see at v. § 3.

[5]—[5] Ficinus, "Ego vero dare leges consulam."

arate injuries into the involuntary and voluntary? And shall we assign greater punishments for voluntary offences and injuries, and less (for the contrary)?[1] Or equal for all, since injuries are not voluntary at all?

Clin. You speak properly, O guest. But how shall we make use of what has now been said?

Athen. You have inquired correctly. Let us in the first place use them for this.

Clin. For what?

[6.] *Athen.* Let us call to mind that we stated correctly, that there is a great confusion and dissonance amongst ourselves respecting things just. Laying hold then of this, let us ask ourselves again [2](what shall we say).[2] Since we have neither found a way clearly out of the doubt relating to these matters, nor defined how those things differ from each other, which in all states, and by all legislators, that have ever existed, are laid down as forming two kinds of injuries, one voluntary, and the other involuntary, [3]are they to be legally established[3] in this way likewise?[4] and shall the language, which has been expressed by us, as if it had been spoken by some god, be dismissed, after having said only thus much, and without assigning any reason, that it has spoken correctly; shall it in some manner lay down a counter-law? This may not be.[5] But it is somehow necessary, before we lay down laws, to show these two things as existing, and (having) another[6] difference between them, in order that when any one assigns a punishment for either, every one [7]may follow what is said,[7] and be able to judge, whether it is established in a becoming manner, or not.

Clin. You appear to us, O guest, to speak well. For it is necessary to do one of two things, either to say that all unjust

[1] I have translated as if the Greek were *τῶν δ' ἐναντίων, ἐλάττους*, not *τῶν δὲ, ἐλάττους*—to preserve the balance of the sentences.

[2]—[2] I have translated as if the Greek were *τί ἐροῦμεν*, not *ἆρ' οὖν*, to supply the apodosis of the sentence.

[3]—[3] The Greek is *νομοθετεῖται*. I have translated as if it were *νομοθετητέα*— Ficinus has "ita varie puniuntur."

[4] i. e. in a twofold manner.

[5] I have translated as if the Greek were *ἔσται*, not *ἔστιν*—

[6] I cannot understand *ἄλλην*, nor could Ficinus, who omits it in his version, "et quam differentiam habeant—" Did Plato write *πολλὴν*?

[7]—[7] Ficinus has "intelligat," translated by Taylor, "may understand—"

actions are not involuntary, or to show, [1]by first defining,[1] that this has been stated correctly.

Athen. Of these two things one I can by no means endure that it takes place,[2] (I mean) [3]the denying that the person, who thinks so, has the truth on his side ;[3] for this would be neither according to law[4] nor holy. But in what manner these are two, if they do not differ by the involuntary and voluntary, but by something else perchance, I must endeavour by some means to show.

Clin. By all means, O guest: for it is not possible for us to understand this at least otherwise.

Athen. Be it so. Come then, (say,) does not, as it seems, much damage take place amongst citizens in their communications and intercourse with each other, and yet the voluntary and the involuntary abound in these transactions?

Clin. How not ?

Athen. Let not however any one imagine, after laying down that all damage is an injury, that in this way the injuries exist in them of a double kind, partly voluntary, and partly involuntary. For the involuntary damage done by all men is neither in number, nor in magnitude, less than the voluntary. But consider [5]whether I am saying any thing, when I say what I am about to say,[5] or nothing at all. For I do not say, Clinias and Megillus, that if some one hurts another, [6]not willingly, but unwillingly,[6] he does an injury to a person unwilling (to be injured). And in this way I will lay down the law, by making legally this an involuntary injury ; nor will I consider a damage of this kind as an injury at all, whether it be of a greater or less magnitude. And we shall frequently

[1]—[1] Ficinus has "antequam ad alia pergamus—"

[2] I have adopted *γίγνεσθαι*, found in all the MSS., in preference to *γίγνεται*, suggested by Cornarius, with the approbation of Steph., Ast, and Stalb.

[3]—[3] Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus has "ut videlicet, quod ita esse existimo, negem," translated by Taylor, "I mean the denying that I think it is so."

[4] In lieu of *νόμιμον* five MSS. read *ἐμὸν*, similar to "officii mei est" in Ficinus. But *νόμιμον* is required by *ὅσιον*.

[5]—[5] In lieu of this repetition of *λέγω λέγων—λέγειν*, Ficinus has "utrum deinceps veri aliquid afferam."

[6]—[6] As Ficinus could not understand, nor can I, the difference between *μὴ βουλόμενος* and *ἄκων*, he very wisely omitted *ἀλλ' ἄκων*, and so after him did Taylor.

say that through[1] assistance taking place not correctly, he, who is the cause of the assistance, does an injury, [2]at least if my opinion is the better.[2] For, my friends, if any one gives one any thing, or, on the contrary, takes it away, it is not meet to call such an action thus simply just or unjust; but whether a person does to another in any thing a benefit or harm, while making use of (a correct)[3] habit, and a just manner, to this ought the legislator to look; [4]and [direct his attention][4] to (these) two things, injustice and detriment; and [5]by making, what has been damaged, uninjured[5] as much as is possible, by the law, and by restoring, what has been lost, and raising up again, what has fallen by means of any one, [6]and making, what has been wounded, whole, and, what has been killed, expiated with money,[6] let him ever endeavour to convert, in the case of the doers and sufferers, by means of his laws, each of the injuries from a state of variance to that of friendship.

Clin. This at least is well (said).

Athen. Unjust damages therefore and gains, if any one can by injuring a person cause [7]to be a gain to himself,[7] he ought to cure, such at least as are to be cured, as being diseases in

[1] To support the syntax, I have translated as if *δι'* had dropt out between *δὲ* and *ὠφέλειαν*—

[2]—[2] Ald. alone has *ἥ γ' ἐμὴ νικᾷ*, with the usual ellipse of *δόξα*—as Stephens was the first to remark; although he has edited himself *ἥγε μὴ νικᾷ*, deceived by "si hæc minime superat" in Ficinus.

[3] Ficinus has "probis moribus," as if his MS. read *ἤθει ὀρθῷ*, to balance *δικαίῳ τρόπῳ*.

[4]—[4] The Greek is *καὶ πρὸς δύο ταῦτα δὴ βλεπτέον πρός τε ἀδικίαν καὶ βλάβην*. But *βλεπτέον* is superfluous after the preceding *θεατέον*: nor could *πρός τε* be thus repeated after *πρὸς δύο*, where *ἀδικίαν* and *βλάβην* are the two things alluded to; nor lastly, could *τὰ* be omitted before *δύο*.

[5]—[5] The Greek is *τὸ μὲν βλαβὲν ὑγιὲς—ποιητέον*: where Ast was the first to see that the sense and syntax require *ποιοῦντα*, while since four MSS. read *ἀβλαβὲς* in lieu of *βλαβὲν*, it is evident that Plato wrote *τὸ μὲν βλαβὲν ἀβλαβὲς*, of which *ὑγιὲς* is the explanation.

[6]—[6] The Greek is *καὶ τὸ θανατωθὲν ἢ τρωθὲν ὑγιὲς, τὸ δὲ ἀποίνοις ἐξιλασθὲν*—where Ast would reject *ἢ τρωθὲν ὑγιὲς* as an interpolation; but Stalbaum insert *ἰώμενον* after *τὸ θανατωθὲν*, forgetting that for what is dead there is no cure. Cousin would understand *ποιοῦντα*— I have translated as if the Greek were—*καὶ τὸ τρωθὲν ὑγιὲς ἱστάντα καὶ τὸ θανατωθὲν ἀποίνοις ἐξιλασθὲν*—and so Winckelmann, but without *ἱστάντα*.

[7]—[7] In *κερδαίνειν* lies hid *κέρδη εἶναι*, and *ἑαυτῷ* in *τούτων*, as I have translated.

the soul; but the question of the cure of injustice it is meet to say inclines in this way.

Clin. In what?

Athen. That what injury soever a person may do, be it great or little, the law may instruct, and altogether compel him, either not to dare again at any time to do such an act voluntarily, or far less frequently, in consequence [1] of the punishment for the injury. This should any one accomplish, either by works or words, or by pleasure or pains, or by honours or dishonours, and by fines of money or gifts, or altogether by any means whatever, (so that) [2] a person may hate injustice, and love, or at least not hate, the nature of justice, this is the very business of laws the most beautiful. But, upon the persons, whom the legislator perceives to be incurable on these points, he shall impose a punishment and law,[3] knowing that to all such as these it is better even for themselves not to live any longer, and that they will doubly benefit the rest, when freed from life, by being an example to others to do no wrong, and by causing the state to be devoid of bad men. In this way there is a necessity for the legislator to assign death, as the punisher of delinquencies of this kind,[4] but by no means otherwise.

Clin. This appears to have been spoken by you with great moderation; but we would hear still more gladly this spoken, namely, the difference between injustice and detriment, [5] and how the question of what is voluntary and involuntary is in these cases variously represented.[5]

[7.] *Athen.* I must endeavour therefore to do and say as you request me. For it is evident that, respecting the soul, you [6] say to, and hear from, each other [6] thus much, that one

[1] This is a rather strange use of πρὸς— Ficinus, whom Taylor follows, has "pœnæ impositione deterritus."

[2] After τις there has evidently dropt out ὥστε—

[3] In lieu of καὶ νόμον, which are evidently corrupt, Ficinus, whom Taylor follows tacitly, has "ultimo supplicio affectos." Winckelmann would suggest καταν μοθετήσει. Cousin understands by νόμον τινα "une certaine peine—qui seule peut obtenir l' effet désiré." But νομος never has nor could have such a meaning.

[4] Ficinus has "insanabiles homines," as if his MS. read τῶν ἀνιάτων in lieu of τῶν τοιούτων.

[5—5] All the words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor, and thus abridged by Ficinus—"et quomodo sponte et non sponte fiant."

[6—6] Ficinus has "sæpe dicitis et auditis," as if his MS. read πολλάκις λέγετε instead of καὶ λέγετε.

property of nature resides in it, whether as an accident or part, namely, anger,[1] a thing naturally hard to contest with and to overcome, and which overturns many things by its irrational violence.

Clin. How not?

Athen. And we speak moreover of pleasure as not being the same as anger; and we say that it possesses, from a contrary influence, a power through persuasion, united to a violent deception, to do whatever the will pleases.

Clin. And very much so.

Athen. He too who says that ignorance is a third cause of crimes, will not state a falsehood. Now the legislator, who makes a twofold division, would act the better by considering one kind as simple, and the cause of light offences; but the other twofold, when any one is in a state of non-instruction, not only by being afflicted with ignorance, but by an opinion of wisdom, as if he knew perfectly what he does not know at all; and laying down things of this kind, when followed by power and strength, as the causes of crimes mighty and unmusical;[2] but when followed by imbecility, as are the crimes of children and old men, he will consider them (all) as crimes, and will ordain laws against those who commit them; (laws), however, the mildest of all, and near to the greatest pardon.

Clin. You speak what is reasonable.

Athen. Now nearly all of us say, that one of us is superior to pleasure and anger, and another inferior. And such is the case.

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. But we have never heard even, that one of us is superior to ignorance, and another inferior.

Clin. Most true.

Athen. But we say that all these allure to their will a person, who is frequently drawn at the same time to things opposite.

Clin. Very often indeed.

[1] In lieu of *ὧν ὁ θυμὸς*, five MSS. read *ὃν ὁ θυμὸς*, which leads to *ὄνομα ὁ θυμὸς*, similar to "quam iracundiam dicimus," in Ficinus. Taylor omits the words entirely.

[2] Such is the literal version of *ἀμούσων*, by which was meant, says Ast, the whole of a liberal education; an idea which it is impossible to convey by any single word in English. Taylor has "rustic—" We might say by a paraphrase, "arising from a want of education."

Athen. Now I will define to you clearly the just and the unjust, of which I was speaking, with no variety of colouring. For I denominate injustice to be wholly the tyranny over the soul through anger, and fear, and pleasure, and pain, and envy, and desires, whether it does, or does not, harm any one. But the opinion of what is the best, by whatever way a state or any individuals may think it[1] will exist, [2]should it (the opinion,) by having a power in the soul, arrange in order the whole man, even though it stumbles in some matter, we must say that, what is done in this way, is just entirely, and (that too) which is under a rule of this kind of each, and of men through the whole of life best;[2] but that a damage of this kind is thought by the multitude to be an involuntary injustice. However, our discourse at present is not a harsh contest about names. But since there have been pointed out three kinds of delinquencies,[3] let us, in the first place, still more diligently recall them to our memory. Of pain then, which we denominate anger and fear, there is one kind.

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. But of pleasure and desires there is a second kind; another the third, of hopes, and [4]a desire of true opinion about that which is the best.[4] Now by this third being divided into two parts, five kinds will be produced, [5]as we have just now stated,[5] for which we must lay down five laws, differing from each other in two genera.

Clin. What are these?

Athen. One, when a deed is done constantly with violence

[1] In lieu of *τούτων* one MS. has from a correction *τοῦτον*, which leads to *τοῦτο*, i. e. *τὸ ἄριστον*, as suggested by Cousin.

[2]—[2] Such is the literal version of the unintelligible Greek; upon which Ast has written what has failed, in my opinion at least, to throw any light. Ficinus, whom Taylor follows for the most part, has "si animo dominata omnem virum exornet, etiamsi quid minus recti illi successerit, justitiam nomino; et quicquid inde gestum est, justum appello; atque eos, qui hujusmodi principatui libenter parent."

[3] As Plato alludes to what he had stated just above relating to the causes of crimes, it is strange to find here *ἁμαρτανομένων* instead of *ἁμαρτάνειν ποιούντων*.

[4]—[4] All between the numerals are considered by Ast to be an interpolation; for the three causes of crimes were said already to be pain, and pleasure, and an opinion of wisdom. Grou suggested *ἄφεσις* in lieu of *ἔφεσις*, which, although the Zurich editors seem disposed to adopt it, I cannot understand. Cousin would reject *ἔφεσις* as a faulty gloss.

[5]—[5] Ficinus, and after him Taylor, omits *ὡς νῦν φαμὲν*.

and accordant[1] actions; and the other, when it takes place secretly in darkness and with a fraud; but sometimes the act is done with both of these, against which there will be laws the most severe, if they possess their proper character.

Clin. This is reasonable.

[8.] *Athen.* But let us after this proceed to the point, from which we have digressed, and finish the laying down of laws. Now the subjects laid down by us were respecting those, who rob the gods, and are traitors to their country, and who corrupt the laws for the purpose of dissolving the existing polity. Of these some one may perhaps commit an act, when mad, or affected with a disease, or a very great age, or childishness, [2] differing not at all from things of this kind.[2] Of which acts should any become manifest to the judges selected on each occasion, either by the party himself informing, or a person making an excuse in behalf of the perpetrator, and he be decreed, when in this state, to have acted contrary to the law, let him pay simply for the damage, whatever he may have done; and let him be exempt from other punishments, unless by having killed any one his hands are not clean from murder; for in this case let him depart to another country, and dwell there in exile during a year; but if he returns before the time prescribed by the law, or puts his foot on the whole[3] of his native land, let him be imprisoned by the guardians of the laws for two years in the public gaol, and then released from bonds.

Since then we have begun with murder, let us endeavour to lay down laws completely for every kind of it. And, in the first place, let us speak of that done with violence and in-

[1] In lieu of *ξυμφώνων* Faehse suggests *ξυμφανῶν*, from "aperte" in Ficinus; but Ast, *ἐμφανῶν*, antithetical to *μετὰ σκότους*. Cousin says that either alteration is admissible. The Zurich editors suggest *ἀξυμφώνων*—

[2—2] Such is the literal version of the Greek, *οὐδέν πω τῶν τοιούτων διαφέρων*: where Stephens was the first to remark that *τῶν τοιούτων* had nothing to which it could be referred. Ast however, with whom Kühner agrees in Gr. Gr. § 373, says that *παίδων* is to be supplied from the preceding *παιδιᾷ*. Plato wrote I suspect *οὐδέν πω τῶν ἀνοήτων διαφέρων*— for both the very old and young are equally silly, according to the saying *Δὶς παῖδες οἱ γέροντες*.

[3] Ast explains *πάσης* by "altogether—" There is, I suspect, some error here. Ficinus, whom Taylor follows literally, has "aut etiam intra fines deprehendatur." The word *πάσης* seems to have been inserted from *ξυμπάσης τῆς πατρίδος*, a little below.

voluntarily. If then any one in a contest, and at the public games, shall involuntarily kill a friend, either on the instant, or some time after from the blows inflicted; or, in like manner, during a war, or in warlike exercises, of which the rulers have enjoined the practice, with naked bodies, or with any weapons, in imitation of warlike doings, let him be purified[1] according to the law brought from Delphi[2] touching these matters, and let him be held to be pure. [3] And in the case of physicians, should any person, when attended upon by them, die, without their willing it, let every one[3] be held to be pure by the law. But if any one with his own hand unwillingly slays another, whether with his own naked body, or with an instrument or dart, or by administering drink or food, or by the hurling of fire, or a tempest,[4] or the privation of breath, whether he does this with his own body, or through the means of other bodies, let him be considered altogether a slayer with his own hand, and suffer punishments such as these. If he kills the slave (of another),[5] thinking that he had done for[6] his own, let him either cause the master of the dead (slave) to be without loss or hurt, or be fined double the value of such slave; and let the judges make an inquiry into the value, and let the homicide make use of greater and more purifications than those, who kill a person in gymnastic exercises; and in such cases let the holy interpreters, whom the

[1] In lieu of *καθαρῶς* Desiderius Heraldus, Observ. ad Jus Attic. et Roman. p. 354, suggested *καθαρθεὶς*, similar to *φόνον καθαρθεὶς—καθαρὸς ἔστω* in ix. p. 869, A., and viii. p. 831, A., *κατὰ νόμον καθαρθέντα, καθαρὸν εἶναι—* Ficinus omits *καθαρῶς*, and so after him does Taylor. But the correction of Heraldus has been confirmed by two MSS.

[2] Compare Æsch. Cho. 1069, and Eum. 283.

[3—3] To avoid the absurdity in *καθαρὸς ἔστω*, applied to the patient—for so it must be according to the rules of syntax—Ficinus, whom Taylor follows, has altered the construction in his version, "omnes autem medici, qui curantes non sponte occiderint, mundi sint." Plato wrote, I suspect, *ἰατρῶν δὲ πέρι, πᾶς τις—* not *πάντων—* and so I have translated. Respecting this clause in favour of a physician, Matthiæ quotes opportunely Antipho, p. 694, R.

[4] This appears strangely introduced here, as if a person could kill another by bringing a storm upon him. Ficinus renders *χειμῶνος* by "frigorisve et fluctus," uncertain of the meaning of *χειμῶνος*, in which there is evidently some error.

[5] Ficinus alone has "alienum servum," what the sense requires; as if his MS. read ΔΟΥΛΟΝ ΑΛΛΟΥ—

[6] This is the exact rendering of *διειργάσθαι*.

god ordains, decide without an appeal.[1] But if any one kills his own slave, let him, after undergoing a purification, be released according to law from (the stain of) murder. But if any one kills involuntarily a free-born person, let him be purified with the same purifications as him, who has killed a slave. And let him not dishonour [2]some of so-called[2] old stories of the ancients. For it is said, that a person, who had lived with the feelings of a free-man, having been violently put to death, was, when recently dead, angry with his murderer; and being filled [3]with fear and terror[3] likewise through his violent suffering, and beholding the person, who slew him, passing the time in his own seats, [familiar haunts,][4] terrified him, and, being disturbed himself, disturbed with all his might the murderer and his doings, by having Memory[5] as an ally. On this account, it is requisite for the doer to withdraw himself from the sufferer through all the seasons of the year, and to cause a void in all his own places through the whole of his native land. But if the party deceased is a stranger, let (the homicide) be debarred the country of the stranger for the same period. And if any one willingly obeys this law, let him, who is the nearest relative of the deceased, be the examiner into all that has taken place and grant a pardon; [6]and by keeping quiet, he would

[1] Such is the proper meaning of *κυρίους*, in lieu of which Faehse suggested *καιρίους*, to answer to "idonei" in Ficinus.

[2—2] Such is the literal version of *παλαιὸν δέ τινα τῶν ἀρχαίων μύθων λεγόμενον*: where instead of *παλαιὸν δέ τινα*, Plato wrote, I suspect, *παλαμναῖον δὲ Δία ἔν τινι*— For the Etymol. M. has *Παλαμναῖος ὁ τοὺς αὐτοχειρὶ φονεύσαντας τιμωρούμενος Ζεὺς παλαμναῖος λέγεται.* "And let him not dishonour Zeus, who avenges murder, as stated in some of the stories of old." Ficinus has "priscum mysterium non contemnat," as if his MS. read *μυστηρίων* instead of *μύθων*.

[3—3] Why the murdered man should be said to be filled with fear and terror, I must leave for those to explain, who can point out the story to which Plato alludes. According to the Greek dramatists, it was the murderer rather, who felt the touch of fear, as shown in the case of Clytemnestra and Orestes. Unless I am greatly mistaken, the author wrote *φθόνου* (to which *φόνου* in one MS. plainly leads) *καὶ λήματος*; where *λῆμα* would be the counterpart of *φρόνημα* mentioned just above.

[4] The word *συνηθείαις* is evidently an explanation of *ἤθεσι*.

[5] What Plato means by *μνήμη*, Euripides, in Orest. 396, expresses by *σύνεσις*, in English "conscience."

[6—6] Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus has "qui etiam pace ipsi reconciliatus et æquus omnino erit."

be altogether moderate towards him.[6] But if a person does not obey, and, in the first place, being still unpurified, dares to go to the temples, and to sacrifice; and, further, is not willing to be an exile, and to complete the stated time; let the nearest relative of the deceased prosecute the murderer on a charge of blood, and let his punishment be doubled when found guilty. But if the nearest relative shall not prosecute [1][for the act of suffering][1], let any one, since the pollution has come round to the relative, [2]through the sufferer turning on himself the suffering,[2] prosecute the relative and compel him by law to be absent from his country for five years. But if a stranger involuntarily kills a stranger amongst those in the city, let whosoever is willing prosecute him on the same laws; but if a foreign settler (kills a stranger), let him be exiled for one year; but if he be altogether a stranger, in addition to the purification, let him, if he shall have killed a stranger, or a foreign settler, or a citizen, be banished for his whole life from the country which has the supreme power over these[3] laws, and if he returns contrary to the law, let the guardians of the laws punish him with death; and if he has any property, let them give it to the nearest relative of the deceased. But if he returns involuntarily by sea, and has been cast out on the coast by a storm, [4]let him fix a tent (on the shore), so that his feet may touch (the water),[4] and watch for an opportunity of sailing; but, if he is brought on land

[1]—[1] The Greek words *τῷ παθήματι* could not thus follow *ἐπεξίῃ*, as shown by *ἐπεξίτω τῷ κτείναντι*. They should be *τῷ δράματι*, or rather be omitted entirely as an interpolation.

[2]—[2] Such is the literal version of the unintelligible original; where the Scholiast says that *προστρεπομένου* means the same as *ἀποτρεπομένου*: but *πρὸς* and *ἀπὸ* never have the same meaning. The Scholiast's interpretation is, however, adopted by Ficinus; whose version is—"ipso videlicet interempto passionem in illum convertente," translated by Taylor—"or in other words the slain person turning his anger towards him."

[3] In lieu of *τῶνδε*, Ficinus found in his MS. *τοιῶνδε*, as shown by his "hujusmodi."

[4]—[4] So Taylor, and after him Ast, paraphrases the Greek—*σκηνησάμενος ἐν θαλάττῃ, τέγγων τοὺς πόδας, πλοῦν ἐπιφυλαττέτω*— But as one MS. has *συννησάμενος*, Plato wrote, I suspect, something more fit to be read than what the literal version presents—"let him, fixing a tent in the sea and wetting his feet, watch for a sailing." Ficinus has "navigandi opportunitatem, pedibus mare tangens, exspectet," omitting *σκηνησάμενος*.

forcibly by any one, [1] let the magistrate, who of those in the city first meets him,[1] release him [2] and send him safe from harm to the country over the borders.[2] But if any one with his own hand kills a free-man, and what is done is done through passion, it is meet, in the first place, to make a two-fold distinction in a thing of this kind. For a thing is done in a passion by those who, on a sudden, and without intending to kill, destroy by blows, or such other means, a person, [3] on the instant that an impulse arises, and when repentance is close upon the deed ;[3] and (a deed is done) in a passion by those too, who, having been befouled by words or deeds of dishonour, pursue with revenge and subsequently kill a person, intending to murder, and for the deed there is no repentance. We must therefore, as it seems, put down two kinds of murder, and both of them as arising nearly from passion, and they may be said most justly to be between the voluntary and the involuntary. [4] Each, however, is only a likeness.[4] For, he who stores up his anger, and does not immediately (and)[5] suddenly, but with malice prepense[6] after a time[7] revenge himself, is like to the voluntary ; but he, who, without storing up[8] his anger, does on the instant [immediately][9] gratify his passion, without premeditation, is like to the involuntary. He is not, however, altogether involuntary, but the likeness of the involuntary. On this account, the murders committed in anger are difficult to define, whether one ought to lay down laws for them, as being voluntary, or some of them involuntary. The

[1]—[1] Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus has, what is less objectionable—" a magistratu, cui primo res delata fuerit—"

[2]—[2] Ficinus, whom Taylor follows, is content with the general sense—" et intactus in exsilium retrudendus."

[3]—[3] Ficinus, followed by Taylor, thus abridges this passage—"ita ut confestim post impetum pœnitentia sequatur."

[4]—[4] Ficinus alone supplies, what is wanting for the sense—" neutra enim voluntaria revera vel involuntaria est ; sed altera alterius est imago."

[5] Ficinus has " nec repente "—for he found probably in his MS. *καὶ* between *παράχρημα* and *ἐξαίφνης*.

[6] This legal phrase in English answers best to the Greek *ἐξ ἐπι-βουλῆς*.

[7] In lieu of *ὕστερον χρόνῳ* I should prefer *ὑστέρῳ χρόνῳ*. See my note on Æsch. Suppl. 220.

[8] The common expression in English of " not bottling up one's anger," would answer the best to *ἀταμιεύτως* in Greek.

[9] The word *εὐθὺς* is evidently an interpretation of *ἐκ τοῦ παράχρημα*.

best and the truest method therefore is to put both down as likenesses ; and to divide them apart from each other, by their being done with malice prepense and without premeditation ; and to lay down by law severer punishments for those, who kill in anger, and with malice prepense ; but milder for those without premeditation and on the sudden. For that, which is like a greater evil, should be punished more severely ; but that, which is like a less one, less severely. Let it then be thus established by our laws.

Clin. By all means.

[9.] *Athen.* Let us then return again to the subject and say, that if any one with his own hand kills a free-man, but if the deed, when done, took place without premeditation, in a moment of anger, let him in other respects suffer, as it is proper for the party to suffer, who has killed a person, not in a passion ; but let him of necessity be an exile for two years, and thus punish his passion. But he, who in a passion, but with malice prepense, commits a murder, let him (suffer) in other respects as the former does ; but let him be an exile for three years, as the other is for two, and be punished for the greatness of his passion by a longer time. And let this be held [1] universally respecting these matters.[1] It is difficult however to give laws on such matters with accuracy. For sometimes of these two murders, the one, which is held by the law to be the more atrocious, is the milder ; and that, which is the milder, would be the more atrocious, [2] according as the murder is committed in a more savage or a more gentle manner.[2] But for the most part the deeds take place according to what has been mentioned already. Of all these matters, therefore, it is meet for the guardians of the laws to have the cognizance ; and, when the period of the exile shall have expired[3] to each

[1]—[1] As four MSS. read *καθόδου*, and six *τούτοις*, Bekker and Stalb. have so edited. But Ficinus found in his MS. *καθόλου—τούτων*, as shown by his version—"Universalis—istorum dispositio." Either would do. But as *κάθοδος* means "the return from exile," to which Plato alludes just afterwards, the reading of the MSS. is to be preferred.

[2]—[2] So Taylor translates the Latin of Ficinus —"prout atrocius aut mitius gesta est." But the Greek is *καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸν φόνον ἀγριωτέρως ἂν πράξειεν, ὁ δὲ ἡμερωτέρως*. By uniting the two it is easy to read—*καθάπερ ὁ μὲν τὸν φόνον——ὁ δὲ*—i. e. "according as one—"

[3] Taylor has thus expressed in English, what Ast says would be in Greek not *ἔλθῃ*, but *ἐξελθῃ*, as shown by x. p. 909, A., xi. p. 921, C.

offender, to send twelve judges to the borders of the country, (so that)[1] after having examined still more clearly the conduct of the exiles during that period, they may be the judges of the pity (to be shown) and of their reception; and let the exiles acquiesce in the decisions of such magistrates. And if, after having returned from exile, any one of them shall, overcome by passion, commit again the very same offence, let him be exiled and never return again; and if he returns, he shall suffer in the same way as a stranger for returning from exile. And let him, who kills his own slave, undergo a purification. But if, in a passion, he kills the slave of another, let him pay to the master double the value of the loss. But whoever of all the homicides does not obey the law, but, while he is uncleansed, defiles (by his presence) the place of public meeting, and of contests, and other sacred places, whoever is willing may bring to trial the relative of the deceased, who has neglected (his duty), and the murderer likewise, and compel him to pay a double fine, and [2]to do some of the other doings;[2] [3]and let the (accusing) party carry off the payment according to the law.[3] If a slave kills his master in a passion, let the kindred of the deceased use the murderer in whatever manner they please,[4] and be clean (of the acts), so long as they do not by any means [5]preserve the life[5] (of the slave). [6]But if a slave kills (not his own master, but) some other free-man, in a passion,[6] [7]let the owners give up the slave[7] to the relatives of

[1] I have translated as if ὥστε had dropt out.

[2]—[2] Such is the literal version of the Greek; which Ast explains by saying, that "the other doings" refer to the acts requisite to be done for the purpose of a purification. But if such be the meaning, and I confess I have nothing better to offer, it is a pity that Plato did not take the trouble to express his ideas more clearly.

[3]—[3] Such is the literal version of the Greek, which Taylor has thus translated, "And let the offending party consider the fine as legal."

[4] From *ἀνέλωσι* Stephens acutely elicited *ἂν ἐθέλωσι*, suggested by "velint" in Ficinus. And so one MS. subsequently collated.

[5]—[5] This is a very unusual meaning of the verb *ζωγρεῖν*, literally "to take alive."

[6]—[6] The Greek is *ἐὰν δὲ ἄλλος τις δοῦλος ἐλεύθερον ἀποκτείνῃ θυμῷ*— But Ficinus has more fully, "sin vero servus non dominum suum sed alium liberum per iram necaverit," from whence Faehse was the first to correct *ἄλλος* into *ἄλλον*—

[7]—[7] This mixture of numbers, *οἱ δεσπόται τὸν δοῦλον*, seems rather strange; as if one slave had many masters.

the deceased, and let them of necessity put him to death in whatever manner they please. If a father or a mother in a passion kills their son or daughter by blows, or any other violent manner—events that happen but rarely—let them be purified after the same manner as other homicides, and be exiled for three years; and on their return from exile, let the husband be divorced from the wife, and the wife from the husband, and let them never afterwards beget children together, nor be a fellow-dweller with those, whom they have deprived of a child or brother, nor have a share with them in sacred rites. But he, who has acted impiously in these matters, and does not obey the laws, let him be brought to trial for impiety by any one who is willing. If a husband kills his wife in a passion, or a wife does the same thing in a similar manner to her husband, they shall undergo the same purifications, and complete an exile for three years; and let not the party, who has so acted, on his return, have a share with their children in sacred rites, nor ever eat at the same table with them. And let the father or the child, who disobeys the law, be brought to trial for impiety by any one who is willing. If a brother kills either a brother or a sister, or a sister (kills) a brother or a sister in a passion, let the matters, relating to purifications and exiles, be stated as necessary to take place in the same manner, [1]as have been stated in the case of parents and children;[1] [2]and (on their return from exile),[2] let not any one[3] be a fellow-dweller or a sharer in sacred rites with those, whom a person[4] has deprived, brothers of brothers, and fathers of children. And if any one disobeys the law, he would rightly with justice[5] be amenable to the before-mentioned law,

[1—1] Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus, followed by Taylor, has "non aliter quam parentes, qui liberos interfecerunt."

[2—2] So Taylor, from "post reditum," in Ficinus; who probably found in his MS. *καὶ τούτοις—κατιοῦσι δὴ*, instead of *καὶ τούτοις—τούτοις δὲ*, where the same pronoun is repeated uselessly. On the meaning of *κατιέναι*, similar to *κατέρχεσθαι*, see Porson on Med. 1011.

[3] Instead of *αὐτοῖς*, Eusebius, Præp. Evang. xii. p. 711, D., has *αὐτὸς*—which leads to *αὖ τις*, as I have translated, and similarly in [(4)] *τις* is to be read for *τε* after *ἀδελφοὺς*—

[5] That Plato wrote both *ὀρθῶς* and *μετὰ δίκης*, it is hard to believe; but which of the two he did write, it is equally hard to say. I suspect however that *ὀρθῶς* is an interpretation of *μετὰ δίκης*: for there would be a Platonic play on the words *ὑπόδικος μετὰ δίκης*. Ficinus has merely "jure ut impius condemnabitur."

relating to impiety on these points. But should any one in the case of his parents be so powerless over his passion, as in the madness of anger to dare to murder one of his parents, if the deceased shall, before he expired, have voluntarily absolved the perpetrator of the murder, let him be purified as they are, who commit murder involuntarily,[1] and performing the other things that they do, let him be considered as pure; but if (the deceased shall) not have absolved him, let the party who has done a deed of this kind be amenable to many laws. For he will be amenable to the extreme punishments for an assault, and, in like manner, for impiety and for the robbery of what is holy, because he has robbed his parent of his life; so that, if it were possible for the same man to die oftentimes,[2] it would be most just for a person, who had in a passion committed an act of parricide or matricide, to meet with many deaths. For in the case of him, whom no law will permit, even when defending himself and about to be made an end of by his parents, to destroy his father or mother, who have brought his nature to the light, and whom (the legislator) shall order[3] to endure all things rather than do a deed of this kind, how would it be fitting for such a person to meet with punishment legally in any other way? Let death then be laid down as the punishment for him, who in a passion kills either his father or mother. But if a brother shall in his own defence, during a fight occurring in a sedition or in any other similar manner, kill a brother, while warding off the party, who first had recourse to his hands,[4] let him be held clear in the same manner, as he who kills an enemy; and similarly, if a citizen (kills) a citizen, or a stranger a stranger; and if a citizen in defending himself kills a stranger, or a stranger a citizen, let him in the same way be held to be clear; and similarly if a slave (kills) a slave. But if a slave, in his own defence, kills a free-man, let him be amenable to the same laws as him, who kills his father. And what has been stated

[1] Cornarius was the first to perceive that the sense required not *ἑκούσιον*, but *ἀκούσιον*, as shown by p. 865, B., and 869, E.

[2] Compare Criton, § 6.

[3] This future seems rather strange here. One would prefer *νομοθετεῖται*, similar to "præcipitur" in Ficinus.

[4] On the phrase *ἀμύνεσθαι τὸν ἄρχοντα*, with or without *χειρῶν*, see Ast's learned note.

respecting the absolution from murder by a father, let the very same thing take place respecting every absolution in matters of this kind; that if any person of his own accord gives an absolution to any one for such an act, let the purifications take place for the perpetrator, as if the murder had been involuntary, and let one year be the term of absence from the country according to law. And thus let the matters relating to murders, done with violence and involuntarily and in a passion, be held to have been detailed in moderation. But as regards those relating to such as are voluntary and perpetrated with every kind of injustice, respecting these and what are done with malice prepense, through yielding to pleasure and desires and envy, it is to be spoken of subsequently.

Clin. You speak correctly.

[10.] *Athen.* [1]Let us then again speak to the utmost of our power in the first place upon these points, how many they are.[1] Now the greatest is desire, having a mastery over a soul rendered savage by regrets.[2] And this exists for the most part there, where[3] there happens to be the greatest and most vehement wish for wealth on the part of the many, and[4] a power that is producing an infinite love for the possession of property insatiable and boundless, by means of a natural disposition and a wretched want of education, [5]of which the cause is that wealth is praised improperly by report amongst both the Greeks and Barbarians.[5] For by placing as the first of good things that, which is the third,

[1]—[1] Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus, whom Taylor follows in part, has "Primum igitur, quod voluntariæ cædis causæ sint, pro viribus declaremus."

[2] Taylor, misunderstanding the meaning of "libidinibus," Ficinus' version of *πόθων*, has translated "venereal incentives—"

[3] Ast, by not perceiving that *οὗ* after *ἐνταῦθα* is an adverb, and not a pronoun, has missed entirely the meaning of the passage.

[4] The Greek is in all the MSS. *ἡ τῶν χρημάτων τῆς*—I have translated as if Plato had written *τῶν χρημάτων, ἥ τε τῆς*—

[5]—[5] Here again by the slightest change I have, I hope, restored what Plato wrote. For where the Greek is now—*τῆς δὲ ἀπαιδευσίας ἡ τοῦ κακῶς ἐπαινεῖσθαι πλοῦτον φήμη*—it was originally *ἧς δὴ ἀπαιδευσίας ἐστ' αἰτία τὸ κακῶς ἐπαινεῖσθαι πλοῦτον φήμη*—where *δὴ* is due to the best MS., and *τὸ* to Stephens, who was led to it, I suspect, by the version of Cornarius, "imperitiæ vero causa est fama, qua et a Græcis et a Barbaris divitiæ male laudantur." Cousin translates *ἀπαιδευσίας* by "préjugés," a meaning which that word does not and could not bear.

they do (by this opinion)[1] injure both those after them and themselves. [2]For that the truth respecting wealth be told in all states is of all things the most beautiful and the best;[2] (namely,) that it exists for the sake of the body, but the body for the sake of the soul. [3]Of the good things then existing, for the sake of which wealth naturally exists, it would be the third after the virtue of the body and soul.[3] This reasoning then will be to us[4] a teacher, that it is not meet for him, who would be happy, to seek to be wealthy (by any means),[5] but [to be wealthy][6] in a just and temperate manner. For[7] thus murders, which require to be purified by murders,[8] would not take place in cities. But now, as we stated at the beginning of the discussion, this is one and the greatest thing, which causes the greatest punishments of voluntary murder. The second is the habit of an ambitious soul, producing envy, a fellow-dweller the most disagreeable to him who possesses it,[9] and secondly,[10] to the best of those in the state. But the third is a cowardly and unjust fear, which has caused many murders, when acts are being done or have been done by a person, which he does not wish to be conscious to himself of their taking place, or of having taken place. They therefore take off by death the informers of such acts, if they cannot do it by any other means. About all these matters then let this be

[1] The words between the lunes are adopted by Taylor from "hac sententia," found in Ficinus alone.

[2]—[2] Here again Ficinus seems to have found in his MS. something more complete than is furnished by the other MSS. For his version is—"Optime sane et pulcherrime viveremus, si vera de divitiis sententia ubique prædicaretur."

[3]—[3] Ficinus, whom Taylor has translated in part, has—"quare cum bona adsint, quorum gratia possidendæ divitiæ sunt, tertium gradum post virtutem animi corporisque tenebunt."

[4] Ficinus has "nos tanquam magistra docebit," as if his MS. read ἡμῖν between οὖν and ἂν—

[5] Ficinus inserts, what is required to balance the sentence, "quomodocunque"—unless it be said that he remembered the passage in Horace —"rem facias; rem, si possis, recte, si non, quocunque modo rem."

[6] This repetition of πλουτεῖν is omitted correctly by Ficinus.

[7] Ficinus, "sic enim," which leads to καὶ γαρ instead of καὶ—

[8] On the doctrine that murder is to be cleansed by murder, see Æsch. Cho. 304.

[9] The Greek is τῷ κεκτημένῳ τὸν φθόνον. But τὸν φθόνον could not thus be repeated after φθόνους— I have therefore omitted those words.

[10] Instead of δευτέροις one MS. has δευτέρους, which leads to δευτέρως, similar to "deinde" in Ficinus.

held to be said as a prelude; and in addition to this, the story, which many of those engaged seriously in the Mysteries have heard touching these subjects, and strongly believe, that of such persons there is in Hades a punishment; and that it is necessary for them to come back hither to suffer punishment according to nature, namely, of suffering from another what a person had done himself, and with such a fate to finish his then life. For him therefore, who from this prelude is persuaded, and fears altogether such a punishment, there is no need to hymn a law on this point, but for him, who is not persuaded, let this law be expressed in writing.

[11.] Whosoever shall designedly and unjustly kill with his own hand any one soever of his tribes-men, let him, in the first place, be debarred from legal rights, nor let him pollute the temples, or the place of public meeting, or the ports, or any other general assembly, whether any person forbids the perpetrator or not. For the law forbids him; and it is ever seen and will be seen forbidding him in behalf of the whole state. But the relative of the deceased as far as a cousin,[1] on the male or female side, who does not, when requisite, prosecute, or forbid him to be debarred (from those things),[2] shall first of all take upon himself the pollution, and the hatred of the gods, [3] as the imprecation by the law provokes the report;[3] and secondly, let him be amenable to any, who is willing to avenge the dead; and let him, who is willing, avenge, after performing every thing respecting the observation of washings[4] for such occasions, and of such other acts as the deity has enjoined as legal in cases of this kind; and after

[1] Ast quotes opportunely Demosthenes in Macart. p. 1068, 28, R., and in Euerg. p. 1161, 8, R.

[2] Ficinus alone has "ab his—" From the passages of Antipho and Demosthenes, quoted by Ast, one might suppose that τῶν νομίμων had dropt out between προαγορεύων and εἴργεσθαι.

[3—3] Such is the literal version of the Greek, which I cannot understand, nor could Ficinus, as shown by his translation—"sicut vulgo legis imprecatio et maledictio dictat," while that of Ast—"ut legis imprecatio existimationem provocat," proves him to have been equally in the dark. I could have understood ὡς ἡ τοῦ νόμου φήμη τὴν Ἀρὰν προτρέπεται—"since the report of the law calls up a curse," as if Plato had in mind a dramatic saying—Ἀρὰν προτρέπεται τοῦ νόμου φήμη (πικρὰν)—

[4] The Greek is λουτρῶν φυλακῆς πέρι— But Ficinus has "de luendi criminis observatione—" from which Faehse was led to λύτρων— Ast however explains λουτρῶν by "the washings," which the party, who prose-

making the proclamation let him go and compel the perpetrator to suffer the vengeance of justice according to law. But that these things ought to take place through certain prayers and sacrifices to certain deities, who have a care of such matters, so that murders may not take place in cities, it is easy for a legislator to show. But who are the deities, and what would be the manner of introducing such suits most correctly as regards the divine power, let the guardians of the laws, together with the (holy) interpreters, and the prophets, and the god, lay down by law, and introduce these suits. But let the judges of these matters be the same as those, to whom has been given the power of deciding upon sacrilege. Let him too, who is convicted, pay the penalty of death, and [1] let him not be buried in the country of the murdered person,[1] on account of his shameless conduct, in addition to the act of impiety. But if he goes away, being unwilling to stand a trial, let him suffer a perpetual exile. [2] And if any one of these sets his foot upon the land of the murdered party,[2] let whatever relation or even citizen, who first meets him, kill him with impunity, or, placing him in bonds, hand him over to the magistrates, who decide upon the suit, to put him to death. [3] But let him, who urges (the suit), require bail at the same time from him, against whom he is urging it ;[3] and [4] let the latter produce three persons, whom the magistrate appointed for such matters shall decide to be in sufficient credit,[4]

cuted the murderer, is supposed to undergo, to avoid the pollution of blood. But as of such washings nothing is to be found elsewhere, Plato wrote, I suspect, something else, which it would be not difficult to discover by bearing in mind a celebrated scene in the Choephori of Æschylus.

[1]—[1] Ast refers to Demosthenes in Aristocrat. p. 634, 26, R.

[2]—[2] Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus has merely "et si unquam citra fines fuerit deprehensus." Winckelmann suggests *τις ἐπιβῇ τῶν τόπων τῆς—χώρας*, as in iv. p. 705, C., *ὁ τόπος—τῆς χώρας*, v. p. 747, E., *τόποι χώρας*, vi. p. 760, C., *τοὺς τῆς χώρας τόπους*.

[3]—[3] Ast was the first to explain this passage, which Ficinus, whom Taylor has followed to the letter, thus translated incorrectly, "quod si quis hunc defensurus accesserit, pro eo fide jubeat, quem tutatur."

[4]—[4] Ficinus has "tresque is fidejussores, quos judices ipsi sufficientes putaverint, afferat," from whence Ast was led to read, what I have adopted, *τρεῖς ἐγγυητὰς, οὓς ἂν ἡ—ἀρχὴ κρίνῃ ἀξιόχρεως*, in lieu of *τοὺς ἐγγυητὰς ἀξιόχρεως, οὓς ἂν ἡ—ἀρχὴ κρίνῃ τρεῖς ἐγγυητὰς ἀξιόχρως*— Cousin, however, so far from being dissatisfied with the repetition of *ἀξιόχρεως*, conceives it to be perfectly after the manner of Plato.

who shall engage to produce (the accused) at the trial; but if the latter either will not or cannot get bail, let the magistrate take and put him in prison, and produce him at the trial of the suit. If a person shall not with his own hand (perpetrate), [1] but suggest to another, a murder, and by his willing and plotting cause the murder to take place,[1] and dwell in a city, having been the instigator of, and not pure in his soul from, the murder, [2] let there be to him in the same manner, with the exception of the bail, a trial and verdict on these matters;[2] and, if convicted, let it be lawful for him to have the family[3] burial-place; but let other things take place in the same manner to him, as to the party previously mentioned; and let the same things take place in the case of strangers towards strangers, and citizens and strangers towards each other, and of slaves towards slaves, with respect to a murder done by a person's own hand and instigation, with the exception of the bail; but this let the murderers with their own hands be required to procure, as has been stated; [4] and let the party who brings forward the suit, require bail of them likewise.[4] But if a slave voluntarily murders a free-man, whether with his own hand or through a plotting, and there is a verdict against him, let the public executioner lead him to the tomb of the deceased, or [5] to a place, where he may see the tomb, and after scourging him with as many stripes as the plaintiff shall order, put the murderer, if he survives the whipping, to death. But if any one kills a slave, who has done no wrong, through the fear of his disclosing deeds disgraceful and wicked, or for any similar reason, [6] let him, as if he underwent the punishment of murder for having killed a citizen, undergo similarly

[1]—[1] Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus has merely "sed voluntate consilio insidiisque hominem interfecerit."

[2]—[2] Ficinus has more briefly, what Taylor adopts, "condemnatus similiter puniatur, præterquam quod fidejussores non præbebit."

[3] So I have translated τῆς οἰκείας—

[4]—[4] The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, for perhaps he could not understand them; nor do I very clearly see why they are introduced here.

[5] Ficinus alone has "vel," from which Ast elicited ἢ before ὅθεν—Cousin however translates πρὸς τὸ μνῆμα "du côte du monument du mort," and explains it by "dans un lieu d'ou le coupable puisse apercevoir la tombe du mort."

[6]—[6] Ficinus, followed by Taylor, has merely "quasi civem necaverit, sic puniatur."

and with the same forms a punishment on account of the slave, who had thus perished.[6]

[12.] But if cases occur, for which it is a thing of dread and by no means agreeable to legislate, and impossible on the other hand[1] not to legislate, (relating to) the murder of relations by a person's own hand or plotting, and done willingly and wickedly in every way—which take place for the most part in states [2]badly administered and nurtured,[2] and which will somehow take place in a country where no one would expect it—it is requisite to mention again, what has been stated a little before, should perchance some one, on hearing us, be enabled more willingly on this account to abstain from murders the most unholy in every way. For a fable, or a story, or whatever else it is meet to call it, has been clearly told by priests of old, that [3]Justice, the avenger and inspector of kindred blood, makes use of the law, which we have just now mentioned; and has ordained that he, who has done any such act, shall necessarily suffer what he has done;[3] (so that)[4] if any one has ever murdered his father, he has at some time suffered [5]the very same fate by the daring and violence of his own children;[5] and if he has (murdered) his mother, he has in after times become necessarily [6]a partaker in a feminine na-

[1] I have translated as if the Greek were *δ' αὖ ἀδύνατον*, not *δὲ ἀδύνατον*—

[2]—[2] Ficinus has merely "male gubernatis—" For his MS. read perhaps *οἰκουμέναις* in lieu of *οἰκούσαις*, which is scarcely correct.

[3]—[3] In the prose of Plato evidently lies hid a dramatic tetrastich—Τῶν ξυγγενῶν ἆρ' αἱμάτων ἐπίσκοπος Δίκη νόμῳ τιμωρὸς οὖσ' ἐχρῆτ' ἀεί Τοιῷδ'. Ἀρὰ δ' ἔταξε τῷ δράσαντί τι Ταὖτ' αὖτ' ἀνάγκαις, ἅπερ ἔδρασ' ἄλλον, παθεῖν—where I have substituted Ἀρὰ for ἆρα, for the verses were probably spoken by Œdipus, while cursing his sons for their unkind conduct to their father: and I have inserted ἄλλον, for δρᾶν frequently has two accusatives, one of the person and another of the thing. With regard to the sentiment Ast refers to Choeph. 409. He might have added Cho. 311, 'Δράσαντα παθεῖν' Τριγέρων μῦθος τάδε φωνεῖ: and Agam. 1541, μίμνει δ', ἀμύνοντος ἐν χρόνῳ Διὸς παθὼν τὸν ἔρξαντα—for so we must read in lieu of Μίμνει δὲ, μίμνοντος—παθεῖν τὸν ἔρξαντα. For the sense is, "the sufferer waits for the doer, when in time Zeus is the avenger."

[4] Ficinus, by his "ut," shows that his MS. had ὥστε between ἔδρασεν and εἰ—

[5]—[5] I have translated as if the Greek were *αὐτὸ ταὐτὸ ὑπὸ τῶν τέκνων τόλμης καὶ βίᾳ*, not *αὐτὸν τοῦτο ὑπὸ τέκνων τολμῆσαι βίᾳ*, where *αὐτὸ ταὐτὸ* is due to Ast, *τῶν* to one MS., and *τόλμης* to Stephens.

[6]—[6] By partaking in a feminine nature is meant, I presume, the be-

ture,[6] and having become so, has departed from life at the hands of his offspring. For of a common blood defiled there is no other cleansing, nor is the pollution wont to be washed out, before the life, that has done (wrong), shall pay like blood for like blood, and appease and put to sleep the anger of all the kindred. It is requisite then for a person to be restrained on these points, through the fear of such punishments from the gods. But if so wretched a calamity should lay hold of any one, as that he should dare designedly and willingly to separate the soul of his father or mother, or brethren or children, from the body, the law of the mortal lawgiver legislates respecting matters of this kind in this way, that there is to be a proclamation [1] respecting a debarring from all rights,[1] and the same bail, as mentioned above; and if any one is convicted of a murder of this kind, [2] [for having killed any one of those,] [2] let the ministers of the judges and the magistrates put him to death, and cast him out of the city naked to an appointed place, where three roads meet; and let all the magistrates, in behalf of the whole state, [3] carry each a stone and hurl it at the head of the dead body,[3] and thus make an expiation for the whole state; and afterwards carry the corpse to the boundaries of the country, and cast it out there unburied, according to law. But what ought he to suffer, who murders his nearest and so-called dearest friend? I mean, he who kills himself, and by violence deprives himself of his share of fate, being compelled neither by a verdict of the city ordering it, nor by a very painful (and)[4] unavoidable misfortune falling upon him, nor by sharing in a thing of shame, without a resource, and not to be lived through, and who by his indolence and [5] the cowardice

coming, like a woman, full of fears, according to the sentiment in Shakspeare, that "conscience doth make cowards of us all."

[1]—[1] I have adopted with Ast the emendation suggested by Matthiæ in Miscell. Philolog. i. 2, p. 161, *περὶ τοῦ τῶν νομίμων*, in lieu of *περὶ τῶν*—

[2]—[2] The words within brackets, evidently an interpolation, are properly omitted by Ficinus, whom Taylor has tacitly followed.

[3]—[3] On such kinds of stoning see Valckenaer in Adnotat. Crit. in N. T. ii. p. 287, ed. Lips., quoted by Ast, and Scaliger on Propertius iv. 5, 75. Jacobs on Epigr. Inc. 234. The practice has been still preserved in the East, as we learn from Laurent's "Recollections," p. 209, and Henniker's "Notes," p. 277.

[4] Stephens was the first to insert *καὶ*, suggested by "et" in Ficinus, whom Ast has followed.

[5]—[5] Baiter suggests *ἀνανδρίᾳ καὶ δειλίᾳ*, in lieu of *ἀνανδρίας*

of unmanliness[5] imposes upon himself an unjust punishment. To such a person a god knows what ought to take place on other points, and relating to purification and burial; about which it is necessary for the nearest relatives to inquire of the (holy) interpreters, and at the same time the laws relating to them, and to do according to the orders given by them; but let the tombs of those, who have perished thus, be in the first place by themselves, and with no one buried in them; next, let them be in the twelve boundaries of the divisions, which are uncultivated and without a name; and bury them[1] without honour, nor mark their tombs with any pillars or names. But if a beast of burden or any other animal shall kill any person, except such as may do so in some public contest, let the relations prosecute the causer of the death: and let the Land-Stewards, upon whom and how many the relative shall impose the task, decide upon the matter; and let them destroy the condemned animal, and cast it[2] beyond the borders. If any lifeless thing deprives a man of life, except lightning, or any other such-like bolt sent from a god, but of all the rest that kill a person, by either the person falling upon it, or it falling upon the person, let the nearest of kin appoint the nearest neighbour to be a judge for him, and let him make an expiation both for himself and the whole of his kindred; but drive the thing condemned beyond the borders of the country, as has been stated in the case of the living kind. If any one is found dead, and the murderer is not known, and is not to be discovered by parties searching not carelessly, let there be proclamations, as in other cases; and let the heir-at-law[3] make a proclamation against the perpetrator of the murder, and state in the Market-place that the person, who has murdered so

δειλίᾳ— I should prefer *ἀνανδρίας δουλείᾳ*, "the slavery to unmanliness."

[1] Matthiæ in Gr. Gr. has suggested *αὖτως* for *αὐτοὺς*, in allusion to *ἀκλεὲς αὖτως* in Il. vii. 100.

[2] The word *διορίσαι* is strangely introduced here. One would have expected something like *διαμερίσαι*, "to cut up into pieces." Unless it be said that *διορίσαι* is the same as *ἐξορίζειν*, a little below. Ficinus omits the word entirely. His version is, "extra regionis fines interficiant."

[3] I have translated, as if the Greek were *τὸν ἐπιδικασάμενον καὶ*—not *καὶ ἐπιδικασάμενον*: where *καὶ* is omitted by two MSS. Ficinus, apparently not understanding *ἐπιδικασάμενον*, has omitted it.

and so, is not, as being guilty of murder, to set his foot upon any sacred place, or in the whole of the country [1] of the party suffering,[1] as he shall die, should he be found and known, and shall be cast out unburied, beyond [2]the country of the sufferer.[2] Let this one law then be laid down by us as decisive on the subject of murder. And thus (be it said) up to this point about matters of this kind.

But for killing whom,[3] and on what conditions, a person would be properly pure, let this be laid down. If any one catches a thief, entering his house by night, for the purpose of stealing his property, and kills him, let him be pure. In like manner, let him be pure, who kills a cloak-stripper[4] in his own defence. And if any one commits a rape upon a free-born woman or a boy, let him be put to death with impunity, either by the party treated with insult and violence, or by the father, or brothers, or sons of the party. And if a man comes upon his wedded wife, while being ravished, and kills the party using violence, let him be pure by the law. And if any one, while assisting his father, when doing nothing [5]unlawful and unholy,[5] or his mother, or children, or brothers, or joint-parent of his children, shall kill a person, let him be in every respect pure.

[13.] Let these then be the laws laid down relating to the nurture and education of a living soul, with which if it meets it may live; but not meeting, the reverse; and relating also to violent deaths, what punishments there ought to be for them. Mention too has been made of the nurture and education of bodies; and what is close upon those subjects, namely, actions done with violence by persons to each other, both voluntary and involuntary, we must define according to our power, what they are, and how many, and meeting with what punishment

[1]—[1] Ficinus omits *τῆς τοῦ πεπονθότος*— Taylor, with a total defiance of the original, translates, "where the deed was committed."

[2]—[2] Ficinus has what seems preferable, "extra regionis fines."

[3] I have with Ast adopted *ὃν*, found in one MS., in lieu of *ὧν*— Ficinus has "nunc dicamus, in quibus recte mundus sit," as if his MS. read *νῦν δὲ—ἐφ' οἷς*, not *ὧν δὲ—ἐφ' οἷς τε*—

[4] Literally, "one who robs another of his clothes at the public baths."

[5]—[5] The Greek is *βοηθῶν θάνατον μηδὲν ἀνόσιον*, where since *θάνατον* is without regimen, I have translated as if Plato had written *ἀθέμιτον μηδὲν καὶ ἀνόσιον*. Ficinus has "haud quaquam per scelus cædem patranti," which Ast truly observes is at variance with the train of thought.

[1] they would each of them possess what is suited to them.[1] For[2] these, it appears, would be properly laid down as laws after those. Now the person of the least mark amongst those, who have turned themselves to law, would rank wounds, and mutilations from wounds, as secondary to murders. Wounds then are to be divided in the same manner as murders have been divided. For some are involuntary, others done in a passion, some through fear; but such as take place from design are called[3] voluntary. Now about all such something of this kind must be premised; that it is necessary to lay down laws for mankind, and for them to live according to law, or for them to differ not at all from animals the most savage in every respect. And the cause of this is, that the disposition of not a single man is naturally sufficient to know what is conducive to a polity amongst men; and, when it does know, to be always able to do and wish what is the best. For first it is difficult to know that not private but public interests must necessarily be the object of the true science of polities—for a common interest binds states, but a private one tears them asunder—and that it conduces to both public and private interests, when the public are well established rather than when the private are so. Secondly, that, although a person should obtain sufficiently from art the knowledge that such things are so naturally, yet should he after this possess power in the state, without being brought to book,[4] and hold it in his own hands entirely, he would never be able to remain in this opinion, and continue to live, while nourishing the public interest in a state as the leading one, and the private as following the public; but his mortal nature will ever urge him on to the wish to possess more, and to his own individual well-doing. (For) through irrationally avoiding pain, and pursuing pleasure, it will set both of these before what is more just and excellent; and, by producing a darkness in itself, it will at length fill both itself and the whole state with every ill. Since should any man, born with a divine destiny, be

[1]—[1] Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus has "commode reprimendæ—"

[2] Ficinus alone has "Recte enim," required by the connexion of ideas.

[3] I have translated, as if the Greek were not *γιγνόμενα*, but *λεγόμενα*—

[4] This is the exact rendering of *ἀνυπεύθυνος*; in which there is an allusion to the custom prevalent at Athens of all magistrates having their accounts audited before they laid down their office.

[1] naturally competent to comprehend[1] this,[2] he would require no laws for the government of himself. For there is no law or order superior to science; nor is it lawful for intellect to be the minister, and the slave of any thing, but the ruler of all, if it is thus[3] true and really free by nature. But now (it is not so);[4] for it does not exist any where and in any manner, except to a small extent. On this account then we must choose the second in rank, namely, order and law; [5] which the one for the most part sees and beholds, but the other is entirely unable.[5] Thus much then has been stated for the sake of these matters; and let us now ordain what he ought to suffer (in person), or pay (in purse), who wounds or otherwise[6] injures another. [7] For it is easy for every one upon every point to take up correctly of a party having wounded what thing, or what person, or in what manner, or whether are you speaking;[7] for there are numberless things of this kind and very different from each other. It is therefore impossible to commit to courts of justice, to decide upon all these matters, or not one. For it is necessary to commit in the case of all to decide upon this one point, whether each of these acts have taken place

[1]—[1] The Greek is *φύσει ἱκανὸς—παραλαβεῖν δυνατὸς*— But *δυνατὸς* is evidently an interpretation of *ἱκανὸς*—which was probably wanting in the MS. of Ficinus, whose version is—"ea natura præditus esset, ut cognosceret."

[2] Ficinus, whom Taylor follows, has—"publicum bonum."

[3] So Taylor, from "ita," in Ficinus. The MSS. read *ὄντως*, which is superfluous after *ἀληθινὸς*— One MS. has neither *οὕτως* nor *ὄντως*. Plato probably wrote *ἐάνπερ ἀληθινῶς ἐλεύθερός γε ᾖ*—for *γε* thus perpetually follows *ἐάνπερ*.

[4] After *νῦν δὲ* Ast says there is an aposiopesis, as in the Banquet, § 8. But there, as here, I suspect that *οὔ* has dropt out before *οὐ*-—

[5]—[5] Such is the literal version of the Greek, which I confess I cannot understand; nor could, I think, Ficinus; for his version is "a quibus plurima quidem perspiciuntur, omnia vero videri nequeunt."

[6] I have translated as if the Greek were *ἑτέρως*, not *ἕτερον*. Ast would read *ἕτερον ἄλλο*, of which Stalbaum approves.

[7]—[7] Such is the literal version of the Greek, where in lieu of *πότερα*, since one MS. gives us a var. lect. *πότε*, Orelli suggested *πότ' ἄρα*— But *ἄρα* is not thus found at the end of a series of questions. Ficinus has—"cuique enim facile est singula hujusmodi recte comprehendere, utrum videlicet quis vulneraverit an non, quem, qua in parte, quo pacto"—which is intelligible indeed, but not to be got out from the Greek. Cousin however is perfectly satisfied with *πότερα*, which he seems to identify with *τὸ πότερον*, and which last he refers to the question touching the reality of the fact, or falsehood of the accusation.

or not; but on the other hand not at all to commit to them, (to decide) upon this point, what the party, who has done any of these injuries, ought to be fined (in purse), and suffer (in person); and yet (for the law-giver[1]) himself to lay down laws upon all questions, small and great, is nearly impossible.

Clin. What then is the inference consequent upon this?

Athen. It is this; that some matters should be committed to courts of justice, and others not, but be [2]left to (the legislator) himself.

Clin. What then are the matters, which are to be laid down by law, and what those to be committed to courts of justice?

[14.] *Athen.* After the preceding, it would be the most correct to say this; that, in a state, where the courts of justice are depraved and dumb, and concealing[3] their opinions pass sentence in private; and, what is still more dreadful than this, when, not in silence, but full of noise, as in a theatre, they praise and blame with an uproar each of the orators in turn; then is a grievous calamity wont indeed to occur to the whole state. It is not then a fortunate circumstance for a person to be laid hold of by some necessity to legislate for courts of justice of this kind; nevertheless, when he is laid hold of by a necessity, [4]he must commit to them to order fines only relating to matters of the slightest kind, but he must himself distinctly lay down those relating to the most numerous,[4] [5]if he would ever legislate correctly[6] for such a kind of polity.[5] But in a state, where courts of justice are established as correctly as possible, and those, who are about to judge, are brought up well and undergo a scrutiny with all accuracy, there it is right and it will be well to commit to such judges to decide upon most points relating to those who are found guilty, as to what they

[1] I have translated as if the Greek were *αὐτὸν τὸν νομοθέτην*, not *αὐτὸν* simply, and so too just afterwards (2), *αὐτῷ τῷ νομοθέτῃ ἑαυτέον*, not *αὐτῷ νομόθετητέον*.

[3] The Greek is *κλέπτοντα*. But Ficinus found in his MS. *καλύπτοντα*, as shown by his version—"occultæ manent."

[4]—[4] Such is evidently what the train of thought requires. Hence we must read *αὐτὸν περὶ τὰ σμικρότατα*, not *ὅτι περὶ σμικρότατα*, as shown by the antithesis in *τὰ πλεῖστα*.

[5]—[5] The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor.

[6] In lieu of *ποτε*, the sense evidently leads to *πῶτ' εὖ*, as I have translated.

are to suffer (in person), or to pay (in purse). Against us then there will be no cause of complaint for our not laying down laws relating to matters the greatest and most numerous, into which judges, who have been educated in the meanest manner, would be able to look, and to adapt to each offence a punishment suited to the suffering and act. But since we are of opinion, that those, for whom we are laying down laws, will be not the least clever of judges in such matters, we must commit to their decision the greatest number of cases. However, as we have often said and done during the previous laying down of the laws, that by giving an outline and types of punishments, we have presented to judges patterns for their never going beyond the line of justice; and, as this was then correctly done, so must we now do likewise the very same thing, while returning again to the laws. Let then the outline[1] (of the laws) relating to wounds be thus laid down. If any one, having both the intention and wish to kill a friend, except it be those whom the law ordains, shall wound, but is unable to kill him, towards the party with such intentions, so inflicting a wound, it is not meet to feel a pity nor to pay a regard to him, otherwise than by compelling him to undergo the punishment of murder, as if he had actually killed his friend;[2] and, by doing reverence to his Fortune, not bad in every respect, and his Dæmon likewise, who, pitying both him and the wounded party, became to both an averter of evil—to one, in the wound not being incurable, [3]and to the other, in the accident and calamity being exposed to a curse[3]—it is meet[4] to give thanks to this Dæmon; and, by not opposing him, to take away the punishment of death from the party inflicting the wound, but for a removal to take place to him during life to a neighbouring state, enjoying there

[1] I have translated as if the Greek were not γραφὴ but περιγραφὴ, to answer to the preceding περιγραφὴν—

[2] Such was the law at Athens, as we learn from Lysias, p. 159, R. quoted by Ast.

[3—3] How the Dæmon could be called an averter of evil, by the accident of a person being exposed to a curse, I cannot understand. Did Plato write ἐπάρατον μόνον κατ' ἀτυχῆ ξυμφοράν— "to be exposed only to a curse touching the event which failed"—instead of ἐπάρατον τύχην καὶ ξυμφοράν. Ficinus endeavoured to evade the difficulty by translating—"fecitque, ne vulnus huic letiferum, illi fortuna calamitasque exsecranda infligeretur."

[4] I have translated as if the Greek were τούτῳ δεῖ, not τούτῳ δὴ—

his property ; but if he has inflicted any loss upon the wounded person, let him pay for the loss ; and let the court of justice, that tried the cause, fix the sum ; [1] and let those, who would have decided about the murder, had the party died from the blow of the wound,[2] be the judges.[1]

If a child designedly wounds his parent, or a slave his master, the punishment shall be death. And if a brother wounds in like manner a brother or sister, or a sister a sister or brother, [3]and there is a verdict of wounding by design,[3] let the punishment be death. But if a woman wounds her husband with the design of killing him, or (in like manner[4]) a husband his wife, let (each) undergo a perpetual exile ; and, if their sons or daughters are at that time but children, let guardians manage their property, and take care of the children, as being orphans ; but if they are adults, let it not be a compulsory act for the exiled parent to be suported by their offspring, but let there be a permission to take possession of the estate. But whosoever happens to be childless, when falling into calamities of this kind, let his kindred, as far as cousins, both on the male and female side, come together, and appoint for this family, being one of the five thousand and forty in the state, an heir, after consulting with the guardians of the laws (and) considering the matter [5]in this manner and reasoning,[5] that no house out of the five thousand and forty is the property of its inhabitant, or of all his kindred, but of the state, considered in a public and private view, and that it is requisite for the state to possess its own houses, as holy and as happy as is possible. When therefore any house has become at the same time unhappy and unholy, so that its possessor has left no children in it, and [6]being in youth and married

[1]—[1] Such is the literal version of the intelligible Greek, which Taylor has thus mistranslated,—"But those judges that decide in cases of murder, shall decide in this case," although he might have found a more correct version in Ficinus, "judices autem sint, qui cædis essent, si vulneratus obiisset."

[2] To avoid the tautology in πληγῆς and τραύματος, we might read τοῦ τρώσαντος—

[3]—[3] The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor.

[4] Ficinus alone has "similiter," adopted by Taylor.

[5]—[5] The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor.

[6]—[6] Here again Taylor has tacitly omitted the words between the numerals, because they were wanting in Ficinus.

has died childless,[6] through his having been convicted of voluntary murder, or some other crime against the gods or his fellow-citizens—[1] the punishment for which has been distinctly laid down by the law to be death—or if a person is in perpetual exile, being without male[2] children,[1] let it be necessary in the first place to purify this house and make use of expiatory sacrifices according to law; and next, let the kindred coming together, as we have said just now, examine together with the guardians of the laws, what family there is in the state in the greatest repute for virtue, and fortunate at the same time, and in which the children are rather numerous; from which let them put one upon the father of the deceased and his progenitors, as their adopted son, [3]and let them call him, for the sake of[4] a good omen,[4] by the name (of the father,)[3] and pray that he [5]may become for them a parent[5] and hearth-preserver and minister of rites holy and sacred, with better fortune than his predecessor;[6] (and)[7] after praying in this manner, let them appoint him the heir according to law, and suffer the sinner to lie nameless, and childless, and shareless, whenever such a calamity shall have seized upon him.

[15.] [8] There is not, as it seems, in all existing things a boundary close in contact with a boundary; but in things to which there is a boundary, that in the middle being previously thrown

[1—1] Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus has merely—"cujus mors vel sempiternum exilium pœna est"—while Taylor's translation is, "the punishment of which according to law is evidently death, or perpetual exile."

[2] In lieu of *τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἄπαις*, we must read, as I have translated, *τῶν ἀρρένων ἄπαις*, as shown by the passages quoted by Ast.

[3—3] The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor. With regard to the addition "of the father," I have been led to it by finding in Ast's note "a patre mortui denominantes."

[4—4] The Greek is at present *φήμης*— I have translated as if it were formerly *εὐφημίας*—similar to "boni ominis causa" in the note of Ast.

[5—5] I have translated as if the Greek were *γεννήτορά τ' ἂν αὐτοῖς—γίγνεσθαι*—similar to "fore" in Ficinus, in lieu of *γεννήτορά τε αὐτοῖς—γίγνεσθαι*: which I cannot understand.

[6] Taylor, by translating "his predecessor," has led me to suggest *τοῦ πάρος* instead of *τοῦ πατρὸς*, which is here unintelligible.

[7] I have translated as if *τε* had dropt out between *τούτῳ* and *τῷ*—

[8—8] Such is the literal version of the Greek, which I must leave for others to explain. Ficinus has—"Non est autem in omnibus rebus

to either of the boundaries, would become between both.[8] Moreover, we have said that what takes place in a passion is something between what are voluntary and involuntary. If then a person is found guilty of wounds [1]existing, taken place[1] in a passion, in the first place let him pay double the amount of the damage, if the wound is curable; but fourfold in the case of those incurable. But if it be curable indeed, and yet brings upon the wounded party a feeling of considerable shame and disgrace,[2] let the party pay fourfold.[3] But when[4] a person in wounding another, injures not only the sufferer, but the state likewise, by rendering him unable to assist his country against its enemies, he must,[5] in addition to other fines, pay for the damage done to the state. [6]For besides his own period of service abroad, let him go through that of the disabled party, and execute the orders relating to war (at home) in the place of the other;[6] or not doing so, let him be brought to trial by any one whatever, according to law, for neglect of military duty. And let the judges, who have given their votes against him, fix the equivalent for the damage, whether it is to be twofold, or threefold, or fourfold. If one relative by blood wounds another in the same manner, let the parents[7]

terminus termino conjunctus. Nam ubi confinium aliquod commune est, ibi hoc inter rerum terminos utrisque conventum medium fit—" where *πρότερον* is omitted, in which one part of the difficulty lies.

[1]—[1] I cannot believe that Plato wrote *τραυμάτων ἐνεστώτων ὀργῇ γενομένων*— I suspect he wrote *ἀνωΐστως ἐν ὀργῇ*—" not knowingly, in a passion."

[2] Ficinus omits *καὶ ἐπονείδιστον*.

[3] Sydenham was the first to suggest *τριπλασίαν* for *τετραπλασίαν*, and so too Orelli, comparing shortly afterwards *εἴτε διπλῆν, εἴτε τριπλῆν, εἴτε καὶ τετραπλασίαν*.

[4] I have translated as if the Greek were, what is suggested by Stalbaum, *ὅταν*, not *ὅσα*, which is without regimen; unless it be said that *τραύματα* is understood, and that *τρώσας* governs two accusatives.

[5] Although *τοῦτον δὲ* might perhaps be defended, yet I have no doubt that Plato wrote *τοῦτον δεῖ*, as I have translated. Ficinus, whom Taylor follows to the letter, has " similiter puniatur, ac præterea damnum civitati restituat."

[6]—[6] Such is the literal version of the Greek; which Taylor has thus abridged: " Besides too his own military duties, he shall perform those of the wounded person."

[7] So Bekker and Stalb. with six MSS. But this is at variance with the subsequent mention of giving up the party to the parents. Hence Ast

and kindred, as far as the cousins on the male and female side, come together, and decide to deliver the offender to his parents to fix the fine according to nature. But if the fixing of the fine be a matter of doubt, let the kindred on the male side fix the fine definitely. And if they are unable (to decide), let them at length commit it to the guardians of the laws. And of such kind of wounds as are inflicted by children on their parents the judges must be of necessity above sixty years old, and whose children are not adopted but truly their own. And if a person is found guilty, let them fix the punishment, whether such a person must die or suffer something else greater, or not much less; but let none of the relatives of the doer act as judge, not even if he be of the age which the law has ordained. But if a slave wounds any free-man in anger, let his owner give up the slave to the wounded person, to use him as he pleases; but if (the owner) does not give him up, he himself shall remedy the wrong. And if any one brings an accusation touching what has happened, as being a plan arising from an arrangement between the slave and the wounded party, let him contest the matter; and if he does not get a verdict, let him pay the damage threefold; but if he does, let him hold the party planning as amenable together with the slave under the statute of slavery. But let him, who involuntarily wounds another, pay a simple fine; for no legislator is competent to be the ruler over accident; and let the judges be those, who were mentioned in the case of children (wounding) their parents, and let them fix a fine for the damage.

[16.] All the aforesaid sufferings come under the class of violent; and violent too is every kind of assault and disfigurement. It is necessary therefore for every man and every woman in matters of this kind alway to bear in mind that, what is older is honoured in no small degree beyond what is younger, both amongst gods and such persons as are about to be in a state of safety and happiness. To see therefore an assault made upon an elderly person by a younger is in a state a thing shameful and hateful to the deity; and it seems reasonable for every young man, when struck by an old one, to refrain with a light heart

correctly prefers γενήτας, answering to "contribules" in Ficinus, and refers to Pollux viii. 111, and Taylor on Demosthenes, in Reisk. Apparat. Crit. p. 1023.

his anger, [1]and to lay up for himself such a kind of honour for his old age.[1] Thus then let it be. Let every one reverence both in deed and word a person older than himself; and let him, deeming a person, who is his superior by twenty years of age, whether male or female, as a father or mother, act reverently towards them, and let him keep his hands from every period of life, that would be able to beget or bring forth himself, for the sake of the gods who preside over births. In like manner let him keep his hands[2] [3]from a stranger, whether a resident of old, or a new comer. For neither as the aggressor nor in self-defence let him dare to punish by blows such a person.[4] But should he conceive that a stranger ought, through acting wantonly and rudely, to be punished, let him lay hold of the party and bring him before the office of the City-Stewards; but let him abstain from beating him,[3] [5]in order that he may be far from daring to strike a fellow-citizen.[5] And let the City-Stewards, reverencing ever[6] the god of hospitality, receive (the stranger) and sift the matter; and let them, should the stranger appear to have struck unjustly the inhabitant of the country, cause the stranger to cease from his foreign and bold behaviour, by inflicting as many blows as he may himself have struck. But if he has acted not unjustly, let them after threatening and reproaching the party, who

[1]—[1] Such seems to be the meaning of the Greek, *αὐτῷ τιθέμενον τιμὴν ταύτην εἰς γῆρας*, or, what correct language would require, *τιμὴν τοιαύτην*, as I have translated. Ficinus, whom Taylor follows to the letter, has "id ob senectutis reverentiam patienter ferre." Cousin translates, "se préparant a lui-même la même déférence dans vieillesse."

[2] Ficinus has here, "abstineat, inquam, non solum cive, sed seniore etiam."

[3]—[3] Here again the version of Ficinus differs from the Greek in consequence of some words having been misplaced in his MS. and others omitted, and others added that are wanting in all the other MSS.

[4] In lieu of *νομοθετεῖν* in Ald. Stephens happily conjectured *νουθετεῖν*, found, it would seem, in all the MSS. but one.

[5]—[5] Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus, whom Taylor follows tacitly, has, what is more intelligible, "ut eo magis a cædendis civibus suis abstineat, quando etiam a peregrinis se continet."

[6] The Greek is *τὸν ξενικὸν αὖ θεὸν*, where *αὖ*, which has no meaning, is either a corruption of *ἀεὶ*, or, what is more probable, of *ἤγουν*, and thus showing that *θεὸν* is an interpretation of *τὸν ξενικὸν*, or, as it should be read, *τὸν ξένιον*. On a similar use of the article and adjective without *θεὸς* see Suidas in *Φίλιος Ζεύς*.

had brought him, dismiss them both. If one person strikes another of the same age with himself, or [1] who is a little older, but without children, or if an old man strikes an old man, or one youth another, let a person defend himself according to nature, [2][without a weapon,][2] with naked hands. But if any one more than forty years old dares to fight with another, either as the aggressor, or in self-defence, let him be called rude, and ill-mannered, and slave-like, and meeting with this disgraceful punishment, he will have what is becoming to him. And if any one is obedient to these admonitions, he will be led easily by the rein; but let him, who is disobedient, and heeds not a prelude,[3] receive with readiness the following law. If any one strikes another, who is older than himself by twenty years or more, in the first place, let him, who happens to be present, if he is neither of an equal age, nor younger than the combatants, prevent them; or [4](if he does not prevent them,)[4] let him be considered a bad man according to law. But if he is of the same age with, or younger than, the person struck, let him defend the injured party, as if he were his brother or father, or a person still more remote;[5] and further still, let him, who has dared to strike his senior, undergo the punishment for an assault and disfigurement, as stated; and if he is found guilty, let him be put into prison for not less than a year; [6] and if the judges fix the fine for a longer period,[6] let the time so fixed be considered as positive. If a stranger or a settler strikes his senior by twenty years or more, let the same law have the same power, with respect to the assistance of those who are present. And let him, who is defeated in a suit of this kind, if he is a stranger, and not a settler,[7] [8]undergo this very punishment, by being in bonds

[1] Ast correctly adopts ἢ before καὶ, from "vel," in Ficinus.

[2—2] Ficinus justly omits ἄνευ βέλους, which is evidently an interpretation.

[3] Stephens was the first to see that the preceding παραμυθίοις seems to lead to παραμυθίον here in lieu of προοιμίον.

[4—4] Ficinus alone has, what is adopted by Taylor, "si non prohibuit—"

[5] The word ἄνω was applied to a relation older than a father. See my note on Soph. Philoct. 180, and compare § 14, τοῖς ἄνω τοῦ γενους.

[6—6] Ficinus, whom Taylor follows tacitly, has "immo etiam majore, si modo judicibus id videbitur."

[7] In this passage ξύνοικος seems to be put for μέτοικος, a meaning which that word does not bear, as far as I have observed, elsewhere.

[8—8] Such is the literal version of the Greek, δύο ἔτη δεδεμένος ἐκτινέτω

for two years.[8] But if he is a settler, and disobedient to the laws, let him be in bonds for three years, unless the court of justice shall fix upon him a punishment for a longer period. And let whoever happens to be present on any of these occasions, and does not give assistance according to law, be fined, the person of the largest estate, a mina, of the second class, fifty drachms, of the third, thirty, and of the fourth, twenty; and let the court of justice for such matters consist of the Generals and Taxiarchs, and [1] Phylarchs and Hipparchs.[1]

[17.] With respect to the laws, some, as it seems, are in behalf of worthy men, for the sake of their instruction, as to what manner they may associate with each other on friendly terms; others for the sake of those, who fly from instruction through their being of an unmanageable nature [2] and not to be softened,[2] so that they proceed to every kind of vice. These are the persons, who would have caused [3] the discourses to be spoken, that are about to be; for whom in truth the legislator would of necessity lay down his laws, while wishing that there may never be a need of using them. Whoever then dares to touch his father [4] or mother or their progenitors still,[4] [5] and to violently maltreat them,[5] neither fearing the anger of the gods above nor the so-called vengeance of those below the earth, but, as one who, thinking he knows what he does not know at all, despises the men of old, and what has been asserted by all, and acts contrary to the law, for such a person there is

ταύτην αὐτὴν τὴν δίκην: where I cannot see the force of *αὐτὴν*, nor could, I think, Ficinus, whose version, adopted by Taylor, is merely "biennium vinciatur." Ast says however that *ταύτην αὐτὴν* is put for *αὐτὴν ταύτην*, from which nothing, as far as I can see, is gained.

[1]—[1] As the Taxiarch, answering to the English Colonel, was under the General, and is therefore placed after him, so ought the Phylarch to come after the Hipparch, as being an inferior officer, according to Aristotle, quoted by Harpocration in *Φύλαρχος*; unless it be said that there is here a Chiasmus, a figure of speech frequently found in Plato.

[2]—[2] The words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor, who might have remarked the similar passage in § i. p. 853, D.

[3] I confess I hardly understand *πεποιηκότες ἂν εἶεν*. One would have expected the indicative *πεποιήκασι*. Ficinus has "hi sequentium verborum causa sunt."

[4]—[4] The Greek is *ἢ μητρὸς ἢ τούτων ἔτι προγόνων*, where Ficinus omits *ἢ μητρὸς*, and Taylor *ἔτι*. But as *ἔτι* could not be united to *προγόνων*, Plato probably wrote *ἔτι προγενεστέρων*—

[5]—[5] The words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor.

a need of some extreme turning aside. Now death is not the extreme; but the pains inflicted[1] on such persons in Hades are still more amongst the extreme than this;[2] and though they tell[3] the greatest truths, they effect nothing in the way of turning aside in the case of such souls as these. For otherwise there would not have been persons to strike their mothers,[4] [5]nor the unholy daring of blows inflicted upon other parents.[5] It is requisite then, that the punishments here for crimes of this kind, should be as much as possible in no respect inferior to those in Hades. Let then what follows be stated in this way. Whoever shall dare to strike his father or mother, or their fathers or mothers, unless he is seized with madness, let, in the first place, any one, who is present, as mentioned before, give assistance; but if it be a settler or stranger,[6] who assists, let him be called to the principal seat at the (public) games; but, not assisting, let him suffer a perpetual exile from the country. But let him, [7]who is not a settler,[7] if he assists, receive praise; but if he does not assist, blame. And if a slave assists, let him be made free; but if

[1] I have here adopted Taylor's idea, who probably wished to read *γενόμενοι* for *λεγόμενοι*, which could hardly be united to *τούτοισι*.

[2] As the last thing mentioned was death, it is evident that Plato wrote not *τούτων*, but *τούτου*, as I have translated.

[3] Here *λέγοντες* is to be united to *πόνοι* by a prosopopœia, of which I could produce full thirty examples, if requisite; of which the most apposite is Æschyl. Pers. 823, *Θῖνες δὲ νεκρῶν στόμασιν εὖ βροτῶν γένει Ἄφωνα σημανοῦσι καὶ τριτοσπόρῳ, Ὡς οὐχ ὑπὲρ θεὸν θνητὸν ὄντα δεῖ φρονεῖν*, i. e.

> "Well with the mouths of dead men shall the shores
> To the third race of mortals voiceless say,
> 'No man must deem himself above a god:'"

where *στόμασιν*, in lieu of *ὄμμασιν*, vainly defended by Paley, is confirmed by Diodor. Sic. i. 2, p. 5. *αἱ πράξεις—διαβοώμεναι τῷ τῆς ἱστορίας στόματι*, and Epigr. Inc. 387, *Πᾶν ἔπος ἀφθέγκτῳ τῷδε λέγω στόματι*, supposed to be spoken by a pen.

[4] With regard to this allusion to the heinousness of the crime of striking a parent, see Æschyl. Eum. 269; and Aristoph. *Βατρ.* 150; Kuhn on Pausanias x. p. 866; and Wyttenbach on Phædon, p. 319.

[5—5] Ficinus, followed to the letter by Taylor, has "nulli, qui parentes scelerate pulsarent, unquam reperirentur."

[6] Taylor omits "or stranger," although found in Ficinus.

[7—7] Cousin, unable to understand *ὁ μὴ μέτοικος*, considers *ἢ ξένος* as a gloss of *μὴ μέτοικος*, which a transcriber had improperly applied to *μὲν μέτοικος*, instead of applying it to *μὴ μέτοικος*—but he correctly adds that this supposition is far from being satisfactory.

he does not assist, let him receive a hundred stripes with a whip. And if this occurs in the market-place, let him (be whipt) by the Market-Stewards; but if out of the market-place in the city, let any one of the City-Stewards, who is resident, inflict the punishment; but if in the rural parts of the country, let the chiefs of the Land-Stewards do so. If any denizen happens to be present [1] (when parents are struck by their child),[1] whether such denizen be a boy, or a man, or a woman, let him assist, and call the striker an impious wretch; and let him, who does not assist, be implicated in the curse sworn in the name of Zeus [2] Homognius, and Patroïus,[2] according to law.[3] And if any one is convicted on the charge of assaulting and disfiguring his parents, let him, in the first place, suffer a perpetual exile from the city to some other country; and next, let him keep himself from all sacred rites; but if he will not so keep himself, let the Land-Stewards punish him with blows, and entirely as they please. And if he returns from exile, let him be punished with death. And if any free-man [4] shall eat or drink with such a person, or have any other communication of such a kind [4] with him, or only touch him voluntarily, should he happen to meet him any where, let the party neither enter a temple, nor a place of public meeting, nor, in short, the city, until he is purified; conceiving that he has had a communication with a calamity of an impious kind. But if, disobedient to the law, he shall [5] contrary to the law [5] defile the sacred places, and the city, let the magistrate, who, cognizant of this, does not institute a suit

[1]—[1] Ficinus alone has, what is adopted by Taylor, as being requisite for the sense, "parentibus a filio verberatis."

[2]—[2] On these titles of Zeus, Ast refers to v. § 2, and Rep. iv. § 5.

[3] Taylor omits the formula *κατὰ νόμον*, although found in Ficinus.

[4]—[4] On this rite of excommunication, see my note on Æsch. Eum. 437, where I should have refered to Cæsar, in B. G. vi. 13, "Iis (quos sacrificiis interdicant Druides) omnes decedunt; aditum eorum sermonemque defugiunt, ne quid ex contagione incommodi accipiant; neque iis petentibus jus redditur, neque honor ullus communicatur;" and I should have corrected the remarkable passage in Eurip. Iph. T. 947, by reading Ἦλθον δ' ἐκεῖσ', οὗ πρῶτα μέν μ' οὐδ' εἷς ξένος Ἑκών γ' ἐδέξαθ', ὡς θεοῖς στυγούμενον· Ὃς δ' ἔσχεν αἰδὼ ξένια μονοτράπεζά μοι Παρεῖχ' ἀκοινώνητά τ' ἐν ταὐτῷ στέγει, Εἰς γῆν δ' ἐκέκτητ' ὄμμ'—ἀπόφθεγκτόν τ' ἔπος, Εἴς τ' ἄγγος ἴδιον γεῦμ' ὅσον γ', οὐ βάκχιον Μέτρημα πληρώσας τις, ἔχε', ἵν' ἡδονὴ Δαιτὸς γάνος τ' ἦν πώματος, πάντων δίχα.

[5]—[5] The expression *παρανόμως* seems perfectly superfluous after *ἀπειθῶν νόμῳ*.

against such a person,[1] be held amenable [2] to the greatest accusation for this very matter.[3] If a slave strikes a free-man, whether a stranger or citizen, let any one present give assistance, or pay the fine above-mentioned, according to the value of his estate; [4] and let those who are present succour the party struck, and having bound the striker, deliver him to the injured party;[4] and he, on receiving him, shall [5] put him into the stocks,[5] and give him as many stripes with a whip as he pleases, without doing an injury to the slave's owner, to whom let him deliver up the slave, to be his possession according to law. And let the law be this. Whatever slave strikes a free-man, without the order of the magistrates, let his owner, on receiving him bound from the party struck, not release him from bonds, until the slave shall have persuaded the party struck that he deserves to be released and to live. And let the same laws be for women, with respect to each other, on all matters of this kind; and for women with respect to men, and men to women.

BOOK X.

[1.] After assaults,[6] let a law of some such kind as this be stated relating to acts of violence, one for all; that no one

[1] Ficinus translates *ἐπάγῃ δίκην τῷ τοιούτῳ* by "punierit," adopted by Taylor.

[2] I have translated as if the Greek were *ὑπεύθυνος*, not *ἐν εὐθύναις*—

[3] In lieu of *ἐν τούτῳ αὐτῷ*, Bekker would read *ἐν τοῦτο αὐτῷ*, and in that case *ἐν εὐθύναις* might remain; for the sense would be, "let this thing be held as one of the greatest charges against him, when the accounts of his office are examined."

[4—4] Such is the English for the Latin of Ficinus, "qui ergo præsentes erunt, pulsato succurrant, vinciantque pulsantem, et ei vinctum tradant, cui fecit injuriam." The Greek is, *συνδήσαντες δὲ οἱ προστυγχάνοντες μετὰ τοῦ πληγέντος παραδόντων τῷ ἀδικουμένῳ*: where *μετὰ τοῦ πληγέντος* is perfectly unintelligible; for it would thus seem that the striker and the struck were to be bound together—an idea that never could have occurred to Plato. Perhaps however it will be said that *μετὰ τοῦ πληγέντος* may mean, "after the blow has been struck—" But that would be in correct Greek, *μετὰ τὸ πληγὲν*—

[5—5] Taylor omits the words between the numerals, although duly found in Ficinus.

[6] Ficinus, uncertain how to render *αἰκίας* by a single word, has made use of three, "cæde, vulneribusque et verberibus."

shall [1] carry or take away [1] any thing belonging to another, or use his neighbour's property, if he has not induced the possessor (to permit it). For from a thing of this kind [2] all the above-mentioned evils have depended, and do and will (depend).[2] But of the remaining evils, the greatest are the lasciviousness and insolence of young men; to the greatest extent, when they are directed against sacred things; and they are particularly great in the case of public and holy matters, [3] or in those of the common portions of tribes-men, or any other (persons) [3] who have a communion in things of that kind. The second in order and heinousness, are those (directed against) the sacred concerns of individuals and sepulchres. The third, when, apart from the acts previously detailed, a person behaves insolently towards parents. The fourth kind of insolence is, when any one, despising the magistrates, carries off, or [4] drives away, or makes use of any thing belonging to them, without having persuaded them (to suffer it). [5] The fifth consists in unjustly calling to account the political conduct of any citizen.[5] [6] For each of these there must be assigned a law in common.[6] For in the case of sacrilege, it has been stated summarily what a person ought to suffer, if it takes place with violence and secrecy. But with regard to what a person does by word or deed insolently towards the gods, let me now detail, after laying down

[1]—[1] In the phrase *φέρειν καὶ ἄγειν*, the first verb was generally applied to things inanimate and portable, the second to animals driven away alive.

[2]—[2] The Greek is *πάντα ἠρτημένα τά τε εἰρημένα κακὰ γέγονε καὶ ἔστι καὶ ἔσται.* Ficinus has "hinc enim mala omnia, quæ narravimus, dependerunt pendentque jam et in posterum dependebunt." From which Ast was led to read *τά γε εἰρημένα*— and Stalbaum to consider *τε* as an interpolation. But then *γέγονε* would have to be united to *ἠρτημένα* in a manner not to be found elsewhere in lieu of *ἦν*. Hence Plato wrote, I suspect, *πάντ' ἦν ἠρτημένα τά τε εἰρημένα κακὰ καὶ ἃ γέγονε*—

[3]—[3] Ficinus, not perceiving that *ἄλλων* agrees with *ἀνθρώπων* understood, as opposed to *φυλετῶν*, has thus translated the Greek, "vel in tribuum aliquarum communiorem vel aliorum hujuscemodi," as if his MS. read *ἢ κατὰ μέρη φυλῶν τινων, ἢ ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων.*

[4] Ficinus, whom Taylor follows, omits *φέρῃ ἢ*—

[5]—[5] Such is Taylor's translation. The Greek is, *πέμπτον δὲ τὸ πολιτικὸν ἂν εἴη ἑκάστου τῶν πολιτῶν ὑβρισθὲν δίκην ἐπικαλούμενον*, where I cannot make out the syntax or sense; nor could Ast, I think, for he is quite satisfied with the loose version of Ficinus, "quintum cum civis alicujus civilis dignitas læditur vel offenditur."

[6]—[6] Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus has "quod genus omnino ultionem poscit."

an exhortation,[1] what he ought to suffer. Let it then be this. No one, who believes that there are gods, conformably to laws, has ever at any time voluntarily done an impious act, or spoken a word contrary to the laws; but he, [2]who does or says an impious deed or word against the gods,[2] suffers one of these three things; either he does not think, what I have stated;[3] or, secondly, that, although they exist, they take no care of mankind;[4] or, thirdly, that they are easily appeased by sacrifices,[5] and drawn aside by prayers.[6]

Clin. What then shall we do, and what shall we say to them?

Athen. Let us, my good man, first hear, what I prophesy they will jocosely say in contempt of us.

Clin. What?

Athen. Perhaps they will say with a banter—O guests from Athens, and Lacedæmon, and Cnossus, you speak the truth. For some of us think [7]the gods are no gods[7] at all; others, [8]that they take no care of us; and others, that they are drawn aside by prayers,[8] as you have described them. We deem it then proper, as you have deemed it with respect to the laws, that, before you threaten us severely, you should endeavour to persuade and teach us that there are gods, by stating sufficient arguments, and that they are beings too good to be drawn aside, contrary to what is just, by any gifts. For now,

[1] In lieu of *παραμυθιον*, Ficinus found in his MS. *προοίμιον*, as shown by his version, "proœmio quodam proposito," which seems to lead to *παραμύθιόν τε καὶ προοίμιον*, as in xi. p. 923, C. *παραμύθιά τε καὶ προοίμια*—

[2]—[2] The words between the numerals, wanting in the Greek, are found only in the version of Ficinus, "faciunt autem aut dicunt impium aliquid in deos."

[3] Namely, "that there are gods;" which very words Taylor has adopted from Ficinus, "deos esse negant."

[4] A similar sentiment is to be found in Hippodamus, quoted by Ast from Stobæus xli. p. 250, 40, *ἤτοι μὴ εἶμεν τὸ θεῖον, ἢ καὶ ἐὸν, μὴ ἔχειν οὕτως ποτὶ τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος, ὥστ' ἐπιβλέπεν αὐτὸ καὶ φροντίζεν.*

[5] On this doctrine, see iv. § 8.

[6] Ficinus, followed by Taylor, omits *παραγομένους*—

[7]—[7] I have adopted the reading *θεοὺς οὐ θεοὺς*, preserved by the Scholiast, in lieu of *θεοὺς οὐδαμῶς*. See Dobree on Aristoph. Eccl. 115, and myself on Crito, § 13, n. 5.

[8]—[8] The words between the numerals are wanting in all the MSS. but the one used by Cornarius, and another by Ficinus, as shown by his version, "alii, nihil nostra curare; alii, muneribus facile placari—" who has however omitted *οἵους ὑμεῖς λέγετε*, which certainly seem to be superfluous.

after hearing this, and other things of such a kind, from those said to be the best of poets, and orators, and prophets, and priests, and ten thousand times ten thousand others, the majority of us do not turn to the acting unjustly, but, after acting so, we endeavour to get a salve. But on the part of legislators, who profess themselves to be not savage, but mild, we think it reasonable for them to make use of persuasion in our case, by stating, with regard to the gods, if not in a manner much superior to the rest, yet superior at least as regards the truth, that they do exist. And then perhaps we may be persuaded by you. Endeavour then, if we say what is fair, to speak on the points, to which we invite you.

Clin. Does it not seem then easy, O guest, to say with truth, that there are gods?

Athen. How?

Clin. In the first place, the Earth and Sun, and all the Stars, and the arrangements so beautiful of the Seasons, divided into months and years, (prove this);[1] and moreover, that all men, both Greeks and Barbarians, believe that there are gods.

Athen. I feel a fear, O blessed man—for I will never say that I feel shame, lest depraved persons hold you in contempt. For you are not acquainted with the cause of their difference[2] (in opinion); but you imagine that their souls are impelled to an impious life, by a want of mastery alone over pleasures and desires.

Clin. But what other cause can there be, O guest, besides this?

Athen. [3]That, which you would know nearly not at all, through living out of their way, and which would lie hid from you.[3]

Clin. Of what are you speaking at present?

Athen. A certain ignorance of a very grievous nature is appearing to be the greatest prudence.

[1] The words between the lunes, absolutely requisite for the sense, are found only in the version of Ficinus, "id ostendunt."

[2] Cornarius seems to have found in his MS., or rather to have wished to read, *διαφθορᾶς*; which Stephens, and after him Stalbaum, considered to be correct. Cousin is content with *διαφορᾶς*—I should prefer *τούτων περὶ—διαφορᾶς*, "of the difference on these points."

[3]—[3] Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus has merely "Quod vos ipsius expertes penitus fugit."

Clin. How say you?

[2.] *Athen.* There are certain stories put into writing amongst us, which, as I understand, are, through the virtue of your polity, not amongst you, some in a kind of verse, and others out of it, which speak of the gods. The most ancient (assert), that the first nature was that of Uranus[1] and the other (gods); and proceeding they detail, not far from the beginning, the birth of the gods, and how after being born they had intercourse with each other. Upon those, who hear the accounts, whether they are well or not upon any other ground, it is not easy to cast a censure, as they are of the olden time; but as regards the attention and honour to be paid to parents, I would never praise them, nor say that they are beneficial, nor that they have been correctly[2] told at all. Let then, what relates to the writings of the ancients, be dismissed and bidden farewell, and let them be spoken of, as may be pleasing to the gods. But let the poetry[3] of the young and wise[4] be blamed as the cause of evil; for the language of such persons effects this. For when you and I, detailing the proofs, that there are gods, bring forward those very things, the Sun and Moon, and Stars, and the Earth, as being gods and of a god-like nature, they, who have been persuaded by these wise men, would say that they are [5]earth and stones,[5] and incapable of paying any regard to human affairs; and that such ideas are cleverly wrapped round in a paste of words[6] to render them plausible.

[1] I have thus translated Οὐρανοῦ: for it alludes to a person, not a thing, as shown by ἄλλων (θεῶν).

[2] Instead of ὄρθως five MSS. read ὄντως. But as Ficinus has "vera esse," he probably found in his MS. ὀρθὰ ὄντα—

[3] I have adopted Ast's ἔπη for ὕπη, which Cousin retains without attempting to explain it.

[4] This union of the young and wise seems rather strange. Hence one would prefer νέων καὶ ἀσόφων—the young and not wise, in lieu of νέων καὶ σοφῶν — Unless it be said that σοφῶν is to be taken ironically.

[5—5] Ast refers opportunely to Apolog. § 14, where, according to the doctrine of Anaxagoras, the Sun was said to be a shining stone and the Moon a mass of earth. Had the philosopher lived in our days, he would perhaps have compared the Sun to a large diamond, or a mass of pure carbon reduced to a solid state, and by the aid of the Earl of Rosse's telescope confirmed his guess that the Moon is a mass of earth in its most solid state of granite.

[6] On the metaphorical use of περιπέττειν Ast refers to Aristoph. Plut. 159, Ὀνόματι περιπέττουσι τὴν μοχθηρίαν. Lucian Anachars. § 19, περιπέττειν τὸ πρᾶγμα ἐν τοῖς λόγοις. Valckenaer Diatrib. p. 158, A.

Clin. You have spoken, guest, a speech, grave indeed, even if only one had (said so);[1] but now, since there happen to be very many (who say so),[2] it will be still more grave.

Athen. What then shall we say, and what ought we to do? Shall we apologize, as if some person were accusing us before impious men, who fly [3]from the subjects relating to legislation, and[3] assert that we are acting in a shocking manner by legislating as if there were gods? Or shall we bid farewell to these, and return again to the laws, in order that this our preface to the laws may not become rather prolix? For the discourse will, if stretched out, become by no means short, if we sufficiently prove only moderately by reasons to men, eager to act impiously, some of the points, on which they say we ought to speak; [4]and if we lead them to feel a fear upon others; and if, after having caused them to be disgusted on others, we lay down laws after this on matters that are becoming.[4]

Clin. But, O guest, we have often, for so short a time at least, said this very thing, that for the present it is not meet to prefer brevity to prolixity. For nobody, according to the saying,[5] is pursuing us in haste. [6]And it would be ridiculous,[6] and at the same time paltry, for us to be seen preferring the shorter to the best. And it is a thing of no little moment, for our reasons possess somehow a power to prove that

Jacobs in Athenæum, p. 297. Other passages are quoted by Dobree on Aristoph. l. c. According to Donaldson in the New Cratylus, p. 370, ed. 1, there lies hid here a comic verse, Λόγοισιδ' εὖ πως ταῦτα περιπεπεμμένα, similar to ῥηματίοις περιπεφθεὶς in Aristoph. Σφηκ. 668.

[1, 2] The words between the lunes have been introduced from the version of Ficinus—"etiamsi solummodo unus dixisset, nunc vero—quo plures sunt, qui dicunt."

[3—3] I have translated as if τὰ had dropt out before, and καὶ after, περὶ τῆς νομοθεσίας. Orelli however has suggested, what Stalbaum approves of, περιττὰς νομοθεσίας: and while Winckelmann would read ψέγουσι in lieu of φεύγουσι, Ficinus, unable perhaps to understand φεύγουσι περὶ τῆς νομοθεσίας, has omitted these words; and so after him has Taylor.

[4—4] Such is the literal version of the Greek, which Ficinus, whom Taylor has followed in part, has thus abridged—"atque etiam terrore illos a scelere amovere, demum vero, quemadmodum convenit, leges ferre."

[5] On this saying, the origin of which is unknown, Ast refers to vi. § 1, σχολῆς ἀπολαύομεν καὶ οὐδὲν ἡμᾶς ἐστὸ τὸ κατεπεῖγον.

[6—6] The Greek is γελοῖον δή— It was γελοῖον δ' ἦν ἄν in the MS. of Ficinus, as shown by his version—"quare ridiculum—esset." On the corruption of δ' ἦν ἄν into δή see Porson Miscellan. Crit. p. 182.

there are gods, that they are good, and that they honour justice pre-eminently more than men. For this will be nearly the most beautiful and excellent preface to all our laws. Let us then, without feeling any disgust, or being urged on, exhibit, as far as we can, sufficiently whatever power we possess in the way of persuasion, and lay aside no part of such kind of reasonings.

Athen. [1]The speech just now spoken by you appears to me to invite a prayer,[1] since you put yourself on the stretch with alacrity, nor is it fitting to delay any longer to discourse.

[3.] But come, (tell us) how can any one speak without a feeling of anger on the question[2] that there are gods? For there is a necessity for us to bear ill with and to hate those, who have been and are[3] now the cause of the discussion, [4]in not being persuaded[4] by the tales, which they have heard even [5]from young children,[5] and when they were fed with milk from their nurses and mothers, and which were spoken, as it were, in epodes,[6] both in sport and in earnest, and together with sacrifices hearing them in prayers, and seeing the sights that follow them,[7] which a young person sees and hears with the greatest delight, when they take place; while their parents are making a sacrifice with the greatest earnestness, and occupied in it in behalf of themselves and them;[8] and addressing in prayers

[1]—[1] Such is the literal version of the Greek; that of Ficinus is a paraphrase—"Iste sermo tuus adeo te paratum promptumque ostendit, ut ad preces votumque videatur provocare"— But what this naked mention of prayer has to do in this place, I confess I cannot understand. Nor could Sydenham; who proposed to read *εὖ μὴν* for *εὐχὴν*— But *μὴν* does not elsewhere thus follow *εὖ*, if I rightly remember.

[2] Taylor adds, no doubt to complete the idea, "as if it were a thing of a doubtful nature."

[3] Ficinus, and Taylor after him, omit *καὶ γίγνονται*.

[4]—[4] I have, with Ast and Stalbaum, adopted Stephens's correction—*γίγνονται νῦν, οὐ πειθόμενοι*—in lieu of *γίγνονται· νῦν οὖν πειθόμενοι*—which is perfectly unintelligible. Cousin however observes that "la construction suspendue (est) extrêmement claire—Il était difficile de gâter davantage une plus belle phrase—"

[5]—[5] It is correct Greek to say *ἐκ νέων* or *ἐκ παίδων*, but not *ἐκ νέων παίδων*. Hence Winckelmann proposed to insert *ἀρξάμενοι* after *παίδων*—I would rather read *ἐκ νηπίων* in lieu of *ἐκ νέων παίδων*—

[6] I confess I cannot understand what is meant by *οἷον ἐν ἐπῳδαῖς*.

[7] Ast translates, after Ficinus, *ἑπομένας* by "consentaneas—"

[8] In lieu of *ἐκείνων* I should prefer *τέκνων*— On the custom of persons praying for themselves and children only, I have written something on II. Alcibiad. § 18, n. 10, *τὰ καλὰ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς τοὺς θεοὺς διδόναι κελεύοντες μόνοις σφίσιν αὐτοῖς*.

and supplications the gods, as really existing, both at the rising of the Sun and Moon, and at their setting; and when they hear and see the rollings on the ground and acts of adoration of Greeks and Barbarians of all kinds,[1] under the influence of all kinds of adversity and prosperity, not as if the gods were not existing, but as if existing in reality, and giving not even a handle for the suspicion that the gods do not exist—they who despise all these facts, and from not a single sufficient reason, as all would say, who possess even a little intellect, compel us to speak as we do at present, how can any one in mild language admonish, and at the same time teach them, in the first place, that the gods do exist? Let us however dare the attempt. For it is not meet that some of us[2] should be mad through a violent hankering after pleasure, and others through being angry with such characters as these. Let then our address to persons thus depraved in their intellect be of this kind and passionless, and let us speak mildly after extinguishing our anger, as if conversing with one of such persons —[3] My child, you are young. But time, as it advances, will cause you to change in many points the opinions you now hold, and to give them to the opposite side.[3] Wait then until that period, so as to become a judge of matters of the greatest moment. Now that is of the greatest moment, which you at present deem to be of no consequence, namely, to have correct ideas on the subject of the gods, and to live well or not. If then I first point out[4] to you a thing of this kind, as being one of great moment, I shall not appear to tell a falsehood. Not you alone nor your friends are the first, who have held this opinion respecting the gods; but there have been always a greater or less number labouring under this very disease. I will therefore tell you this, as I have come in contact with many of them, that not one of them, after adopting this opinion

[1] I have translated as if the Greek were not *πάντων*, but *παντοίων*, to suit better with the subsequent *παντοίαις*—

[2] In lieu of *ἡμῶν*, which Stephens wished to reject, Winckelmann would read *ἡττωμένους*— Sydenham suggested *ἡδονῶν* for *ἡδονῆς ἡμῶν*— Cousin translates *ἡμῶν* by "parmi nous autres hommes—"

[3—3] In the Greek it is easy to detect a dramatic fragment in Anapæstics— Ὦ παῖ, νέος εἶ· προϊὼν δ' ὁ χρόνος Πολλὰ ποήσει σ', ὧν δοξάζεις Νῦν, μεταβάλλοντ' ἐπὶ τἀναντία Θέσθαι. Ficinus has "juvenis adhuc es—" as if his MS. read ἔτι νέος εἶ.

[4] Ficinus has "sacrificavero," from which it is difficult to discover what he found in his MS. in lieu of *μηνύων*—

from their youth respecting the gods, that they do not exist, has continued to old age remaining in it. Two circumstances have however remained as regards the gods, not indeed to many, but to some; one is, that the gods exist indeed, but take no care of human affairs; and the other after this, that they do indeed take care, but are easily appeased by sacrifices and prayers. If then you will be persuaded by me, you will, turning over[1] with all your might this doctrine, [2]which has ever been clear[2] to you, wait and consider whether it be thus or otherwise, by inquiring of other persons, and the legislator in particular. But during that period do not dare to act impiously towards the gods. For he, who lays down laws for you, must endeavour, both now and hereafter, to teach you on these points in what state they are.

Clin. What has been said thus far, is, O guest, most beautiful.

Athen. Entirely so, Megillus and Clinias; but we have unconsciously fallen upon a wonderful assertion.

Clin. Of what kind are you speaking?

Athen. That, which is thought by many to be the wisest of all assertions.

Clin. Speak yet clearer.

[4.] *Athen.* Some persons surely say, that all things, which are and have been and will be, exist, some from nature, others from art, and others from chance.

Clin. And do they not (say) well?

Athen. It is reasonable, indeed, for wise men to speak correctly. Let us then follow [3]those from that point,[3] and consider what they happen to be thinking of.

Clin. By all means.

Athen. It seems, say they, that nature and chance effect the

[1] I have translated as if the Greek were *περιελίττων*, not *περὶ αὐτῶν*, which I cannot understand.

[2—2] Here again, by the slight change of *ἂν* into *ἀεὶ*, I have made the meaning of Plato intelligible, of which Ficinus and Cornarius had only a vague idea, as may be seen from their respective versions, quoted by Ast.

[3—3] In lieu of *τοὺς ἐκεῖθεν* Ast suggests *τὸ ἐκεῖθεν*, "what results from thence," and translates *τί διανοούμενοι τυγχάνουσι* by "quid inde colligant," a meaning those words certainly cannot bear. I suspect that Plato wrote *τοὺς Ἰῆθεν*, "those from Ias," the name for the people of the country called more commonly Ionia. For the writer is here alluding more particularly to the tenets of Ionic philosophers.

greatest and most beautiful things, but art the lesser; which, receiving from nature the generation of great and primary works, moulds and fabricates all the smaller works, which all of us call artificial.

Clin. How say you?

Athen. I will speak still clearer in this way. They say that fire and water and earth and air exist from nature and chance, and not one of them from art; and that the bodies, next after these, of the Earth, and the Sun, and the Moon, and the Stars,[1] are generated through them, being entirely without a soul; and that, [2]each being borne along by the chance, which is a portion of the power of each,[2] to the spot where they fall together, [3]fit together in some congenial manner,[3] the hot with the cold, the dry with the moist, and the soft with the hard; and that all things, which by the mixture of contraries, according to chance, have been commingled through necessity, have in this way and under such circumstances really[4] generated the whole of heaven and all that are in heaven, and animals and plants together, [5]all the seasons having been produced from them;[5] and not, say they, through intellect, nor any god, or art, but, as we have stated, by nature and chance; and that art, mortal itself, being subsequently produced from these, themselves mortal, generated afterwards some kind of instruction, not partaking very much of truth, but certain images allied to themselves,[6] such as painting produces, and music, and whatever arts are fellow-workers: and that if any[7]

[1] Ast says that *πέρι* after *ἄστρων τε* might be omitted; and omitted it was in the MS. of Ficinus; from whose "stellarum omnium" it is easy to elicit *ἄστρων τε πάντων*—unless it be said that in *περι παντων* united lies hid *περιπλανῶν*, "wandering round," i. e. planets.

[2]—[2] This is the only translation I can give of *τύχῃ φερόμενα τῇ τῆς δυνάμεως ἕκαστα ἑκάστων*—

[3]—[3] The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus.

[4] From *οὕτως* in Euseb. P. E. i. 7, Viger elicited *ὄντως*, which I have adopted; for *ταύτῃ κατὰ ταῦτα οὕτω* is not found elsewhere thus united.

[5]—[5] Why Plato should have thus introduced genitives absolute after the preceding accusatives, it is hard to say.

[6] In lieu of *ἑαυτῶν* Ast suggests *αὐτῶν*, i. e. *τεχνῶν*. But Taylor translates *ἑαυτῶν* by "each other," a meaning assigned elsewhere to the same pronoun.

[7] I have translated as if the Greek were, not *αἳ δὲ τι—γεννῶσι*—for *ἂν* or *ἐὰν* could hardly be omitted—but *ἂν δέ τινές τι*— for thus *τῶν τεχνῶν* recovers, what it had lost, its governing pronoun.

of the arts produce any thing of a serious nature, they are such as communicate their own power with that of nature, such as the art of medicine, and of agriculture, and of gymnastics; and, moreover, the statesman's art communicates in some small part with nature, but very much with art; and thus the whole of legislation is not from nature, but art; of which[1] the positions are not true.

Clin. How say you?

Athen. The gods, O blessed man, these persons say, in the first place, exist from art, not nature, but from certain laws; and that these are different amongst different people, according as each have agreed to have laws laid down for each.[2] And, moreover, that things beautiful by nature are of one kind, those by law of another; and that [3]things just do not exist by nature at all,[3] but that persons continue to dispute amongst themselves about them, and are perpetually changing them; and that, what they change and when, possess then a fixed authority, emanating from art and laws, but not from any certain nature. All these, my friends, are amongst young men[4] the doctrines of the wise, both private persons[5] and poets,[6] who assert that to be the most just, by which a person obtains a victory through violence. From whence both impiety comes upon young men—since gods are not such as the law enjoins us we ought to think there are—[7]and seditions too (arise) on this account, while persons are drawing towards the

[1] I cannot understand ἧς applied to τέχνη. Plato wrote, I suspect, οἷς οὐκ ἀληθεῖς φήσω εἶναι τὰς θέσεις, "to whom I will say that their positions are not true;" where φήσω might easily have dropt out after ἀληθεῖς—

[2] I have adopted ἑκάστοις, preserved in one MS. in lieu of ἑαυτοῖς, similar to ἕκαστα ἑκάστων—

[3—3] On this doctrine Ast refers to Gorg. p. 482, E. § 85; Theætet. p. 172, B. § 75; Protag. p. 337, D. § 69; and Aristot. Polit. i. 3.

[4] As ἀνθρώποις is seldom thus united to νέοις, Plato wrote, I suspect, both here and shortly afterwards, ἄνοις, "senseless," for such young men are, and ἄνων for ἀνθρώπων a little below. See my Poppo's Prolegom. p. 106.

[5] Ficinus has "scriptores alii—" which would lead to ΛΟΓΙΩΝ ΤΙΝΩΝ in lieu of ΙΔΙΩΤΩΝ. Where λογίων would mean "prose writers—"

[6] Plato alludes to Pindar, as shown by iii. § 10.

[7—7] Such is the literal version of the Greek, out of which I can make nothing, nor could, I think, Ficinus; whose translation is—"hinc etiam seditiones oriuntur, per quas ad eam homines vitam, quasi secundum naturam rectam, trahuntur, qua ita vivant, ut ceteros vincant, nec secundum

life, which is correct according to nature, which is in truth that a person lives, the master over others, and not the slave of others according to law.[7]

Clin. What an account have you, O guest, gone through, and what a mischief (detailed) to young men, both publicly in cities, and in their private homes!

Athen. You speak truly, Clinias. What then think you a legislator ought to do, [1]when states have been of old in this condition.[1] Ought he [2]merely to stand up in the city[2] and threaten all, that unless they assert, and [3]are thoroughly satisfied in their own minds,[3] that there are gods, such as the law says there are, [4](they shall suffer punishment).[4] And with respect to things beautiful and just, and every thing of the greatest moment, and whatever tends to virtue and vice, that it is meet for them to think and act in the way the legislator leads by his writings; and that, whoever does not exhibit himself obedient to the laws, one of them ought to die, another to be punished with stripes and bonds, and another with disfranchisement, and others with poverty and exile; and that while he is laying down laws for men, [5]he is to have no persuasion over them, (so that) by fitting them to reasonings, he may, as far as he can, render them mild.[5]

Clin. By no means, O guest. But should any persuasion, though small, happen to exist relating to matters of this kind, it behoves a legislator, who is of the least worth, to be never

leges aliis serviant"— From which however it is easy to see that his MS. read *ἑλκομένων*, what the sense seems to require, instead of *ἑλκόντων*—

[1]—[1] In lieu of the words between the numerals Taylor has merely "in this case," got from "cum ita se res habent—" in Ficinus.

[2]—[2] The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and partly by Taylor likewise.

[3]—[3] Such seems to be the meaning of *διανοηθήσονται δοξάζοντες*. But as such an union of words is scarcely admissible in Greek, there is probably some error in *δοξάζοντες*, for which one would prefer *οὐ διστάζοντες*, "nothing doubting"—a word quoted by Stephens from Synesius Epist. 44, and he might have added Plato in p. 897, B. § 8.

[4]—[4] The words between the lunes, absolutely requisite for the sense, are found only in the Latin of Ficinus—"eos omnino pœnas daturos."

[5]—[5] Such is the literal version of the Greek, which, although it is not quite unintelligible, is not so clear as the Latin of Ficinus—"ut autem in legum latione persuasionem minis adjungat, qua mitiget, nihil curabit:" by the aid of which Ast has given, what he considers to be the general sense of the passage, not to be elicited fairly from the Greek.

faint-hearted, but[1] to utter, as the saying is, every cry,[1] and to become an helper to the old legal saw,[2] that there are gods, and such other things as you have discussed; and moreover, to aid both nature itself and art, (by showing) that they two exist by[3] nature, or not less than nature,[3] since they are the progeny of intellect, according to correct reasoning, which you seem to me to have stated, and as I now believe.

Athen. O thou most eager-minded Clinias, what, are not the matters thus spoken before the multitude difficult to follow up by arguments, and do they not possess a prolixity spoken with a clamorous voice?

Clin. But what, O guest, have we on the subject of drunkenness and music waited, while we were speaking at such a length, and shall we not wait (while speaking) on the subject of the gods, and such like matters? Moreover there will be[4] the greatest assistance to the legislation, which is united to intelligence, because the ordinances relating to the laws being put into writing, will, [5]as being about to afford a disproof,[5] for all time remain[6] perfectly quiet. So that we ought not to be alarmed, even if those things are at the commencement harsh to hear, which it will be in the power of a person, who is slow to learn, by frequently recurring to them, to look into; nor even, if they are prolix, yet useful, do they on this account possess no consideration; nor does it seem to me to be a holy thing for every person not to assist these assertions to the utmost of his power.

Megil. Clinias appears to me, O guest, to speak most excellently.

Athen. Yes, very much so; and we must do as he says. For if assertions of this kind were not scattered, so to say,

[1]—[1] On the expression—*πᾶσαν φωνὴν ἱέναι*, Ast refers to his note on Rep. v. § 19, p. 530, A.

[2] The Greek is *τῷ παλαιῷ νόμῳ ἐπίκουρον γίγνεσθαι λόγῳ*: where Winckelmann would expunge *νόμῳ*, but Orelli alter it into *νομίμῳ*, whom I have followed.

[3]—[3] This I confess I hardly understand. The sense seems to require *φύσει ἢ φύσεως οὐχ ἥττονί τῳ*—" by nature or by something not less than nature."

[4] Ficinus has " est futurum," for his MS. doubtless read *ἔσται*, not *ἐστὶ*—

[5]—[5] Ficinus has " redargutioni subjecta—" as if his MS. read something the reverse of *δώσοντα*—

[6] One MS. has *ἠρεμοῖ*, to which if we add *ἂν*, we shall have what Ficinus found in his MS., answering to " quiescant."

amongst all men, there would be no need of arguments to prove that there are gods. But now this is necessary. To whom then does it pertain, more than to the legislator, to give assistance to the greatest laws, when corrupted by wicked men?

Clin. To no one.[1]

[5.] *Athen.* But do you, Clinias, tell me again—for it behoves you to take part in the conversation—does not he, who mentions these things, namely, fire and water and earth and air, appear almost to consider them as the first of all things, and to call them nature, and (to say) that soul is (a production) subsequent to them? Does it seem that he not only appears (to think so), but in reality signifies to us so much by his assertions?

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. Have we not then, by Zeus, discovered, as it were, some source of the stupid opinion of those men, who have ever touched upon inquiries relating to nature? Look into and examine the whole subject. For it is a matter of no small moment, if those, who meddle (themselves) with impious assertions, and are the leaders to others, are seen to employ arguments not correctly, but erroneously. Such to myself at present[2] appears to be the case.

Clin. You speak well; but endeavour to show why so.

Athen. It seems then I must employ rather unusual arguments.

Clin. You must not, guest, hesitate. For I understand that you conceive you will travel out of legislation, if we handle reasonings of this kind. But if it is not possible to agree in any other way than this with what has been according to law just now stated, as being correct, [3]on the subject of the gods,[3] let us, O wonderful man, speak even in this way.

Athen. I will detail then some such reasoning as this, which, as it seems, is nearly not usual. The discourses, which have worked upon the soul of the impious, have shown that,

[1] Instead of *οὔκ ἔστιν* the syntax requires evidently *οὔ τινα*, to answer to the preceding *τίνα*.

[2] The sense requires *τὰ νῦν*, as I have translated, not *τοίνυν*.

[3—3] In lieu of *θεοῖς*, which is perfectly unintelligible, Ast suggested *λόγοις*. But Ficinus found in his MS. *θεῶνπέρι*, as shown by his version, "de diis secundum legem"—which Sydenham says is correct. For otherwise there would have followed, not *ὡς ὀρθῶς ἔχουσιν*, but *ὡς ὄντως εἶσιν*. Orelli would read *θεσμοῖς*, and refers to Epist. viii. p. 355, Bekk.

what is the first cause of the generation and corruption of all things, was not produced the first, but subsequently, and that the subsequent was prior: from whence they have erred respecting the real existence of the gods.

Clin. I do not yet understand.

Athen. Almost all men, my friend, appear to have been nearly ignorant what the soul happens to be, and what power it possesses, with respect to other things belonging to it, and its generation besides—how that it is amongst the first of substances and before all, and that more than any thing else it rules over the change and altered arrangement of bodies. And if this be the case, is it not necessary for things allied to soul to have been produced prior to those pertaining to body, through soul itself being more ancient than body?

Clin. It is necessary.

Athen. Now opinion, and care, and intellect, and art, and law, would be prior to things hard and soft, and heavy and light. And moreover the great and first works and doings of art would be amongst the first things; but those produced by nature, and nature herself, which they do not correctly call by that name, would be posterior to, and ruled by art and intellect.

Clin. [1]How not correctly?

Athen. Because[1] they are willing to say that nature is the generation relating to the first; [2]and they place bodies amongst the first.[2] But if soul shall appear to be first, and not fire or air, [3]soul would be said with almost the greatest

[1]—[1] I have with Ast adopted what Ficinus found in his MS., as shown by his version—*Clin.* Cur non recte? *Athen.* Quia— From whence Ast saw correctly that ὅτι had dropt out before φύσιν—

[2]—[2] Ficinus alone has, what the train of thought requires, "primaque ponunt corpora—" in Greek, according to Cornarius, τὰ δὲ σώματα τιθέασι τὰ πρῶτα—words evidently lost through τὸ ὁμοιοτέλευτον. Cousin, however, considers those words to be perfectly useless.

[3]—[3] I have followed for the most part Ficinus, whose version is, "anima ipsa corpore antiquior rectissime affirmabitur; et hæc ipsa ita natura constare, si animam corporibus antiquiorem esse constiterit," who seems to have found in his MS. ψυχὴ δή, not ψυχὴ δὲ—and εἶναι καὶ φύσει, not εἶναι διαφερόντως ὅτι φύσει—while to preserve the train of thought, it is requisite to read ἔσται for ἐστὶ— Ast, however, adopts διαφερόντως φύσει, from Eusebius P. E. xii. p. 622, D., which, I confess, I do not understand. Cousin says—"On eclaircit la phrase entiere un peu en lisant καὶ ὅ τι ou ὅ τι δὲ, i. e. et que c'est là le veritable ordre naturel des choses."

correctness to have been produced amongst the first; and these will be pre-eminently by nature in this state, should any one show that soul is more ancient than body;[3] but otherwise not.

Clin. You speak most true.

Athen. Shall we then, after this, proceed to this very point?

Clin. Undoubtedly.

Athen. But let us by all means guard against a deceitful reason, lest perchance, being of a youthful look, it persuades us old men improperly, and after escaping, makes us a laughing-stock; and lest we appear, [1]after throwing ourselves upon greater things, to miss even the little.[1] Consider then, if it were requisite for us three to pass a river, running with a strong current, and I, happening to be the youngest of us, and acquainted with many rivers, should say,—It is proper for myself to make an experiment the first, and, leaving you in safety, to ascertain whether it is fordable by you, older than myself, or how it is; and, on its appearing to be in that state, I were then to call upon you, and by my experience cause you to pass it together with myself; but if not fordable by you, for the danger to fall upon myself—I should appear to speak with moderation. So now, the future reasoning is of rather a violent kind, and perhaps nearly impassable, at least by your strength. [2]Lest then it should cause in you a dizziness and giddiness, by being carried round, and put questions to you unaccustomed to give answers, and afterwards beget in you an unseemly and unbecoming conduct,[2] it appears to me that I ought, in the present case, to do thus to myself, (namely) to interrogate myself, first, while you are hearing in safety, and after this to give the answer myself, and thus to go through the whole of the reasoning, until, as regards the soul, it is finished, and shows that soul exists prior to body.

[1]—[1] There seems to be here an allusion to the fable of the Dog and Shadow. At least in the prose of the original lies hid a Choliambic verse, Μείζω δ' ἐπιβληθεὶς ἀπέτυχε καὶ σμικρῶν.

[2]—[2] Such is the literal version of the Greek. Taylor however thought it sufficient to translate nearly as closely the Latin of Ficinus, "ne vertiginem tenebrasque vobis faciat, ad eas vos quæstiones deducens, quibus consueti non estis, atque hoc pacto dedecore et tristitia afficiat—" where παραφερόμενος was probably omitted, as being unintelligible; for Plato wrote no doubt περιφερόμενος: since giddiness is produced rather by a circular than a lateral motion. And so I have translated.

Clin. You seem to us, guest, to speak most excellently; and do then as you are saying.

[6.] *Athen.* Come then, if at any time we ought to call upon gods,[1] let this be done so now; (and) let them be called on with all earnestness to the demonstration of their existence. And laying hold, as by some secure rope,[2] let us mount up to the present reasoning. Now it appears to me that, when I am examined upon these points, I shall answer most securely after this fashion,[3] to questions of this kind. When a person says—O guest, do all things stand still,[4] and is nothing moved; or does quite the contrary[5] to this take place? Or, are some things moved, but others remain (fixed)? To this I shall reply—Some things are moved, but others remain (fixed). Do not then the things, which stand still, stand in a certain place; and are not the things, which are moved, moved (in a certain place)? How not? And some things would surely do so in one spot, but others in more (than one). Are you speaking, we shall say, of the things, which, obtaining the power of such as stand in the middle, are moved in one (spot), just as the circumference of tops,[6] which are said to stand still, revolves? I do. And we understand that, in this circumference, the motion, which carries round [7]the largest and the smallest circle,[7] distributes itself proportionally in small and large circles, and is proportionally less and more. Hence it becomes

[1] I have adopted *θεοὺς*, suggested by Viger on Euseb. P. E. xii. p. 623, in lieu of *θεὸν*— See my note on Æsch. Suppl. 630.

[2] Ast refers to Phædo, p. 85, D. where reasoning is compared to a raft.

[3] In lieu of the unintelligible *κᾷτα δὲ*, I have with Ast adopted *κατὰ τάδε*, furnished by Eusebius, and similar to hujusmodi in Ficinus.

[4] This was the doctrine of Parmenides.

[5] This was the doctrine of Heracleitus.

[6] So I have translated *κύκλων*. For Plato is alluding here to the fact, that a top, when it revolves the quickest, seems to stand still, or, as boys in England say, to sleep. See my note on Sophist § 73, p. 155. And hence by *ἐν μέσῳ*, "in the middle," we must understand "on their centre—" See § 8, on *τῶν ἐντόρνων—κύκλων*.

[7]—[7] This allusion to the large and small circles will be understood at once by knowing that in a top the circles are less and less, as the sides of the toy taper to a point. With regard to the collocation of the words *τὸν μέγιστον καὶ τὸν σμικρότατον*, as Plato has written just afterwards *σμικροῖς τε καὶ μείζοσιν* and *ἐλάττων τε—καὶ πλείων*, one would prefer here *τὸν σμικρότατον καὶ τὸν μέγιστον*: unless it be said that there is the figure of speech called Chiasmus.

the fountain of all wonderful things, [1]proceeding (with) slowness[1] and swiftness, that coincide with large and small circles,[2] in a manner that one would expect to be an impossible occurrence. You speak most true. But by things that are moved in many (places), you appear to me to mean such as are carried along by a movement, and pass from one place to another. And [3]sometimes it is when[3] they obtain the going of some one centre, and sometimes more,[4] by being rolled around,[5] [6]and meeting on each occasion with each, they are cut through by

[1]—[1] Sydenham, dissatisfied, it would seem, with the syntax of *βραδύτητας πορεύουσα*—for the accusative can depend only upon *κατὰ* understood—proposed to read *πορίζουσα*, remembering probably the preceding *περιάγουσα—κίνησις*— I should however prefer *περαίνουσα*—

[2] Here *κύκλοις* is taken in its usual sense. For there is a general inference drawn from a particular fact.

[3]—[3] The Greek is *τότε μὲν ἔστιν ὅτε*—where Stephens, after justly objecting to such an union of words, supposes that *ἔστιν ὅτε* is used pleonastically with *τότε*. The idea is adopted indeed by Ast; but neither of those editors have produced a parallel passage, nor could they, I suspect, produce one. In *εστιν οτε βασιν* lies hid perhaps *αστατου μεταβασιν*—where *μετάβασις* would coincide with the preceding *μεταβαίνοντα*, and *ἀστάτου* with *εἰς ἕτερον ἀεὶ τόπον*: and the sense would be, "and sometimes they obtain the changing motion of some one centre that is not at rest."

[4] I cannot understand to what *πλείονα* is to be referred. From its being opposed to *ἑνὸς κέντρου*, one would expect *πλειόνων*. But as *ἑνὸς κέντρου* depend themselves upon *βάσιν*, (or *μετάβασιν*, if my correction is correct,) the sense would require *βάσεις* (or *μεταβάσεις*) *πλειόνων*. With regard to the two kinds of motion, one of a body revolving on its centre in a fixed place, and another of a body revolving similarly, but with a change of place, Ast refers to Parmenid. p. 138, D. § 24, and Theætet. p. 181, D. § 95.

[5] Cousin translates *περικυλινδεῖσθαι*, by "rouler çà et là dans l' espace." But that would be in correct Greek *ἔνθεν καὶ ἔνθεν κυλινδεῖσθαι*.

[6]—[6] Such is the literal translation of the Greek, which I confess I cannot understand; nor could, I think, Ficinus; who has "et cum singula sibi invicem passim occurrant, si stantibus resistentibusque obvia fiunt, scinduntur—" as if he had found in his MS. *προστυγχάνοντα δὲ ἑκάστοτε ἕκαστα ἑαυτοῖς τοῖς ἑστῶσι καὶ ἀνθεστῶσι διασχίζεται μὲν*— For Plato might have alluded to a theory promulgated perhaps by some philosopher, who endeavoured to unite the conflicting tenets of Parmenides and Heracleitus, that the Earth, which was supposed to be at rest at the centre of the system, might be split by a planet coming in contact with it; just as some modern astronomers have fancied that the four asteroids, Juno, Ceres, Pallas, and Vesta, are the fragments of a large planet, that was once found between the Earth and Mars.

those that stand still ;[6] [1]but being in the middle and between things of this kind, they are mingled with each other, meeting from an opposite direction, and carried along to one point.[1] I mean that these things are, as you say. And, moreover, the things that are mingled together,[2] are increased; but when separated,[3] waste away, when the existing condition of each remains ; but when it does not remain, both are destroyed. But the generation of all things takes place, when what event occurs ? It is evident that, when the commmencement, after receiving an increase, arrives at the state of a second transition, and proceeding from this to that which is near, as far as three, [4]it possesses sense in things sentient.[4] Every thing therefore is generated by this change and transition, and it exists in reality when it remains ; but when it is changed into another condition, it becomes entirely destroyed. Have we not then detailed, O friends, the whole of motion in its species and numbers, except two ?

Clin. Of what kind are those ?

Athen. They are nearly those, my good man, for the sake of which has been the whole of our present inquiry.

Clin. Speak more clearly.

Athen. It was surely for the sake of soul.

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. Let then one motion be that, which is able to move other things, but is ever unable to move itself ;[5] and let the

[1]—[1] Here again I am quite in the dark ; and so was Ficinus, as is evident from his unintelligible version, "sin vero contra latis unum facta, tam hæc quam ipsorum intermedia conjunguntur atque condensantur ;" and so too was Taylor, whose translation is—"But when they meet with each other and are borne along in an opposite direction, then the parts situated in the middle, and those between these, becoming one, they are mingled together." Cousin says—J' entends *μεταξὺ τῶν τοιούτων* par *μεταξὺ τῶν ἐξ ἐναντίας ἁπάντων των καὶ φερομένων*, c'est a dire que deux corps qui, partis de deux points opposés, se rencontrent, forment un seul corps, dont le mouvement tient le milieu entre les deux mouvemens, qui poussaint les deux corps, dont il est composé."

[2, 3] Ficinus, aware that *συγκρινόμενα* could not be translated into Latin by a single word, has properly made use of two, "conjuncta densataque," and rendered similarly *διακρινόμενα* by "disjuncta rarefactaque."

[4]—[4] Unless *σχῇ* is to be taken in the sense of *παρέχῃ*, we must take *αἴσθησιν* in a passive sense, says Ast ; whose version is "percipi possit ab iis, qui sensibus præditi sunt—" referring to *ἀρχὴ* as the thing to be perceived. For myself I am quite content to confess my inability to perceive what Plato is aiming at in the whole of this passage.

[5] This motion belongs to nature. T.

other be that, which is ever able to move both itself[1] and other things, by a commingling and a separation, and by increase and the contrary,[2] and by generation and corruption; and let this motion be different from all the other motions.

Clin. Be it so.

Athen. Shall we not then place that motion as the ninth, which always moves another, and is moved by another; but the motion, which moves both itself and others, (and) which is adapted to all doings and sufferings, and which is truly denominated the change and motion of all things, shall we not call this almost[3] the tenth?[4]

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. But which of the ten motions shall we most correctly select as the most powerful of all, and pre-eminently effective?

Clin. It is necessary to say, that the motion, which is able to move itself,[5] is superior ten thousand-fold, and that all the rest come after this.

Athen. You speak well. Must we not then alter one or even two of our present assertions, as having been made not correctly?

Clin. Of what are you speaking?

Athen. That, which was stated respecting the tenth, was not correctly stated.

Clin. In what way?

Athen. According to reason, it is the first in generation and strength; but we hold, as second to this, that which comes

[1] This is the motion of soul. T. On these two kinds of motion Plato founds his leading argument in the Phædo for the immortality of the soul.

[2] Why Plato should thus have written *καὶ τῷ ἐναντίῳ*, instead of *μειώσεσι*, to balance the preceding *αὔξαις*, it is difficult to understand. Something similar however is found in v. 5, as I have remarked in p. 163, n. 4.

[3] This "almost" seems very strange here, as if there could be any doubt of its being the tenth or not. The word is properly omitted by Ficinus. It came from *δεκάτης—σχεδὸν* shortly afterwards.

[4] The genus of motion is here distributed into ten species: 1. revolution about a fixed centre; 2. transition from place to place; 3. condensation; 4. rarefaction; 5. increase; 6. decrease; 7. generation; 8. destruction; 9. change produced in another by another; and 10. change produced by a thing itself, both in itself and in another. This last is the tenth motion, of which he now speaks, and is the motion of soul. T.

[5] Ficinus has "et se et alia movere," as if his MS. read *τὴν αὐτὴν αὐτὴν καὶ ἕτερα κινεῖν*—similar to *τήν τε ἑαυτὴν κινοῦσαν καὶ ἕτερα* just before.

after it, (the tenth,) although it has been just now absurdly called the ninth.

Clin. How say you?

[7.] *Athen.* Thus. When one thing moves another, and something else always moves the former, will there ever be amongst such things any thing which first moves?

Clin.[1] How can that, which is moved by another, ever be the first of things that cause an alteration?

Athen.[1] It is certainly impossible. But when a thing, by moving itself, alters another thing, and this latter some other thing, and thousand things upon ten thousand become moved thus, will there be any other commencement of all the motion than the change of that, which moves itself?

Clin. You speak most beautifully; and on these points we must agree.

Athen. Let us speak[2] still further in this way, and give an answer to ourselves. If all things that are produced should somehow stand still together, as the majority of such persons[3] dare to assert (they do), which of the above-mentioned motions must necessarily exist the first?

Clin. That surely which moves itself. For things[4] will never change by a fall under another, when there has not existed previously a change by a fall in themselves.[4]

Athen. We will say then that the commencement of all motions, and which first exists in things standing still and moved, is that, which moves itself; (and) that this is necessarily the most ancient and the most powerful change of all: but that the second is that, which is altered by another thing, and moves other things.

Clin. You speak most true.

Athen. Since then we are at that point of our reasoning, let us likewise give an answer to this.

[1]—[1] I have adopted in part the arrangement of the speeches suggested by Ast, and approved by Stalbaum. Cousin however is content with the common arrangement, but without being able to assign any satisfactory reason in its favour.

[2] Ficinus, whom Taylor follows, has "nos ipsos interrogemus."

[3] By "such persons" are meant "the impious," whose arguments the Athenian is supposed to be bringing forward and refuting.

[4]—[4] I have translated as if the Greek were *οὐ μή ποτέ τιν' ἔμπροσθεν μεταπέσῃ*—not *ποτε ἐμπροσθεν*—for otherwise *μεταπέσῃ* would want its subject.

Clin. To what?

Athen. If perchance we should see this (first)[1] motion taking place in a body formed of earth, or water, or fire-like, whether separate or mixed, what circumstance should we say was inherent in a thing of this kind?

Clin. Do you ask me, whether, when a thing moves itself, we should say it is alive?

Athen. Yes.

Clin. That it is alive. How not?

Athen. But what, when we see soul inherent in any thing, must we admit [2]that it lives through any thing else than this?

Clin. Through nothing else.[2]

Athen. Hold then, by Zeus. Would you not be willing to understand three things with respect to each thing?

Clin. How say you?

Athen. One, the existence; and one, the definition[3] of the existence; and one, its name; and that there are likewise two questions respecting every thing that exists?

Clin. How two?

Athen. Sometimes each of us, when the name itself [4]is proposed, inquires the definition; and sometimes, when the definition itself[4] is proposed, we inquire on the other hand the name. Are you then willing for us to speak again of a thing of this kind at present?

Clin. Of what kind?

Athen. There is surely a twofold distinction in other things, and in numeration. Thus, for instance, in numeration, "even" is a name; but the definition is, a number divided into two equal parts.

Clin. Certainly.

[1] Ficinus has alone, what the train of thought requires, "primum motum," as if his MS. read *ταύτην τὴν ᾱ* instead of *ταύτην* merely.

[2]—[2] I have followed Ficinus, who doubtless found in his MS., *ἄλλῳ ἢ τούτῳ αὐτὸ ζῆν*, and *οὐκ ἄλλῳ*, in lieu of *ἄλλο ἢ ταὐτὸν τούτῳ ζῆν— οὐκ ἄλλο*: which Ast could not understand, as is evident from his attempt to explain and correct the common reading.

[3] The proper Greek word for definition is *ὅρος*. But *λόγος* is sometimes taken in that sense, as shown by Wyttenbach, quoted by Ast, on Phædon, p. 198.

[4]—[4] I cannot see what *αὐτὸ* and *αὐτὸν* have to do here. The sense seems to require rather, *τὸ ὄνομα προτεινόμενόν πού του*— "the name perchance of a thing being proposed—" and similarly in the next sentence, *τὸν λόγον αὖ του προτεινόμενον* instead of *αὐτὸν*—

Athen. I mean some such thing as this. Do we not speak of the same thing in each way, when, on being asked the name, we give the definition, or, being asked the definition, (we give) the name? [1] and when we call by the name of "even" a thing really the same, but by a definition divide a number as into two (equal) [1] parts?

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. But what is the definition of that thing, to which there is the name of soul? Have we any other than what has been just now mentioned, I mean, the motion which is able to move itself?

Clin. Do you mean, that the thing, which moves itself, is the definition of that existence, which we all call by the name of soul?

Athen. Yes, I do. But if this be the case, do we not still regret that it has not been shown sufficiently, that soul is the same with the first generation and motion of things which are, and have been, and will be, and, on the other hand, [2] of all the contraries to these; [2] since it has appeared to be the cause of all change and motion in all things?

Clin. No. For soul has been sufficiently shown to be the most ancient of all things, and the commencement of motion.

Athen. Will not then the motion, which exists in another through another, but which never causes a thing to be moved in itself, be the second in order? [3] and ought it not to be placed after the former motion, by whatever interval of numbers any one may choose to reckon, [3] since it is the change by a truly soulless body?

Clin. Right.

[1]—[1] I have translated the Latin of Ficinus, "quandoquidem unam eandemque rem, nomine quidem, parem, ratione vero numerum in duo æqualia divisibilem appellamus;" for he probably found in his MS., not simply *δίχα διαιρούμενον*, but *δίχα εἰς ἴσα διαιρετέον*, similar to *διαιρούμενος εἰς ἴσα δύο μέρη* just before.

[2]—[2] What Plato meant by the contraries to things that are, have been, and will be, I confess I cannot conceive.

[3]—[3] Such is Taylor's translation of the Latin of Ficinus, "et quoto quis velit numerorum intervallo, superiori motui postponendus," as if he had found in his MS. *καὶ ὁπόσῳ ἀριθμῷ βούλοιτ' ἄν τις ἀριθμεῖν αὐτὴν, πολλοστὴ τοσούτῳ*, instead of *ὁπόσων ἀριθμῶν—πολλοστὴν τοσούτων*, where I cannot discover either syntax or sense. With regard to *πολλοστὴ*, Ast says it means "one out of many, i. e. the least," referring to Phileb. p. 44, E., while "postponendus" would lead to *ἑκτέα* in lieu of *τε καὶ*—

Athen. Rightly then, and decisively, and most truly, and most completely, should we have said that soul was generated prior to body, and that body is posterior and secondary, as being according to nature ruled over by the ruling soul.

Clin. With the greatest truth indeed.

[8.] *Athen.* We surely remember, however, that we agreed on a previous occasion that, if soul should appear to be more ancient than body, the things pertaining to soul would also be more ancient than those pertaining to body?

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. Now conduct, and manners, and wishes, and reasonings, and true opinions, and attention, and memory, would have been generated prior to the length, and breadth, and depth, and strength of bodies, if soul be (prior) to body.

Clin. It is necessary.

Athen. Is it not then necessary after this to acknowledge, that soul is the cause of things good and evil, and of honourable and base, and of just and unjust, and of all contraries, if we lay it down as the cause of all things?

Clin. How not?

Athen. Is it not also necessary to assert, that soul, which administers [1][and dwells in][1] all things that are moved in every way, administers likewise the heavens?

Clin. How not?

Athen. One soul, or many? Many; (for) I will answer for you. Let us not then lay down less than two, one the beneficent, and the other able to effect things of a contrary kind.[2]

Clin. You speak very correctly.

Athen. Be it so. Soul then leads every thing in heaven, and on earth, and in the sea, by its movements; the names of which are, to will, to consider, to take care of, to consult, to form opinions true and false, to be in a state of joy, sorrow, confidence, fear, hate, love, together with all such primary movements as are allied to these, and which, receiving those of bodies that are secondary efficients, lead all things to increase

[1]—[1] The words *καὶ ἐνοικοῦσαν* are omitted by Clemens Alexandr. Strom. v. p. 593, A. = 701, Pott., correctly; for the argument turns not upon *διοικεῖν* and *ἐνοικεῖν* united, but *διοικεῖν* singly.

[2] On this doctrine of two powers, good and evil, Ast refers to Xenophon Cyrop. vi. 1, 41.

and decay, and to rarefaction and condensation, and to things consequent upon these, such as heat, cold, gravity, lightness, the hard and the soft, the white and the black, the sour and sweet, (and the bitter,)[1] and all that Soul makes use of, when, being a goddess herself, [2]she ever takes as an ally Mind, a god,[2] and disciplines all things correctly and happily; but when with Not-Mind,[3] it works out every thing the contrary. Shall we lay down that such is the case? or do we still doubt whether the case is different?

Clin. By no means.

Athen. Whether then shall we say, that the genus of soul has a power over heaven and earth, and the whole circuit,[4] (as being)[5] intellectual and full of virtue, or as[6] possessing neither of these qualities? Are you willing then for us to answer these questions thus?

Clin. How?

Athen. If, let us say, O wonderful man, the whole path of heaven, and at the same time the progressive movement of all it contains, possess a nature similar to the motion and circulation and reasonings of Mind, and proceed in a manner allied to them, it is evident that we must say that the most excellent soul takes care of the whole world, and leads it along a path of that very kind.

Clin. Right.

[1] The words between the lunes are omitted by Bekker, with the two modern MSS., which have been evidently tampered with. Ficinus found them in his better one, as shown by his version, "austerum, dulce, amarum."

[2—2] I have followed the text of Bekker, *προσλαβοῦσα ἀεὶ θεὸν θεὸς οὖσα*, and translated *προσλαβοῦσα*, "taking as an ally," remembering the expression in Æsch. Prom. 225, *προσλαβόντα μητέρα*, as explained by Barker in Classical Recreations, p. 303, who to the passages quoted from Demosthenes might have added Thucyd. i. 82, and Xenophon K. A. i. 7, 3. In considering Mind as a god, Plato had perhaps in mind the doctrine, to which Euripides alludes in Tro. 890, *Ζεὺς εἴτ' Ἀνάγκη φύσεος εἴτε Νοῦς κρατῶν*: where Musgrave refers to Cicero de N. D. i. 11, "Cur quidquam ignoraret animus, si deus esset?"

[3] To preserve the antithesis in *Νοῦς* and *Ἄνοια* I have translated "Mind," and "Not-Mind."

[4] Ficinus has "totumque orbem." But as *περίοδος* could not have that meaning by itself, one would suspect that *τοῦ παντὸς* had dropt out between *τῆς* and *περιόδου*, similar to *ἡ τοῦ παντὸς περίοδος*, in Timæus, p. 58, A.

[5, 6] I have translated as if the Greek were *ἅτε φρόνιμον ὄν*, and *ἢ ἅτε*, not *τὸ φρόνιμον*, and *ἢ τὸ*—

Athen. But if it proceeds in a mad and disordered manner, that the evil (soul leads it).

Clin. And this too is correct.

Athen. What nature then does the motion of Mind possess? To this question indeed it is difficult, friends, to answer prudently. It is therefore just that I should for the present anticipate [1] you in the answer.

Clin. You say well.

Athen. Let us then not look, as it were, opposite to the sun,[2] and, bringing upon ourselves night in mid-day, answer the question, [3] as if we could ever sufficiently see and know Mind with mortal eyes: [3] but one may see it more securely by looking to the image of the object of the question.

Clin. How say you?

Athen. From among those ten motions let us take (one) [4] as an image, to which Mind is similar, which bearing in remembrance, I will in common with you give a reply.

Clin. You would speak most beautifully.

Athen. We remember, at present,[5] so much at least of what was said formerly, that some of all things we laid down were moved, and others remained (at rest).

Clin. We do.

Cthen. But of things, which are moved, some were moved in one place, but others borne along in many.

[1] I have adopted *προλαμβάνειν*, found in one MS. of Eusebius, in preference to *προσλαμβάνειν*, which Ast says means the same as *ξυλλαμβάνειν*: an assertion so little to the taste of Winckelmann, that he proposes to read *προθύμως ξυλλαμβάνειν*, referring to *ξυλλήπτωρ—προθύμως*, in xii. p. 968, B.

[2] Ast explains this correctly by saying that persons by looking upon the sun blunt their eye-sight. But unless I am greatly mistaken, Plato did not write *ἐξ ἐναντίας*. For *εἰς ἥλιον* expresses all that *ἐξ ἐναντίας εἰς ἥλιον* could do, to say nothing of *οἷον*, which ought to precede, not follow, *ἐξ ἐναντίας*. But he might have written something to this effect, *γλαυξὶν ἀνοήταις ὅμοιοι*, i. e. "like owls without sense—" For owls, like bats, cannot see when flying against the sun.

[3—3] In the words of the original lies hid, I suspect, a poetical fragment, *οὐ νοῦν ποτε θνητοῖς Ὀμμασιν ὀψόμενοι γνωσόμενοί θ' ἱκανῶς*.

[4] I have translated as if *μίαν* had dropt out after *λάβωμεν*. Of this fact had Ficinus been aware, he would have given a closer version than the following, "Videamus, cui potissimum decem illarum agitationum similis sit intellectus, ut, tanquam imagine, hac utamur."

[5] I have translated as if the Greek were not *τοίνυν* but *τὰ νῦν*, to balance *τῶν τότε—*

Clin. They are so.

Athen. Of these motions, it is necessary for that, which is borne[1] along in one place, to be moved round a certain middle point, in imitation of [2] circles fashioned by a wheel,[2] and that it is in every respect as much as possible allied and similar to the circular movement of Mind.

Clin. How say you?

Athen. In saying that both Mind and the movement borne along in one place, are moved according to the same, and in a similar manner, and in the same, and round the same, and towards the same, according[3] to one reason, and one order, similar to the movements of a sphere[4] made round by a turner, we should not appear to be at all indifferent workmen for beautiful similes in a speech.

Clin. You speak most correctly.

Athen. The motion, then, which is not borne along in a similar manner, nor according to the same, nor in the same, nor round the same, nor towards the same, [5] neither in arrangement, nor in order, nor in one certain reason,[5] will be allied to all Not-Mind.

Clin. It will so most truly.

Athen. It will then be now no longer difficult to assert distinctly, that since it is soul, which leads all things in a circular

[1] As *φέρεσθαι* is generally employed by Plato to denote a progressive motion, *φερομένην* could scarcely be introduced here; nor was it, I conceive, in the MS. of Ficinus, whose version is "qui semper in uno fit." But since Eusebius acknowledges it, and it is repeated twice afterwards, it would be perhaps uncritical to reject it in this place.

[2]—[2] Such is Taylor's English for the Latin of Ficinus, "circuli torno confecti similis." For neither of them knew that Plato was alluding to a top, as I have shown on § 6, p. 419, n. [6]. Hence the real meaning is, "being an imitation of tops made round by a turner." For according to Hesychius, the Τόρνος was an instrument used to make things round. With respect to the text, it is strange that Bekker should not have adopted *οὖσαν* from Eusebius, in lieu of *οὐσῶν*, which is perfectly unintelligible, and properly rejected by Ast.

[3] Ast would read *καθ' ἕνα* in lieu of *καὶ ἕνα*, which is without regimen. Ficinus too has "una ratione et uno ordine."

[4] By this "sphere," was meant "a top."

[5]—[5] Others may, but I will not, believe that Plato wrote here, *ἐν κόσμῳ —ἐν τάξει—ἕν τινι λόγῳ*, after he had written in the corresponding clause of the preceding speech, *καθ' ἕνα λόγον καὶ τάξιν μίαν*, although it is true that *κόσμῳ* seems to have been introduced here to pave the way for the subsequent *κοσμοῦσαν*. In lieu however of *τινι* we must evidently read *ἑνὶ*, as I have translated.

manner, we must of necessity assert, that the best soul, or the contrary, leads round, and takes care of, and arranges the circular movement of heaven.

Clin. From what has been now stated, it is not, O guest, holy to say otherwise than that either one soul, possessing every virtue, or more souls, lead those things round.

Athen. You have listened, Clinias, to the reasons in the best manner; but listen still further to this.

Clin. To what?

[9.] *Athen.* If a soul leads round the Sun, and Moon, and the other Stars, does it not do so to each singly.

Clin. How not?

Athen. Let us then direct our arguments to one (luminary), that they may appear to suit all the stars.

Clin. Which one?

Athen. Every one sees the body of the Sun, but not one its soul; nor (the soul) even of the body of any other animal, either living or dead; [1] but there is a great hope that this genus (of things), which is naturally altogether not perceptible by all the senses of the body, would be thoroughly perceptible by the Mind alone. Let us then take something of this kind in our thoughts respecting it.[1]

Clin. What?

Athen. If soul leads the Sun, we shall perhaps not miss the mark by asserting that it does so in nearly one of these three methods.

[1]—[1] I have translated as if the Greek were—*ἀλλ' ἐλπίς ἐστι πολλή, τὸ γένος ἡμῖν τοῦτο, ὃ ἀναίσθητον τὸ παράπαν πάσαις ταῖς τοῦ σώματος αἰσθήσεσι περιπέφυκε, διανόητον ἂν εἶναι νῷ μόνῳ· καὶ δὴ καὶ διανοήματι λάβωμεν αὐτοῦ πέρι τὸ τοιόνδε*—not *ἀλλ' ἐλπὶς πολλὴ τὸ παράπαν τὸ—τοῦτο ἀναίσθητον πάσαις—περιπεφυκέναι, νοητὸν δ' εἶναι· νῷ μόνῳ δὴ καὶ διανοήματι*—where, as Ast was the first to remark, there is neither syntax nor sense. With regard to the transposition of *τὸ παράπαν*, it is required by the usual practice of Plato, who unites perpetually *πᾶς* with some of its adverbial derivatives, and so too he does *καὶ δὴ καὶ*: and while *περιπεφυκεν* ΔΙΑ might have been easily corrupted into *περιπεφυκεν* ΑΙ, where the compound *διανόητον* is better suited than the simple *νοητὸν* to the following *διανοήματι*, both the syntax and sense require rather *ἂν εἶναι* after *ἐλπὶς* than *εἶναι*. Lastly, as regards *διανόητον—νῷ μόνῳ*, Ficinus found that very reading in his MS. as shown by his version—"idque genus cum nullo corporis sensu percipiatur, sola mente comprehenditur," although less dependence than usual is to be placed here upon his translation, as he has omitted *ἐλπὶς πολλὴ—τὸ παράπαν* and *περιπεφυκέναι*— Baiter too would unite *νῷ μόνῳ* with *νοητὸν*—

Clin. What methods?

Athen. That either, residing within this apparent circular body, it entirely carries along a thing of that kind, just as the soul within us carries us around every where; or that, by supplying somehow from without a body of fire or air, as the doctrine is of some persons, it violently impels body with body; or thirdly, that being itself destitute of body, yet possessing certain other powers pre-eminently wonderful, it leads the way.

[1] *Clin.* Yes, this is necessary, that a soul, by doing some one of these things, should lead through[2] all.

Athen.[1] [3]And this too is surely better,[3] for every man to consider this very soul as a god, [4]which, keeping together the Sun, as a well-reined car, brings a dancing light to all the universe, whether derived from without, or in whatever manner, or by whatever road. Or how shall we say?

Clin. Yes, (for every man) surely, who has not arrived at the extremity of silliness.

Athen. But with respect to all the stars, and the moon, and years, and months, and all the seasons, shall we give any other

[1]—[1] I have followed the arrangement of the speeches found in Ficinus.

[2] Instead of *διάγειν* one would have expected rather *περιάγειν*, or *διακομίζειν*—

[3]—[3] I have translated as if the Greek were *καὶ τοῦτό γ' ἦν ἄμεινον τὸ ταύτην*, not *αὐτοῦ δὴ ἄμεινον*: to which Stephens was the first to object; for since *ἄμεινον* and *χρεὼν* could not both be found in the same sentence, one of them is superfluous. He did not however remark that *αὐτὸς* and its cases never begin a sentence, unless followed by *μὲν*, *δὲ*, *γὰρ*, or an encilitic.

[4]—[4] The Greek is *εἴτε ἐν ἅρμασιν ἔχουσα ἡμῖν ἥλιον ἄγει φῶς τοῖς ἅπασιν, εἴτ' ἔξωθεν εἴθ' ὅπως εἴθ' ὅπῃ, θεὸν ἡγεῖσθαι χρεὼν πάντα ἄνδρα.* But as the first *εἴτε* has nothing, to which it is opposed, it is evidently an error. So too is *ἐν ἅρμασιν*. For the Sun was not held to be in more cars than one, but to be seated in a car drawn by four horses. Moreover *ἡμῖν* is perfectly useless. And lastly, *χρεὼν* would, as remarked already, be superfluous after *ἄμεινον*. I have therefore translated as if the Greek were *ἥ γε, οἷον ἅρμα, συνέχουσα εὐήνιον ἥλιον, ἄγει φῶς χορεῦον τοῖσδὲ πᾶσιν εἴτ' ἔξωθεν εἴθ' ὅπως εἴθ ὅπῃ θεὸν ἡγεῖσθαι πάντα ἄνδρα*: where *εὐήνιον* is plainly confirmed by Plato himself in Phædr. § 57, *τὰ μὲν θεῶν ὀχήματα ἰσορρόπως εὐήνι' ὄντα ῥαδίως πορεύεται*, and his imitator Plutarch, ii. p. 445, B., *ὥσπερ εὐήνιον θρέμμα καὶ πρᾷον ὁ λόγος ἡνιοχεῖ*: and while *χορεῦον*, as applied to the heavenly bodies, is sufficiently defended by Euripides in Peirith. Fr. 2, *Νὺξ αἰολόχρως ἄκριτός τ' ἄστρων Ὄχλος ἐνδελεχῶς ἀμφιχορεύει*, and by Tibullus in ii. 1, 87, "Nox jungit equos currumque sequuntur—sidera fulva choro—" the expression *τοῖσδε πᾶσιν* may be compared with *ἐμβιβάσας ὡς εἰς ὄχημα τὴν τοῦ παντὸς φύσιν ἔδειξε*, in Timæus, p. 41, E.

account than this, that, since a soul, or souls, good in every virtue, are seen to be the causes of all these things, we will call them gods, whether they exist in bodies, as being animals, and put in order the whole of heaven, by whatever road or in whatever manner (they do so)? nor is there the person,[1] who, assenting to this, would endure (to say) that all things are not full of gods.[2]

Clin. [3] There is not, O guest, a person so insane.[3]

Athen. After assigning then limits to him, who at the former period conceived that gods do not exist, let us, Clinias and Megillus, free ourselves (from this person).

Clin. What (limits)?

Athen. Either that he is to teach us we do not speak rightly, in laying down that soul is the first generation of all things, and such other points as follow upon this; or, if he is unable to assert any thing better than we do, that he is to be persuaded by us, and live for the remainder of his life in the notion that gods do exist. Let us then see whether we have spoken sufficiently to those, who do not conceive that gods exist, or insufficiently.

Clin. Insufficiently, O guest, the least of all.

[10.] *Athen.* For these then let this be the end of our discourse. And let us thus [5] soothe him, who conceives that gods exist indeed, but take no care of human affairs. Let us then say, O thou best (of men),[6] since you think there are gods, perhaps a certain divine relationship leads you to honour what is cognate, and to think it does exist; but the [7] (good) fortune [7] of

[1] I have adopted *οὐθ' ὅστις*, as suggested by Ast, in lieu of *εἴθ' ὅστις*, to answer to *οὐκ ἔστιν—οὐδεῖς* in the answer of Clinias, and *ὁμολογῶν* with four MSS., and *ὑπομενεῖ* with Stephens.

[2] This was the theory of Thales. See Aristot. Περὶ Ψυχῆς, i. 8, Diogenes Laert. i. 27, and Stobæus Ecl. Physic. AST.

[3—3] From the words of the original may be elicited an Iambic verse—Οὔκ ἐστιν οὕτως παραφρονῶν οὐδ' εἷς, ξένε.

[4] Ficinus omits entirely *ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ*. Taylor has "at present."

[5] Ficinus has "sic," answering to *ὧδε* in Theodoretus. The word is wanting in all the MSS. of Plato.

[6] Ast, not aware that *δὴ* follows the superlative, as I have shown in Poppo's Prolegom., and that *ἄριστε δὴ* is to be taken ironically, conceives that *δὴ φῶμεν* is put by an hyperbaton for *φῶμεν δὴ*—as if *δὴ* could thus begin a clause after a vocative.

[7—7] Ficinus, whom Taylor follows, has "successus," as if his MS. read *εὐτυχίαι*, not *τύχαι*.

evil and unjust men, both in private and public life, who, although not truly happy, yet are deemed to be very much so in common opinion, and are improperly hymned by the Muses, and in all kinds of compositions to boot, leads you not very sensibly[1] to impiety. Or perhaps, on seeing that impious old men, after arriving at their end, have left behind them grandchildren in the greatest honours, you are disturbed [2] for the present[2] [3] in all these matters;[3] [4] or learning by hearsay, or perhaps being altogether an eye-witness,[4] you have met with many and dreadful impieties, that have occurred to some, who through such very acts have arrived[5] [6] from small means at despotic power and the greatest (state).[6] On account of all such events, you would then evidently be unwilling to blame the gods as the causes of such things, through your relationship with them; but at the same time being led by a want of reason, and unable to feel an ill-will towards the gods, you have arrived at your present state, so as to think that they do indeed exist, but that they despise and neglect the affairs of men. In order then that your present opinion may not[7]

[1] I have translated as if the Greek were *μάλ' οὐκ ἐμμελῶς*, not *ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐμμελῶς*— Ficinus has "temere," without *ἀλλ'*—

[2]—[2] In lieu of *τὰ νῦν*, Plato evidently wrote *τι νοῦν*— remembering the expression in Sophocles Œd. T. 473, *Δεινά με νοῦν δεινὰ ταράσσει σοφὸς οἰωνοθέτας*—for so we must read in lieu of *Δεινὰ μὲν οὖν*—which every editor of the dramatist has hitherto failed to correct; while from *ὅταν*, which Eusebius has after *ὅταν*, Stephens elicited *ὦ 'τὰν*, with the approbation of Ruhnken on Timæus, p. 281. But as Ficinus has "valde turbaris," perhaps he found in his MS. *ἄγαν* instead of *ὅταν*: and in that case I should prefer *ἄγαν τι νοῦν*— For this *ἄγαν τι* is similar to *πάνυ τι* in Phileb. p. 63, B., and in Athenæus xiii. p. 555, A., and the other passages quoted by D'Orville on Chariton V. 4, p. 477, ed. Lips.

[3]—[3] The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor.

[4]—[4] Ficinus has "audistis fortassis aut etiam ipse vidisti." For he found in his MS. *ἴσως δὲ δι' ἀκοῆς αἰσθόμενος ἢ καὶ αὐτόπτης προστυχών*, not *ἰδὼν ἢ δι' ἀκοῆς αἰσθόμενος ἢ καὶ παντάπασιν αὐτὸς αὐτόπτης προστυχὼν*, where *ἰδὼν αὐτὸς* is evidently an explanation of *αὐτόπτης*— Cousin however says that the common reading "est irréprochable et même élégante."

[5] For the sake of the syntax, it is evident that we must read *τισὶ—ἀφικομένοις*, not *ἀφικομένως*.

[6]—[6] Ficinus, followed by Taylor, has what is more elegant, "ex re parva in magnam et ex infimo gradu ad tyrannidem."

[7] Ficinus has "te trudat," as if his MS. read *ὠθῇ σε*, not *ἔλθῃ σοι*, from which I have elicited *ἔλκῃ σε*— For *ἕλκειν* and *ἐλθεῖν* are else-

draw you in the direction of impiety to greater suffering, but that[1] we may be able, as it were, to send it away,[2] while advancing (like a disease), by reasonings, let us endeavour to unite the reasoning next in order, with that, which we went through from the beginning, against the party, who held that gods did not exist at all, and to make use of it for the present. And do you, Megillus and Clinias, in succession, answer for the young man, as you did before; and if in our reasonings any thing difficult occurs, I will, as I did just now, take hold of you and cause you to pass the river.

Clin. You speak correctly. And do you act in this manner, and we will, to the best of our power, do as you say.

Megil.[3] But, perhaps, it would not be difficult to prove this at least, that the gods are no less attentive to small things than to such as are pre-eminent in greatness. For I surely [4] heard and was present[4] during what was just now said, that they are good and possess every virtue, and have a care peculiarly their own of all things.

Clin. And I too heard it very distinctly.

Athen. Let us then after this search out in common thus, by speaking of what virtue of theirs do we acknowledge that they are good. Come then, to be temperate, we say, and to possess a mind, (belongs) to virtue, but their contraries to vice.

Clin. We say so.

where interchanged, as I have shown in Poppo's Prolegom. p. 234, and to the passages there quoted I could add not a few more.

[1] I have translated as if the Greek were *ἀλλ' ἵνα*, not *ἀλλ' ἐὰν*, to which Ast was the first to object.

[2] The verb *ἀποδιοπομπεῖσθαι*, similar to "averruncare" in Latin, is applied to the driving away a calamity or disease; and hence I have introduced just afterward the words, "like a disease," as has been done just before in the phrase "impietatis morbum," and for the same reason, by Ficinus; whose translation, "remedium pro viribus, opinionem hanc refutantes adhibeamus," is thus partially adopted by Taylor, "to the utmost of our power to convince you of its fallacy."

[3] I have adopted the arrangement of the speeches suggested by Ast; while in *ἄκουε*, found in five MSS., and *ἤκουον*, in three, lies hid *ἀκήκοα* or *ἠκηκόειν*. So too again, where one MS. reads *ἐπήκοεν* for *ἐπήκουον*, there Plato *ἐπηκηκόειν*. In like manner *ἀκούεις* is quoted incorrectly by Georg. Lecapen. in lieu of *ἀκήκοας* in Meno, § 32.

[4—4] Plato has here, as elsewhere, adopted an *ὕστερον πρότερον*. Ficinus therefore, designedly perhaps, abridged the whole passage in his version, "præsertim cum paulo ante dictum fuerit, eos omni virtute refertos providentiam omnium sibi propriam vendicare."

Athen. And that fortitude (belongs) to virtue, and cowardice to vice.

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. And shall we say that some of these are base, and others honourable?

Clin. Of necessity.

Athen. And shall we say that of such things those, that are vile, if (vile) they are,[1] belong to us; but that to gods there is no share in aught that is great or small amongst things of this kind?

Clin. And this too every one would acknowledge.

Athen. What then, shall we place carelessness, and idleness, and luxuriousness, as belonging to the virtue of soul? Or how do you say?

Clin. How can we?

Athen. But belonging to the contrary?

Clin. Yes.

Athen. The contraries therefore to these belong to that which is contrary.

Clin. To that which is contrary.

Athen. What then, would a person luxurious, and careless, and idle, whom the poet[2] says is most like the bees without a sting, be [3]wholly of such a kind amongst us?[3]

Clin. [4]Having spoken most correctly.[4]

Athen. It must not then be said, that a god has a habit of

[1] On the ellipse in εἴπερ Ast refers to ii. § 10.

[2] Hesiod in Ἐργ. 300.

[3—3] The Greek is ὁ τοιοῦτος πᾶσιν ἡμῖν. But four MSS. acknowledge πᾶς, adopted by Stalbaum; who confesses however the passage to be corrupt, nor is it clear how it ought to be corrected. Ficinus has—"nonne odio nobis habetur"—as if his MS. read γίγνοιτ' ἂν στυγητὸς in lieu of γίγνοιτ' ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος— Hence, if we read πᾶς ἐν ἡμῖν likewise, we shall probably have what Plato wrote, unless we adopt Winckelmann's—ὁ τοιοῦτος πᾶσι νεμεσητὸς, got from the words in Hesiod, Τῷ γε θεοὶ νεμεσῶσι.

[4—4] To make something like sense out of these words, Ficinus, who is followed by Taylor, translated—"Rectissime profecto poeta ille cecinit." But the question is not whether Hesiod said what was correct or not, but what any one else would say. Hence I suspect the true reading to be Ὀρθότατα ταῦτά γε ὁ εἰπὼν εἴποι ἄν: i. e. "He who says so, would say so most correctly." For ταῦτα might easily have dropt out after Ὀρθότατα, and εἴποι ἄν after εἰπών. With regard to the formula, perpetual in Plato, see Ast on iii. p. 682, and myself on Criton, § 8, n. 10. And to the passages there quoted I could now add full twenty more.

such a kind that he himself hates it; nor must we overlook it, when a person attempts to say so much.

Clin. By no means. For how could it (be said)?

Athen. But of him, to whom it belongs pre-eminently to do, and to take care of, any thing, does the mind take care of great things, but neglect small? (And)[1] shall we not do wrong entirely in the case of a person by praising such an assertion? But let us view the matter in this way. Does not he, who acts so,[2] whether a god or a man, so act according to two kinds (of acting)?

Clin. What two?

Athen. We will tell (you).[3] Either because he thinks it of no consequence to the whole, when the small are neglected; or, if it is of consequence, he does through indolence and luxuriousness (knowingly) disregard them.[4] Or does negligence take place in any other way? For surely, when it is impossible to take care of all things, there will not then be a neglect of things small, or great, in the case of the party not taking care of what [5]either a god may be wanting in power or some trifling person unable to take care.[5]

Clin. How not?[6]

[11.] *Athen.* Now then let those two, who, although they both confess that there are gods, yet one (says) they are easy to be turned aside, and the other that they neglect matters of small moment, give an answer to us three. Do ye both assert, first that the gods know, and see, and hear all things, and that no-

[1] I have with Taylor inserted "and," as if *καὶ* had dropt out before *κατὰ*—

[2] i. e. neglects the small.

[3] Ficinus omits *λέγομεν*: which Stephens and all subsequent editors assign to Clinias on the authority of Eusebius. But in that case Plato would have written *λέγεις*, or *λέγοιμεν ἄν*;

[4] In *ὁ δὲ*, to which Stephens justly objects, lies hid *εἰδὼς*—or, since Ficinus has "pigritia mollitieque detentus"—*ἀλοὺς*—a word elsewhere corrupted, as I have shown on Æsch. Prom. 918.

[5]—[5] The Greek is—*δυνάμει θεὸς ἢ φαῦλός τις, ὧν ἐλλιπὴς καὶ μὴ δυνατὸς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι γίγνηται.* The version of Ficinus—"sive homo quidam sit impotens, sive deus aliquis non posse fingatur"—who either found in his MS. or else wished to read—*ἢ ἄνθρωπος τις—δυνάμει φαῦλος ἢ θεός τις μὴ δυνατὸς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι λέγηται.* I have translated as if Plato wrote *ἢ δυνάμει θεὸς ὢν ἐλλιπὴς, ἢ καὶ—φαῦλός τις μὴ δυνατὸς*—

[6] In lieu of *ἂν* the syntax requires *οὔ*. For otherwise to supply the ellipse *ἔσται* would be united to *ἂν*, which I have shown to be impossible, in Poppo's Prolegom. p. 125—132.

thing of what there is a perception or knowledge can lie hid from them? Do ye say that such is the case? Or how?

Clin. That it is such.

Athen. What then, that they are able to do all things over which there is a power to mortals and immortals?

Clin. How will they not agree that such too is the case?

Athen. We five then have agreed that the gods are good and the best.

Clin. Entirely.

Athen. Is it not, then, impossible to confess that they do at all any thing whatever through indolence and luxuriousness, since they are such as we confess they are? For with us inactivity is the offspring of cowardice, but indolence of inactivity and luxuriousness.

Clin. You speak most truly.

Athen. Now of gods not one is negligent through inactivity and indolence; for in cowardice surely they have no share.

Clin. You speak most correctly.

Athen. It remains then that, if they neglect things of little moment and size of those in the universe, they would do so either through their knowing that there is no need of taking care of things of this kind; [1] or—what remains but to think the contrary? [1]

Clin. Nothing.

Athen. Whether then, O thou [2] most excellent and best of men,[2] shall we put you down, as saying that (the gods) are ignorant, and through their ignorance neglect, when they ought to take care; or that, knowing what is proper, they do just as the weakest of mankind are said [3] to do, when they know

[1—1] The introduction of a question, where one would expect an assertion, expressive of another alternative, is at variance with the generally transparent style of the author.

[2—2] I confess myself quite incompetent to understand, much less to explain, the difference between ἄριστε and βέλτιστε. Ficinus has merely "O vir eximie."

[3] Plato had probably in mind the sentiment of Medea, in Euripides, Καὶ μανθάνω μὲν, οἷα δρᾷν μέλλω κακά· Θυμὸς δὲ κρείσσων τῶν ἐμῶν βουλευμάτων, in v. 1074, 5, where it is strange that Porson did not perceive that the dramatist wrote, τῶν καλῶν βουλευμάτων— similar to "video meliora proboque; Deteriora sequor," in Ovid, and the version by Meursius of Chalcidius, "Nec me latet nunc, quam cruenta cogitem; Sed vincit ira sanitatem pectoris—" both of which passages are quoted by himself.

there are other things better to be done [1] than what they are really doing, they do not do them through some failure, arising from pleasure or pain.

Clin. But how could there be ignorance? [2]

Athen. Do not human affairs partake of a nature endued with soul? and at the same time is not man of all animals the most pious towards the gods? [3]

Clin. It appears so.

Athen. Now we assert that all mortal animals are the property of gods, to whom belongs [4] the whole of heaven.

Clin. How not?

Athen. Let then any one say that these things are to the gods either small or great, (it matters not);[5] for on neither ground would it be fitting for our owners, who are the most careful and the best, to neglect us. For let us, in addition to these points, consider still further this.

Clin. What?

Athen. Respecting sensation and power, are they not naturally contrary to each other, with reference to easiness and difficulty?

Clin. How say you?

Athen. To see and hear small things is more difficult than large. But on the other hand, to carry, and to rule over, and to take care of, small and few things, is for every one more easy than in the case of their contraries.

Clin. Yes, more easy.

[1] I have taken *ποιεῖν* in a passive sense after *βελτίω*, remembering a similar expression, Ῥᾴων *φυλάσσειν* for *φυλάσσεσθαι*, in Med. 320. Ficinus, it would seem, not aware of this, and remembering the passage in Ovid, has given this version, "An sicut improbos homines dicimus meliora quidem videre, sed voluptate aut dolore fractos deteriora sequi, sic deos, quamvis sciant providendum esse, similiter non providere."

[2] Instead of *ἂν*, one of the best MSS. read *ἄνια*, which evidently leads to *ἂν ἄγνοια εἴη*— and so I have translated. For otherwise *ἂν* would have nothing to which it could be referred.

[3] Compare a similar sentiment in Menexen. § 7.

[4] In lieu of *ὧν περ*, Ficinus, as shown by his "quemadmodum," found in his MS. *ὥσπερ*, of which Ast here approves, and Wyttenbach likewise on Phædon, p. 62, B., § 16, *τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἓν τῶν κτημάτων τοῖς θεοῖς εἶναι.*

[5] So Ast supplies the ellipse before *γὰρ*—of which Ficinus not being aware, thus renders, "Jam ergo, seu parva hæc sive magna quis dixerit diis esse, nullo modo, cum providentissimi atque optimi sint, negligenda sibi sua possessio est—" which Taylor has for the most part adopted.

Athen. But when the whole of a thing is enjoined upon a physician, both willing and able to cure, will the whole itself[1] ever be in a good state, while he is taking care of great matters, but neglecting parts that are small?

Clin. By no means.

Athen. Nor will things many and large, apart from the few and small, [2](be in a good state)[2] in the case of pilots, or army-leaders, or housekeepers, nor, [3]on the other hand, of some[3] statesmen, or any other person of such a kind. For masons say, that great stones do not lie well without small ones.[4]

Clin. [5]For how (is it possible)?

Athen. We will not then think it right[5] for a god at least to be even more vile than mortal artificers; who, the better they are, by so much the more do they from one art bring out accurately and perfectly the works small and great, pertaining to their own trade; but that a god, who is most wise, and both willing and able to take care of things, does of things which, being small, it is easy to take care of, take no care at all, like a person inactive or timid, or listless through labour, but only of things that are large.[6]

Clin. Let us by no means, O guest, receive this notion, respecting the gods; for we should form a conception neither holy nor true.

Athen. We seem then, to myself, to have conversed in a very moderate manner with him who loves to find fault with the carelessness on the part of the gods.

[1] I have adopted *αὐτὸ*, found in Eusebius, in lieu of *αὐτῷ*—

[2—2] Ast supplies *καλῶς ἕξει* from the preceding speech.

[3—3] In lieu of *τισὶ* one MS. has *τοῖσι*— Hence in *αὖ* and *τισὶ*, neither of which is suited to the train of thought, there lies hid, I suspect, some other reading; perhaps *οὐδέ ᾱ τοῖς πολιτικοῖς*—where *ᾱ* is put for *πρώτοις*—as I have shown in Poppo's Prolegom, p. 223.

[4] Donaldson in The New Cratylus, p. 551, ed. 1, compares very aptly Soph. Aj. 158, *Καίτοι σμικροὶ μεγάλων χωρὶς Σφαλερὸν πύργου ῥῦμα πέλονται. Μετὰ γὰρ μεγάλων βαιὸς ἄριστ' ἂν, Καὶ μέγας ὀρθοῖθ' ὑπὸ μικροτέρων.* He did not however perceive that in the words of Plato there probably lies hid a proverbial hexameter—*Οὐ γὰρ ἄνευ μικρῶν μεγάλους κεῖσθ' ἐστὶ λίθους εὖ.*

[5—5] The Greek is *Πῶς γὰρ ἄν*; *Μὴ τοίνυν—ἀξιώσωμεν*— But there is nothing to which *ἂν* can be referred; and moreover *μὴ—ἀξιώσωμεν* is rather doubtful Greek. To meet the latter difficulty, we might read *ἀξιῶμεν* with Thedoretus in Therap. Serm. vi. p. 570, B., or—*Οὐ μὴ τοίνυν ἀξιώσομεν*—which last word is found in one of the best MSS.

[6] The aposiopesis is to be supplied from the next speech of Clinias.

Clin. Certainly.

Athen. By forcing him through our reasoning to confess that he does not speak correctly. He seems however to myself to be still in want of enchantments by certain words.[1]

Clin. Of what kind, my good man?

[12.] *Athen.* Let us persuade the young man by our reasonings, that by him, who takes care of the universe, with a view to the safety and excellence of the whole, every thing has been arranged, each part of which, as far as possible, suffers and acts what is suited to it; and that over each of these parts rulers have been appointed with reference to even the smallest portion of action and passion, [2]having worked out an end to the ultimate distribution;[2] of which parts, even thy portion, O miserable man, is one, and although it is very small, it is continually stretching its view to the whole. But this very thing has lain hid from you, that all generation is for the sake of the whole, in order that the existence of the universe may be happy in its life, and not for the sake of you; but that you exist for the sake of the universe. For every physician, and every skilful handicraftsman, works out all things for the sake of the whole, stretching (his view)[3] to that which is the best, taken in common; and he fashions a part for the sake of the whole, and not the whole for the sake of a part.[4] But you take it ill, through not knowing that what is best with respect to yourself, happens both to the universe and yourself, according to the power of a common generation. But since a soul, connected[5] at one time with one body and at another with

[1] Stephens compares the expression *μύθοις οὓς—ἐν ἐπῳδαῖς—λεγομένους*, in p. 877, D. § 3.

[2—2] Such is the literal translation of the Greek, which Stalbaum conceives to be corrupt; and so too does Ast; for he proposes to read *τελέως* in lieu of *τέλος*: but I confess I cannot see what is gained by the change. Ficinus has what is intelligible indeed, but not to be got from the Greek at present—"per singulas et extremas universi particulas distributione, ad ultimum usque peracta, curam habent"—as if his MS. read *καὶ μερισμὸν τοῦ ὅλου τελέως εἰς τὸ ἔσχατον ἀπειργασμένοι*, i. e. "and working out a distribution of the universe perfectly to its extreme point."

[3] I have added "his view," on account of the preceding *ξυντεῖνον βλέπον*—from which came here *ξυντεῖνον*, corrected first by Stephens into *ξυντείνων* from Eusebius.

[4] Of this passage in Plato Horace had perhaps a recollection, when he wrote his remark—"Infelix operis summæ, quia ponere totum Nescit."

[5] In lieu of *συντεταγμένη* one would prefer *συμπεπηγμένη*—

another, undergoes all kinds of changes through itself, or through some other soul, nothing else remains for the player at pebbles[1] than to place the habit, which has become better, into a better place, but the worse into a worse, according to the proper condition of each, in order that they may obtain their fitting allotment.

Clin. In what way do you mean?

Athen. I appear to myself to be speaking in that way, by which an inactivity on the part of the gods in taking care of all things would seem to have a reason. For if any one, always looking to the whole, were to mould all things by changing their forms—for instance, water [2]with a soul[2] from fire, and either[3] many things from one or one from many—participating in a first, or second, or even a third generation, the things relating to an altered arrangement would be infinite in number. But now there is a wonderful easiness to the party taking a care of the universe.

Clin. How again, say you?

Athen. Thus. After our king had seen all his actions, possessing a soul,[4] and much of virtue existing in them, and much of vice, and both soul and body being a thing [5]indestructible,

[1] The game called *πεττεία* I have supposed to be something similar to the modern backgammon. But Ficinus has here "harum rerum ordinatori, tanquam talos jacienti," from which it is easy to elicit, what the sense requires, *ἔργον, οἷον πεττεύτῃ, αὐτῇ* (i. e. *ψυχῇ*) *λείπεται*— With regard to the metaphor, in addition to the authors quoted here by Ast, may be added those, of which I have given a list on Æsch. Suppl. 14, to be still increased by as many more.

[2—2] In lieu of *ἔμψυχον* Cornarius proposed to read *ἐμψύχον*—"cold-producing—" But Ast says that in *ἔμψυχον* there is another allusion to the theory of Heracleitus; who conceived that from the change of the fiery particles of matter into the aqueous the principle of all things was evolved, as we learn from Clemens Alexandr. Strom. v. p. 712, while according to Plotinus in Ennead. iv. 8, 1, p. 468, the doctrine of all things undergoing a change was the leading tenet of the same philosopher.

[3] I have with Ast adopted *ἢ*, the conjecture of Cornarius, in lieu of *μὴ*—

[4] How actions can be said to have a soul, I confess I cannot understand.

[5—5] Here again I am at a loss to understand how that, which is indestructible, is not eternal. Taylor indeed says that body, when it is corrupted, is resolved into the elementary wholes, from which it originated, but is never destroyed. This would however be true only of the particles of which a body is composed, not of the body, taken as a mass of particles put into some form; for the form might be destroyed, while the particles remained indestructible.

but not eternal,[5] like the gods, existing according to law,[1] for there never would have been a generation of living beings, if either of these (soul or body) had been destroyed,—and that the thing which, as being[2] a good in the soul, has been thought to be always naturally disposed to be of service, but that the thing which, as being an evil in it, (has been thought) to do mischief,—all this, when (the king) beheld, he planned, where each of the parts should be situated, and cause virtue to gain the victory in the universe,[3] and vice to suffer a defeat, in the easiest[4] and best manner. He planned therefore generally[5] this, how a thing, being generated of what kind, what seat it ever ought to share in,[6] and in what place[7] reside ; but he left to the will of each of us the causes of generation of [8]this or that.[8] [9]For wherever a person has a desire, and of what kind he may be as to his soul, there nearly on each occasion, and such becomes each of us, for the most part.[9]

[1] By "law," says Taylor, Plato meant intellectual distribution ; so that the gods according to "law," are those divine natures, which proceed from the intellect of the fabricator of the universe ; while by "law," Ast understands "the law of fate." But in that case Plato would have written here, as he does shortly afterwards—*κατὰ τὴν τῆς εἱμαρμένης τάξιν καὶ νόμον*—

[2] I have adopted, what Stephens suggested, *ὡς ὂν* for *ὅσον*, which I cannot understand. Cousin says that *ὡς ὂν* means the same as *ὅσον*.

[3] In lieu of *τῷ* one MS. has *αὐτῷ* ; which seems to lead to some other reading.

[4] On the doubled superlative *μάλιστα ῥᾷστα*, see Monk on Hippol. 487.

[5] Ficinus has "ad universum," as if his MS. read *πρὸς τὸ πᾶν*, translated by Taylor, "with reference to the universe," and by Ast, "universi rationibus convenientem—" And hence we can avoid the impropriety in *τὸ ποιόν τι*—by reading *πρὸς τὸ πᾶν τοῦτο, ποιόν τι*—

[6] Ficinus has "sortiri," as if his MS. read *μεταλαγχάνειν*—

[7] I hardly understand here the difference between *ἕδραν* and *τόπους* : for where the seat is, there also will be the place. Ficinus has "sedem habitationemque—"

[8—8] So Taylor translates the Latin of Ficinus—"talis cujusdam aut talis—" as if his MS. read *τοῦ ποίου ἢ τινος*— Eusebius and Theodoretus offer *τὸ ποίου τινος*—approved of by Stephens and Ast. But the definite *τοῦ* could not be thus united to the indefinite *τινος*.

[9—9] Such is the literal version of the Greek, out of which I must leave for others to make what sense they can. I am quite in the dark. In lieu of *ὁποῖός τις ὢν* Theodoretus has, what Ast adopts, *ὁποῖος ἂν ᾖ*, similar to "qualisque animus sit" in Ficinus ; while from "ferme semper habitat" in the same version, Cornarius elicited *σχεδὸν ἑκάστοτε οἰκίζεται*. Lastly *ἅπας ἡμῶν* is omitted there, as being considered perhaps perfectly useless.

Clin. It is likely.

Athen. Every thing then, that has a share of soul, is changed, and possesses in itself the cause of the change; but, when changed, it is borne along according to the order and law of fate. And [1]of the manners such as being changed are less and less (wicked),[1] proceed along the superficies of the region;[2] but those that are more (changed) and are more unjust, fall into a depth, and into the so-called places below, which persons, designating by the name of Hades, and what are close upon these appellations, greatly fear, and dream of, when living [3]and freed from their bodies; but the soul when it partakes more of vice than of virtue through its will and intercourse becoming strong, when mixing with divine virtue, it becomes pre-eminently such, and it is changed to a pre-eminent place entirely holy, after being carried to some other better place; but when the contrary, it transfers its life to the contrary.[3]

[1]—[1] I have translated as if the Greek were *σμικρότερα μὲν τὰ τῶν ἠθῶν μεταβάλλοντα καὶ ἐλάττω κακὰ κατὰ*—not *σμικρότερα μὲν τῶν ἠθῶν μεταβάλλοντα ἐλάττω, κατὰ*—which Ast would correct by omitting *ἐλάττω*, an explanation he says of *σμικρότερα*: as if any one would ever think of explaining a word so common and intelligible as *σμικρότερα*: while to support the syntax in *ἠθῶν*, he conceives that *σμικρότερα τῶν ἠθῶν* is the same as *ἤθη, ἃ σμικρότερα αὐτῶν ἐστὶ*—an idea he would, I think, find it difficult to confirm by a parallel passage. Ficinus has "quæ minus peccarunt, minus profundæ," which is evidently a guess, and not a very successful one, at the meaning. Cornarius has "quæ quidem animæ minus pravos mores habent, minus mutantur," which is certainly more intelligible, but not to be obtained from the Greek; and if it could be, it is at variance with the train of thought, which relates to the changes made positively, and not in a greater or less degree. Hence Viger on Eusebius Præp. Ev. xiii. 18, p. 703, B., proposed to read *ἐλάττω μὲν καὶ δικαιότερα*, antithetical to *πλείω δὲ καὶ ἀδικώτερα* in the corresponding clause. But though *ἐλάττω μὲν* could scarcely follow *σμικρότερα μὲν*, yet was Viger near the mark; at least he led myself to conjecture *καὶ ἐλάττω κακὰ*, where *κακὰ* might have been easily lost before *κατὰ*—

[2] I confess I cannot understand what Plato meant by *τῆς χώρας*—nor could Ast, I suspect; for he supplies "terræ" in his translation, "per terræ planitiem—" But from the subsequent *εἰς βάθος τά τε κάτω λεγόμενα τῶν τόπων*—it is evident that some word was written here originally, as antithetical to *κάτω λεγόμενα*, as *ἐπίπεδον* is to *βάθος*. Now this would lead at once to *τῆς ἄνω χώρας*.

[3]—[3] Such is the literal version of the Greek, where I am completely in the dark; and so too was Ficinus, I suspect; for he has been content to give what he conceived to be the general sense—"anima vero, quæ majoris virtutis vel vitii compos est, quando propria voluntate et assidua

[13.] [1] This is the judgment of the gods, who hold Olympus—[1]

O thou [2]boy and youth,[2] who thinkest that thou art neglected by the gods; for that the person, who has become more wicked, departs to the more wicked souls; but he, who has become better, to the better, both in life, and in all[3] deaths, to suffer and do what is fitting for the like[4] to do to the like.

consuetudine vehementius permutata, divinæ virtuti adhæsit, talisque præcipue facta est, in locum similiter longe meliorem sanctumque transfertur; quæ vero contrario modo affecta est, in contrarium translata vitam peragit suam." But as Eusebius offers *διαλυθέντες δὲ σωμάτων*, properly opposed to *ζῶντες*— I suspect that Plato wrote to this effect, *διαλυθέντες δὲ τῶν σωμάτων μείζω δεδίασιν, ἡ ψυχὴ κακίας ἢ ἀρετῆς πλέον ὅταν μεταλάβῃ διὰ τῆς αὐτῆς βούλησιν καὶ ὁμιλίαν γενομένην ἰσχυρὰν καὶ αἰσχραν· ὅταν δ' αὖ μένῃ ἀρετῇ θείᾳ προσμίξασα, γίγνεται διαφερόντως τοιαύτη, διαφερόντως καὶ, εἰς τόπον ἅγιον ὅλον μετακομισθεῖσα, εἰς ἀμείνω μετέβαλεν· ὅταν· δὲ τἀναντία ποιῇ, κατὰ τἀναντία μεθιδρύσατο εἴς τινα τόπον ἀνίερον τὸν αὐτῆς βίον*: i. e. "But after being freed from their bodies they have a greater fear, when the soul shall have participated in more of vice than virtue, through its will and converse (in life) having become violent and base. But when on the other hand it shall remain, having an intercourse with divine virtue, it becomes such (i. e. divine) pre-eminently; and pre-eminently, after being conveyed to a place entirely holy, it is changed for the better; but when it acts in a contrary manner, it has, under contrary circumstances, placed its existence in some unholy spot." To produce however this light out of darkness, it was requisite to alter the position of some words, and to change *δε δη* into *δεδιασιν*, and *οποταν* into *πλεον οταν*, and *οποταν μεν* into *οταν μενῃ*, and *γίγνηται* into *γίγνεται*, and *διαφεροντα* into *διαφεροντως*, and *επι ταναντια* into *ποιῃ κατα ταναντια*; and *τοπον ετερον* into *τοπον ανιερον*; and lastly, on the authority of Eusebius, *μεθιδρύσασα* into *μεθιδρύσατο*, which Stephens was the first to point out and approve. With regard to *μείζω δεδίασι*, this is evidently required as a climax to the preceding *σφόδρα φοβοῦνται*—and so too both *ἰσχυρὰν* and *αἰσχρὰν* are required by *βούλησιν* and *ὁμιλίαν*: and *διαφερόντως καὶ* by the preceding *διαφερόντως*: and lastly, *τόπον ἀνίερον* to balance *τόπον ἅγιον*: by the aid of which it is easy to see that in § 13, where all the MSS. read *ἁγιώτερον—τόπον*, contrary to the sense, except that of Ficinus, which seems to have had *ἀπώτερον*, answering to his "remotiorem," as remarked by Stephens, Plato probably wrote *ἀνιερώτερον*— Neither of these corrections would however meet with the approbation of Winckelmann, if he still adheres to his proposed reading, *τόπον ἄλλον* in lieu of *τόπον ἅγιον ὅλον*—

[1]—[1] This is from Hom. Od. T. 43.

[2]—[2] *Παῖς* and *νεανίσκος* are not, I think, thus united elsewhere.

[3] This "all" seems rather strange here, as if the question were about many kinds of death.

[4] From *προσφέρουσι* in Ald. Cornarius elicited *προσφερέσι*, by the aid of "a similibus ad similes" in Ficinus. And so all the MSS. subsequently

But neither must you or any one else[1] pray, after becoming fortunate,[2] to be superior to this judgment of the gods. For this judgment, pre-eminent above all, did those, who ordained, ordain, and it is meet to regard it carefully in every way. For you will never be neglected by it, [3]not though you were so small, as to sink into the depths of the earth, nor so lofty, as to fly up to heaven;[3] but you will suffer from them the fitting punishment, whether you abide here, or depart to Hades, or are carried to a place still more wild[4] than those. And my language will be the same to you, as it was respecting those persons, whom you have seen becoming great after being small, and whom, after committing unholy acts, [5][or doing something of that kind,][5] you thought had become happy after being miserable. And then you conceived that you beheld in their doings, as in a mirror, the disregard of all things on the part of the gods, nor did you know in what way they pay up the full amount of their contribution to every one;[6] and to know that, think you, O most courageous of all men, is a thing of no consequence?[7] which he who is ignorant of, will neither see a type of life, nor be able to contribute a discourse about it on the subject of happiness or an unhappy fortune. If then Clinias here, and the whole of this old assembly,[8] are able to persuade you that you do not know what you are saying about the gods, a god himself will kindly give you his aid; but if

collated. Eusebius has however προσφυέσι. But even there some MS. probably reads προσφερέσι—

[1] Instead of οὔτε εἰ ἄλλος, Ficinus found in his MS. οὔτε τις ἄλλος, as remarked by Ast. For his version is "nec alius ullus—"

[2] I have adopted εὐτυχὴς, found in the three best MSS., in lieu of ἀτυχὴς, through the usual change of ευ and α, as I have shown on Eurip. Tro. 606. Ficinus too found εὐτυχὴς, as shown by his version, "adeo felicem." Eusebius however acknowledges ἀτυχὴς.

[3—3] On this sentiment, Ast refers to Dorville on Chariton, p. 665, and Wyttenbach in Biblioth. Crit. iii. iv. p. 37.

[4] Ficinus has "remotiorem inaccessibilemque," as if he had found in his MS. ἀπώτερον καὶ ἄβατον— But see just before in § 12.

[5—5] The words between the brackets are omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor. They are certainly superfluous.

[6] I have translated as if the Greek were παντί τῳ, not τῷ παντὶ—for the allusion to the universe would be here out of place.

[7] I have adopted πρὸς οὐδὲν, found in Eusebius, in lieu of πῶς οὐ δεῖν— Winckelmann suggests πῶς οὐ πολλοῦ δεῖν δοκεῖς;

[8] Instead of γερουσία, Plato probably wrote γερωΐα, for such was the Spartan word.

you are still in want of a further reason, hear us, if you possess any mind whatever, while we are speaking to the third party. For that there are gods, and that they take care of men, I would say has been not altogether badly shown by us. But that the gods can be turned aside by receiving gifts from those who act unjustly, must not be conceded to any one; but on the other hand, disproved by every means in our power.

Clin. You speak most beautifully; and let us do as you say.

Athen. Come, then, by the gods themselves, (say) if forsooth[1] they are turned aside in what manner are they so moved; and who and what kind of beings are they? Now it is surely necessary for those to be rulers, who regulate continually the whole of heaven.

Clin. It is so.

Athen. But to what rulers are they like? or what rulers are like to them [2]amongst such as it is in our power to meet with, while likening the less to the greater?[2] Would such be either the rein-holders, while two-yoked cars are contending (in the course), or the pilots of ships? Perhaps however they may be likened to certain leaders of armies. Or it would be possible to liken them to physicians, who have a prudent care respecting the war of diseases[3] about bodies; or to husbandmen, who, in fear for the generation of plants, wait for the usual period of bad seasons; or to the superintendents of herds. For, since we have agreed amongst ourselves that heaven is full of many good things, and that there are some of the opposite kind, but the majority is of those that are not,[4] we assert that a war of this kind is immortal, and requires a wonderful watching. The gods however, and at the same time dæmons, fight on our side; for[5] we are the property both of

[1] In lieu of *αὖ*, which has no meaning here, Plato wrote, what I have translated, *δή*, taken in its usual ironical sense.

[2—2] Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus, whom Taylor follows to the letter, has "ut possibile nobis sit minores majoribus comparare," as if he had found in his MS. *ὡς δυνατὸν ᾖ ἡμῖν ἀπεικάζειν μείζοσιν ἐλάττονας*, in lieu of *ἀπεικάζουσι τυγχάνειν*.

[3] Although the expression *νόσων πόλεμον* might perhaps stand, yet I should have preferred *νόσων πολὺν ἐσμὸν*— similar to *νούσων ἐσμὸς* in Æsch. Suppl. 677, and "morborum cohors," in Horace. Winckelmann suggests *νόσους διὰ πόνων*, referring to *πόνοιο Νούσων τε*, in Hesiod 'Εργ. 91.

[4] Ast would supply *ἀγαθῶν* after *μὴ*—

[5] The Greek is *δ' αὖ* — but as *αὖ* has no meaning, it is properly omitted in one good MS. Plato wrote *γὰρ*, not *δὲ*, as I have translated.

gods and dæmons. But injustice and insolence together with imprudence corrupt us; whereas justice and temperance, united to prudence, which dwell in the soul-endued powers of the gods, preserve us. Now that some little portion of such properties resides in us, one may clearly see even in this way. Certain souls residing on the earth, and possessing an unjust disposition,[1] it is plain, have a savage feeling towards the souls of their guardians, whether dogs, or shepherds, or in every respect the highest of all rulers. (And) [2]falling upon these, they persuade them[2] by flattering words, and some prayer-like enchantments[3]—as say the reports of the wicked—that it is lawful for them to possess a superfluity of power amongst men, and not to suffer any thing. Now this superfluity, what is now denominated a sin, we surely say is called, in the case of fleshly bodies, a disease; in that of the seasons of the year,[4] a pestilence; and in that of cities and polities, by giving again to this very word a change, injustice.

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. Such a reasoning as this it is, therefore, necessary for him to state, who asserts that the gods always pardon men [5]unjust and acting unjustly,[5] should any one offer a part of his unjust gains, just as wolves [6]give a small portion of their

[1] I have adopted λῆμα, suggested by Ast, in lieu of λῆμμα, which Dorville on Chariton, p. 87, vainly identifies with λῆμα. See Valckenaer on Ammonius, p. 87.

[2—2] The Greek is *προσπίπτουσαι πείθουσι*— But no person, who wishes to persuade another, would think of making a violent attack upon him. Nor can *προσπίπτουσαι* be rendered "falling down to" in an attitude of prayer, as applied to souls. There is then, evidently, some error in *προσπίπτουσαι*. But since *προσπίπτουσαι* suits sufficiently well with *θηριώδεις*, one would say that the error is in *πείθουσι*, were it not that *πείθουσι* suits equally well with *θωπείαις λόγων*. Hence to avoid either dilemma, perhaps Plato wrote *δῆλον ὅτι, εἰ θηριώδεις εἰσὶ—δεσπότων, ὅμως πλάθουσι προστρέπουσαι*—i. e. it is plain that, even if they are savage—they still approach them and beg of them by flattering words—that it may be lawful—

[3] Ast explains *εὐκταίαις ἐπῳδαῖς* by "carminibus preces continentibus"—But Plato wrote, no doubt, *καὶ ἱκετείαις ἔν τέ τισιν ἐπῳδαῖς*, "and by supplications and some enchantments—"

[4] Although *ἐτῶν* and *ἐνιαυτῶν* are united in Homer, they are not so in prose. Hence Ficinus, followed by Taylor, has omitted one of those words.

[5—5] Ficinus unable, no doubt, as I am, to see the difference between *ἀδίκοις* and *ἀδικοῦσιν*, has merely "injustis," adopted by Taylor.

[6—6] By this passage may perhaps be understood the *λυκοφιλία* alluded to in Epist. iii. p. 318, E.

plunder to dogs,[6] who, being softened down by gifts, allow them to seize upon the sheep. Is not this the assertion of those who say that the gods are easily turned aside?

Clin. It is this.

[14.] *Athen.* To which then of the aforesaid guardians would any man [1]by likening the gods[1] not become a laughing-stock? Is it to pilots, who turned aside

[2]By wine-libations and the scent of fat,[2]

destroy both the ships and the sailors?

Clin. By no means.

Athen. Nor yet to charioteers, who, when drawn up in order for contest, are induced by a bribe to give up the victory to the other two-yoked cars.

Clin. For in speaking such a speech you would speak of a dreadful likeness.

Athen. Nor yet to army-leaders, nor to physicians, nor to husbandmen, nor to shepherds, nor to certain dogs softened down by wolves.

Clin. Speak good words. For how could[3] (a person, by so likening them, not be a laughing-stock)?

Athen. But are not all the gods the greatest of all guardians, and over the greatest affairs?

Clin. Very much so.

Athen. Shall we then say that those, who watch over the most beautiful things, and over [4]themselves pre-eminently,[4] with a guard as respects virtue, are worse than dogs, and men of a moderate kind, who would never betray justice for the sake of bribes[5] given in an unholy manner from unjust men?

Clin. By no means—such an assertion is not to be borne; and of those, [6]who are engaged in every kind of impiety,[6] he

[1—1] The Greek is *ἀπεικάζων ὁμοίους φύλακας εἶναι θεοὺς*— But Ficinus found, no doubt, *φυλάκων* without *ὁμοίους εἶναι*—for his version is "quibus prædictorum custodum deos aliquis conferens—"

[2—2] Plato had in mind Ιλ. Λ. 500.

[3] After *ἂν* is to be supplied *ἀπεικάζων καταγέλαστος οὐ γίγνοιτο*, from a preceding speech of the Athenian.

[4—4] In lieu of *διαφέροντας αὐτοὺς*, which I cannot understand, I have translated as if the Greek were *διαφερόντως αὐτοὺς*—

[5] Instead of *δώρων*, "gifts," one would have expected rather *δωρεῶν*, "bribes," as I have translated.

[6—6] The words between the numerals here, or between those at [7—7],

who lays hold of this opinion runs the risk surely of being most justly adjudged to be [7] of all impious persons [7] the worst and most impious.

Athen. Let us say, then, that the three subjects proposed, namely, that the gods exist and have a care of (all things),[1] and that they are not to be drawn aside (by entreaties) contrary to what is just, have been demonstrated sufficiently.

Clin. How not? and we give our votes together in favour of these reasonings.

Athen. The arguments have however been somehow stated with greater vehemence through the love of contention in bad men. But, friend Clinias, this love of contention has been indulged in on this account, that wicked persons may not imagine that, by being the masters in words, they have a licence to do what they please, (according to) [2] [3] what and of what magnitude and of what kind [3] they conceive of the gods. There has then arisen a readiness on this account, to speak in rather a novel [4] manner. But if we have done even a little of moment towards persuading somehow the (three) [5] men to hate themselves and to love manners quite the reverse, the prelude to the laws relating to impiety will have been spoken by us to a good purpose.

Clin. There is a hope at least; but should (the event be) not so, this kind of discourse will bring no blame upon the lawgiver.

[15.] *Athen.* After the prelude, then, such a discourse as is the interpreter of the laws, would follow [6] correctly, pro-

are evidently an interpolation. They are omitted in the former place by Ficinus, whom Taylor does, and Ast would, follow. They ought rather to be omitted in the latter. For we find in § 15, *περὶ ἀσέβειαν ὄντων.* But in both passages Plato wrote, I suspect, *ἰόντων.* For *εἶναι περί τι* is scarcely correct Greek.

[1] Ficinus, followed by Taylor, alone has "omnium."

[2] The syntax and sense show that *καθ'* has dropt out before *ἃ*— Hence Taylor has "conformably to—"

[3—3] Ficinus has merely "et qualiacunque adversus deos," as if his MS. read *καὶ οἷα πρὸς θεοὺς*— in lieu of *ἃ δὴ καὶ ὅσα καὶ οἷα περὶ θεοὺς*— Cousin would omit *ἃ δὴ καὶ* and read *διανοεῖσθοι.*

[4] On account of *σφοδρότερον* just before, perhaps *νεωτέρως* means here "rather like a young man."

[5] I have translated as if Δ (i. e. *τρεῖς*) had dropt out before *Ἄνδρας*, for there were three parties, whose ideas Plato had shown to be incorrect.

[6] So Taylor after Ficinus, who found no doubt *ἕποιτο* in his MS., an-

claiming to all impious persons, that they must stand apart from their depraved manners, and (betake themselves) to such as are pious. But against those, who are not persuaded, let this be the law relating to impiety. If any one is impious in word or deed, let any one who happens to be present repel him by giving information to the magistrates; and let the magistrate, who first hears of it, bring, according to law, the party before the court of justice appointed for such matters. But if any magistrate, on hearing of it, does not act so, let him be accused of impiety by any one, who is willing to be the avenger on behalf of the laws. And if any one is convicted, let the court of justice fix a fine against each person[1] for each act of impiety. And let a prison in the case of all be assigned, since[2] there are three prisons in the city; one in common for the generality of crimes committed about the Market-place, for the sake of safety to the majority of persons; another by the spot, where meetings take place at night, and which has the name of the House of Correction; and another in the middle of the country, where the locality is most solitary and wild,[3] and [4] having as an appellation of punishment some ill name.[4] [5] There being respecting impiety three causes which we have

swering to his "sequitur." Stalbaum however defends *γίγνοιτο*, and refers to his small edition of the Euthyph. p. 5, C.

[1] I have adopted Winckelmann's *ἑνὶ ἑκάστῳ* in lieu of *ἐν ἑκάστῳ*.

[2] To avoid *τὸ ἀσύνδετον*, Stephens suggested, what Ast has adopted, *γε* for *δὲ*: but Plato wrote rather *ἄτε*, as I have translated.

[3] Ficinus renders *ἀγριώτατος* incorrectly by "silvestris."

[4—4] Such is the literal version of the Greek, where others may, but I will not, believe that Plato wrote *τιμωρίας ἔχων ἐπωνυμίαν φήμην τινα*. For it is evident that *ἐπωνυμίαν* is the explanation of *φήμην*: while, since every prison is a place of punishment, the name of no individual one would be *τιμωρία*, although it might be *μωρία*, as the opposite to *σωφρονιστήριον*. Hence we must read *μωρίας*—For thus the philosopher would lead us to consider wickedness to be only a kind of folly. Ficinus has "supplicii nomine notatus."

[5—5] Such is the literal version of the Greek, *περὶ ἀσέβειαν δὲ ὄντων αἰτίαις μὲν τρισὶν, αἴσπερ καὶ διήλθομεν*, where Ast, despairing doubtless of being able to make out the syntax, is content to give the sense in his version, "Quum tribus de causis (homines) in impietate versentur:" and so too is Ficinus, "tres quoque impietatis, ut supra narravimus, causæ sunt." I suspect however that Plato wrote, *περὶ ἀσέβειαν δ' ἰόντων Δ Αἰτίαις ἐν τρισὶν, αἴσπερ διήλθομεν, δύο δή*— i. e. "The three being engaged in impiety from the three causes which we have gone through, two indeed—" For here, as before in § 14, *ἰόντων* has been corrupted into *ὄντων*, and Δ (three) been lost through A in *αἰτίαις*.

gone through; and since from each of such-like causes two are produced, there will be six kinds of crimes against the gods; which, [1] as being worthy of a distinction,[1] require neither an equal nor a similar punishment. For to him, who may think that gods do not exist at all, there may be a naturally just habit (of mind); and such become the haters of the wicked; and through their bearing ill with injustice, they do not give themselves up to committing actions of that kind, and they avoid the unjust, and love the just. [2] But upon whom, in addition to their opinion that all things are destitute of the gods, there falls a want of self-control in pleasures and pains, and to whom there is present a strong memory and a quickness in learning, the notion that gods do not exist, would be one circumstance common to both; but in the mischief done to the rest of mankind, one effects less of evil, the other more;[2] for the one would in word be full of a freedom of speech on the subject of the gods, and about sacrifices and oaths, and, laughing at the others, he would perhaps render the rest like himself, should he not meet with punishment. But the other, who thinks as the former does, is called by the vulgar clever,[3] but is full of fraud and stratagem;[4] from whom many diviners are produced, and such as are excited[5] with respect to every kind of witchcraft; and sometimes, too, from them are produced tyrants, and mob-orators, and army-leaders; and those, who plot against[6] private mysteries,[7] and with the plans of men called sophists. Of these indeed there are many species. But two of them are worthy of legislation; one of which the ironic[8]

[1]—[1] The words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor.

[2]—[2] Such is the literal version of the Greek, which I confess I do not understand; nor could, I think, Ficinus; who has in the last clause, what Taylor has adopted to the letter, "in hoc autem differunt, quod, ceteris hominibus ille minus, hic plus, nocet."

[3] From *εὐτυχὴς*, found in two MSS., in lieu of *εὐφυὴς*, Winckelmann elicits *εὔστοχος*, and refers to xii. p. 950, B., *θεῖον δέ τι καὶ εὔστοχον*.

[4] Literally "ambush," in Greek *ἐνέδρας*, which is strangely applied here to the mind of a man.

[5] Winckelmann reads *καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν—κεκτημένοι*, referring to ii. p. 635, D.

[6] Such is the exact meaning of *ἐπιβεβουλευκότες*. But the sense seems to require "plot against others with their own private mysteries—"

[7] I have translated, with Cornarius, as if the Greek were *μηχαναῖς*, not *μηχαναὶ*: which Ast considers as the abstract for the concrete. Ficinus has "et qui homines captiunculis sophistarum decipiunt," which gives a better sense.

[8] I confess I cannot understand what Plato means by *εἰρωνικὸν* here.

errs in a way to deserve not one or two deaths, (but more);[1] but the other requires admonition and bonds. In like manner the notion that the gods are careless, produces two errors; and that they are easily turned aside, another two. Of these persons, so placed apart, such as have become so through folly, without a vicious frowardness and manners, let the judge [2] appointed by law,[2] put into the House of Correction, for not less than five years; and during that time, let no one of the citizens converse with them, except those, who participating in the assembly by night,[3] associate for the purpose of admonition and the safety of the soul. And when the period of their imprisonment expires, if any one amongst them appears to be modestly behaved, let him dwell together with the modest; but if not, and he is again convicted on such a suit, let him pay the penalty of death. But such as, in addition to their believing that gods do not exist, or that they are careless, or easily turned aside, become brute-like, and despising mankind, allure the souls of many while living, and pretend they can allure too the souls of the dead, and promise they can [4]persuade the gods, as bewitching them with sacrifices, and prayers, and incantations,[4] and who endeavour by these means to destroy utterly individuals and whole families and cities, for the sake of their property; amongst these whoever shall be deemed to be convicted, let the court of justice determine that he is to be imprisoned[5] according to law in the prison of the midland district; and let no free-man be ever allowed to visit him; but let the food, appointed for him by the guardians of the laws, be brought to him by servants; and, when he dies, let him be cast out, beyond the boundaries of the country, unburied; and if any free-men shall [6]together bury him,[6] let the party undergo the punishment for impiety

[1] On "many deaths," see at ix. § 10. Ficinus alone has what the sense requires—"sed pluribus."

[2—2] The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor.

[3] On the *νυκτέρινος ξύλλογος*, see at xii. § 14.

[4—4] A similar idea is expressed in Rep. ii. § 7, quoted by Ast.

[5] In lieu of *δεδέσθαι*, which could not be applied to a future event, common sense requires *δεδήσεσθαι*: on which Attic future passive see myself at Æsch. Eum. 302. Ficinus, omitting *τιμάτω τὸ δικαστήριον*, has merely "vinciatur."

[6—6] Ast, who justly finds fault with *συνθάπτῃ*, did not see that Plato wrote *τὸ σῶμα θάπτῃ*, i. e. "bury his body."

through any person who is willing to obtain by lot a trial.[1] If he leaves behind him children, sufficient[2] for the state, let the guardians of orphans take care of these likewise, as being orphans not less than the others, from the day, on which their father was convicted.

But it is meet for a common law to be established in all these cases, such as shall cause the masses to behave less improperly towards the gods, both in word and deed, and may render them moreover less devoid of intellect, through not permitting them to attend to sacred matters in a manner contrary to law. Now let this law be laid down simply for all together. Let no one practise sacred rites in a private dwelling.[3] But when it enters into the mind of any one to sacrifice, let him go to the public buildings, and there sacrifice; and let him place his offerings in the hands of the priests and priestesses, to whom the holy ritual is a care; and let him pray, both himself and whoever else may wish to join with him in prayer. And let this take place on this account. It is not easy to build temples and place statues of the gods; but to do such things correctly, is the work of some mighty intellect. But it is a custom with all women especially, and all[4] men in sickness, or in danger, or in want, and, on the contrary, when they receive an abundance of any thing, ever to consecrate that which is at hand, and to vow sacrifices, and to promise statues to the gods, and to dæmons, and to the sons of the gods; when they are awakened by frightful[5] apparitions, and in dreams bring up the recollection of many visions likewise; against all of which things they endeavour to make for each of themselves[6] remedies, by filling all the streets[7] and all the villages with altars and chapels, and fixing them in purified places, and [8]wherever a person has met with such events.[8] On account of all which

[1] On the phrase λαγχάνειν δίκην, see Ast on vi. § 9.

[2] I do not remember to have met elsewhere with ἱκανοὺς, used in a similar manner.

[3] Ast quotes a similar enactment in the laws of the Twelve Tables at Rome. "Separatim nemo habessit deos."

[4] In lieu of πάντῃ Taylor, by his "all," seems to have wished to read πᾶσι, subsequently found in a good MS.

[5] I have translated as if the Greek were διαφόβοις, not διὰ φόβους.

[6] I have adopted ἑκάστοισι, found in three MSS., in lieu of ἑκάσταισι—

[7] Instead of οἰκίας Plato wrote, I suspect, ἀγυιὰς, as I have translated. See Buttmann on Demosthen. Mid. § 15, n. 2.

[8—8] Such I conceive to be the meaning of the words καὶ ὅπῃ τις ἔτυχε

things it is meet to act according to the law now mentioned, and on account moreover of the impious; in order that they may not, after acting fraudulently by such doings, put up altars in their private dwellings; and, thinking to render the gods propitious by sacrifices and prayers in secret, increase injustice unlimitedly, and give rise to accusations on the part of the gods against them and those, who permitted them (to do so), although the latter were themselves [1]the best of all;[1] and thus the whole city meet[2] justly, after a certain manner, with mischief through the impious. The god, however, shall not blame the lawgiver. For let the law be laid down that no one is to have holy places in private houses; and the party, who is discovered as having other places and performing orgies, except such as are public, let the person, who is cognizant of it, denounce to the guardians of the laws; and let them, [3]if a man or a woman has it, not having committed any great or impious crime,[3] order the parties to carry their private sacred affairs to the public places; and not persuading,[4] let them punish with a fine, until they are carried. But, if any one shall be conspicuously committing, [5]not the impious deed of unholy boys, but of men,[5] whether by sacrificing[6] to the gods in private or in public temples, let him be condemned to death, as one who has sacrificed, not being pure; and let the guardians of the laws, [7]after deciding, whether there is (any impiety) or not,

τῶν τοιούτων: which Ast renders "ubicunque ejusmodi homines ea collocant—" Ficinus, apparently unable to understand them, has omitted them entirely, and so after him has Taylor.

[1]—[1] As five MSS. read βελτίστοις, I have altered αὐτῶν into πάντων—

[2] Ast quotes very opportunely Hesiod Ἐργ. 238, Πολλάκι καὶ ξυμπᾶσα πόλις κακοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἀπηύρα—where ἀπαύρεσθαι, like ἀπολαύειν here, is used in the sense of "unhappily enjoying—" a meaning first remarked by Jensius in Lection. Lucian. i. 4, p. 24.

[3]—[3] The words between the numerals Ficinus doubtless found transposed, as he has translated them; or else he exercised a sound discretion in so transposing them.

[4] One would have expected here πεισθέντας in lieu of πείθοντες, which Ast strangely says is put for πειθομένους.

[5]—[5] Ficinus has "non puerilem sed nefariam impietatem," who therefore did not find in his MS. ἀνδρῶν. But what he did find, it is not so easy to tell; and still less, to what circumstances Plato is here alluding.

[6] So Taylor, from "sacrificando" in Ficinus, who probably found in his MS. ἱερευσάμενος instead of ἱδρυσάμενος.

[7]—[7] This seems a rather strange enactment. For if the guardians of the laws decided that there was no act of impiety on the part of the boys, there could be no necessity for bringing the matter before a court of jus-

on the part of the children, bring it before a court of justice,[7] and thus put in their case a finish to the trial for impiety.

BOOK XI.

[1.] After these, the compacts with each other would require from us a suitable regulation. Now a thing of this kind at least is surely simple. [1]Let no one touch,[1] as far as possible, my property, nor disturb the least thing (of mine), without previously persuading me; and may I, possessing a well-disposed mind, act in the same manner with respect to the property of others. Let us then, in the first place, speak about such a treasure,[2] as a person [3]not descended from my parents,[3] has placed as a thing to be kept both for himself and those belonging to him, and which may I never pray to the gods to find, nor, on finding, to disturb; [4]nor on the other hand to communicate with those called diviners, who in some sort advise me to take up the deposit put into the ground.[4] For I should never be so much benefited by the possession of property, should I take it up, as I should increase in the virtue of the soul and in justice by not taking it to myself, [5](and)

tice. To avoid therefore this difficulty, Ast renders *εἰσαγαγόντες* by "judicium reddentes," a meaning that *εἰσάγειν* never has, nor could have.

[1]—[1] Although *μὴ ἅπτοιτο* expresses here a wish, yet the wish itself is of the nature of a command. So in English, "let a person not do a thing," is said both of a wish and command.

[2] The Greek is *τῶν τοιούτων*, which, says Ast, depend upon *πρῶτον*, and that the sense is *πρῶτον τῶν τοιούτων*, "primo inter has res." But *πρῶτον* is always used by itself adverbially. Ficinus has "thesaurum eum," which leads to *τὸν τοιοῦτον*—

[3]—[3] So Taylor, after the Latin of Ficinus, "qui meorum parentum non erat," as if his MS. had read, *μὴ τῶν ἐμῶν ὧν πατέρων*, instead of *ὃν πατέρων* in five MSS., adopted by Stalbaum. Ast retains the Aldine, *ὃν πατρῴων*, and supplies *ἀγαθῶν* with Stephens after *πατρῴων*.

[4]—[4] Such is the literal version of the Greek; where however Stephens suggested, what Ast has adopted and Stalbaum approves, *ξυμβουλεύσουσιν* for *ξυμβουλεύουσιν*. Ficinus has merely "nec hariolis depositum accipere consulentibus credam," which Taylor has thus translated, "nor be induced to partake of by those who are called diviners." I wish too that Stephens had proposed *μηδέ τι*, for *αὖ* has no meaning here.

[5]—[5] In lieu of this verbiage, where the phrase *ἄμεινον ἐν ἀμείνονι* is

by acquiring one possession instead of another, a better in a better, (and) preferring justice in the soul to wealth, to hold it as a property in preference.[5] For on many occasions it is well said—"Do not disturb what ought not to be disturbed—" and it may be said on this too, as being one of them. It is likewise meet to be persuaded by the stories[1] told relating to these matters, that things of this kind do not contribute to the procreation of children. Now he, who is careless of children, and disregards the enactment of the lawgiver, and takes up that, which neither he nor his grandfather had deposited, such a one destroys the most beautiful and simple law, which has been laid down by a man,[2] ignoble by no means, which says, "Thou shalt not take away that, which thou hast not deposited." What then he ought to suffer at the hands of the gods, who, disregarding these two lawgivers, takes up a trifling thing, which he did not deposit himself, but is sometimes a mighty treasure, the god[3] knows; [4](but let us declare what he ought to suffer from men.)[4] Let him, who first sees (the offender) give information, if such an event happens in the city, to the City-Stewards; if in the marketplace of the city,[5] to the Market-Stewards; and, if in any other part of the country, point him out to the Rural-Stewards and to their chiefs; and when the parties have been pointed out, let the city send to Delphi; and whatever the god gives as an oracle respecting the money and the person who

without syntax and sense, Ficinus has more tersely, "pro possessione igitur pecuniæ melior mihi possessio animi justitiæ erit, si virtutem divitiis proposuero."

[1] It is difficult to understand what stories Plato is here alluding to, unless it be something like what the Etymologist mentions relating to Helen, that she was after her birth thrown by Tyndareus into a marshy spot, and there taken up by Leda. So too Œdipus was exposed by the order of Laïus, and afterwards taken up by a shepherd; and a similar story is to be found in the case of the children of Melanippé, and doubtless in many other dramas likewise.

[2] This was Solon, as we learn from Diogen. Laert. i. 57.

[3] Why Plato thus introduced the article, as if some specific god were intended, it is difficult to say. From the subsequent mention of Delphi, one would suspect that he wrote ὁ Πύθιος—

[4—4] Ficinus alone has, what the train of thought requires—"quæ vero ab hominibus, declarabimus—" which Stephens however and Stalbaum conceive he added out of his own head, and not from the MS. before him.

[5] Ficinus omits τῆς πόλεως, which is not elsewhere thus united to ἀγορά.

has removed it, let the city perform, and be the minister to the oracle; and if the informer is a free-man, let him have a reputation for virtue; but, not informing, for wickedness; but if he is a slave, let him for informing be made, and justly so, free by the city, paying the value to his owner; but not revealing it, let him be punished with death. This enactment there would in due order follow this same[1] law relating to matters great and small, [2](so as) to follow.[2] If a man leaves any property of his own willingly or unwillingly, let him, who may happen to meet with it, suffer it to remain, conceiving that the dæmon, who presides over roads, watches over things of this kind, that are dedicated to the deity[3] by the law. When any one shall be [4]disobedient to the enactment, and, contrary to it,[4] take up and carry home any thing of little worth, let him, if a slave, receive many stripes from any one not less than thirty years of age, who may happen to meet him. But, if he is a free-man, let him in addition to his being considered ungentleman-like[5] and out of the pale of the law, pay as a fine to the party, who left it, ten-fold the value of what he took up. When any one accuses another of detaining his property, whether it be much or little, and the party (who detains it) acknowledges that he has it, but (denies) that it is the other's property, if there be a written statement relating to the property laid before the magistrates according to law, let the plaintiff call the detaining party before the magistrate, [6]and let the latter place the property in court;[6] and the matter being rendered clear, if the property mentioned in the written statement shall appear to belong to either of the

[1] Instead of *ταὐτὸ τοῦτο*, some MSS. read *ταὐτὸν τούτω*: which seems to lead to *τοιοῦτό τι*—"some such as this."

[2—2] It is impossible to believe that Plato would have added *ξυνακολουθεῖν* after *ἑπόμενον ἑξῆς*—and this too without any word to govern the infinitive. He might however have written *ξυνακολουθοῦν*—of which *ἑπόμενον* would be the interpretation.

[3] The deity was Diana, the Moon, or Hecaté, three names for one goddess, whose power was respectively on earth, in heaven, and in hell.

[4—4] It is evident that *ἀπειθῶν* is a gl. of *παρὰ ταῦτα*—

[5] This is perhaps the best translation of *ἀνελεύθερος*—

[6—6] The words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor, for they are wanting in Ficinus; who probably did not understand the expression *ὁ δὲ καθιστάτω*—where Ast would supply *ἑαυτόν*: but the ellipse is rather of *αὐτὸ*, the property in "dispute," just as we say in England, "money paid into court."

contending parties, let him have it and depart. But if it belongs to some of those, who are not present, whichever party shall in favour of the absent owner produce trust-worthy bail, that he will deliver it up to him, [1]let the party (so producing the bail) take the property away, according to the right of taking away in the absent party.[1] But if the property in dispute be not stated in writing before the magistrates, let it lie under the charge of the three oldest magistrates until the trial; and if the property under security be [2]a thing requiring food,[2] let the party defeated in the suit respecting it, pay the magistrates for its keep; and let the magistrates decide the question within three days.

[2.] [3]Let any one who wishes, provided he is in his senses, take his own slave and treat him as he pleases, in whatever way it is holy, and let him on behalf of a relation or friend, for their security, lead the slave (to punishment) who has revolted.[3] But if any one takes away another person, as if the latter were a slave led away, on the ground [4]of giving him freedom, let the party so leading let (the other) go; and let the person taking away, on producing three trust-worthy bail, take away on these conditions,[4] but otherwise not. And if a person takes away contrary to these conditions, let him be amenable to the laws relating to acts of violence; and on being cast, pay to the party, who has taken away,[5] double of the damage which

[1]—[1] Such, I presume, is the meaning of the Greek *κατὰ τὴν ἐκείνου ἀφαίρεσιν ἀφαιρείσθω*: which Ficinus, perhaps unable to understand literally, has thus put into Latin—"is tantumdem deponere cogatur," translated by Taylor, "let him be compelled to deposit it."

[2]—[2] Such, I conceive, is the correct translation here of *θρέμμα*, not merely "an animal—"

[3]—[3] All the words between the numerals are tacitly omitted by Taylor, although duly found in the version of Ficinus.

[4]—[4] Such is the literal version of the Greek; where I must confess myself to be quite in the dark. For as *ἀφαιρεῖσθαι* is never, that I know of, taken in an intransitive sense, I cannot perceive how *ὁ ἀφαιρούμενος* differs from *ὁ ἄγων*. Ficinus however, not aware of this difficulty, renders "qui vero ita ductus est"—adopted by Taylor, who translates moreover—*μεθιέτω μὲν ὁ ἀγὼν*, by "let him who leads him be dismissed" —either because he did not know that *μεθιέτω* was of the active voice, and *μεθιέσθω* passive; or else that the train of thought led to such a translation, at variance with the language. I could have understood the passage had the Greek been *μεθιέσθω μὲν ὁ ἀγόμενος* instead of *μεθιέτω ὁ ἄγων*—

[5] Ficinus renders *τῷ ἀφαιρεθέντι* "a quo abstulit"—thus taking the participle in a passive sense; and so Ast translates it—"detrimento af-

has been stated in the pleadings. And let a person lead (to punishment) his freed-man, if he does not attend to those, who have made him free, (at all) or not sufficiently. Now the attention is in the freed-man going thrice in the month to the hearth of the party, who had made him free, and engaging to do whatever is requisite of acts just and in his power; and as regards marriage, to do whatever seems good to his lord. And let it not be lawful for him to possess more wealth than the person who made him free; and let the overplus belong to his lord. And let a freed-man remain not longer than twenty years, but like [1] the rest of strangers [1] depart, taking his whole property with him, unless he can persuade the magistrates and the party who made him free. And if the property of a freed person, or of any other stranger, is more than that of the census, the third in magnitude, let him within[2] thirty days from that on which this occurs[3] take his property and depart; nor let there be granted to him by the magistrates a request for a further stay. And if any one disobeys them, let him be brought before a court of justice, and after being convicted, let him be punished with death, and his wealth become public property. And let the suits in these cases be [4] amongst the suits relating to parishes,[4] unless the parties are previously freed [5] from the accusations against each other[5] in the presence of neighbours or chosen judges. And if any one lays his hand upon an animal or any thing else whatever, as being his own property, let him who has possession of it bring (the claimant) to the party who sold or gave it, being trust-worthy, and having the right to do so, or who handed it over in any

fecto," i. e. cujus servum quis in libertatem asseruit"—and this too although he had shown from Demosthenes, p. 1327, 22, R., and Æschines, p. 85, 6, R., that *ἀφαιρεῖσθαι εἰς ἐλευθερίαν* meant actively—" e reliquorum servorum numero eximere et in libertatem vendicare."

[1]—[1] This is said because slaves were generally brought from foreign countries.

[2] The ellipse of *ἐντὸς* before *ἡμερῶν* is supplied in § 1.

[3] Ficinus, followed partly by Taylor, has—" factum deprehensumve sit—" where he designedly added, what he saw was requisite for the sense, " deprehensumve."

[4]—[4] Ficinus, followed by Taylor, has " tribuum judices cognoscant"—as if his MS. read *ἐν τοῖς φυλετικοῖς δικασταῖς*—

[5]—[5] In lieu of the words between the numerals, Ficinus, whom Taylor follows, has merely " litigantes" and " arbitros" as the version of *αἱρετοῖσι δικασταῖς*, from which Winckelmann was led to *ἐν διαιτηταῖς*—

manner with authority,[1] in the case of a citizen, or a settler in the city, (within) thirty days, but in the case of a transfer by a stranger, within five months, the middle of which[2] is the month in which [3]the summer sun turns to the winter.[3] And whatever articles one person exchanges with another by sale or purchase, let them thus make the exchange, by one party giving and the other receiving on the instant the value in the place appointed for each kind of articles in the market-place, and no where else; and let no one engage in the purchase or sale of an article on credit.[4] But if any one person barters with another any thing whatever for any thing whatever in any other manner or in any other place, by trusting the party, who is making the exchange, let a person act in this way towards him, as no action will lie[5] according to law, respecting articles, that have not been purchased according to what is here detailed. [6]With respect to joint contributions, let any who is willing ask a contribution as a friend amongst friends; but if any difference arises respecting the payment of the contribution,[7] let the parties act thus,[8] as there will be no action against any one on such matters.[6]

[1] Ficinus has strangely here—"et veritas, si ad civem vel urbis incolam ille retulit, intra triginta dies inveniatur—"

[2] So Ficinus, as if his MS. read *ὧν* in the place of *ἧς*, which Ast refers to *παράδοσις*— But in both readings I am equally at a loss.

[3—3] On this method of marking the summer solstice, when the sun turns from the tropic of Cancer to that of Capricorn, see at iii. § 5.

[4] This is the phrase in English, answering to *ἐπ' ἀναβολῇ*. Plato's object was that all transactions should be for ready money alone. For he knew that the credit system was the forerunner of usury; and usury, of extravagant profits; and these, of large fortunes; and these again, of luxurious habits; and these, lastly, of a corruption in morals and the destruction of the state.

[5] I have translated as if the Greek were not *οὐσῶν*, but *ἐσομένων*, repeated shortly afterwards.

[6—6] All between the brackets are evidently out of their place: unless it be said that Plato introduced the subject of friendly contributions, with the view of showing that under no circumstances, either of barter or voluntary subscriptions, was any credit to be given; or if given, any remedy by law for the creditor.

[7] The *Ἔρανοι* at Athens were like the Benefit Societies or Clubs in England, to which persons contributed by monthly, as in England by weekly, payments; and the money thus raised was, according to certain regulations, given to the contributors when in want. At Athens the contributors could be sued for arrears. But this Plato would not permit in his code of laws.

[8] i. e. as friends. But *οὕτω* conceals, I suspect, some error.

Whoever sells an article and receives for it a price of not less than fifty drachms, let him remain of necessity ten days in the city; and let the buyer know the residence of the seller, for the sake of the complaints which usually take place on such matters, and the return of the articles according to law. Now let the return or not, according to law, be in this way. If a person sells a slave labouring under a consumption, or the stone, or a strangury, or the disease called sacred,[1] or any other malady not apparent to the many, of long standing and incurable, whether of the body or mind, if the sale be to a physician or a master of gymnastics, there is to be no return; nor yet, when the seller tells beforehand the (whole) truth to any one; but if a handicraftsman sells to a person not in trade an article of such a kind, let the buyer return the article, except in the case of (a slave affected) with the sacred disease, within six months; but in the case of the disease, let it be lawful to make the return within a year; and let the matter be decided before some physicians, whom the parties may bring forward and select in common, and let the party defeated pay double the value for which the party sold it. But if a party not in trade sells to another not in trade, let the return and decision take place in the manner mentioned above; and let the party defeated pay simply the value. If any one knowingly sells to another knowingly a slave, who has killed any person, let him have no return in the case of a purchase of this kind; but to a person not knowing, let there be a return then, when any buyer becomes aware of it; and let the decision rest with the five youngest guardians of the laws; and if it is decided that the seller was cognizant of the fact, let a person purify the residence of the buyer according to the law of the sacred interpreters, and let the seller pay the purchaser triple the sum.

[3.] Let him who exchanges either money for money, or any thing whatever for things of life or not of life, give and receive every thing unadulterated, following out the law. Let us however receive[2] a prelude, as in the case of other laws, so likewise with respect to the whole of this wrong. It is meet

[1] Epilepsy, as we learn from Celsus, quoted by Ast. See too Herodot. iii. 33, where Wesseling refers to Hippocrates, p. 308.

[2] In lieu of *δεξώμεθα*, Winckelmann would read *ἀποδειξώμεθα*, "let us exhibit."

for every man to consider adulteration, and lying, and fraud, as forming one genus; to which it is usual for the multitude to apply the saying, although speaking improperly, that when such a conduct is adopted opportunely, on each occasion, it often turns out well. But as they leave the occasion, and the where, and the when, in an unregulated and undefined state, they do by this assertion much injury to themselves and to others. But it is not fitting for the legislator to leave this undefined; but he ought always to state clearly the greater and lesser limits. Let them be determined now. Let no one who is not about to be the most odious to the gods, perpetrate, either by word or deed, a falsehood, or fraud, or adulteration in any thing, when calling (to witness) the race of the gods. Now such is (in the first place) [1] he, who while swearing false oaths, thinks nothing of the gods; and secondly he, who speaks falsely before those who are better than himself. Now the better are superior to the bad, both the elder, to speak in general terms, than the younger, and parents [better] [2] than their offspring, and men than women and children, and governors than the governed; [3] all of whom it is becoming for all to reverence in every other government,[3] and especially in political offices, [4] for the sake of which [4] the present conversation has come upon us. For every one of those in the market-place, who by adulterating any thing perpetrates a falsehood and a fraud, and calling upon the gods takes an oath,[5] according to the regulations and precautions of the Market-Stewards, is a person who has no regard for men nor reverence for the gods. [6] It is indeed a beautiful institution not to defile the names of the gods, while a person is taking it

[1] Ficinus, whom Taylor follows, alone has "primum—"

[2] The word *κρείττους* is properly omitted in one good MS.

[3—3] Ficinus has "quos revereri par est, cum in omni principatu—"

[4—4] Ficinus, followed by Taylor, has "cujus gratia," as if his MS. read *οὗ γ' ἕνεκα* in lieu of *ὅθεν οὖν*, found in four MSS. Ast suggests that the words *ὅθεν ὁ νῦν παρὼν ἡμῖν λόγος ἐλήλυθε* mean, "ut, unde digressa est oratio, eo revertatur." But had Plato so meant, he would have written something to this effect, *ὥστε, ὅθεν ὁ πρὶν ὢν λόγος ἀπελήλυθεν, ἀνέλυληθεν αὖ ἡμῖν ὁ νῦν παρών—*

[5] Ficinus and all the subsequent translators, says Ast, have taken *ἐπόμνυσι* incorrectly in the sense of swearing falsely.

[6—6] Ficinus, misled, it would seem, by the phrase *ἔχοντα ὡς ἔχουσιν*, which has generally a meaning not suited to this place, or because his MS. was incorrectly written, thus renders the whole passage, "Æquum

easily, as the majority of us do on each occasion as regards the greater part of a pure and holy conduct in what relates to the gods.[6] If then a person is not persuaded [1] (by these reasonings),[1] let this be the law. Let the seller of any thing in the market-place never mention two prices of what he is selling; but after mentioning a simple one, if he does not meet with it, let him take the article back again, and justly so, nor value it for that day at a greater or less sum. Let puffing[2] and oaths be absent in the case of every thing sold. And if a person is disobedient to these enactments, let any citizen, not less than thirty years of age, who happens to be present, punish the party swearing, and strike him with impunity; and if he neglects to do so, and is himself disobedient (to the law), let him be amenable to blame for his betrayal of the laws. And let him, [3] who falls in with those who know [3] the seller of an adulterated article, and unable [4] to obey the present reasonings, if he is able himself to detect the party, expose (the fraud) before the magistrates, and if he is a slave or a settler, let him carry off[5] the adulterated article. But let the citizen, who does not expose (the fraud), be proclaimed a bad man, as one who defrauds the gods: but if he exposes it, let him offer up (the adulterated article) to the gods, who preside over the market-place.[6] And let him, who has been discovered selling any thing of this kind, in addition to his being deprived of the adulterated article, be scourged with as many lashes from a whip as there are drachms in the sum at which he valued the article, by the hands of the crier, proclaiming in the market-place the reason of his being

profecto est nomina deorum non facile inquinare, nec ea huc atque illuc devolvere; sed omnia, quæ ad deos pertinent, pure casteque servare."

[1]—[1] Ficinus alone adds "his rationibus—"

[2] This is the best rendering in English of the Greek ἔπαινος.

[3]—[3] Such is the literal version of ὁ προστυγχάνων τῶν γιγνωσκόντων. But the sense requires rather ὁ γιγνώσκων, and hence Ficinus has "qui advertit—"

[4] This "unable" seems very strange here, where one would have expected "unwilling." Correctly then has Ficinus "qui legi non obtemperaverit," as if he had found in his MS. νόμοις instead of λόγοις.

[5] Ficinus, not understanding apparently the meaning of the middle voice, has "secum asportet," translated by Taylor, "bring with him." The adulterated article was forfeited to the informer.

[6] These gods at Athens were Zeus and Hermes especially, as shown by Aristoph. Plut. 1156, quoted by Ast.

about to be whipped. And let the Market-Stewards and the guardians of the laws, after hearing from those who are skilled in each of the adulterations and evil practices of the sellers, write out [1]what the seller ought and ought not to do;[1] and let them, after writing down the laws that are to afford clear information to those engaged in business about the market-place,[2] put them upon a pillar before [3]the court belonging to the Market-Stewards.[3] But the particulars relating to the City-Stewards have been sufficiently detailed above. Should it however appear that any thing more is wanting, let them communicate with the guardians of the laws, and writing down what seems to be wanting, let them place on a pillar at the court belonging to the City-Stewards, the first and second regulations, as laid down by their authority.

[4.] To the business of adulteration [4] there follows on its heel [5] those of the huckster's trade. But about the whole of this let us first give advice [6]according to reason, (and)[6] afterwards a law respecting it. For the whole of huckstering in a city does not exist for the sake of doing an injury, at least naturally, but the reverse. For how is not every one a benefactor, who causes the existence of property of any kind soever, that is out of measure and unequably (diffused), to become so equably in measure? [7] This it is meet for us to acknowledge, and to work out the power of money; and it is necessary

[1]—[1] This clause Ficinus places after [2], whom both Ast and Stalbaum are disposed to follow, as Taylor had done already, forgetting however that *ἀναγραψάντων* would, thus standing by itself, have no meaning.

[3]—[3] In lieu of *ἀγορανόμου*, which is unintelligible, Stephens suggested, what Ast has adopted and Stalbaum approves of, *ἀγορανομίου*, obtained from "foro" in Ficinus, similar to *ἀντυνομίου* just afterwards.

[4] I have adopted Winckelmann's *κιβδηλίας*, in lieu of *κιβδήλοις*, to balance the subsequent *καπηλείας*.

[5] Such is the idiomatic English version of *κατὰ πόδα*.

[6]—[6] I have translated as if the Greek were not *καὶ λόγον*, but *κατὰ λόγον καὶ*, where *κατὰ* is due to one of the best MSS.

[7]—[7] Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus, whom Taylor follows to the letter, has, "quod nummularius, mercator, mercenarius, et hospitalis diversorii magister faciunt; hi enim ceterique hujusmodi sive honestiores sive turpiores, indigentiam supplere rebusque æqualitatem præbere;" from which however I have been led to elicit *δείξει* and *ἐκποριεῖν* out of *ἐξευπορεῖν*, which cannot stand here, as *εὐπορεῖν* and its compounds are intransitive, whereas the syntax requires a transitive verb.

to say that the merchant is ordained for this; and the person who is hired, and the tavern-keeper, and other trades, that are some, more genteel, and some, less, have all this power, to show assistance to all in need, and to cause an equality in property.[7] But let us see why this seems to be neither honourable nor becoming, and why it happens to lead to calumny, in order that, although we may not cure the whole by a law, yet we may at least a part.

[1] *Clin.* This, as it seems, is no trifling matter, and requires no little virtue.

Athen. How say you, friend Clinias?[1] [2]A race of men small and naturally few,[2] and brought up with a superior education, are, when they fall into want and a desire for certain things, able to bear up with moderation; and when they have it in their power to acquire great wealth, behave soberly, and prefer that, which borders on moderation, to excess. But the mass of mankind conduct themselves in a manner perfectly the reverse of this; for they desire without measure; and when they have it in their power to obtain a moderate gain, they prefer to have a gain that never satisfies. Hence all the races of men engaged in trades [3]retail and wholesale,[3] and as tavern-keepers, have been calumniated and subject to disgraceful reproaches. For should any one—which never may it happen, nor ever will—compel—[4] what it is ridiculous indeed to say, yet said it shall be[4]—the best of men in every way to keep a tavern for a certain time, or to be a huckster, or to do any thing of this kind, or even [5]women (the most holy)[5] through some necessity of fate, to take part in an employment

[1—1] Ast, with whom Stalbaum and the Zurich editors agree, has adopted the arrangement of the speeches suggested by Grou; who continues the words, Πρᾶγμ' ἔσθ'—*ἀρετῆς* to the Athenian, and assigns Πῶς λέγεις to Clinias, and Ὦ *φίλε*— to the Athenian.

[2—2] Ficinus, unable probably to see the difference here between *σμικρὸν* and *ὀλίγον*, has merely "Pauci admodum homines." Unless I am greatly mistaken, Plato wrote *φύσει οὐ λιχνὸν*— On the meaning and loss of *λιχνὸν* see Porson on Hippol. 917.

[3—3] On the difference between *καπηλὸς*, "a retail dealer," and *ἔμπορος*, "a wholesale merchant," see at Sophist, § 19, n. 23.

[4—4] In the words of the original lies hid an Iambic verse, *Εἰπεῖν γελοῖον, ἀλλ' ὅμως εἰρήσεται*—

[5—5] Ficinus alone has "mulieres sanctissimas," as if he had found in his MS. something to balance the preceding *τοὺς πανταχῆ ἀρίστους ἄνδρας*—

of such a kind, we should know that each of these is [1] honest and laudable,[1] and that [2] if they occurred uncorrupted according to reason,[2] all such acts would be honoured, as belonging to the character of a mother and a nurse. But now, since some one has for the sake of a retail trade established dwellings in solitary places, and, having in every direction a length of road, receives in much-desired resting-places those unable to proceed, or affords a warm and quiet spot to those driven[3] by the violence of severe weather, and a cool one in hot; and afterwards having them received as friends, does not give them[4] symbols of friendship [5] subsequent to their reception,[5] but, [6] as if they were enemies taken in war and in their power, lets them go for a ransom very great, and unjust, and not to be cleansed[6] —these actions and such as these, having been disgracefully [7] committed by all persons of this kind, have correctly[7] furnished a ground of calumny against the assistance given to distress. Against these the lawgiver ought therefore to prepare[8] a remedy. For the saying[9] of old is correct, that against two opposite things it is hard to fight, as in the case of diseases

[1—1] So Taylor translates the Latin of Ficinus, "honesta et approbanda." But such is not the meaning of *φίλον καὶ ἀγαπητὸν*, "dear and to be loved," words which I can scarcely understand here, even if they are applied to a person, and not, as the train of thought seems to require, to a thing.

[2—2] Here again I am at a loss, and so was Ficinus; who translates, "nisi corrupte fierent," omitting entirely *κατὰ λόγον*, while Taylor has "according to uncorrupt reason."

[3] I have translated as if the Greek were *φιλικὰ—ξύμβολα*, not *φιλικὰ ξένια*—

[4] I have adopted with Ast *ἐλαυνομένοις*, as suggested by Stephens, in lieu of *ἐλαυνομένους*—

[5—5] The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor; who through the whole of this passage has looked only to the Latin version.

[6—6] Such is the literal translation of the Greek. Ficinus has "sed ut inimicos atque captivos crudeliter se redimere cogunt rebusque omnibus spoliant." For he did not understand, nor can I, the meaning here of *μακροτάτων* and *ἀκαθάρτων λύτρων*.

[7—7] In lieu of *ὀρθῶς*, Ficinus found in his MS. *αἰσχρῶς*, as shown by his version, "turpiter." Plato wrote, I suspect, both words; and so I have translated.

[8] Literally, "to cut." On this expression, see Blomf. on Agam. 16.

[9] To this saying there is an allusion in Phædon, § 38, *πρὸς δύο οὐδ' Ἡρακλῆς λέγεται οἷός τε εἶναι*, where by the two were meant the Hydra and Crab, as shown by Euthydem. § 60.

and many other things. But at present the contest is against these two things, poverty and wealth; the latter of which corrupts the soul of man through luxury, while the former turns itself through pain to shamelessness of every kind.[1] What protection, then, will there be against this disease in a state endued with intellect? In the first place, let it make use, to the utmost of its power, of the fewest in number of the race of hucksters; next, we enjoin [2]such trades upon some[2] of those persons, from whose corruption there would be not a great mischief to the state; and thirdly, to discover a plan in the case of those, who take a part in these occupations, how their morals may not happen to become freely partakers in impudence and in feelings unfitted for free-men. Let then, after what has now been stated, a law of this kind take place, with a good fortune relating to these matters. Of the Magnesians, whom a god is again raising up and settling into a colony, let no one amongst such as have a share in the land, and possess hearths amounting [3]to five thousand and forty,[3] either willingly or unwillingly become a retail or wholesale dealer, nor hold any situation whatever under individuals, who are not upon an equality with himself, except under a father or mother, and those [4]who are still higher up in birth than these,[4] and all who are older than himself, and (live)[5] like free-men in a free manner. It is not however easy to legislate for what is gentleman-like or ungentlemanly. Let however a distinction be made by those, who have obtained the prize of excellence, by their hatred and reception of these doings (respectively). Let then any one, who is willing, indict, on the charge of disgracing his family, the person, who takes a part in any trickery

[1] As *αὐτὴν* cannot thus follow *ἀναισχυντίαν*, I have translated as if the Greek were *παντοίην*.

[2]—[2] I have translated as if the Greek were *ταῦτά τισιν*, not *τούτοις*, which is without regimen. Ficinus has "his hominibus cauponandi artes."

[3]—[3] Taylor has, by an error perhaps of the press, "forty-five thousand."

[4]—[4] I have translated as if the Greek were *ἔτι τούτων εἰς τὸ ἄνω γένος ἰοῦσι*, not *γένεσι*; or since one MS. has *γένεσιν, γένος ἰοῦσιν*. For in this formula the singular *γένος* is either adopted or omitted entirely, as in ix. p. 878, A., *πατρὶ καὶ τοῖς ἄνω τοῦ γένους*. Menex. §. 5, *τῶν ἄνωθεν ἔτι προγόνων*, and the other passages quoted by myself on Philoct. 180. Ast too would read here *εἰς τὸ ἄνω γένους*—

[5] Ficinus alone has "qui libere vivunt," as if his MS. read *ζῶσι* after *ἐλευθέρως*.

of an ungentlemanly huckstering; and if he shall appear to have defiled his paternal hearth by any unworthy employment, let him, after being in bonds for a year, abstain from such employment; and if he does so again, for two years; and on each conviction let him not cease doubling the previous period. A second law ordains, moreover, that a person must be a settler or a stranger, who is to follow a retail trade. And a third one (ordains this) the third,[1] in order that the best character, or one the least improper, may be a fellow-dweller in the city, that it is requisite[2] for the guardians of the law to consider that they are the guardians not only of those, whom it is easy to guard against, when (acting) contrary to the law, and becoming wicked—such, I mean, as are well born and have been well brought up—but that they ought to guard still more against persons, who are not of such a kind, and who follow pursuits, that possess a powerful incentive[3] to their becoming bad. [4]Such then are the circumstances[4] relating to retail trade, which is extensive, and embraces many occupations. Respecting then such of these, as may be left, through their being thought to be, from a great necessity, requisite in a state, it behoves the guardians of the laws to come again together with those skilled in retail trades, as we before enjoined in the case of adulteration, an occupation allied to this; and, after coming together, to see what receipts and outlay produce a moderate profit to the retail dealer; [5]and after writing down the outlay and receipts, to lay down the result,[5] and, to watch over it, in some matters the Market-Stewards, in others the City-Stewards, and in others the Rural-Stewards. And thus will retail trading be of service in some points on nearly every occasion,[6] and be of the least disservice to those, who make use of it in states.

[1] Ficinus incorrectly omits *τὸ δὲ τρίτον*, but correctly adds "cavendum monet," requisite to complete the sense.

[2] I have translated as if the Greek were *χρῆναι νοῆσαι*, as required by the syntax, not *χρὴ*—

[3] I have omitted *προτρέπειν*, which Ast vainly, I conceive, attempts to defend.

[4—4] In *ταύτῃ δή*, which has puzzled Ast not a little, evidently lies hid—*ταῦτ' ἦν δη*—similar to "cum vero cauponatio—sit," in Ficinus.

[5—5] All between the numerals is thus translated by Ficinus, "et tam impendium quam emolumentum conscribant," and by Taylor, "and establish its expenses and emolument."

[6] I have translated as if the Greek were *ἑκάστοτε*, not *ἑκάστους*—

[5.] [1]Whatever compact a person acknowledges to have made, if he does not act according to the acknowledgment, except in cases where laws or a decree prevent him, or where he has made the acknowledgment through being compelled by some unjust necessity, or if he is prevented unwillingly by an unexpected accident, let an action lie against him [2]in the legal suits relating to the tribes,[2] for an acknowledgment not completed in other respects, unless the parties are able to come to a reconciliation previously, in the presence of arbitrators or neighbours.[1] The race of artificers is sacred to Hephæstus and Athéné, [3]who jointly fit up our life by their arts ;[3] while, on the other hand, they, who preserve the works of artificers by other arts of a defensive kind, are (sacred) to Ares and Athéné. And justly too is this race sacred to those gods ; for all these are through life attending to the country and people ; some by presiding over the contests of war ; others by bringing to an effect the production by hire of instruments and works ; to whom it would not be a becoming act to tell a falsehood about these matters, while reverencing the gods, their progenitors.[4] If then any operative shall, through improper conduct, not complete his work by the stated time, and, paying no reverence to the god, who is the giver of life, conceive, seeing nothing with his mind's eye, that a god, as being of his own kindred, will pardon him, such a one will, in the first place, suffer punishment from the god himself ; and secondly, [5]let a law be laid down conformably to this ;[5] and let him be bound to pay the value of the work, of which he has defrauded by a falsehood the party, who gave it out ; and let him complete it again from the commencement within the stated time gratuitously. And as the law has advised the seller not to make an attempt (on the purchaser) by

[1]—[1] All between the numerals is omitted by Taylor, although duly found in the version of Ficinus.

[2]—[2] Here, as above in § 4, Ficinus translates *ἐν ταῖς φυλετικαῖς δίκαις* by "tribuum judices cognoscant," as if his MS. read *ἐν τοῖς φυλετικοῖς δικασταῖς*. And so he does in § 5, where the Greek is *ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φυλὰς δικαστηρίοις*—

[3]—[3] A similar expression in Menexen. § 7, where however the names of the deities are not given. Compare too Protagor. § 33, and the Statesman, p. 274, C., and Pseudo-Plato in Critias, p. 109, C.

[4] Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus has "auctores—" translated by Taylor, "the authors of these arts—" And so too Ast.

[5]—[5] The words between the numerals seem strangely introduced. Ficinus has "hoc lege reus factus," what is far preferable.

valuing (an article)[1] at more than its worth, but in all simplicity at its worth—for the operative knows the value—so does it advise in the case of a person undertaking a job, and gives the same order. In cities, therefore, of free-men, it is not meet for the operative himself to make an attempt upon unskilled individuals by his own skill in an art, which is a thing naturally clear and devoid of falsehood ; but (it is meet) for an action to lie on this ground in behalf of the person injured against the party doing the wrong. If then any one, after giving out work to an operative, does not pay him his wages, according to the agreement legally drawn up, but by dishonouring Zeus, the guardian of the city, and Athéné, [2](both) sharing in the polity,[2] and, by being in love with a little gain, shall loosen[3] great societies, let there be a law to assist, conjointly with the gods, the binding together of the state. For let him, who, after he [4]has bargained for work and got hold of it,[4] does not pay the wages at the time agreed upon, be sued for double the amount. [5]And if a year has elapsed, while all the other monies are without interest, which a person confers as a loan, let him put down the interest at the rate[6] of an obolus,[5] for a drachm monthly, and let the cause be tried in the courts of justice[7] belonging to the tribes. As, however, (we have made mention)[8] incidentally of those, who in war are the workers of safety, and of army-leaders, and such as are artists in

[1] I have translated as if τι had dropt out before τιμᾶν.

[2—2] As I do not believe that Zeus and Athéné, both of whom are called elsewhere πολιοῦχοι, are ever spoken of as κοινωνοὶ πολιτείας, I suspect there is some error here, arising from the improper position of some words, and the faulty writing of others. To avoid the difficulty Ficinus has "Minervamque hujus rei participem—"

[3] Ficinus alone has "pro virili parte dissolverit.

[4—4] Such seems to be the meaning of προαμειψάμενος ἔργον. I suspect however that Plato wrote something like προειπὼν ἔργον καὶ ἀψάμενος — But as the very same phrase is repeated shortly afterwards, it is perhaps to be considered as a technical one, applicable to various trades. Cousin's note is—"Celui, qui apres avoir commandé un ouvrage à un artisan, προαμειψάμενος ἔργον, ne le paie pas le prix convenu, paiera le double."

[5—5] All the words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor, although duly found in Ficinus.

[6] As the obolus was the sixth part of a drachm, the rate was above 16½ per cent. monthly.

[7] From this passage it is evident that, although the expression in § 4 and 5 is ταῖς φυλετικαῖς δίκαις, Plato wrote in all the three places τοῖς φυλετικοῖς δικαστηρίοις.

[8] Ficinus alone has, what the sense requires, "mentionem fecimus"—

these matters, [1]it is (only) just to say that we have been reminded of operatives altogether, as in the case of these being again, like those, as it were other operatives.[1] If then any one even of these undertakes a public work, either voluntarily or from a command,[2] and executes it beautifully, (and)[3] the law justly pays him in honours, which are the wages of men skilled in war, [4]such a law one will never be tired of praising;[4] [5]but he will blame it, if it does not pay, after it has bargained for and got hold of any work of those [works][6] that are beautiful in war.[5] Let then this law mingled with praise be laid down by us respecting these matters, in the form of advice, and not of compulsion, to the mass of the citizens, namely, to pay secondary honours to brave men, who are the saviours of the whole state, whether by their valour, or by stratagems in war; for let the greatest guerdon be given to those the first, who have been able[7] to honour pre-eminently the writings of good legislators.

[6.] The greatest of compacts, that men have with each other, except such as relate to orphans, and the guardians of orphans, have been laid down by us in due order, in nearly (the best manner).[8] It is necessary however, after what has

[1]—[1] Such is the literal version of the Greek; which Ficinus, unable, like myself, to understand, has given a translation of it, adopted to the letter by Taylor, "non alienum est ut de his quoque dicamus."

[2] Ficinus has "jussus," which leads to *προσταχθεὶς*: but if *προσταχθὲν* be retained, we must read *ἑκούσιον* instead of *ἑκὼν*.

[3] I have adopted *καὶ*, suggested by Stephens, and inserted by Ast.

[4]—[4] I have translated as if the Greek were *τοῦτον ἐπαινῶν οὔποτε καμεῖ τις*, not *αὐτὸν—καμεῖται*, for the sense partly, and partly the syntax. For there is no such form in Greek as *καμοῦμαι*, as I have remarked on Æschyl. Suppl. 851, *Οὗτοι καμοῦμαι σοὶ λέγουσα τἀγαθά*: where I edited *Οὔτοι κάμοιμ' ἂν*— We meet indeed with *περὶ δ' ἔγχεϊ χεῖρα καμεῖται* in Il. B. 389. But there it is easy to read *χεὶρ καμέει τευ*: where *τευ* is plainly confirmed by the preceding *Ἰδρώσει μέν τευ τελαμὼν*, and the following *Ἰδρώσει δέ τευ ἵππος*: while here, as regards the sense, it will be sufficient to refer to Prom. 340, *Τὰ μὲν σ' ἐπαινῶν οὐδαμῇ λήξω ποτε*, and Theognid. 1327, *οὐποτέ σ' αἰνῶν Παύσομαι*.

[5]—[5] Ficinus has been content to give the general sense, "sin autem ei, qui rem bellicam bene gesserit, nihil redditur, juste conqueretur."

[6] The word *ἔργων* could not be thus repeated after *ἔργον*.

[7] This introduction of "able" seems very strange here. It was probably omitted by Ficinus designedly. One MS. has *διανθεῖσι*. The sense seems to require—"who have caused the writings of good legislators to bloom pre-eminently in eternal honour:" in Greek, *τιμῇ διαφερόντως ἀϊδίῳ ἀνθεῖν θεῖσι*. With the expression *τιμὴ ἀΐδιος* compare *ἀΐδιον δόξαν* in Thucyd. iv. 87.

[8] I have translated as if *κάλλιστα* had dropt out between *διατέτακται* and *ταῦτα*, for *σχεδὸν* could scarcely stand here by itself.

been now detailed, to arrange these matters at least in some manner. Now of all these is the desire [1]of those about to die[1] respecting their will, and the circumstances of those who have made no will. I have said it is necessary, Clinias, from looking at the harsh and difficult temper of such persons; nor is it possible to leave the point unarranged. For each party would, [2]previous to his being about to make his will,[2] introduce many clauses at variance with each other, and contrary to the laws, and the manners of the living, and their progenitors, if one gave a power for a will to be effective, simply in the manner, that a person may have made it in whatever state he might be towards the end of life. For most of us, when we think we are about to die, are in a certain manner silly in mind, and broken down in spirit.[3]

Clin. How say you this, O guest?

Athen. A man, Clinias, when about to die, is morose, and full of language very terrible to legislators, and difficult (to treat with).

Clin. In what way?

Athen. Seeking to be the master of all things, he is wont to speak with anger.

Clin. What?

Athen. It is a shocking thing, O ye gods, says he, if I am not permitted to give my property to whomsoever I please, [4]and not[4] to one person more, and to another less, amongst such as have evidently behaved ill or well towards me, after they have been tested sufficiently, (some)[5] during my disorders, and others during my old age, and in other circumstances of various kinds.

Clin. Does he[6] then, O guest, not appear to you to speak correctly?

[1]—[1] Ficinus has "qui mortui sunt," as if his MS. read *τῶν τελευτηκότων*, not *τῶν τελευτᾶν μελλόντων*.

[2]—[2] Ficinus, followed by Taylor, omits all between the numerals.

[3] Ast renders *διατεθρυμμένως* "animo fractos," and refers to Xenophon's Agesilaus ii. 14, *ἀσπίδας διατεθρυμμένας*. He should have read here *διατεθρανσμένως*, and there *διατεθρανσμένας*.

[4]—[4] Ficinus, followed by Taylor, omits *καὶ μὴ*. But Stephens says that the ellipse is to be thus supplied, *καὶ μὴ δοῦναι, ᾧ δοῦναι μὴ ἐθέλω*.

[5] Here *οἱ μὲν* is to be supplied from the subsequent *οἱ δὲ*—

[6] Taylor has, what the train of thought requires, the singular here, not the plural, as if he wished to read, *δοκεῖ σοί γε*, instead of *δοκοῦσι σοὶ*—

Athen. The lawgivers of old appear to me, Clinias, to have been cowards, and to have legislated, while they were looking to [1] and thinking upon [1] a trifling portion [2] of human affairs.

Clin. How say you?

Athen. Terrified at this language (of the dying man),[3] they laid down this [4] law, that it should be lawful for any one [5] to dispose of his property without exception entirely as he pleased. But I and you will answer those in your state about to die, in a more careful manner.

Clin. How?

Athen. O friends, we will say, [6] who exist really but for a day,[6] it is a difficult thing for you to know your own affairs, and yourselves to boot, as the writing of the Pythian (priestess) [7] says at present. I, therefore, as being a legislator, lay down that neither yourselves are your own property, nor this substance of yours, but that they belong to the whole of your family, both past and to come; and further still, that both the whole of your family and substance belong to the state; and this being the case, should any one by flattery insinuate himself[8] into your favour, either during a disorder or when you are tost about by old age, and persuade you to dispose of your property by will in not the best manner, I shall not willingly agree to it; but looking to all that is the best both for the whole state,

[1]—[1] Ficinus, whom Taylor follows, omits *καὶ διανοούμενοι*—

[2] Ficinus has "ad minimum quid," as if his MS. read *σμικρότατόν τι*, not *σμικρὸν* merely.

[3] Ficinus adds "morituri hominis," and so after him Taylor, "of the dying man."

[4] The Greek in all the MSS. but two is *τόνδε*, in lieu of which Bekker, whom Stalbaum follows, has edited *τὸν*— contrary, I conceive, to the genius of the language. They should have read *τοῦτον*— With regard to the law itself, Ast refers to Plutarch, in Solon, p. 90, A., but there, as remarked by Cousin, Solon permitted a father to dispose of his property, only when he had not a son.

[5] Ficinus has "licet cuique," as if his MS. read *ἐξεῖναί τῳ τὰ*—

[6]—[6] Ficinus, not aware that Plato had in mind the expressions in Pindar, Æschylus, and Aristophanes, where man is described as "the being of a day," has "brevi procul dubio morituri," and so Taylor after him.

[7] Of the celebrated saying, "Know thyself," to which Plato has alluded in not less than five places, the earliest notice is in Æsch. Prom. 317, *Γίγνωσκε σαυτόν*; and the passage the least noticed is in Ovid, A. A. ii. 499, "Est ibi (at Delphi) diversum fama celebrata per orbem Littera, cognosci quæ sibi quemque jubet."

[8] Ast quotes opportunely, Rep. iv. § 5, *χαρίζηται ὑποτρέχων*.

and your family, I will lay down laws [1] by justly putting to a less account that which belongs to each individual.[1] May you, therefore, be mild and well-disposed towards us, and proceed in the path, [2] in which you are now, according to man's nature, journeying ;[2] while of the rest of your concerns it will be for us to be the guardians, by taking, to the utmost of our power, a care (of every thing),[3] and not of merely some, but not of others. Let this then, Clinias, be [4] the consolation for the dead, and for the living this the prelude (of the law) ;[4] but this the law itself.

[7.] Let him, who makes a will, disposing of his property, if he is a father of children, appoint first whichever of his sons he thinks proper to be his heir, but of his other children whichever he gives to another person to adopt, let this too be written down. And if any of his sons survive him, after having been adopted, but not with any heir-property, and of whom there is an expectation that he will be sent to a colony according to law, let the father be permitted to give him from his other property what he pleases, except the paternal allotment, and all the chattels belonging to it. And if there are more children, let their father distribute in shares the remainder of the allotment in whatever manner he pleases. But whichever of the sons possesses a house, let him not leave to such a one any money. To a daughter, in like manner, to whom a man has been affianced, [5] [that he may be about to be her husband,] [5] let him not give a share ; but to her, who is not betrothed, let him give a share. And if any allotment in the country shall be found to be in the hands of any of the sons or daughters, after the will has been made, let it be left [6] for the heir of the party

[1—1] Ficinus, whom Taylor follows to the letter, has more fully, "ut singulorum commoda minoris quam cunctorum, ut par est, æstimem."

[2—2] Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus has "quo naturæ humanæ vos necessitas vocat," thus rendered by Taylor, "as human nature requires you should."

[3] I have with Taylor adopted "omnium" in Ficinus, similar to the expression of Phocylides, *Λέριοι κακοὶ, οὐχ ὁ μὲν, ὃς δ' οὔ, Πάντες δ'—*

[4—4] To avoid the figure of speech called Chiasmus in the original, I have placed the words in their natural order ; while Ficinus has altered the construction by his version, "hæc procœmio solamina."

[5—5] The words between the numerals are evidently an explanation, and are omitted by Ficinus, who has "filiæ, quæ viro sit desponsata."

[6] In lieu of *καταλειπέτω* Ast suggests correctly *καταλειπέσθω*, similar to "relinquatur" in Ficinus.

who has made the will. And if the testator has no sons, but daughters, let him write down what man he would wish as the husband for any of his daughters, and as the son-in-law for himself. And if the son of any one, whether natural or adopted, happens to die before he could be enrolled amongst men, let the testator mention this circumstance in the will, and signify whom he wishes to be his son in his stead with better fortune. And if any one without children makes a will, let him select the tenth part of his property, beyond the allotment, and give it to whom he pleases; but all the rest let him give without blame to his adopted son, and make for himself, according to law, a son kindly disposed. And in the case of a person whose children require guardians, if, after having made his will, he dies, and has mentioned as guardian for his children parties of the number and kind he wishes, and who are willing and agree to act as guardians, let the selection of the guardians be according to what has been written down in full force. But if a person dies intestate, if there is [1]any thing deficient in the selection[1] of the guardians, let the next of kin, two on the father's side, and two on the mother's, and one from among the friends of the deceased, have power to act as guardians; and these let the guardians of the law appoint (as guardians) to any orphan, who is in want of them. And of the whole care of orphans, let fifteen of the guardians of the laws, who are the oldest, have the charge [2]ever according to seniority; and having divided themselves into threes, let three (act) in one year, and in another year three others, until the five periods are accomplished in a circle;[2] and let no one fail in this duty to the best of his power. But should any one die without having made a will at all, and leave children that require a guardian, let the indigent state of the children share in the same laws. And should any one, meeting with an unexpected misfortune, leave behind him daughters, let him pardon the legislator if, looking to two things out of three, namely, proximity of race, and the preservation of the allotment, he makes provision for

[1]—[1] Instead of ἢ τῆς—αἱρέσεως ἐλλιπὴς, where there is nothing to govern the genitive, I have translated as if the Greek were ἤ τι τῆς—αἱρέσεως ἐλλιπὲς ᾖ—

[2]—[2] Ficinus, partly followed by Taylor, has thus abridged all between the numerals, "ut terni pro dignitate singulis annis curent, et, exacto quinquennio, similiter quindecim alios."

the giving the daughters in marriage; but the third point, to which the father would have attended, namely, [1] by looking to habits and manners,[1] (to select)[2] from all the citizens a fitting son for himself and a husband for his daughter, he omits, through the consideration of it being an impossibility. Let then this law be laid down relating to matters of this kind. If any one, dying intestate, leaves behind him daughters, [3] let the brother on the father's or mother's side, if he is without an allotment, take the daughter and the allotment of the deceased. But if there is not a brother, let a brother's son (do so) in like manner, if the cousins are of a sufficient age. And if there is not one of these left, let the son of (the father's) sister (act) in the same way, and let the fourth after these be the father's brother; the fifth, the son of this (brother); and the sixth, the son of the father's sister;[3] and in like manner let the race be continued perpetually by consanguinity, if a person leaves behind daughters, proceeding through brothers and cousins, first the males, and afterwards the females, in one[4] family. And let the judge on reflection determine the fitness or unfitness of the time of marriage, by looking at the males naked, and at the females naked, as far as the navel. And if there is a want of kindred to families, as far as the sons of brothers, and as far too as the children of grandfathers, whomsoever of the other citizens, being willing, the girl shall of her own free-will select, with the consent of her guardians, let that person become the heir of the deceased, and the husband of his daughter. Further still, there might be [5] a great want of many things, and a still greater of persons of this kind,[5] at some time in this very state. Should then a female, [6] being in want of nuptials,[6] see any one going from hence to a colony, and it

[1—1] The words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor.

[2] Ficinus alone has, what the sense requires, "deligat." Hence, as one MS. reads κλέπτων for βλέπων, Winckelmann suggests ἐκλέγων, βλέπων.

[3—3] With this law Ast compares a similar one at Athens, as shown by Isæus, T. vii. p. 270, R., and Demosthenes, p. 1067, R.

[4] Ficinus has, what is preferable, "in eodem genere—"

[5—5] I have adopted the reading suggested by Ast—πολλὴ πολλῶν ἀπορία καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἔτι πλείων—in lieu of πολλὰ πολλῶν καὶ ἀπορία τῶν τοιούτων πλείων— What Ficinus found in his MS. it is impossible to discover by his version, adopted to the letter by Taylor—"quod si magna in penuria illorum, qui urbem habitant—"

[6—6] I have translated as if the Greek were τις οὔσ' ἄπορος ὑμεναίων, not τις ἀπορουμένη—which Ast vainly, I think, endeavours to explain.

is in her mind for that person to be the heir of her father's property, provided he is a relation, let him enter upon the allotment according to the arrangement of the laws. [1]But if he is out of the family, those in the city being out of relationship,[1] let him have the power, through the selection of the guardians and of the daughter of the deceased, to marry her, and returning home, to take the allotment of the intestate. And if any one, who has no male or female children at all, dies intestate, let other matters hold good respecting such a person, according to the aforesaid law; but let a female and a male go, as joint-sharers, from his family to the dwelling, on each occasion deserted; and to them let the allotment belong as owners; and let a sister (enter) first; a brother's daughter, second; a sister's offspring, third; a sister of the father, fourth; a daughter of the father's brother, fifth; and a daughter of the father's sister, sixth. Let these females live together with those (males) according to affinity and lawfulness, as we have previously laid down by law. Nor let the weighty nature of laws of this kind lie hid from us, that sometimes it harshly ordains the relation of a deceased person to marry a relation. [2](For he who introduces a law of this kind,)[2] does not appear to consider that [3]ten thousand impediments arise, so as to render a person unwilling to comply with mandates of this kind; and that there are those, who would suffer any thing whatever, when diseases and maimings in body or mind come upon some of those ordained by law to marry, or be married. The legislator then will perhaps seem, not correctly so, to some, to pay no regard to these matters. Let this then be stated, as if it were a prelude in common, both for the lawgiver, and the party to whom laws are given; which requests[4] those under laws to grant a pardon to the legislator, because, while he is taking care of public concerns, he cannot at the same time regulate the circumstances that occur to each in-

[1]—[1] Such is the Greek literally. Ficinus has, what is more intelligible, —"sin vero civis quidem, sed non ex genere sit," as if he had found in his MS. *ἐὰν δέ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει ὄντων ἐκτὸς γένους τις ᾖ*—without *ἔξω τῆς ξυγγενείας*.

[2]—[2] The words between the lunes are found only in the version of Ficinus, "quippe qui hujusmodi legem fert," adopted by Taylor.

[3] In lieu of *ἃ μυρία* Ficinus seems to have found in his MS. *ὡς μυρία*—For his version is "quam multos—"

[4] Ast unites *δεόμενον* with *προοίμιον* by a rather violent prosopopœia.

dividual likewise; and, on the other hand, [1](the legislator to grant)[1] a pardon to those under laws; since they are sometimes unable, and reasonably so, to perform the commandments of the legislator, which, ignorant [2](of private circumstances,)[2] he has ordained.

Clin. By doing what then, O guest, will a person be the most in measure in such a case?

Athen. It is necessary, Clinias, to choose arbitrators between laws of this kind, and for those governed by them.

Clin. How say you?

Athen. Sometimes [3]the son of a rich father[3] would not be willing to marry the daughter of his uncle,[4] through being given to luxury and keeping his thoughts upon a greater connexion; [5]and sometimes too, while the legislator is enjoining the greatest calamity, he would be compelled by necessity to disobey the law, which forces[6] him to accept an alliance with a mad woman, or other terrible calamities of body or soul, and by possessing them, to live a life not to be endured.[5] Let then this law, which has been just now spoken of,[7] be laid down by us. If any persons find fault with the laws laid down relating to wills and any thing else whatever, and marriages to boot, (by saying)[8] that if the legislator himself were [9]present and living,[9] he would never compel a person to act thus, nor would those compelled to marry, or to be married, do either; or should any of the family or any guardian assert, that (as) the lawgiver

[1]—[1] I have inserted the words between the numerals, as being requisite for the balance of the sentence.

[2]—[2] Ficinus, followed tacitly by Taylor, has alone, what the train of thought requires, "singularum calamitatum—"

[3]—[3] The Greek is *πλουσίου* without regimen. But one MS. has *πλείους*. From the two it is easy to elicit *πλουσίου υἱὸς*, as I have translated.

[4] I have omitted *ἀδελφιδοῦς*, as a gloss for *θείου*.

[5]—[5] Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus found something different, it would seem, in his MS. For his version is "non nunquam calamitate maxima puellæ seu corporis sive animi coactus, legi illi non obtemperat, qua ad insana connubia invitus trahitur, quibus implicitus vivere nollet."

[6] I have followed Stephens, who reads *ἀναγκάζοντι* in lieu of *ἀνάγκάζοντος*, which is without regimen.

[7] I have translated as if the Greek were *λεγόμενος*, not *λόγος*, which I cannot understand, and Ast fails, I conceive, to explain satisfactorily.

[8] Ast supplies *λέγοντες*, which he got from "asserant" in Ficinus.

[9]—[9] I confess I cannot understand why Plato thus put the cart before the horse. Ficinus omits *παρόντα καὶ*—

had left the fifteen of the guardians of the laws to appear[1] as arbitrators and parents to male and female orphans, to these[2] let those go, who are contesting about any of such like matters, and by them be adjudged, and bring to an end their decrees as being decisive. But should it seem to any one that too great a power has been given to the guardians of the law, let him carry the matter to the tribunal of selected jurymen, and decide the question about contested points; and upon him, who is defeated by the legislator, [3]let blame and reproach lie, a fine in the eyes of him, who possesses a mind, more heavy than a mass of money.[3]

[8.] And now there would be, as it were, a second birth to orphans. After the first the nurture and education for each have been spoken of. [4]But after the second, rendered desolate by the want of fathers, it is meet to devise by what means the misfortune of their orphanhood may excite the least possible pity for their misfortune in the case of those who have become orphans.[4] First then, we assert that we assign by law to them the guardians of the laws to be not worse parents, in the place of those who begat them; and we ordain moreover, that for each year they take a care of them, as if they were their own. [5]And such is the prelude we have given with care[5] to them and the guardians, relating to the bringing up of orphans. For we appear to have detailed at some fitting time in the previous discourse, how that the souls of the dead possess a certain power,[6] by which they attend to human affairs.

[1] I have translated as if the Greek were *φανῆναι*, not *φάναι*, which, says Ast, often means "to think." But even if such were the case, of which I am very doubtful, we should here gain nothing by such a meaning.

[2] In lieu of *οὓς* I have adopted *τούτους*, as suggested by Stephens; who got the idea from "ad hos ipsos" in Ficinus. For otherwise the apodosis of all the preceding sentences would be wanting.

[3—3] In the Greek there evidently lies hid a dramatic distich—*Ψόγος βαρυτέρα χρημάτων πολλῶν ἄρ' ἦν Ἡ ζημία τῷ νοῦν ἔχοντι σώφρονα.*

[4—4] That Plato should have been guilty of this wretched verbiage seems hardly credible. Ficinus has—"Post secundam vero, operam dare debemus, ut privati parentibus, quam minime miserabili calamitate premantur"—thus translated by Taylor, "But after the second it is necessary to devise some means by which orphans may be oppressed with calamity as little as possible."

[5—5] I have translated as if the Greek were—*ἐμμελῆ ταῦτα τούτοις*—not *ἐν μελέτῃ τούτοις*—Opportunely then do three MSS. offer *ἐμμελῆ*—

[6] I have omitted *τελευτήσασαι* with Ficinus.

On this point indeed the reasons are true, but long, through the going round about. It is necessary likewise to believe in the other traditions relating to matters of this kind, which are so numerous and very old; and to believe too in those who legislate, unless they seem to be altogether insane, that such is the case. If then such is naturally the case, let persons fear in the first place the gods above, who have a perception of the desolate state of orphans; next, the souls of the dead, to whom in the course of nature it belongs to have a care of their own offspring, and to be kind to those who do them honour, but hostile towards those who treat them with dishonour; and further still, the souls of those who are living, but in old age, and in the greatest honours;[1] for to whom there is a state under good laws and prosperous, their[2] children's children live a pleasant life, through paying them a proper attention. [3]For all those acutely hear and acutely see every thing[3] relating to these matters, and are kind to those who act justly to these persons, but excessively angry, on the other hand,[4] with those, who behave insolently towards orphans and the destitute; since they deem (such a state) to be a deposit the greatest and the most sacred. To all of which points it is meet for the guardian and magistrate, who possesses the smallest degree of intellect, to direct his attention, and by bestowing his care upon the bringing up and education of orphans, to pay, as it were, a contribution for the benefit of himself and children, and to confer wholly a kindness to the whole of his power. He then, who is persuaded by this story[6] before the law, and does not behave insolently towards an orphan, will never know distinctly the anger of the legislator about matters of this kind. But let him, who is unpersuaded and does an act of injustice to one

[1], [2] I have translated as if the Greek were ὅτοις γὰρ, not ὅπου περ, and τούτοις, not τούτους—On the Attic ὅτοις see myself in Æsch. Eum. 282.

[3]—[3] The Greek is at present—καὶ τὰ περὶ—It was, I suspect, originally, καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι πάντες πάντα περὶ—as I have translated. And thus we need not adopt the transposition recommended by Desiderius Heraldus; which Ast and Stalbaum call an egregious one.

[4] I have adopted αὖ τοῖς—the reading of Ast, in lieu of αὐτοῖς—which is unintelligible.

[5] Ast quotes opportunely Demosthen. c. Aphob. p. 840, 7, R.

[6] Ficinus has "hoc ante legem exordio"—as if his MS. read παραμυθίῳ: for παραμύθιον is found in nearly the same sense as προοίμιον in x. p. 885, A., § 1, as remarked by Stephens.

deprived of father and mother, suffer a punishment entirely the double of what he would have done from acting evilly to a party whose parents are both alive.

With regard to the remaining portion of legislation applicable to guardians, in the case of orphans, and to magistrates touching their supervision of guardians, if they had not[1] themselves a pattern for bringing up free children, in bringing up their own, and taking care of their own property, and laws relating to these very matters stated[2] in moderation, there would have been some reason to lay down certain laws for guardians, as differing very much individually from others, and causing to vary by individual pursuits the life of orphans from that of those who are not so. But now, with respect to every thing of this kind, the care of orphans does not with us differ much from paternal care; but it is unwilling to be equalized in honour, and dishonour, and in attentiveness. Hence as regards this very point the law has, by consoling and threatening, attended to the legislation relating to orphans; and further still, a threat of this kind would be very seasonable. Let him, who is the guardian of a female or a male, and him, who is appointed by the guardians of the law to watch over the guardian, love, not less than his own children, the party who has a share in the misfortune of an orphan; nor let him pay less attention to the property of the party brought up than to his own, but better than according to the forethought[3] shown to his own. Let then every one act as a guardian while having this one law relating to orphans. But if any one acts otherwise (and) contrary to this law in affairs of this kind, let the magistrate fine the guardian. [4]And let the guardian bring the magistrate, (who has acted contrary to the law,) before the tribunal of select (jurymen),

[1] I have with Baiter adopted *εἰ μὲν μή*, suggested by Grou, for *εἰ μὲν δή*.

[2] Instead of *διῃρημένος*, Ast would read, what Stalbaum has edited from two MSS., *διειρημένους*—

[3] The sense requires *προμήθειαν*, not *προθυμίαν*.

[4—4] All the words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor; although Ficinus has "magistratus autem ad electorum judicium a tutore vocatus, duplo damno afficiatur; id damnum sententia judicum æstimetur—" But even thus it would be impossible to see what Plato intended to say, unless we suppose, with Ast, that after *ἄρχοντα* is to be supplied *παρὰ τὸν νόμον πράττοντα*, and, what he has neglected to remark, *ὀφλόντα* after *ζημιούτω*— as I have translated.

and punish him (if convicted) with a fine, that shall have seemed good to the tribunal, two-fold.[4] And if the guardian shall appear to the kindred of the orphans, or to any other of the citizens, to act negligently or viciously, let such party bring him before the same tribunal; and [1]in whatever sum he shall be cast, let him pay the quadruple,[1] and let one half belong to the child, and the other to the party who brought the charge forward. When an orphan arrives at puberty, if he thinks that he has been badly treated by his guardian, let him be allowed to obtain by lot a trial relating to guardianship up to [2]five years from the close of the guardianship;[2] and if any guardian is found guilty, let the court of justice fix what he is to suffer (in person), or pay (in purse); and if any magistrate shall appear to have injured an orphan through negligence, let the court of justice fix what he is to pay the child; and if through injustice, in addition to the fine, let him be removed from the office of a guardian of the law; and let the common power of the state appoint another in his place for the country and the city.

[9.] Greater differences take place between fathers and sons and between sons and fathers, than is proper; in which fathers will think that the legislator ought to permit them to renounce, if one wishes it, a son by the public crier, (and to say) he is no longer his own according to law; and sons, on the other hand, that they ought to be allowed to indict their fathers on the charge of silliness, when they are disgracefully in that state through disease or old age. Now these things are wont to take place, when the morals of men are perfectly corrupt. For on the half only of these evils taking place, as in the case of a wicked parent and child, or the contrary, calamities, which are the progeny of such a mighty hatred, have no existence. Indeed, in any other polity, a son disowned by his father would not necessarily become cityless; but in a state, where these are the laws, it is a matter of necessity for the fatherless to settle himself in some other place; since it is not possible for a single one

[1]—[1] Ficinus, followed by Taylor, has "quadruplum damni restituat." Hence, to avoid the difficulty, which presented itself to Ficinus, one might read *εἰς ταὐτὸν ἀγέτω δικαστήριον αὐτόν· ἂν δ' ὄφλῃ*—instead of—*δικαστήριον· ὅτι δ' ἂν ὄφλῃ*—

[2]—[2] A similar law was in force at Athens, as shown by Demosthenes, p. 989, 22, R., quoted by Ast.

to be added to the five thousand and forty households. On this account it is necessary that the son, who shall suffer this justly at the hands of one person, his father, should be renounced by his whole race. It is meet then, in relation to matters of this kind, to act according to some such law as this. For him, upon whom a feeling by no means fortunate has come, whether justly or not, in his desire to release the party, whom he has begotten and brought up, from a relationship to himself, let it not be lawful to do so upon slight grounds, nor on the instant; but let him first bring together his own relations up to cousins, and in like manner those of his son on the mother's side; and let him accuse his son before them, and show that he deserves on all accounts to be expelled from the family; and let him allow his son to give reasons of equal weight (to prove) that he does not deserve to suffer any thing of that kind; and if the father can persuade them, and get to vote on his side more than half of all the relations,[1] except the father,[2] mother, and the son himself, [3]and of the rest such as are complete women and men,[3] in this way and under these regulations let it be lawful for the father to renounce his son; but otherwise not; and if any of the citizens is willing to adopt as his son the party so renounced, let no law prevent him from so adopting him. For the habits of youth naturally undergo many changes continually in life. But if during ten years no one wishes to adopt the renounced party as a son, let the curators of the superabundant population [4](that is fit) for a colony,[4] look to these likewise, in order that they may have a share in the same colony in a proper manner.[5] But if disease, or old age, or

[1] Ficinus, followed by Taylor, has here "tam viri quam mulieres—"

[2] After *πατρὸς* the Greek has *διαψηφιζομένου*, which neither Ast nor Baiter could understand; for the former would read *διαψηφιζομένους*, and the latter *διαψηφιζομένων*: nor could Ficinus, who has omitted it. I could have understood *κρύβδα ψηφιζομένων* placed after *ξυγγενῶν*, or after *τῶν τε ἄλλων—*

[3—3] The words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor. Ficinus has "tam viri quam mulieres conferant, nisi ætas impedimento sit," which evidently leads to *ὅσοιπερ ἂν ὦσι—μὴ τέλειοι*, what the sense requires: where *τέλειοι* is to be taken in the sense of "perfect" in limbs and full grown.

[4—4] Ficinus alone has, what the sense seems to require, "quam constituimus transmissis coloniis amputari—" But what he found in his MS. it is not so easy to say.

[5] I confess I scarcely understand here *ἐμμελῶς*, which Ficinus translates "congrue," and Ast would unite to *ἐπιμελεῖσθαι*.

harshness of manners, or all these together, more than any thing else, cause a person to be pre-eminently beyond the majority out of his mind, and this is concealed from every one, except those who live with him, and, as being the master of his property, he brings his family to ruin, but his son hesitates and fears to bring a charge of silliness, let a law be first laid down in this case, that the son is to go to the oldest guardians of the law, and inform them of his father's calamity; and let them, when they have seen him sufficiently, take counsel together, whether the suit is to be entered upon or not; and if they together advise (a suit), let them be both witnesses and parties in the cause. And if the father is condemned, let him for the remainder of his time be without the power of disposing by will of even the smallest portion of his property, but dwell at home for the rest of his life, like a child.

[10.] If a husband and wife cannot, through the misfortune of their tempers, agree with each other, it will be requisite for ten men, from amongst the guardians of the laws, as mediators, and similarly ten women, who are the curators of marriages, to have the care of matters of this kind; and if they are able to reconcile the parties, let their decision be valid. But if their minds swell rather violently, like waves, let them seek, to the best of their power, such persons as will reside[1] with either party; and as it is likely that such persons are not tempered by gentle manners, it is meet[2] to endeavour to fit to them social habits and manners of greater weight and mildness, and that such as, being without children, or having but a few, disagree, [3]should, even for the sake of children, make for themselves a joint-dwelling.[3] [4]But it is meet for such as, when there is a sufficient number of children, to make for themselves a separation and an union, for the sake of a joint old age, and a care for each other.[4] If a woman dies,

[1] Instead of *ξυνοικήσουσιν* five MSS. read *ξυνοίσουσιν*, similar to "conveniant" in Ficinus; who has likewise "facto divortio," to which there is nothing at present to answer in the Greek.

[2] In lieu of *δὴ* one MS. has *δὲ*, which leads distinctly to *δεῖ*—

[3—3] Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus, whom Taylor follows in part, has "procreandorum liberorum causa conjugium rursus quærere compellendi." Hence instead of *τὴν*, Winckelmann suggested *καινὴν*— Orelli, *ἄλλην*—

[4—4] Here again Ficinus swerves from a literal translation in his "quod

and leaves behind her male and female children, let the law laid down advise, but not compel, (the husband)[1] to bring up the children, and not bring upon them a stepmother; but if there are no children, let him of necessity marry, until he has begotten children, sufficient both for his household and the state. But if the husband dies, and leaves behind him a sufficient number of children, let the mother of the children remain (a widow),[2] and bring them up. But if she seems to be younger than is fitting for a person to live in a state of health without a husband, let her kindred, communicating with the women who take care of marriages, do what seems good to themselves and the women touching matters of this kind; and if they are in want of children, even for the sake of children;[3] and let an exact sufficiency of children be considered, according to law, a male and a female. When it is agreed that an offspring is the progeny of the adopters,[4] but there is a need of a decision, as to which of the parents the child ought to follow,[5] if a female slave shall have had connexion with a slave, or with a free-born person, or with a freed-man, let the offspring be the property of the master of the female slave; and if a free-born woman shall have had intercourse with a slave, let the offspring belong to the master of the slave. If a slave becomes pregnant by her master, or a mistress by her slave, and this becomes apparent, let the women[6] send the offspring of the woman, together with the father, into another country; but let the guardians of the law (send away) the offspring of the man together with its mother.

[11.] [7] To have a neglect of parents neither a god nor a man,

si filios non paucos habent atque dissentiunt, senectutis mutuo curandæ gratia, divortio facto, aliud conjugium ineant." What Plato meant to say, I must leave for others to explain.

[1] Ficinus alone has, what the sense requires here, "virum—"

[2] Here again Ficinus supplies, what is wanting for the sense, "vidua—"

[3] Ficinus adds here—"ducant nubantve:" but Ast understands *τοῦτο ποιούντων*, which he explains by "mulierem viro nubere jubento." I am quite in the dark.

[4] From the version of Ficinus, "qui sibi eos vendicant," Stephens, who is followed by Ast, was led to *προσποιουμένων*— "of those who lay claim to it"—Taylor translates "the begetters"—But that would be in Greek *πεποιηκότων*. Winckelmann would read either *ἀποποιουμένων* or *ὀποιομένων*—

[5] Ficinus, followed by Taylor, inserts "sic agatur"—

[6] i. e. those, who have the care of marriages.

[7] Winckelmann, in the Preface to the Phædrus in the smaller Zurich

who has any mind, would ever advise any one. [1] And it is necessary to consider that a prelude of this kind would be relating to the ministering to the gods,[1] having been properly regulated touching the honours and dishonours shown to parents. Now laws have been of old laid down relating to the gods amongst all men in a two-fold manner. For seeing clearly some of the gods,[2] we honour them; but of others we place statues as resemblances; which[3] while we are honouring, although not endued with life, we do not vainly[4] imagine that the gods, who are endued with life, feel a great good-will on this account, and gratitude towards us. Let not then any one, whose father or mother, or the fathers or mothers of these, lie in his house, like a deposit, worn down with old age, ever conceive that while he has such a possession[5] at his hearth and in his house, there will be ever a statue more powerful,[6] if only the possessor ministers to it in a proper manner.[7]

Clin. What is the propriety which you say exists?

Athen. I will tell you. For things of this kind, friends, it is fit to hear.

Clin. Only mention it.

Athen. We say that Œdipus, having been dishonoured by his children, imprecated upon them what every one celebrates in hymns,[8] [9] as having come to pass and being heard[9] by the

edition, has supplied here what he conceives to be omissions, by the aid of a fragment of Pempelus the Pythagorean, in Stobæus Tit. 77, p. 460.

[1]—[1] Such is the literal version of the unintelligible Greek. Ficinus, followed by Taylor, has changed the terms of this proposition—"Sed quod de cultu deorum ignorare non oportet, id recte dictum ad honorandos parentes proœmium erit," as if he had found in his MS. *φρονῆσαι δὲ χρὴ τὸ περὶ θεῶν θεραπείας ὀρθῶς συντεταγμένον τοῦτο δὴ προοίμιον ἂν γενόμενον εἰς τὰς τῶν γεννησάντων τιμάς τε καὶ ἀτιμίας.*

[2] By these are meant the Sun and Moon.

[3] Instead of *οὓς*, which is unintelligible, I have translated as if the Greek were *ἃς*, similar to "eas" in Ficinus.

[4] I have translated as if the Greek were *οὐ κενῶς*, not *ἐκείνους*—

[5] I have adopted *κτῆμα*, which the Bipont editor elicited from *οἴκημα* in Ald., in lieu of which five MSS. offer *ἵδρυμα*, evidently a various reading for *ἄγαλμα*, both of which are found shortly afterwards.

[6] Ast incorrectly explains *κύριον* by "his own"—See a little below.

[7] I have omitted *ὀρθῶς*, plainly an explanation of *κατὰ τρόπον*, although it seems to be defended by the subsequent *ὀρθότητα*.

[8] On these imprecations of Œdipus see Valckenaer on Eurip. Phœn. 67.

[9]—[9] Here again Plato has chosen to put the cart before the horse. For the prayers must have been heard by the gods before they were brought to pass.

gods. Amyntor too is said to have cursed in anger his son Phœnix,[1] and Theseus too Hippolytus,[2] and innumerable other fathers innumerable other sons. From which it has become manifest that the gods hearken to parents (when praying) against their children. For a parent is to his children, as no one else is to other persons, [3]when imprecating a curse, most justly pernicious.[3] Nor let any one imagine, that for a deity to be hearkening to the prayers of a father and mother, when dishonoured pre-eminently by their children, is according to nature; for when a parent is held in honour, and has become very joyous, and on this account is earnest in prayer and is calling upon the gods for good things to his children, shall we not imagine that they equally hear and grant us (their requests)? For otherwise they would not be just distributors of what is good—an act, which we say becomes the gods the least of all.

Clin. Certainly.

Athen. Let us think then, as we observed a little before, that we could not possess a statue more honoured by the gods, than that of our father and grandfather, worn down by old age, and of mothers and grandmothers, possessing the same want of power;[4] which when any one honours, the god is glad; for otherwise he would not hear them.[5] For the statues of our progenitors (still living) are wonderfully superior to those without life. For those, which are animated, do, when ministered to by us, pray for us on each occasion; but the very contrary when they are held by us in dishonour. But (the inanimate do) neither of these. So that he, who behaves properly to his father and grandfather, and all persons of this kind, would possess the most powerful of all statues, as regards his portion (of life) beloved by the gods.

Clin. You speak most beautifully.

[1] This was probably told in the Phœnix of Euripides, who followed Homer in Ιλ. *ι*. 417.

[2] See Eurip. Hipp. 891.

[3—3] One MS. has *βλαβερὸς*, all the rest *ἀραῖος*— Plato wrote, I suspect, both, as I have translated, *βλαβερὸς γὰρ ἀραῖος*— Winckelmann proposes *βαρὺς γὰρ ἀραῖος*, comparing Soph. Trach. 1202.

[4] I have translated as if the Greek were not *δύναμιν*, but, what the sense requires, *ἀδυναμίαν*, as suggested by Winckelmann. Pempelus however, quoted by Stobæus, has *τὴν ἰδίαν δύναμιν*, in lieu of *τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν*.

[5] As there is nothing to which *Αντῶν* can be well referred, one would prefer *Λιτῶν*, "prayers."

Athen. Every one therefore, who has any mind, fears and honours the prayers of his parents, as knowing that they have come to pass to many persons and at many times. Since then this is the ordinance of nature to good men, their aged progenitors will be a god-send, when living to the extremity of life, and young persons, when they depart,[1] be a source of great regret; but to the bad, on the contrary,[2] very terrible. Let then every one, persuaded by these reasonings, honour his parents with all lawful honours. But if the voice of preludes like these lays hold of any deaf person,[3] for such would this law be properly laid down. If any one in this state takes a less care of his parents than is fitting, and does not pay them in all matters more attention than he does his sons, and all his offspring and himself, and is (not)[4] fulfilling their wishes, let the party suffering in this way lay an information, either himself or by sending some one to three of the oldest guardians of the law, and likewise to three of the women, who have the care of marriages; and let these attend to the matter, and punish the offenders, if young men, with stripes and bonds, if they happen to be up to thirty years of age; and let women be punished with the same punishment, up to ten years more. But if they are beyond these years, and do not stand aloof from the same neglect of parents, but maltreat them in some way, [5]let (persons) bring them before a court of justice, to one and each of the citizens,[5] who may be the oldest of all; and if a person is cast, let the tribunal fix what he is to pay (in purse) or suffer (in person), and consider nothing of what a person can suffer (in person) or pay (in purse) as a thing not to be told. And

[1] Instead of *ἀπιόντες* Winckelmann would read *ἀπόντες*, comparing Lys. p. 215, B.

[2] In lieu of *εὖ* Ficinus found in his MS. *αὖ*, as shown by his "contra—"

[3] I have translated as if the Greek were not *κωφὴ*, but *κωφὸν*, similar to "surdus" in Ficinus; unless it be said that Plato wrote *κωφὴ κωφὸν*, for *κωφὸς* means both "deaf" and "dumb."

[4] I have translated as if the Greek were *ἀποπληρῶν μὴ ᾖ*, not *ἀποπληρῶν ᾖ*—

[5]—[5] Such is the literal version of the Greek—*εἰς δικαστήριον εἰσαγόντων αὐτοὺς εἰς ἕνα καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν πολιτῶν*—which I cannot understand, nor could Bekker; who proposes to read *ἑκατὸν*, from which nothing appears to be gained; and still less from Ast's method of explaining *εἰς ἕνα καὶ ἕκαστον*, as if it were *ἐν ἑνὶ καὶ ἑκάστῳ*, which he renders "coram singulo quoque—" Winckelmann too is equally at a loss; for he wishes to read *εἰς τὸ τῶν ἐκκρίτων δικαστῶν δικαστήριον εἰσαγόντων αὐτοὺς καὶ διαδικαζέσθων τῶν πολιτῶν οἵτινες*— I am quite in the dark.

if any one, who has been maltreated, is unable to tell the tale, let him, who has heard from free persons, lay an information before the rulers, or let him be considered a bad man, and brought to trial by any one who is willing, for a mischief done. And if a slave gives information, let him be made free; and if he is the slave, either of the maltreating or maltreated parties, let him be made free by the magistrate; but if he is the slave of any other citizen, let the public (treasury) put down his value for his master; and let it be a care to the magistrates, that no one, in revenging himself, does an injury to a person of this kind for giving the information.

[12.] With respect to the cases, where one person does a mischief to another by means of poisons, such as are deadly have been already spoken of; but as regards other mischiefs, if any does an injury willingly and with malice prepense, by drink, or meat, or ointments, of these nothing has been stated as yet. For two kinds of poisonings [1]according to the race of man[1] [2]stop the statement.[2] For (the poisoning), of which we were just now clearly speaking, is doing an injury to bodies by bodies according to nature; but the other is that, which, by sorceries and incantations and the so-called bindings,[3] persuades those, who dare to injure them,[4] that they are able to do something of this kind; and others, that they are injured more than any thing by those, who are able to act the sorcerer. Now these matters, and all relating to things of this kind, it is neither easy to know how they exist in nature, nor, if any one did know, to persuade others. But upon the minds of men, who look with suspicion on each other in things of this kind,

[1]—[1] Winckelmann, unable, like myself, to understand *κατὰ τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων οὖσαι γένος*, proposes to read *κακὰ—ποιοῦσαι*— i. e. "doing mischiefs to the race of man."

[2]—[2] Here again I am at a loss. For though Ast translates *ἐπίσχουσι τὴν διάρρησιν* "inhibent expositionem," yet I cannot see how such a result could arise from the poisonings merely of two kinds. Ficinus omits the words entirely.

[3] What the ancients understood by "bindings," is perhaps similar to what would now be called "mesmerisms," when a person is thrown into a state of torpor, and becomes spell-bound. To this kind of quackery the earliest allusion is in Eumen. 322, *ὕμνος ἐξ Ἐριννύων δέσμιος φρενῶν—*

[4] Ficinus, unable probably to understand *αὐτοὺς*, has omitted it. Taylor has "others." But Plato wrote, I suspect, either *τοὺς ἄνους*, or *τοὺς ἀνοήτους*—Winckelmann suggests *ἐναντίους—*

it is not worth while to endeavour to make an attack,[1] if perchance they see representations moulded in wax, either on the house-door, or where three cross-roads meet, or on the tombs of their parents, and to exhort those, who have no clear notions about them, to hold all things of that kind cheap. Dividing then the law relating to poisonings into two parts, [2]according as a person may attempt to use poisons in one way or the other,[2] let us first beg, and exhort, and advise persons, that they ought not to attempt to do a thing of this kind, nor to terrify the masses of mankind, frightened like children; nor, on the other hand, to compel the legislator and judge to cure mankind of such fears;[3] since, in the first place, he who attempts to make use of poison, if he does not know what he is doing, both as regards the body, if he happens not to be skilled in medical science, and as regards on the other hand sorceries, unless he happens to be a diviner, or an interpreter of miracles.[3] Let this law then be stated in words[4] respecting poisons. He, who employs poison, not for deadly injury [5]to a person himself, or to the folks belonging to that man,[5] but [6]for an injury of another kind, or deadly[6] to cattle and hives of bees, if he happens to be a physician, and is condemned for poisoning

[1] I have translated, both for the syntax and sense, as if the Greek were ἐπιθεῖναι, not πείθειν.

[2—2] The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and by Taylor after him.

[3] There is evidently a lacuna here.

[4] I have translated as if the Greek were λεγέσθω δὴ ἐν λόγοις ὅδε νόμος, not δὴ λόγος ὅδε, where λόγος is omitted by Ficinus, as being, no doubt, unintelligible.

[5—5] The words between the numerals I hardly understand; nor could, I think, Ficinus. At least he has omitted them, and so after him has Taylor. The difficulty lies in ἐκείνου, placed after αὐτοῦ, whether the two pronouns be applied to the same person or not. Cornarius applies it to the same. Moreover ἀνθρώπων is strangely used here for ἀνδραπόδων, or ἄλλων, opposed to αὐτοῦ: from whence one would be led to read ἐν οἴκῳ for ἐκείνου.

[6—6] Stephens was the first to object to εἴτ' ἄλλῃ βλάβῃ εἴτ' οὖν θανασίμῳ, thus introduced after ἐπὶ βλάβῃ μὴ θανασίμῳ. He would therefore expunge εἴτ' ἄλλῃ βλάβῃ, as an interpolation. But εἴτ' οὖν could not stand here or any where without εἴτε in a corresponding clause. I suspect that Plato wrote ἐπὶ ἄλλῃ βλάβῃ, explained by ἤγουν θανασίμῳ: for when ηγουν was corrupted into ειτ' ουν, the επι would of course be altered into ειτε. Ficinus seems, as remarked by Ast, to have found in his MS. εἴ γ' ἄλλῃ βλάβῃ ἢ θανασίμῳ. For his version is "sive etiam ut aliter quam morte bestiis noceat."

let him be punished with death; but if he is unskilled (in medicine), let the tribunal fix what he must suffer (in person) or pay (in purse). But if any one by bindings-down, or allurements, or certain incantations, or any of such like poisonings whatever, appears to be like a person doing an injury, if he is a diviner, or an interpreter of miracles, let him be put to death. But if any one is accused of poisoning, without being a diviner, let the same thing take place to him likewise. For respecting him, let the tribunal fix what it seems good to them he ought to suffer (in person) or pay (in purse). Whatever injury one person does to another by fraud or force, if it be a great one, let him pay a greater fine; but a smaller one, if it be small; and in all cases let a party pay as much as he may on each occasion have done an injury, until he shall have remedied the mischief done. [1] In each case of wrong-doing, let each person pay the penalty that follows it, for the sake of bringing him to his senses; [1] and let one, who in thoughtlessness has done wrong, and by making use of a persuasion foreign to his nature, through his youth or some such thing, (pay) a lighter (fine), but another one a heavier, through his own thoughtlessness, or his non-mastery over pleasure and pain, from the fears of cowardice,[2] or certain desires, or envyings, or angers, that have become difficult to cure; and let him suffer a punishment, not for having done wrong—[3] for what has been born, ne'er will be unborn[3]—but for the sake of this, that in aftertime both the culprit and those, who see him under the sentence of the law, may either hate injustice entirely, or that a great portion of a calamity of this kind may cease. For the sake of all which, it is meet for the laws to look to all these matters, nor, like a bad archer, to take aim, for the sake of the magni-

[1]—[1] The words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor.

[2] Stephens and Ast, objecting to *ἐν φόβοις δειλίας*, wished to read, the former *ἐν φόβοις ἢ δειλίαις*, the latter *ἢ δειλίᾳ*— But as one MS. has λια
δεινως, perhaps Plato wrote *ἐν φόβοις δουλούμενος*— "enslaved by fear." Winckelmann suggests *ἐν φόβοις δειλοῖς*, referring to p. 870, C.

[3]—[3] With this sentiment, *Οὐ γὰρ τὸ γεγονὸς ἔστιν ἀγένητόν ποτε*—which is a dramatic fragment, Ast compares Soph. Trach. 743, *τὸ γὰρ Φανθὲν τίς ἂν δύναιτ' ἂν ἀγένητον ποιεῖν*— and Horace, "neque Diffinget infectumque reddet, Quod fugiens semel hora vexit," and the other passages quoted by Gataker in Misc. Adv. Posth. p. 756.

tude of the punishment in each case, and the proper desert viewed as a whole.[1] The same ought the judge to do, and to be the minister to the legislator, whenever a law puts upon him to fix what the party tried ought to suffer (in person) or pay (in purse); and, like a painter, he ought to sketch out the acts, in conformity with the description of them; which must be done at present by us, Megillus and Clinias, in the most beautiful and best manner; and we must state what fines, as they are called, are to take place for all acts done by fraud and violence, in order that the gods, and the sons of gods, may permit us to lay down laws.

[13.] If any one is insane, let him not be seen openly in the city, but let the relations of each person watch over them at home, in the best manner they know of; or let them pay a fine, he with property of the largest valuation a hundred drachms, if he is negligent in the case of a person, whether a slave or a free-man; he of the next valuation, four out of five parts of a mina; he of the third, three parts of a mina; and he of the fourth, four parts. Many indeed are mad in various ways. Some, of whom we have just spoken, through disease; others, through the vicious nature and nurture to boot of passion; for being excited by a trifling enmity, they send forth a loud voice and speak blasphemously against each other. But nothing of this kind ought to take place at any time, or by any means, in a state under good laws.[2] Let then there be this one (law) relating to all on the subject of evil-speaking. Let no one speak evil of another. But when one person has [3]in some discourses[3] a dispute with another, let him give to and receive instruction, from the person disputing, and those who are present, and abstain entirely from evil-speaking. [4]For from uttering prayers and curses against each other, and bringing through disgraceful names the language of women upon each other,[4] in the first place from words,

[1] Such seems to be the meaning here of *παντελῶς*, which is omitted entirely by Ficinus.

[2] I have adopted *εὐνόμῳ* for *εὐνόμων*, as suggested by Stephens, who refers to xii. p. 950, D., to which he was led by finding "bonis legibus instituta" in Ficinus, followed tacitly by Taylor.

[3—3] In lieu of *ἔν τισι λόγοις* Winckelmann suggests *ἐν πράξεσι λόγοις*, referring to p. 888, A., but Baiter *ἔν τισι συλλόγοις*—

[4—4] Ficinus, followed by Taylor, has thus abridged all between the

which are a light thing, hatred and grievous enmities are produced in deed. For by gratifying anger, a thing most unlovely, the speaker gorges passion with an evil feast, and just as much as he was once rendered mild by education, to such an extent does he again make his soul savage, and, living in moroseness, becomes like a wild beast, and receives from passion a bitter delight. And under these feelings all are frequently wont to go out of the way to utter something ridiculous about their opponents; to which there is no one who accustoms himself, but who fails in a seriousness of manner, partially or entirely, or destroys of highmindedness many a part. On this account therefore, let no one ever speak any word of this kind in a temple, or [1]at public sacrifices,[1] or at public games, or in the market-place, or a court of justice, or at any common meeting. But let the magistrate, who is the president at such places, punish without damage to himself the individual (so speaking); [2]or never let him enter the lists for the prizes of good conduct, as being one who pays no attention to the laws, nor performs what is enjoined by the legislator.[2] And if any one in other places begins abuse or uses it in self-defence, and does not keep himself from language of this kind, let any more elderly person, who meets him, in defence of the law restrain with blows those, who [3]act kindly towards anger, another ill;[3] or let them be held amenable to the fine ordained. We say too at present, that he, who [4]is entangled with abuse,[4] is not able to make use of it without seeking to say what raises a laugh;

numerals—" cum enim sibi invicem verbis turpibus maledicunt, muliebres habentur—"

[1]—[1] Philoctetes is said by Sophocles, in v. 8—11, to have interrupted the rites of sacrifice *δυσφημίαις Βοῶν, ἰύζων*. Compare likewise El. 630, *Οὐκ οὖν ἐάσεις οὐδ ὑπ' εὐφήμου βοῆς Θῦσαί με*;

[2]—[2] Ficinus is here unusually prolix—" quod si non fecerit, quasi legum proditor præceptorumque legislatoris spretor, nunquam ad publici cujusquam muneris certamen, quasi de virtute certaturus, ascendat."

[3]—[3] The Greek is *τοὺς θυμῷ, ἑτέρῳ κακῷ, φιλοφρονουμένους*: where *φιλοφρονουμένους* is strangely used for *χαριζομένους*, and *ἑτέρῳ κακῷ* applied to *λοιδορίᾳ*. Ficinus has "ira, alieno malo, concitati," dissatisfied, it would seem, with *φιλοφρονουμένους*. Winckelmann proposes *θυμῷ, ὥσπερ θηρίῳ κακῷ* — I should prefer *θυμῷ, ἀγρίῳ κακῷ καὶ ἀφίλῳ, θηριουμένους*— Cousin with Grou refers *κακῷ ὄντι* to *πληγαῖς*—

[4]—[4] Stephens was the first to find fault with *λοιδορίαις συμπλεκόμενος*, and to suggest that *συμπλέκεσθαι* might mean " velitari," for he had perhaps a faint recollection of the passage in Festus quoted by Ast—" Velitatio dicta est ultro citroque probrorum objectio, ab exemplo velitaris

and this is what we abuse ourselves, when it takes place through anger. But what then? [1]Shall we admit the propensity of comic writers to say what raises a laugh against persons, if without any feeling of anger they attempt in their comedies to say any thing of this kind against the citizens?[1] Or shall we make a twofold division into the playful and not? and that it may be lawful for any one in fun to say what is laughable, if without anger, about any one; but that it be not lawful for any one, as we said before, when on the stretch[2] and with any angry feeling? This then must by no means be put off; but let us lay down by a law for whom it may be lawful, or not. Let it then be not lawful for any composer of comedies, or of any iambics or melodies of the Muses, either by words or caricatures, to make any citizen a butt in comedy, either in anger or without anger. And if any one disobeys (this law), let the umpires at the contests expel him utterly from the country on the very same day, or be fined three minæ, sacred to the god to whom the contest belongs. But let it be lawful for the others, to whom it has been stated above that there is a permission, to do so to each other without anger and in sport; but let it not be allowed in seriousness and in anger. And let the inquiry into this matter be committed to him, who has the care of the whole education of the young. And whatever he shall select, let it be lawful for the composer to bring it before the public; but whatever he rejects, let not the author show it to any one, nor let him be found to have taught it to any other person, either a slave or free-man; or let him be considered as a vicious character, and disobedient to the laws.

[14.] But he is a person deserving of pity, not when he is hungry or suffers a thing of this kind, but when temperate, or possessing some (other) virtue,[3] or a part of it, he has in

pugnæ;" and hence λοιδορίαις συμπλεκόμενος would signify "fighting with abuse," as Thersites doubtless did, until he was stopt by Ulysses— an idea that would have been borne out to the letter, had Plato written— ζητεῖν, Θερσίτης ὤν—

[1]—[1] Ficinus is here rather wide of the Greek—"Comicorumne satyrorumque sales et ridiculosa convicia, quibus adversus cives utuntur, si absque ira sic mordeant, admittemus."

[2] In lieu of ξυντεταγμένῳ, Heusde was the first to suggest, what Stalbaum takes to himself, ξυντεταμένῳ, got from "concitato" in Ficinus.

[3] Ficinus alone has "virtute alia," as if his MS. read τιν' ἄλλην ἀρετήν.

addition a certain calamity.[1] Hence it would be a thing of wonder, should a person, who is such, be so entirely neglected, as to arrive at extreme poverty, whether a slave or a free-man, in a polity and a city which is regulated even moderately. On this account it would be safe for the legislator to lay down for such persons a law of this kind. Let there be no beggar in the state. But if any one attempts to do a thing of this kind, by collecting food by prayers [2]which cannot be satisfied,[2] let the Market-Stewards expel him from the market-place, and the City-Stewards from the city, and the Rural-Stewards send him from the rest of the country, over the land on the borders, in order that the land may become altogether pure from an animal of such a kind.

If a male or a female slave injures the property of persons ever so little, the injured party himself not being a joint-cause, through inexperience or any other event of an intemperate kind, let the owner of the party, who has done the mischief, either remedy the mischief in not a deficient manner, or hand over the injuring party himself. But if the owner (of the slave) brings an accusation by saying that the charge has been made by the common trick of the parties injuring and injured, with the view of depriving him of his slave, let him bring against the person, who pretends to have been injured, an action for fraudulent practices; and if the party is convicted, let him receive double the value of the slave, at which the tribunal may have fixed it; but if he is himself defeated, let him remedy the mischief and give up the slave. And if a beast of burden, or a horse, or a dog, or any other animal, injures the property of neighbours, let [3](the owner of the animal)[3] in like manner pay for the mischief done.

If a person is unwilling to be a witness, let the party, who wants him, cite him;[4] and after being cited, [5]let him meet the

[1] After "calamity" Taylor inserts what is neither in the Greek, nor in the Latin of Ficinus—"But this cannot be said universally of any one, who falls into such like misfortunes."

[2—2] Such is Taylor's translation of "inexplebilibus" in Ficinus; a meaning that *ἀνηνύτοις* can scarcely bear.

[3—3] Ficinus, whom Taylor tacitly follows, has alone, what the sense requires, "animalis dominus—"

[4] This would be said in England "to serve him with a subpœna."

[5—5] Ficinus, followed for the most part by Taylor tacitly, has—"citatusque tempore idoneo adsit ut testimonium, prout sciverit, afferat."

party at the trial; and if he knows the facts, and is willing to give evidence, let him give it.[5] But if he says that he knows nothing, let him swear by the three deities, Zeus, Apollo, and Themis, that he knows nothing, and be dismissed from the trial; and let him, who, when cited to give evidence, does not attend,[1] be held amenable for the mischief according to law. If any one cause a juryman to stand up as a witness, let him not, while giving evidence, give his vote upon the case. Let a free woman be allowed to bear witness, and appear as counsel, if she is more than forty years of age, and to obtain by lot a trial, if she is unmarried; but if her husband is living, let her be allowed to be a witness only. Let a male and female slave, and a boy,[2] be allowed to be a witness in the case of murder, and to act as counsel, if they can produce trust-worthy bail that they will remain up to the trial, should they be accused of bearing false witness. Let either of the litigants bring a charge against the whole or part of the evidence, if he asserts that some have borne false witness before the trial is decided; and let the magistrates preserve in writing the accusations put under the seal of both, and bring them forward for the purpose of deciding upon the false testimony. If any one shall be twice convicted of having borne false witness, let the law no longer compel him to bear witness again; but if thrice, let him not be allowed ever to bear witness again. And if he dares, after having been caught thrice, to bear witness, let any one who is willing, inform against him before a magistrate; and let the magistrate deliver him to a tribunal, and if he is convicted, let him be punished with death. Of whomsoever, that have seemed to have borne false witness in a cause, and by so doing to have gained the suit for the plaintiff, the evidence shall be detected, if more than half of such testimony is condemned, let the verdict obtained by such evidence be set aside, and let there be a question of doubt, and a trial, whether the cause had been decided or not by such evidence; and according as the decision may be on either side, let the final result of the previous trials be determined by this decision.

While however there are many things of beauty in the life

[1] The technical word in Greek was *ἀπαντᾶν*, "to meet," as shown by Demosthenes in various places, quoted by Ast.

[2] This boy would appear strange, did we not know that youths up to eighteen years of age were called "boys" at Athens.

of man, to the majority of them there stick, as it were naturally, evil fates, which stain and defile them. And yet, as there is justice amongst men, how is not that beautiful, which renders all human affairs mild? And this being beautiful, how would it not be beautiful in us to take the side of a party in a cause? But [1] on these notions being of such a kind a certain maliciousness brings a calumny,[1] by putting forward art under an honourable name, which says forsooth that the first thing is a certain stratagem in causes, and that it is able to gain a victory [2] by litigating, and taking a part in causes,[2] whether what may have been done respecting each suit is just or not; and that of this art, and of the speeches resulting from it, there is a gift, if a person will give money in return. This therefore, whether it is an art, or an artless skill [3] and practice, it is particularly necessary that it should not exist in our state; but, as the legislator [4] requests (the people) to be persuaded by him, and not to say what is contrary to justice,[4] [5] be sent about its business to some other country.[5] [6] To those then, who are persuaded, silence (is sufficient);[6] but for the unpersuaded let this be the voice of the law. If any one is thought to be endeavouring to turn the power of justice, which is in the souls of the judges, to a contrary direction, and out of season [7] to

[1]—[1] The Greek is *ταῦτα οὖν τοιαῦτα ὄντα διαβολή τις κακὴ*— But as all calumny is bad, and as there is nothing to govern *ταῦτα—τοιαῦτα*, Cornarius proposed to read *κακοῖ*, adopted by Stephens. Since however

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one MS. offers *διαβάλλη*, and another *διαβάλλη*, I have, with the Zurich editors, accepted *διαβάλλει*, and altered *κακὴ* into *κακία*, where Orelli would read *κάκη*, and Winckelmann, *δικανικὴ*—

[2]—[2] Such, I presume, is the meaning of *τῷ τε δικάσασθαι καὶ ξυνδικεῖν*: which Ficinus either did not understand, or else he found something very different in his MS. For his version is "quo agenda et dicenda, sive honesta, sive turpis sit causa, superare facile quis possit, victoresque facere, quibus ipsa rationibus suis favet." The art however to which Plato alludes here is evidently that of the Sophist, who boasted that he "could make the worse appear the better reason."

[3] Ast quotes opportunely Gorg. p. 464, E. § 45, and Phædr. p. 259, E.

[4]—[4] Here again the version of Ficinus, followed in part by Taylor, has something different from the Greek, "legum verita conditorem, nihil adversus leges proferat."

[5]—[5] Ficinus differs again from the Greek, "et alio profecta, vires suas ostendat."

[6]—[6] The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus.

[7]—[7] Instead of *πολυδικεῖν*, which is not, I believe, to be found else-

toss back and fro[7] a matter of this kind,[1] or to side with it, let any one who is willing, indict him for the perversion of a suit, or siding with a wrong one; and let the trial come on in the court for select jurymen; and if he is convicted, let the court decide whether he seems to have done a deed of this kind through a love of money or contention; and if through a love of contention, let the court decide for what length of time such a person is not to obtain by lot a suit, or to side in a suit with any one; but if through avarice, let him, if he is a stranger, depart from the city, and never return to it again, or be punished with death; but let a citizen be put to death for his love of money, which has been honoured by him in every way; but if a person is convicted of having done so twice through a love of contention, let him be put to death.

BOOK XII.

[1.] [2]If an ambassador or a herald by telling falsehoods performs improperly an embassy from one state to another, or when sent does not report the embassy on which he is sent, as it is in reality; or again, on the other hand, is clearly bringing back not correctly from enemies or friends what he has heard as an ambassador or herald,[2] let indictments be drawn up against these persons, for having, contrary to law, acted with impiety towards the messages and mandates of Hermes and Zeus; [3]and let there be a fine as to what he is to suffer (in person) or pay (in purse).[3]

where, I have translated as if the Greek were *παλινδικεῖν*, where there is a play on *δικεῖν*, "to throw," and *δίκη*, "a suit," as in Aristoph. Ach. 376, Τῶν τ' αὖ γερόντων οἶδα τὰς ψυχὰς, ὅτι Οὐδὲν βλέπουσ' ἐς ἄλλο πλὴν ψῆφον δικεῖν; for so I corrected in Præf. Troad. p. xxviii., and should have compared Archestratus, quoted by Athenæus vii. p. 305, E., Εἰώθασι δονεῖν ψήφους αἴθωνι λογισμῷ.

[1] Stephens would omit, with Ficinus, *τῶν τοιούτων*. Ast refers those words to *τις*. He should have read *τι τῶν τοιούτων*, as I have translated.

[2—2] Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus, followed for the most part by Taylor, has "Si legatus aut præco falsa, quæ sibi commissa sunt, nunciaverit, dicendave tacuerit, vel rursus ab hostibus amicisve rediens, quæ ab illis accepit, aliter quam acceperit, retulisse reperiatur."

[3—3] Ficinus has more fully "et judices pro magnitudine rei, quid pati dareve ipsum oportet, si damnatus fuerit, statuant."

The stealing of money is an ungentlemanlike act, but seizing by violence is a shameless one. But of the sons of Zeus not one[1] has ever carried on either of those pursuits by fraud or force with impunity. Let no one therefore, acting improperly, be deceived and persuaded at all[2] by poets or certain mythologists, and think that, if he makes use of fraud or force, he does nothing disgraceful, but only what the gods themselves are doing. For this is neither true nor becoming. But whoever[3] does a thing of this kind contrary to law, is neither a god, nor a son of the gods. But this it is fitting for the legislator rather than all poets to know. He therefore, who is persuaded by our discourse, is happy, and may he be happy through the whole of time; but let him, who is unpersuaded, be restrained[4] subsequently by some such law as this. If any one steals what is public property, whether great or small, he has need of the same punishment; for he who steals a trifle, steals with the same desire, but with less power. But he, who removes any thing of greater value, and does not put it down again, is wholly unjust. The law however deems it just to punish the one with a less punishment than the other, not on account of the greatness of the theft, but through one of them being perhaps curable, but the other incurable. If any one convicts before a tribunal a slave or a stranger of stealing any public property, let sentence be passed on him as to what he ought to suffer (in person), [5] or what fine he ought to pay,[5] as if he were, from what is likely, curable; but if a citizen, who has been brought up, as he will have been brought up, is caught committing a theft upon, or doing violence to, his country, whether taken in the fact or not, it is meet to punish him with death, as being nearly incurable.

[1] Ast very opportunely quotes from Horace, speaking of Mercury, "Callidum, quicquid placuit, jocoso condere furto." But I do not remember where it stated that he did not practise his art with impunity.

[2] I have translated as if the Greek were *μηδαμῶς ὑπό τε*, not *μηδ' ἄλλως ὑπὸ*— where I cannot understand *ἄλλως*, nor could Ficinus; who has "a fabulosis aliis hominibus," as if he wished to read, or found in his MS., *μηδ' ὑπ' ἄλλων τινων μυθολόγων*—

[3] Instead of *ὥς τις*, one MS. has *ὅς τι*, from which the Zurich editors have elicited, what I have adopted, *ὅς τις*— similar to "qui" in Ficinus.

[4] In lieu of *μαχέσθω*, Stephens would read *κατεχέσθω*, from "arcebitur" in Ficinus. But Ast, more correctly, *ἐνεχέσθω*—

[5]—[5] The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus; for the letters *ἢ τινα ζημίαν ἀποτίνειν*, made up one line of the Codex Archetypus.

[2.] For the sake of foreign expeditions much consultation and many laws are properly instituted. The greatest of all things, however, is for no one, either male or female, to be at any time without a ruler, nor the soul of any one, either seriously engaged or in sport, to be ever accustomed to do any thing alone itself by itself; but that in all time of war and in all of peace, to look perpetually to a ruler, and, following him, to live and be governed by him in the smallest things; as for instance, to stand, when he commands, and to march and to engage in gymnastics, and to wash himself, and to take food, and to get up at night, to mount guard and to convey orders; and in the midst even of dangers, neither to pursue nor to give way to any one, without the orders of the rulers; and in one word, to teach the soul by habit to do nothing apart from the rest, nor to think of, or know it at all; but that the life of all men should, as much as possible, be in all things collected (into one), and in common. For nothing is, or will ever be, superior to, and better, and more full of art than this, for the purposes of safety and victory in war. And in peace, too, men must from their childhood be practised in ruling over others, and being ruled by others; but anarchy must be expelled from the whole life of all men, and [1] of wild beasts under man.[1] All dancings moreover (it is meet) to celebrate with a view to the best modes of warfare, and to practise a complete facility in using the body and arms for the sake of the same objects, and an endurance in food and drink, and of cold weather and the contrary, and a hard bed, and, what is the greatest of all, the not destroying the powers of the head and feet through the covering of strange clothing, and by relaxing[2] the generation and growth of our natural caps and shoes.[3] For these extremities, when preserved, possess the greatest power of the whole body; but the contrary, when in a contrary state; and one (the feet) is the most subservient to the whole body; but the other (the head) has the greatest power, through possessing naturally all its dominant senses. And this praise of a warlike life, it is meet, it seems to me, for young men to hear; but the laws are these. Let the party serve in a campaign, who is on the list, or has been ordered through a certain quota.

[1]—[1] This, I confess, I scarcely understand.

[2] I have translated as if the Greek were ἀπολύοντας, not ἀπολλύντας.

[3] By a natural cap is meant the hair, and by a natural shoe, the hardened flesh.

But if any one through cowardice deserts his post, without a dismissal from the army-leaders, let an indictment for desertion lie before the war-officers, when they return from camp; and let those, who have served, try each of the parties, the heavy-armed foot and the cavalry severally, and all the other arms of the service each of the parties in a similar manner; and let the heavy-armed bring (the defaulters) before the heavy-armed, and the cavalry before the cavalry, and each of the other arms in like manner to those of their comrades. If any one is convicted, let it be not in his power to be a candidate for the whole prize of good conduct; [1] or to indict another party for not serving in a campaign,[1] or to be an accuser on these matters; and besides this, let a court of justice decide what he is to suffer (in person) or pay (in purse). After this, when the trials for desertions have been decided, let the commanders of each arm of the service form an assembly; and let the party, who wishes it, have amongst his own clans a trial relating to the prizes for good conduct; but let him not produce any testimony touching a former war, nor the confirmation of his assertions by witnesses, but only of the campaign, which had taken place at that time; and [2]let the crown of victory to each be that of a bough;[2] and let this person, after writing out an inscription, hang it up in the temple of whatever war-god he likes, as a witness through the whole of life, of the decision relating to the prize of good conduct; and so of the second and third prizes likewise. But if any one goes out during a campaign, but returns home before his time, without the commanding officers having sent him away, let there be indictments against such persons for leaving the ranks before the same parties as those in the case of non-service; and against the parties convicted, let punishments be imposed, such as have been laid down before. Now it is requisite for every man, when bringing every kind of law-suit against a person, to have a fear of bringing a false punishment,[3] either willingly or

[1]—[1] The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor.

[2]—[2] Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus has "corona ex frondibus arboris perpetuo virentis conserta," as if his MS. omitted *τὸν νικητήριον*, and had *ἀειζώου* after *θάλλου*. Taylor's translation is "let a crown of olive too be the reward of the military champion." From which I have been led to conceive that *ἐλαΐνου* has dropt out after *θάλλου*—

[3] Winckelmann, perceiving that there was nothing to answer to *μήτε*

unwillingly, to the best of his power. For Justice is said to be a modest [1] virgin, and [2] is said to be so really.[2] Now Falsehood is naturally an object of blame to Modesty and Justice. Respecting other matters then it is requisite to take care not to err against Justice; but pre-eminently so, in the case of throwing away arms in war; lest perchance a person by making a mistake about the throwing away of arms from a necessity, places such acts on the score of a reproach, and brings lawsuits unjustly against a person not deserving them. Indeed it is by no means easy to define one or the other of these points. It is necessary however for the law to endeavour to define somehow in part. Employing then a fable, let us say, that had Patroclus been carried to his tent without arms, and was still alive, as has befallen numberless persons, [3] and those former arms, which, as the poet says,[3] (Il. Σ. 84,) were given as a wedding present to Peleus by the gods on his marriage with Thetis, had Hector possessed, would it have been lawful for such bad men, as were at that time, to reproach the son of Menœtius, for throwing away his arms? Still further, [4] (could such persons be reproached,)[4] who, by being thrown down from precipices, have lost their arms, or (have fallen) into the sea [5] during storms, or [5] [6] in level places, when a

τιμωρίαν, proposed to read *κατηγορίαν μήτε μαρτυρίαν*— So too Ficinus has "supplicium mulctamve," unless it be said that he has here, as elsewhere, translated one Greek word by two Latin.

[1] In lieu of *αἰδοῦς* Stephens suggested *αἰδοίη*, which he got from "pudica" in Ficinus, and *παρθένος—Δίκη—αἰδοίη* in Hesiod Ἔργ. 256. Winckelmann would read—*αἰδοίη Διὸς Δίκη*, answering to *παρθένος ἐστὶ Δίκη Διὸς* in Hesiod. But since it would matter nothing to the argument, whether *Δίκη* was, or was not, a virgin, Plato wrote, I suspect, *παράθρονος γὰρ Αἰδοῦς Δίκη*—for we find in the next sentence *Ψεῦδος δὲ Αἰδοῖ καὶ Δίκῃ νεμεσητὸν*— On the confusion between *παράθρονος* and *παρθένος* see my note on Æsch. Eum. 227.

[2]—[2] As *ὄντως εἴρηται* never are, because they could not be, so joined, Plato wrote, no doubt, *πάντως εὖ εἴρηται*, "wholly well said—"

[3]—[3] Ficinus has "et arma, quæ a diis, ut poeta dicit, in dotem Thetidi data fuerant, ab Hectore rapta fuissent," as if his MS. omitted *πρότερα ἐκεῖνα*, and read *εἶλεν* for *εἶχεν*.

[4]—[4] I have adopted, what Ficinus alone has preserved, absolutely necessary for the sense, "eruntne vituperandi—"

[5]—[5] I have translated, as if the Greek were *χειμώνων ὄντων ἢ*, not *ἢ χειμώνων*—

[6]—[6] The Greek is *ἐν τόποις ὑποδεξαμένης*— where Ast would read *ἐν τρόποις*, Orelli *ἐν κότοις*, and Winckelmann *ἐν στρόβοις*. I have trans-

great flow of water has suddenly received[6] them—and[1] numberless things of this kind one might chaunt, when consoling (persons), and beautifying an act bad (in itself), and easy to be abused? It is necessary, however, to the utmost of our power, to divide the greater and the most grievous evil from the contrary. Now in abuse, the very abundance of such appellations possess nearly a certain division. For a person would not be justly called in all cases a thrower away of a shield, but the loser of them. For he, who is deprived (of his arms) by a reasonable display of force, and he, who throws them willingly away, would not be equally a thrower away of a shield; but there is a difference wholly and entirely. Let then this be held as spoken by a law. If any one, being overtaken by the enemy, and having arms, does not turn round and defend himself, but voluntarily drops them, or throws them away, catching at a base life, united to [2]a soulless cowardice,[2] rather than at an honourable death, united to manliness, against such a loss of arms thrown away, let there be justice done; but let the judge neglect to consider the loss mentioned above. For it is requisite always to punish the coward, in order that he may become better; but not the unfortunate. For in this there is no advantage. [3]But what punishment will be suited to him, who gives up such a power of defensive weapons to a contrary purpose?[3] [4]For it is not possible to do, in the case of a man, the contrary to what they say a god did, by changing

lated as if it were originally *ἐν τόποις ἀπέδοις δεξαμένης*— for *ἄπεδον*, found in Thucyd. vii. 78, *χωρίον ἄπεδον*, is explained in Greek Lexicons by *ἰσόπεδα, ὁμαλά*: while it is chiefly in level grounds that a sudden rush of waters, when it overtakes an army, is sure to carry off soldiers, unless they throw away their arms.

[1] In lieu of *ἤ*, Stephens saw that the sense requires *καὶ*, as I have translated.

[2—2] The Greek is *μετὰ τάχους*, which is perfectly absurd. Porson was the first to point out, in Miscellan. Critic. p. 266, that Photius in *Κάκη*, has preserved a portion of the original reading, *μετὰ κάκης*— while Winckelmann was the first to see that in *μετα ταχους* lies hid *μετ' αψυχου*— and that Plato wrote *μετ' ἀψύχου κάκης*, as I have translated.

[3—3] Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus has "sed quænam abjectionis armorum damnato et a virili fortitudine degeneranti pœna congrua erit?" One would prefer *τὸν ἐναντίον*, "the enemy—"

[4—4] Ficinus, whom Taylor follows almost to the letter, swerves here from the Greek, which I have closely translated, in his version, "præ-

Cæneus of Thessaly from a woman into the nature of a man.[4] [1]For to the man, who throws away his shield, the sex would, after a manner, be the most becoming of all, which is the contrary to that sex, which, by the being changed from a man into a woman, would become a punishment to such a person.[1] But now, what[2] is the nearest to these, in order that a person, for the sake of a love of life, may through the remainder of life run no risk, but live as long as possible, as being a coward and coupled to reproaches, for such let this be the law. The man, who is convicted of having disgracefully thrown away his weapons of war, let neither the general of an army, nor any other military officer, ever employ as a soldier, nor put him into the ranks at all; otherwise let the party, who is the auditor of his accounts and doings, set him to rights thus.[3] If the person who has put the coward into the ranks, belongs to the highest property-census, (let him pay) a thousand drachms;[4] if to the second, five minæ; if to the third, three; and if to the fourth, one mina. And let him, who has been convicted (of throwing away his arms), pay, in addition to his being excluded from manly dangers, through his own individual nature, a thousand drachms, if he belongs to the highest census; and five minæ, if to the second; three, if to the third; and one mina, in like manner as the preceding, if to the fourth.[5]

[3.] With respect to the auditing[6] of accounts, what would be for us the fitting discourse, when some of the magistrates are chosen by the chance of a lot for a year, and others for many years

sertim cum impossibile sit homini in contrarium commutari, ut Cæneum Thessalum ferunt divina quadam vi in naturam viri ex fœmina commutatum." The god alluded to is Neptune, as we learn from the Scholiast and Hyginus, Fab. xiv., quoted by Ast; who should have adopted Stephens' ᾧ in lieu of his own ὧν, for ὡς—

[1]—[1] Here again Taylor has followed the abridged translation of Ficinus, "abjectori enim armorum contrarium maxime conveniret, ut in mulierem ex viro translatus sic puniatur."

[2] I have adopted Ast's ὅ, τι for ὅτι— And so too Sydenham.

[3] Photius in Εὐθύναι quotes—τούτους κατευθύνειν αὐτοὺς—where lies hid οὕτως, as I have translated.

[4] i. e. 10 minæ.

[5] After τετάρτου the text has μέρους, which is evidently an interpolation.

[6] I have adopted εὐθυνῶν, which Ficinus found in his MS. for εὐθύνων, as shown by his version—"repetendis—rationibus—"

and from a selection? For of such accounts who will be a sufficient Auditor? [1] For should any one of the persons in office say or do any thing not straightforward, when bent down by the weight of his duties, or by the want of power, with respect to the dignity of his office, it (would be) by no means easy to find a ruler, superior to (other) rulers in virtue;[1] still we must endeavour to discover some god-like Auditors. For the case is this. There are many occasions for dissolving a polity, as of a ship, [2] or any animal;[2] [3] of which while we say there are blocks, and underjoinings, and fibres, and ropes,[3] we call the nature one, yet dispersed in many parts by many names. But this is an occasion by no means the smallest, for the preservation of a polity and its dissolution and falling away. For if those, who audit the accounts of the magistrates, are better than the magistrates, and this takes place with justice not to be blamed,[4] and in a blameless manner, the whole country and state thus flourishes and is happy. But if that, which relates to the audit of the magistrates, takes place in a different manner, then the justice,

[1]—[1] Ficinus, whom Taylor follows to the letter, has "Quis enim sufficiens repetundarum judex erit, si quis magistratus, rerum pondere pressus, dixerit feceritve suo aliquid indignum principatu? Difficile inventu hoc est. Nam cum delecti magistratus virtute alios antecellant, quo pacto præstantiorem eis inveniemus?" where not only are sentences transposed, but many words omitted; and "feceritve" added; from which Cornarius elicited *ἢ πράξῃ*, wanting in every other MS.

[2]—[2] This introduction of an animal seems very strange here, as if an animal were, like a form of government or a vessel, made by man. Unless I am greatly mistaken, Plato wrote *νεὼς εὐζώστου τινος*, not *νεὼς ἢ ζώου τινος*, for he goes on to mention the parts of a well-joined vessel.

[3]—[3] The Greek is at present *οὓς ἐντόνους τε καὶ ὑποζώματα καὶ νεύρων ἐπιτόνους*. I have translated as if it were originally—*ἧς λέγοντες ὄνους τε καὶ ὑποζώματα καὶ νεῦρα εἶναι ἐπιτόνους τε*—for by *ὄνους* is meant what we call the "blocks" through which the ropes run, or a windlass, as it would seem from Eustathius on Ιλ. Λ. p. 862 = 807, and the Schol. on Thucyd. vii. 25, *ὄνος ἐστὶ μηχάνη ἐπ' ἄκρων τῶν ἀκατίων πηγνυμένη, ἀφ' ἧς περιβάλλοντες βρόχους τοὺς σταυροὺς ῥαδίως ἐκ τοῦ βυθοῦ ἀνέσπων*. With regard to *ἐντόνους*, that word is never found in the sense of a rope; only *τόνους* and *ἐπιτόνους*—both of which however would not be used here: and with respect to *νεύρων ἐπιτόνους*, Cornarius was the first to read *νεῦρα καὶ ἐπιτόνους*, for he doubtless remembered the passage in the Timæus, p. 84, E., *τοὺς τε ἐπιτόνους καὶ τὰ ξυνεχῆ νεῦρα*— By *νεῦρα* are probably meant ropes made of the tendons of animals twisted like the so-called cat-gut.

[4] Winckelmann would expunge *ἀμέμπτῳ*: Orelli read *ἀμιάντῳ*, referring to p. 777, E. Ficinus, followed by Taylor, has "ut nemo jure conqueri possit." What Plato wrote, others, I hope, will discover.

which binds together all political affairs into one, being dissolved, the whole government is torn apart, one portion from another, and [1] no longer inclining to the same point,[1] they cause the city from being one to become many, and, filling it with sedition, destroy it quickly. On this account then it is requisite for the Auditors to be objects of admiration for their virtue. Let us then devise by some method that their production shall be of this kind. Let the whole city come together each year, after the turn of the sun from the summer to the winter, to a sacred grove, common to the Sun and Apollo,[2] [3] with the view of exhibiting to the god [3] three men, which each person shall judge to be the best of all except himself, and not less than fifty years of age; and of those voted in preference by the greatest number of persons, let them make a selection up to the half, if they are an even number; but if they are odd, let them take away the one, who had the fewest votes, and leave the half, and make a decision by the number of votes; but if to some the votes are equal, [4] and they make the half number more,[4] let them take away the surplus, after rejecting on account of the youth; but selecting the others, let them give their votes again, until three with unequal votes are obtained.[5] But if for all or for two the votes are equal, then, committing the affair to good fate and fortune, let them select the victor by a lot, and let them crown him, and the second, and the third, with a bough;[6] and after giving the prizes for excellence, let (a crier) proclaim to all, that [7] the city of the Magnesians having again obtained

[1]—[1] The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus. For he could perhaps make nothing out of *νέαι οὖσαι*, corrected by Stephens into *νεύουσαι*, but into *τείνουσαι* by Winckelmann.

[2] This is the only place I remember, where the Sun and Apollo are considered different deities.

[3]—[3] Ficinus, followed by Taylor, has simply "electuri"—

[4]—[4] These words, I confess, I cannot understand. Ficinus has "dimidiumque numerum auxerint"—which is equally unintelligible. Taylor translates—"and the half of these is more than three"—

[5] In lieu of λειφθῶσιν Stephens proposed to read ληφθῶσιν, similar to "obtineant" in Ficinus, and so the best MS., followed by Ast and Stalbaum. The Zurich editors prefer λειφθῶσιν— But in the whole of this passage I must acknowledge myself to be quite in the dark.

[6] Here, as before in § 2, Ficinus renders *θάλλῳ* by "ex semper virentis arboris frondis contexta—"

[7]—[7] In the original there seems to lie hid the following pentastich, Ἡ *κατὰ θεὸν τυχοῦσα* Μαγνήτων *πόλις* Σωτηρίας, *θεῖσ' ἣν κατ' ἀρχαῖον*

safety from a god, shows before the Sun three of her best men, and offers them up, according to the old law, as a common first-fruit to Apollo and the Sun, for as long a time as they follow their judgment.[7] Let these in the first year mark out twelve Auditors [1](and do so)[1] until each has reached his seventy-fifth year; and afterwards, let three be always added every year. Let these, dividing the magisterial offices into twelve parts, freely[2] examine them, by making use of all kinds of touchstones; and let them reside, as long as they are Auditors, in the grove sacred to the Sun and Apollo, in which they were elected. And let each, judging of some matters privately, and of others in common with each other, exhibit the rulers before the state; and putting, what they have written respecting each office in the market-place, let it be stated what the parties are to suffer (in person) or pay (in purse) according to the decision of the Auditors. And whichever of the magistrates shall not admit that he has been judged of with justice, let him bring the Auditors to the select jurymen; and if he escapes from the Auditors' decision, let him, if he will, bring a charge against the Auditors themselves; and if he is convicted, let him, if the punishment fixed by the Auditors against any one is death, simply die, as necessity requires; but of the other fines, of which it is possible to pay the double, let him pay the double.

It is now meet to hear what the honours[3] of these Auditors are to be, and after what manner. Let the first seats in all public meetings be given to those, who, while they live, are deemed by the whole state worthy of the prizes for good conduct; and further, in the case of sacrifices, and holy embassies

νόμον Τρεῖς *τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄνδρας, ἀκροθινιον* Κοινόν *τ' Ἀπόλλωνος καλόν θ' ὃν* Ἡλίου, Ὅσονπερ *ἀκολουθῶσι τῇ δίκῃ χρόνον*, where, however, correct Greek would require a dative after *ἀκροθίνιον*, as shown by *ἀκροθίνια* Λοξίᾳ in Phœniss. 210. As regards the last clause, all the words after "Sun" are tacitly omitted by Taylor. Ficinus has—"quatenus judicium secuturi sunt—" But the business of the Auditors was to follow not the judgment of any one, but justice alone. Hence I suspect that Plato wrote not *κρίσει*, but *δίκῃ*. The two words are confounded in MSS. elsewhere.

[1]—[1] Ficinus, followed by Taylor, supplies "idque facient—"

[2] Instead of *ἐλευθέραις*, the two best MSS. read *ἐλευθέροις*, which leads distinctly to *ἐλευθέρως*.

[3] I have adopted *τιμὰς*, as suggested by Ast, in lieu of *εὐθύνας*, which is here unintelligible. On the other hand, Ast quotes opportunely *τῶν ἄλλων τῶν δοθεισῶν τιμῶν*, found at the end of this section.

amongst the Greeks in common, and of holy rites, in which there is a communion on other grounds,[1] let them send from amongst these the chiefs of each holy embassy; and let these alone of those in the state be adorned with a crown of laurel; and let all of them be priests of Apollo and the Sun; and let one be the high priest for the year, who is adjudged to have been the first amongst the priests [2]in that year;[2] and write up his name every year, in order that it may become the measure of the period of time, as long as the city is inhabited. And when they die, let the laying out of the corpse, and the carrying it out, and their graves, be different from those of the other citizens; and let (every one)[3] wear his whole robe white, and let no one be without weeping and lamentation; and let there be also (one) choir of fifteen girls, and another of as many boys, and let each stand round the bier, and sing in turn praises on the priests, as it were a set hymn, and celebrate their happy state in an ode the whole day long; and on the morning (following), let a hundred young men, amongst those engaged in gymnastic exercises, and whom the relations of the deceased shall have selected,[4] carry the bier to the sepulchre. And first, let the unmarried young men precede (the bier), each having put on a warrior's dress, the horsemen with their horses, and the heavy-armed foot-soldiers with their shields, and the rest after a similar manner; and let the boys around the bier go before and sing the national hymn, and let the girls follow behind, and such of the women as happen to be freed from child-bearing; and after them let the priests and

[1] I have translated as if the Greek were *ἑτέρως*, not *ἑτέρῳ*, although I confess I do not understand what Plato meant to say here; nor could, I think, Ficinus; who has omitted the clause *καὶ ὅσων ἂν ἑτέρῳ κοινωνῶσιν ἱερῶν*—and so after him has Taylor.

[2—2] Ficinus has, what the sense requires, "in superiori anno." But how *ἐκείνῳ* came here in lieu of *περυσίνῳ* I am unable to explain.

[3] So Taylor, as if he wished to read *πάντα* for *πᾶσαν*— Plato wrote, I suspect, *πάντας πᾶσαν*— For *πᾶς* is thus repeated perpetually.

[4] So Ficinus, and after him Taylor. But from his "delegerint" it is difficult to elicit what he found in his MS. It was certainly not *ἂν—ἐπόψωνται*— for there is no such Greek aor. 1, mid. as *ὠψάμην*: and incorrectly did Stephens suggest, and Ast and Stalbaum adopt, *ἐπόψωνται* to avoid the solecism in *ἂν—ἐπόψονται*. Equally at a loss was Buttman, who in Gr. Gr. T. ii. p. 201, suggests *ἐπιόψωνται*, a word perfectly unknown in Greek. Perhaps Plato wrote *οἷς ἂν—ἐπιτρέψωνται*, i. e. "upon whom the relations of the deceased may have imposed the duty."

priestesses follow, as to a pure tomb, although they are repelled from other tombs, if at least the Pythian priestess gives her vote so and on this side; and let the place of deposit for them be built under the earth, a long vault composed [1]of stones very valuable, and without old age to the best of their power,[1] and having couches, made of stones, lying by each other; where having placed the man, who has become blessed,[2] and raising a mound in a circle, they shall plant a grove of trees around, except at one limb, in order that the burial-place may have an enlargement, [3]such that there may be no deficiency in a mound for those to be placed there in all time;[3] and they shall make yearly contests in music and gymnastics and horsemanship. Such are the honours to be paid to those, [4]who have escaped (the reversal) of their auditorship.[4] But if any one of these, confiding too much in his having been tried, should exhibit [5](a depraved)[5] human nature, by becoming depraved after his trial, let the law ordain that any one, who is willing, may indict him; and let the trial take place at a tribunal, in some such manner as this. First let the guardians of the laws belong to this tribunal. Next [6]of these very persons

[1]—[1] The Greek is *λίθων προτίμων καὶ ἀγήρων εἰς δύναμιν*. But Julius Pollux ix. 49, and Suidas in *Ψαλίδα*, offer *λίθων πολυτίμων*; which has led me to suggest *ἐριτίμων*: for Suidas in *Λίθος* has—*οἱ δὲ Ἄβαροι—λίθων τὰς ἐριτίμους ἀποφέρεσθαι ἠξίουν*. Moreover as *ἀγήρων εἰς δύναμιν* is here perfectly unintelligible, Hemsterhuis on Pollux, p. 1039, was led to consider those words as an interpolation. But since words are not introduced thus without some reason, it is probable, that they are either a corruption of some others, or, what is more likely, misplaced; for they might follow *τὸν μακάριον γεγονότα θέντες*—where they perhaps dropt out, as forming one line of the Codex Archetypus.

[2] On this custom of calling a deceased person by the name of blessed, see Blomfield on Æsch. Pers. 639.

[3]—[3] The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, who is thus followed by Taylor—"that the sepulchre may be always enlarged, when it is requisite."

[4]—[4] Such is, as Ficinus saw correctly, what the sense requires. This is evident from his version, adopted almost to the letter by Taylor, "hæc præmia illis reddantur, quorum de relatis rationibus judicia damnata non sunt." But such is not the meaning of *τοῖς τὰς εὐθύνας διαφυγοῦσιν*—What Plato wrote, I must leave for better scholars to discover.

[5]—[5] I have translated as if *κακὴν* had dropt out before *κακὸς*—

[6]—[6] Such is the literal version of the unintelligible Greek, *αὐτῶν τούτων οἱ ζῶντες*: where Ast would read *αὐτῶν τῶν εὐθύνων ζῶντες*—But that is equally obscure. Ficinus has "accusati ipsius collegæ," as if he had found in his MS. *τοῦ ἐν αἰτίᾳ ὄντος αὐτοῦ οἱ συζῶντες*—

the living;[6] and moreover let the tribunal be composed of the select jurymen. And let him, who lays the indictment, put on the record against the party, whom he is indicting, the charge, averring that this or that person is unworthy of the prize for good conduct and of his office. And if the defendant is cast, let him be deprived of his office, and sepulchre, and the other honours granted to him; but if the accuser does not obtain a fifth part of the votes, let him pay, if his property is of the highest valuation, twelve minæ; eight, if of the second; if of the third, six; and if of the fourth, two.

[4.] Respecting the so-called decision of Rhadamanthus, in judicial matters, it is indeed worthy of admiration. For he saw that the men of that time distinctly believed that there were gods, and reasonably so; because at that time the majority were the descendants of gods, of whom he was himself one, at least as the story goes. He appears, therefore, to have thought that he ought to commit (nothing)[1] to any man as a judge, but to gods; from whence causes were decided by him simply and quickly. For by tendering an oath to the disputants upon each matter in dispute, he was freed from them with rapidity and safety. But since at present, as we have stated, some portion of mankind think that the gods do not exist at all; and others conceive that they take no care of us; while the opinion of the greatest and worst part is, that, by receiving trifling sacrifices and abundance[2] of flattery, they will conjointly deprive persons of considerable property, and free them from harm on many occasions,[3] the art of Rhadamanthus in lawsuits would no longer be suited to men of the present time. For since the opinions of men respecting the gods have undergone a change, it is necessary for laws to be changed likewise. In the allotment of causes therefore, it is meet for those who, possessing a mind, lay down laws, to take away the oaths of either of the opposing parties, and for the party, who has obtained by lot a trial against any one, to write down

[1] I have translated, as if *οὐδὲν* had dropt out between *οὐδενὶ* and *διανοούμενος*.

[2] I have retained *πολλὰς*, which Bekker, followed by Stalbaum, has inconsiderately omitted with two indifferent MSS.

[3] Such seems to be the meaning of *κατὰ πολλὰ*— I suspect however that Plato wrote *κατ' αἰκάλην*, "according to their flattery." The word *αἰκάλη* Stephens found in a MS. Greek lexicon explained by *ἀπάτη*. Ficinus omits all after *χρήματα*, and so does Taylor.

ths accusations, but to swear no oath; and for the defendant in like manner to write down his denial, and to hand it over to the rulers without an oath. [1]For it is surely a terrible thing to know well that, while many lawsuits are occurring in the state, almost one half of the parties have perjured themselves,[1] by having been easily mixed up with each other at joint-feasts [2]and through other intercourse and private joint-producings of each one.[2] Let it therefore be laid down as a law that he, who is about to act the juryman, shall take an oath as a juryman; and that he, who appoints for the commonweal the magistrates by oaths, or by the bringing of votes, [3]must bring them from sacred places and do something of this kind;[3] and on the other hand, that the judge of choirs and all kinds of music, and the presidents over, and the umpires at, the gymnastic and equestrian contests, and in all matters which, according to the opinion of men, do not bring a gain to the party forswearing himself, (shall take an oath;) [4]but in those, that seem to be plainly a great profit to the party, who makes a denial or takes an oath, let all, who bring a charge against each other, be judged by lawsuits without any oaths.[4] And generally in a lawsuit let

[1]—[1] Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus has rather strangely, what Taylor has adopted, "Nam si jurandi licentia cuique dabitur, ubi plura quotidie ad judices deferuntur, omnes pœne perjuri erunt."

[2]—[2] Such is the literal version of the Greek, *συνουσίαις τε καὶ ἰδιωτικαῖς συγγενήσεσιν ἑκάστων*: where Ast explains *συγγενήσεσιν* by *συνουσίαις*, thus introducing a needless tautology. Moreover *γένησις* always means elsewhere "a producing," or "production." Opportunely then does the best MS. offer *συντονήσεσιν*, from which it is easy to elicit *συμπονήσεσιν*, "joint-labourings;" but as the idea of an act, done jointly by more persons than one, requires the mention of such persons taken jointly, not individually, it is evident that for *ἑκάστων* the train of thought leads here to *δικαστῶν*: while the antithesis required by *ἰδιωτικαῖς* plainly shows that *δημοσίαις* has dropt out after *συνουσίαις*; and thus the sense will be "by other intercourse, and joint-labourings of jurymen of a public and private kind," where, by the figure Chiasmus, *ἰδιωτικαῖς* belongs to *συνουσίαις*, and *δημοσίαις* to *συμπονήσεσι*.

[3]—[3] The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor. With regard to the expression *τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀφ' ἱερῶν φέρειν*, Ast explains it by saying that the pebbles used in voting were taken to a temple, as stated in vi. p. 753, C. § 2, and afterwards brought from thence with the odour of sanctity about them.

[4]—[4] Ficinus, followed almost to the letter by Taylor, has thus abridged all between the numerals, "in quibus autem utilitatem ex perjurio aliquis assequitur, ea sine jurejurando judicentur."

not the presidents permit a person while speaking to take an oath, for the sake of making his assertion credible, or to imprecate curses on himself and race, or to employ unseemly entreaties or the piteous tones of a woman, but let the party proceed ever with good words in teaching [1] and learning [1] what is just; and if not, let the magistrate, as if the party were speaking out of the record, bring him back to the arguments that may happen to be relating to the business in hand. [2] But let it be in the power of a stranger (when litigating) with a stranger, as at present, to receive from, if they are willing, and to tender to, each other oaths.[2] For they will not grow old, [3] nor by hatching young ones [3] in the state, [4] will they furnish the power to others for the most part of such a brood to become the masters of the country.[4]

In the same manner let there be a decision respecting the allotment [5] of lawsuits against each other in all cases, where a free-man is not obedient to the state in matters, deserving neither stripes, nor bonds, nor death. But as regards the non-attendance [6] at dancings, or processions, or other public acts of a showy kind, or sharing in public duties, such as take place for the sake of a sacrifice in peace, or a contribution in war, in all these let the first necessity be a remedy [7] for the damage done; but from such, as are disobedient, let a security be demanded by those, on whom the state and the law together enjoin to demand it; [8] and of such, as are inattentive

[1—1] The words between the numerals, evidently out of place here, are omitted in the best MS. Ficinus has elegantly, but not closely, "sed quod justum putant mansuete doceant, et docentem audiant."

[2—2] Here again Ficinus, followed by Taylor, has abridged the original in his version, "peregrinis autem inter se litigantibus, quemadmodum nunc, si velint, jurare liceat."

[3—3] The metaphorical word *ἐννεοττεύοντες* is omitted by Ficinus and Taylor; who should have remembered *ἐπιθυμίας—ἐννεοττευμένας* in Rep. ix. p. 573, E. § 3, quoted by Ast.

[4—4] Ficinus, followed to the letter by Taylor, has strangely represented this passage in his version, "non est formidandum, ne alios corrumpant."

[5] Such, I presume, is the meaning of *λήξεως*. But the reading is here uncertain. For two MSS. offer *λέξεως*: while Ficinus, followed by Taylor, has "Eodem autem modo inter liberos homines exsecutio judicii fiat."

[6] Ficinus has, what the sense requires, "siquis ad choreas—non venit"—as if his MS. read *τῶν οὐ φοιτήσεων*, not *τινῶν*—

[7] I have adopted *ἴασιν* for *ἰατὴν*, as suggested by Ast.

[8—8] Here again Ficinus, followed by Taylor, has strangely rendered—"exactoque tempore—"

(to the matter),[8] let there be a sale of the security, and let money (got from the sale) belong to the state. But if they are in need of a greater fine, let each of the magistrates, after imposing a fitting fine on the disobedient, bring the parties before a court of justice, until they are willing to do what they are ordered.

[5.] It is necessary moreover to consult about what it is meet to do for a state, which does not make money, except by what[1] arises from the land, and does not import any thing,[2] [3]touching the going abroad of its own people out of the country, and the reception of foreigners from other parts.[3] On these points the legislator ought to give advice by first persuading to the utmost of his power. The intermixture indeed of states with states naturally causes a mixture of all kinds of manners, through strangers making with strangers innovations [4]with each other;[4] which thing would bring an injury the greatest of all to those, who have a good polity through good laws. But, to the greater number of states, as being by no means under good laws, it makes no difference for the citizens[5] to be contaminated by receiving foreigners, and for the citizens[6] to revel in other states, when a person is desirous of going abroad in any way or at any time, whether he is young, or rather advanced in years. But, on the other hand, for these never to receive others, and never themselves to travel elsewhere, is not at all suitable; and it would appear to be a behaviour rustic and rude to the rest of mankind, who would make use of harsh names, such as the so-called stranger-expellings,[7] and manners self-willed and morose, as they would seem to be. Now to

[1] I have translated as if the Greek were πλὴν τοῦ—not πλὴν τὸν—

[2] I have supplied τι, which seems to have dropt out after ἐμπορεύηται, unless it be said that ἐμπορεύεσθαι means "to be a foreign merchant—"

[3—3] Ficinus, followed partly by Taylor, has—"neque peregrinationibus vacat, neque peregrinos aliunde suscipiat—"

[4—4] As ἀλλήλοις is evidently superfluous, Ficinus has "plurima innovare—" either because his MS. read μάλα πολλὰς, or he wished to read so from conjecture. I should prefer ἄλλῃ ἄλλους, i. e. "some in one way, and others in another." See my Poppo's Prolegom. p. 135.

[5, 6] Winckelmann has correctly suggested ἀστοῖς for αὐτοῖς, and he should have read likewise ἀστοὺς for αὐτοὺς—in [6]. What Ficinus found in his MS. it is impossible to ascertain; for he has abridged the passage in his version, adopted by Taylor—"si tam senes quam juvenes pro arbitrio et alio peregrinatur et aliunde peregrinos suscipiant."

[7] In ξενηλασίαις is an allusion to a Spartan custom. Ast refers to Protag. p. 342, C. § 80, and Plutarch, Lycurg. p. 56, C.

appear to be good, or not good, to others, it is meet never to consider a thing of small importance. For the multitude [1] do not, as far as they happen to fail in the substance of virtue, fail so far in their judgment of others, who are vicious and useless,[1] but there is even in the bad a something divine and felicitous in hitting the mark, so that very many even of the very bad distinguish very well, both by their words and thoughts, the better sort of men and the worse. And hence the exhortation to many states is correct, to set some value on the good opinion of the multitude. For it is a thing the most correct and of the greatest consequence for a man truly good to hunt in this way after a life of fair repute; for without it, he will by no means become the perfect man. And truly becoming would it be for the city, settled in Crete, to render itself in the opinion of the rest of mankind the most beautiful and best. And there is every hope in all likelihood, should it conduct itself according to reason, that in a little time [2] the Sun and the other gods will see it amongst the states and countries, that are well-governed. In this way then it is meet to act, with regard to travelling into other countries and places, and the reception of foreigners. In the first place, let it not be lawful for a person less than forty years of age to go abroad at any time, or in any manner; and further still, for no person on a private account, but on a public one, let it be lawful for heralds or ambassadors, or certain holy inspectors (to go abroad). But to be absent from the country during a war or a campaign, does not deserve to be called a going abroad, nor to be a part of such political doings. It is likewise requisite to send persons to the Pythian Apollo, and the Olympian Jupiter, and likewise to Nemea and the Isthmus,[3] to take a share in the sacrifices and contests (sacred) to those gods; and to send the most numer-

[1]—[1] Here again Ficinus, followed by Taylor, has given merely an abridgment of the Greek in his version—"quamvis virtutes expertes sint, qui tamen probi sint, qui improbi, judicant." From which however it is easy to see that he found in his MS. *οἵ εἰσι πονηροὶ καὶ χρηστοὶ*—where *χρηστοὶ* is confirmed by four other MSS., while *οἵ εἰσι* has been corrupted into *ὅσοι* in two.

[2] Bekker has adopted *μετ' ὀλίγων* from four MSS., similar to "cum paucis aliis civitatibus" in Ficinus.

[3] It seems strange, that after Plato had mentioned the names of the gods, who presided over the Pythian and Olympian games, he should have omitted that of Neptune, who presided over the two others. Hence one would suspect that *τῷ Ποσειδῶνι* had dropt out after *τῷ Διὶ καὶ*—

ous, and such as are the most beautiful and the best in their power, who may cause the state to appear of fair repute in holy and peaceful meetings, by exhibiting its apparatus for renown as the counter-part of what is requisite for war. And when they return home, they will teach the young, that the legal institutions of the rest of mankind relating to political affairs, are second to their own. [1]But on other grounds it is (not) meet to send out holy inspectors; but some such as these, after obtaining permission of the guardians of the laws,[1] should any of the citizens be desirous to look at the affairs of the rest of mankind, let no law restrain. For a state, while unacquainted with good and wicked men, cannot by being unsociable be sufficiently mild and perfect. [2]Nor again, can it preserve its laws without taking them into consideration, but not only by morals.[2] For amongst the multitude there are always some, not many, godlike men, every way worthy of being associated with, and who are produced in no respect the more in well-governed states than in those that are not so; in whose footsteps it is ever meet for him, who dwells in well-regulated states, to proceed, when on going out by sea or by land, he is seeking the party, who may be uncorrupted, so as to make some of the legal institutions, that have been laid down correctly, more firm, and to correct others, where there is any deficiency. For without such an inspection and search, a state will never continue perfect; [3]not even if they inspect it badly.[3]

[1]—[1] The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor. For they were either wanting in his MS., or, what is more probable, he could not understand the Greek—*θεωροὺς δὲ ἄλλους ἐκπέμπειν χρεὼν τοιούσδε τινὰς τοὺς νομοφύλακας*—nor could Stephens; from whose "si oporteat" Ast was led to suggest—*εἰ χρεὼν*—but Winckelmann, whom I have followed, reads more correctly, *οὐ χρεὼν, τοιούσδε δὲ τινας* —while none have seen that Plato wrote *ἄλλως*, not *ἄλλους*—and so I have translated the whole passage. Stalbaum, after confessing the difficulty, says that if *κἂν*, not *ἂν*, were found in MSS., he would adopt it. But I cannot discover what is to be gained by the change.

[2]—[2] Ficinus has "nec leges servare moribus et consuetudine solum, nisi etiam notitia legum prudentur fiat:" which has led me to suggest that Plato wrote *ἄνευ τοῦ μὴ μόνον γμώμῃ λαβεῖν αὐτοὺς, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἤθεσιν*— not *ἄνευ τοῦ γμώμῃ λαβεῖν αὐτοὺς, ἀλλὰ μὴ μόνον ἤθεσιν*— For *μὴ μόνον* could scarcely thus follow *ἀλλὰ*—

[3]—[3] The words between the numerals I cannot understand. Three MSS. offer *ταύτην* for *αὐτὴν*: from which nothing is gained. I could have understood *οὐδ' ἂν κακίστην τινα θεωρῶσιν*, "not even if they inspect a very bad one," in lieu of *κακῶς ταύτην*—

Clin. How, therefore, can both of these take place?

Athen. Thus. [6.] First let an inspector of this kind be not more than fifty years of age; and further, let him be of good repute for other matters and for war, if he is about to lay before other cities a specimen of the guardians of the laws. But when he is more than sixty years of age, let him no longer be an inspector. And having made an inspection for as many years of the ten as he likes, let him return home and go to the assembly of those who inspect the laws. And let this (assembly) be composed of old persons and young; and let it be held of necessity every day, from day-break until the sun rises; and let it be composed first of those priests, who have received the prizes for good conduct; next, ten of the guardians of the laws, [1]who happen to be the seniors;[1] and further still, the guardian of the whole education, both the new one, and those who have been released from the office. And let each of these go not alone, but with a young man from thirty to forty years of age, having taken as an ally the person agreeable to himself; and let there be a conference amongst them, and a conversation upon the laws of their own state, and on such matters as they shall have heard of, superior at all in any other quarter; and about objects of learning to boot, such as may seem to be of use in this inquiry, and which, to those, who have learnt, will be more clear to be understood;[2] but to those, who have not learnt, the points relating to laws would seem to be rather dark.[3] And whatever the elders may select from these, let the younger learn with all attention; and if any one of those, who have been invited, seems to be an unworthy person, let the whole meeting blame the party who invited him. But let the whole[4] state watch over those of the young men, who are in good repute, [5]looking at them, and observing them pre-eminently; and let them hold in honour those, who

[1—1] In lieu of *τοὺς ἀεὶ πρεσβεύοντας*, where there is nothing to govern the accusative, Ast suggests *οἱ ἀεὶ πρεσβεύοντες*, similar to "decem—seniores" in Ficinus.

[2] In lieu of *εὐαγέστερον γίγνεσθαι*, which I cannot understand, I have translated, as if the Greek were *εὐαγέστερα γιγνώσκεσθαι*— to which I have been led by finding in Ficinus "facilius—intellecturi sint."

[3] After *φαίνεσθαι* I have omitted *καὶ ἀσαφῆ*, evidently an explanation of *σκοτωδέστερα*.

[4] Instead of *ἄλλην*, Ficinus found in his MS. *ὅλην*, as shown by his "tota."

[5—5] The words between the numerals Ficinus, followed by Taylor, omits.

are in the right way,[5] but in dishonour more than the rest, if they turn out worse than the majority. To this meeting let him, who has inspected the legal institutions amongst the rest of mankind, go immediately on his arrival; and if he has discovered any persons possessing any rumour about the laying down of any laws, or of education or bringing up, let him mention it, or if he has himself thought upon any matters, let him communicate it to the whole assembly. But if he appears to have returned in no respect either worse or better, let him be praised at least for his very great readiness to go; but if (he returns) much better, let him while living be greatly honoured, and when dead, let all the power of the parties in the assembly honour him with befitting honours. But if he appears to have returned corrupted, although he pretends to be wise, let him associate with no one, either young or old. And if he is obedient to the magistrates, let him live in private; but if not, let him be put to death, [1]at least if he be convicted in a court of justice of being a busy-body on the subject of education and the laws.[1] But if none of the rulers bring him before a court of justice, when he deserves it, let a reproach be laid up against the rulers at the time of their undergoing a trial for the rewards for good conduct. Let him then, who goes abroad, go abroad in this manner, and being such a person. But after him it is meet to receive kindly the person, who comes from abroad. Now there are four kinds of foreigners of whom we ought to make mention. The first is he, who comes ever in the summer, and continues for the most part in his visits like birds of passage; and of these the majority flying, as it were, cleverly[2] over the sea in the spring of the year,[3] wend their way to other cities, for the sake of making money as merchants; which persons it is meet for the magistrates, appointed for such purposes, to receive in the market-places, and ports, and public buildings outside the city, at the city;[4] taking care that

[1]—[1] The words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor, although found in Ficinus, "sin autem contra magistratum voluntatem de disciplina legibusque civilibus disputare condemnatus in judicio fuerit—"

[2] I have translated, as if the Greek were *ἐντέχνως*, not *ἀτέχνως*. For most assuredly neither birds of passage, nor persons in the pursuit of gain, fly from place to place "artlessly."

[3] Although *πετόμενοι—πέτονται* might perhaps stand, yet I have translated as if the Greek were *ἐπιτείνονται—*

[4] Such is the literal version of the Greek, *πρὸς τῇ πόλει*: which Fi-

none of such foreigners make any innovation; and distributing correctly to them the claims of justice, and having an intercourse with them for what is necessary, but as little as possible. The second kind is he, who is in reality an inspector with his eyes, and receives[1] with his ears such sights, as are presented by the Muses. For every such person it is meet that lodgings should be fitted up near the temples by the kindness of people towards strangers; and it is meet for the priests and the sweepers of the temples to take care[2] that, after they have staid a moderate time, and have seen and heard (all), for the sake of which they came, they take their departure, uninjured by doing or suffering any thing; and let the priests be their judges, should any one of them do an injury to any one, or any one else[3] do an injury to any one of them, to within fifty drachms. But if there be a greater charge laid against them, it is requisite that the trial in such cases be before the Market-Stewards. The third kind of foreigner it is meet to receive in a public manner, when he arrives from another country on some public business. Him let the Generals, and the Hipparchs, and the Taxiarchs alone receive; and let the care of such person rest with that one of the Prytanes, with whom alone any person, received as a stranger, takes up his abode. The fourth, should he come at any time, is a rarity; but if he should come, the counterpart of the Inspectors from us,[4] let him, first, be not less than fifty years of age; besides this, let him think it right to see something beautiful, and superior in its beauty to the things in other cities, [5]or to show something of the same kind to another city.[5] Let then every such person come unbidden to the doors of the wealthy and wise, as being himself another of such a kind.[6] And let him go to the house of the party, who is the guardian of the whole of education, trust-

cinus renders, "in ipsis suburbiis." But such could scarcely be the meaning here. Plato wrote, I suspect, *πρὸς τῇ ἐμπολῇ*, "for the purpose of traffic."

[1] I have adopted, with Stephens, the conjecture of Cornarius, *δέχεται* for *ἔχεται*.

[2] I have omitted, with Ficinus, *ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ*, an evident explanation of *τημελεῖν*.

[3] The sense evidently requires *ἄλλος* for *ἄλλον*, as I have translated.

[4] Ficinus alone inserts here "hic ita recipietur," adopted by Taylor.

[5—5] Winckelmann would read *καὶ δεῖξαί τι κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἄλλο τῇ πόλει*.

[6] i. e. both wealthy and wise.

ing that [1]the reception of a stranger by one of those, who have gained a victory for virtue, will be sufficient for a stranger[1] of such a kind; and after being with some of these, and teaching in part, and learning in part,[2] let him go away honoured, as a friend should be by friends, with gifts and becoming honours. According to these laws it is meet to receive all strangers, both male and female, from another country, and to send out our own people, doing honour to Zeus, who presides over hospitality, nor to make an expulsion of foreigners by eatings and sacrifices, as [3]the nurslings of the Nile[3] do at present, nor yet by savage proclamations.

[7.] Let a person, who makes himself a guarantee, make it in an explicit manner, by acknowledging the whole transaction in writing, before not less than three witnesses, where the guarantee is for a sum under a thousand drachms; but, if above a thousand, before not less than five. [4]Let the broker of a person, who sells any thing not justly, or is not trustworthy, be a guarantee;[4] and let the broker, like the seller, be amenable to a lawsuit.

If a person wishes to search for his property in the possession of another party, let him, having previously sworn by the gods who preside over laws, that he expects to find (the property), search for it, either naked, or wearing a small cloak

[1]—[1] The Greek is *ξένος τῷ τοιούτῳ ξενῶνι τὴν*—where Ast, unable to understand *τὴν*, would omit it. But the difficulty rests rather in *ξένος—ξενῶνι*. I have therefore translated as if Plato had written *ξένισιν—ξένῳ*, where *ξένῳ* is furnished by two MSS. Baiter suggests *ξένος—ξένῳ ἢ*—and so does Grou.

[2] Ficinus, followed by Taylor, inserts "quæ discenda docendaque putavit."

[3]—[3] Despite the assertion, *καθάπερ ποιοῦσι νῦν*, it is hard to believe that in the time of Plato the people in Egypt fed upon foreigners and sacrificed them; while from the poetical expression, *θρέμματα Νείλου*, one would suspect that Plato obtained the knowledge of the fact from some drama, the argument of which was similar to the Helena and Iphigenia in Tauris of Euripides. Ast however explains the passage by saying, that "to expel foreigners from banquets and sacrifices is to prohibit them the use of such things." But the dative *βρώμασι* could not be thus taken in the sense of the genitive *ἀπὸ βρωμάτων*.

[4]—[4] Such is the literal version of the Greek, where *ὁ προπωλῶν* means, in English, a "broker," i. e. the party who finds for the seller a purchaser. Ficinus however seems to have found the whole passage more full in his MS., for his version is "fidejussor autem sit, qui prius vendidit, ejus de quo an jure possit vendere, dubitatur, atque ejus, qui videtur minus ad promissa sufficere."

and ungirded;[1] and let the other permit him to search the house, and the portions sealed up or unsealed. But if any one does not allow the search to the party desiring it, let the party, who is prevented, bring an action, after setting a value upon the property sought;[2] and, if the person is convicted, let him pay for twice the loss of the property valued. If the master of the house happens to be abroad, let those that inhabit it permit the search of such portions as are unsealed, and let the searcher place his own seal by those already sealed, and appoint any person he pleases as a guard for five days. But if the master is absent for a longer time, let the other party take the City-Stewards along with him, and search it thus, by breaking the seals, and, together with the relations and City-Stewards, seal them again in the same manner (as before).

Of property in dispute [3]it is meet to define the time,[3] during which, if a person has held it, it will not be lawful to dispute it any longer. Of farms and dwellings indeed there will be in this way no dispute. But of other property, whatever a person may have had in his possession, if he appears to have used it in the city, and market-place, and at sacred rites, [4](openly for a whole year,)[4] [5]and no one has made a claim upon it, and he says he has been seeking (an owner)[6] during that time, but that the party has concealed himself and never

[1] Ast, misled by "præcinctus" in Ficinus, says that the object of this clause was, that the searching party might get over the business more speedily. But in that case the searcher would have been *εὔζωστος*, in Latin "succinctus." By his being *ἄζωστος* he would lose the opportunity of carrying away any small article of great value, concealed in the folds of the cloak.

[2] From "amissæ rei" in Ficinus, Ast was led to *τὸ ἐρευνώμενον*, for *τὸν ἐρευνώνενον*, subsequently confirmed by two MSS.

[3—3] The Greek was once *χρόνου ὅρος*, where Stephens wished to insert *ἔστω*—the remains of which, Stalbaum says, seem to be found in five MSS. that read *χρόνου δὲ ὅρος*: where however lies hid *δεῖ ὁρίσαι*—similar to "determinandum est" in Ficinus.

[4—4] I have adopted "aperte anno integro," found in the version of Ficinus; for otherwise the subsequent *τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον* would be unintelligible.

[5—5] Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus has "atque hunc non occuluisse constet, nec quisquam interea, quamvis quærens, eam exegerit."

[6] To complete the sense I have translated as if *δεσπότην* had dropt out between *δὲ* and *ζητεῖν*.

appeared—if a person has thus held possession of any thing for a year,[5] [1] and he continues to be the seeker,[1] let it be lawful for no person[2] to lay claim to property of this kind, after a year has gone by. But if a person uses it neither in the city nor in the market-place, but in the fields openly, and no one offers himself during five years (as the owner), let it not be lawful for any one, after the five years have elapsed, to lay claim to it for the remainder of time. But if any one uses it at home in the city, let the period (of laying claim) be for three years; but if he uses it not openly in the country, for ten years; but if in another land, whenever (the owner) shall find it any where, let there be no definite period in all time for laying claim to it.

If any one by violence prevents another from being present at a trial, whether the party himself, or his witnesses, or his slave, or that of another person, let the cause be unfinished and undecisive; but if (the party prevented) is a free-man, in addition to the cause being unfinished, let (the party preventing)[3] be in bonds for a year, and let him be amenable to a trial for making him a slave at the suit of any one, who wishes. And if any one by violence prevents an antagonist in a gymnastic or musical or any other contest from being present, let any one, who is willing, inform the prize-distributors; and let them send to the contest a free-man, who is willing to contend; but if they are unable (to do so), let them, should he, who has prevented a party from contending, be the victor, assign the reward of victory to the party prevented, and write him down as the victor in whatever temples he pleases; but to the party preventing let it not be lawful for any offering or inscription of such a contest to exist; and let him be amenable to a trial for doing an injury, whether he is defeated in the contest, or is the victor.

If any one receives stolen property knowingly, let him undergo the same punishment as the thief. Let death, too, be the punishment of him, who harbours an exile.[4] For[5] let every

[1]—[1] Such, I presume, is the meaning of ὁ δὲ ζητῶν διαγένηται, for so we must read in lieu of διαγένωνται—which I cannot understand; nor could, I think, Ficinus, for he has omitted the whole sentence.

[2] I have adopted Ast's μηδενὶ for μηδὲν—

[3] Ficinus alone has what the sense requires—"qui depulit—"

[4] Ficinus alone adds here—"seu quemvis hujuscemodi fugientem—"

[5] Ficinus alone has "quippe—"

one consider the same person a friend and enemy, as the state does. If any one makes privately a peace[1] with, or a war against, certain persons, without the public (sharing in it), let death be the punishment for such a one. But if any part of the state makes a peace with, or a war against, any persons for its own benefit for itself, let the Generals bring the authors of this affair before a court of justice; and let death be the punishment of the party convicted. For they, who serve their country in any way, ought to do so without gifts. And let there be no pretext or argument held out,[2] that for good deeds we ought to receive gifts, but not for bad. For it is not easy either to know,[3] or knowing [4]to restrain oneself[4] patiently, when this knowledge is obtained. It is, therefore, the safest plan to obey the law—"Do not serve for gifts"—and let him who does not obey, simply die, when found guilty at a trial.

With regard to the contribution of money to the public, it is meet for [5]the state of each person[5] to be valued, for many reasons; and for the parishioners to put down in writing before the Rural-Stewards the yearly produce, in order that, as there are two contributions, the public may, after deliberating[6] every year, make use of whichever it pleases, whether it be a part of the whole valuation, or of the income arising each year, exclusive of the sums paid for the joint-feasts.

It is meet likewise for a man of moderate means to make moderate offerings to the gods. Now the Earth is the holy hearth of the whole[7] domicile of all the gods. Let no one

[1] Of this an instance is feigned to take place in Aristoph. Ach. 291. See too Thucyd. v. 60, *ἐνὶ ἀνδρὶ τῶν ἐν τέλει σπένδεται.*

[2] Instead of *ἐπαινούμενον*, which I cannot understand, I have translated as if the Greek were *ἐπιτεινόμενον*—

[3] Taylor adds, and so does Ast—"when actions are good or bad."

[4—4] So Ficinus understood *καρτερεῖν*, as shown by his version—"continere"—to which Ast adds—"from accepting gifts."

[5—5] I have translated as if the Greek were, not *ἕκαστον τὴν οὐσίαν*, but *ἑκάστου τὴν οὐσίαν*, similar to "cujuscunque census—" in Ficinus.

[6] I have adopted Ast's *βουλευόμενον*, applied to *τὸ δημόσιον*, instead of *βουλευομένων*, omitted entirely by Ficinus; for he probably saw it was without regimen.

[7] The Greek is *πᾶσι*, which, as it is omitted by Cicero Legg. ii. 18, 45, and Ficinus, Casaubon would reject on Apuleius Apolog. p. 30, ed. Lugd. 1614, but Wagner on Cicero alter to *πᾶσα*: which would be correct only if *οἴκησις* be read with Ficinus in lieu of *οἰκήσεως*, that requires *πάσης*, as I have translated.

then consecrate (the same thing)[1] a second time to the gods. But gold and silver in [other][2] states, both privately and in temples, is an invidious possession.[3] And ivory, as belonging[4] to a body, that has departed from life, is not a pure[5] offering to the gods. And iron and brass are the instruments of war.[6] Let, then, any one offer up whatever he pleases, of wood,[7] and of one kind of wood,[8] and, in a similar manner, of stone at the public temples; and let the woven portion be not more than one month's work for one woman; and the colours becoming to a god, both in other things and those woven, should be white; and offer nothing dyed, except for warlike ornaments. But the most godlike gifts are birds and pictures, such as a painter could finish in a single day. And let all the other offerings be imitations after this fashion.

Since then the portions of the whole state have been detailed, as to what number and of what kind they ought to be, and the laws have been mentioned relating to compacts of the greatest moment, it would be requisite that, as to what remains, the lawsuits [9]relating to all matters should be mentioned.[9] In the first place, there should be in the courts of justice selected judges, whom the defendant and plaintiff may choose in common, having the more becoming name of arbitrators, than

[1] Cicero has "iterum idem;" who therefore found in his MS. *ἱερὰ καθιερούτω ταὐτὰ* — unless he quoted from memory. Theodoret in Therap. Serm. iii. p. 519, B., offers *ἱερὰν εἰκόνα*—similar to "simulacra" in Ficinus. And in truth *εἰκόνα*, or rather *εἰκὼ*, might easily have dropt out between *ἱερὰν* and *καθιερούτω*. What Plato wrote is quite uncertain.

[2] Both Cicero and Ficinus omit *ἄλλαις*, acknowledged by Clemens Alex. Strom. V. ii. p. 692, Pott., which I confess I cannot understand; and I should therefore prefer *πολλαῖς*—

[3] Cicero's version is "res," as if his MS. read *χρῆμα*. Compare Eurip. Phœn. 205, *Φιλόψογόν τι χρῆμα θῆλυ γένος ἔφυ.*

[4] So Taylor, and after him Ast; who would, however, read *ἅτε λελοιπότος* in lieu of *ἀπολελοιπότος*— He should have suggested that *ἅτ'* had dropt out before *ἀπ*—

[5] In lieu of *εὐχερὲς*, Clemens, Theodoret, and Euseb. P. E. iii. 8, p. 99, D., offer *εὐαγὲς*, similar to "satis castum" in Cicero. Ficinus has "ineptum—" Perhaps Plato wrote *οὐκ εὐαγοῦς χειρὸς*—

[6] Cicero adds "non fani—"

[7] Ast explains *ξύλου*, where the genitive is without regimen, by "quod attinet ad—" But *ἐκ* has evidently dropt out between *ὄργανα* and *ξύλου* —similar to "ex ligno" in Ficinus, and *ἐκ λίθου* in Theodoret.

[8] Cicero adds "cavato—"

[9]—[9] The Greek is *δίκας—γίγνεσθαι*. But Ficinus has—"de judiciis—dicamus"—which leads to *δίκας—λέγεσθαι*: to which I have added *περὶ πάντων*, commonly read before *εἴρηνται* just above.

of judges. Secondly, let those of the same village and parish divided according to a twelfth part (be the judges), before whom let those go to contest about greater damages, who shall not have had the cause decided before the first judges; and let the defendant, if he is defeated a second time, pay the fifth part of the damages [1] in the indictment.[1] But if any one brings an accusation against the judges, and wishes to contest the matter a third time, let him carry the cause before the select judges; and if he is again defeated, let him pay the whole of the damages, and the half of it besides. But if the plaintiff, after being defeated before the first (judges), will not be quiet, but goes to the second, let him, if he is the victor, receive the fifth part; but if defeated, pay the same portion. And if the parties go to the third tribunal, not satisfied with the former trials, let the defendant, if defeated, pay [2]as has been stated, the whole of the damages, and the half to boot,[2] but let the plaintiff pay the half only of the damages. With respect to the allotments of the tribunals,[3] and their fillings up,[4] and the appointments of persons[5] to minister to the magistrates, and the times at which each of these ought to take place, and the matters relating to votes, and puttings off, and all that of such a kind necessarily takes place in lawsuits, and the obtaining by lot former and latter (trials)[6] and the necessities of answers,[7] and of coming (into

[1]—[1] The Greek words, *τῆς γραφείσης δίκης*, are not translated by Ficinus, whose version is—" quin tam debiti partem persolvet."

[2]—[2] Ast, with the approbation of Stalbaum, would read *τὸ πεμπτημόριον, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, καὶ τὴν ἡμιολίαν*. But Cousin correctly observes that *ὥσπερ εἴρηται* is to be referred to *τὴν ἡμιολίαν*, and not to *τὸ πεμπτημόριον*.

[3] If Plato had here an eye to the customs of his own country, he would have written *δικαστῶν*, "jurymen," as is evident from the Scholiast's explanation of Aristoph. Plut. 277.

[4] From the note of Ast it appears that Matthias in Miscell. Philolog. T. i. p. 3, p. 253, has discussed this passage. But as I have never seen the work, I am unable to state whether he has done so satisfactorily or not. Judging however from the extract made by Ast, it would seem that he has not thrown much light on the obscurity in *πληρώσεις*: by which word I suspect Plato meant to show, that, when all the special jurymen in any cause, called *ἐκλεκτοὶ δικασταὶ*, did not appear in court, their place was supplied by some of the common jurymen, who happened to be present, as is done to this day in England.

[5] Ast says that *ὑπηρεσιῶν* is here put for *ὑπηρετῶν*.

[6] Budæus, quoted by Ast, supplies here *δικῶν*— for the order, in which the suits were to be taken, was determined by lot.

[7] Harpocration explains *ἀπόκρισις* by *ἀπολογία*. But I suspect it

court)[1] and all together that are the nearest of kin[2] to these, we have spoken of even before;[3] [4] but what is right is beautiful twice and thrice.[4] All such legal matters then, as are of a trifling kind, it is requisite for a young legislator to fill up after an older one has passed them by. The tribunals relating to private suits, would, when existing in this way, have a sufficient measure. But those, that are public and common, and which it is meet for the magistrates to make use of, (so as) to administer affairs suited to each office, [5] are in many states the not unseemly legislation nor few of reasonable persons;[5] from whence it is requisite for the guardians of the laws to furnish what is suited to the polity now being in a state of birth, by reasoning together, and correcting themselves (and) testing by experience, until each of the points shall appear to be laid down sufficiently; and then by putting a finish, to place a seal on what is to be thus irremovable, and to use them for the whole of life. But what relates to

means what is called "an answer" given to an "interrogatory," put by one party to another, as in the Court of Chancery in England.

[1] Ast explains *παρακαταβάσεις*, as if it were put for *κατάβασις*, thus neglecting the meaning of *παρὰ* entirely. Grou suggested *παρακαταβολῶν*. For by *παρακαταβολὴ* was meant a certain sum deposited in court in certain causes by opposing parties, and which was lost by the defeated one. The whole passage was however so little intelligible to Ficinus, that he has introduced after "de mora et dilatione judicii," answering to *ἀναβολῶν*, apparently out of his own head, "termino, citatione, repulsa." Cousin prefers the sense given by Ast.

[2] In Greek *ἀδελφά*, which is used metaphorically in a similar manner elsewhere. See at Epistol. 6, p. 499, n. [4].

[3] This assertion seems here very strange. For Plato has touched upon scarcely one of these matters before. But if *εἴπομεν μὲν καὶ πρόσθεν* is to be united to what follows, then is there something wanting at the close of the preceding paragraph, supplied by Ficinus, who has "quamvis in superioribus tetigimus, tamen, quæ pulchra sunt, ut habet proverbium, et bis et ter recte dici possunt," which is at once intelligent and elegant, what cannot be said of the Greek; where Stephens was the first to find some difficulty, but failed to correct it. Cousin refers to vi. § 12 and 13, although he confesses that there is nothing to be found there precisely bearing on the points detailed here.

[4]—[4] Such is the literal version of the Greek. Cornarius has "sed pulchrum est quod rectum est, etiam bis ac ter," with which Ast indeed is satisfied; but *λέγειν* could not be omitted, as shown by vi. § 3, Gorg. § 117, and Phileb. § 140.

[5]—[5] Ficinus, followed by Taylor, has "in multis civitatibus a prudentibus viris, recte constituta reperiuntur," thus omitting *οὐκ ὀλίγα*—

the silence and the good-omened language [1] of the judges and the contrary, and what in other states cause [2](the mind) of the many to change improperly (about) things [2] just, good, and honourable, these have been mentioned in part; but a part will be still mentioned towards the end. To all of which it is requisite for him, who is about to be an impartial judge according to justice, to look, and possessing [3]them in writing to learn respecting all.[3] For of all objects of learning the matters laid down relating to laws have the greatest power to make the learner better; [4]which event, if the laws are laid down correctly, would take place (well);[4] or vainly would the law, (considered) by us divine and wonderful, possess a name having an affinity with intellect.[5] And moreover [6]of the rest of discourses whatever are detailed in poems, as the praise or blame of some persons, or whatever in prose, whether in writings, or in all the rest of daily meetings, and are disputed about through a love of contention, and through concessions sometimes very foolish[6]—of all these the writings of the legislator

[1] Ficinus, followed by Taylor, renders *εὐφημίας* by "laude vituperationeque—"

[2—2] The Greek is *παραλλάττει τῶν πολλῶν — δικαίων*, which Ficinus unable to understand, omits *τῶν πολλῶν*, and thus renders—"de justis—quæ in aliis civitatibus differunt." I have translated as if it were originally—*πολλῶν νοῦν—περὶ δικαίων*—

[3—3] The Greek is at present *γράμματα αὐτῶν πέρι μανθάνειν*: which Ast unable to understand, has adopted *πάρα* for *πέρι*, as suggested by Stephens. But *πάρα* is never thus put after its case, as *πέρι* constantly is. I have translated as if it were originally *γεγραμμέν' αὐτὰ πάντων πέρι μανθάνειν*. Ficinus has, what he considered to be the general sense, "atque operam dare, ut has legum constitutiones ante omnia discat et mente firmiter teneat."

[4—4] The Greek is *ἃ εἴπερ*— But two MSS. omit *ἃ*— They should have read *ὃ εὖ, εἴπερ*—as I have translated. On the phrase *εὖ—γίγνοιτ' ἄν*, see my Poppo's Prolegom. p. 182.

[5] In a similar strain it has been said by some English lawyer, who perhaps had heard of this passage in Plato, that "Law is the perfection of Reason." With regard to this notion of the Athenian philosopher, Taylor remarks that *νόμος* is properly *νοῦ διανομή*—an idea obtained, I suspect, from Proclus or some other Neo-Platonist.

[6—6] Such is the literal version of the Greek, where I can scarcely discover what Plato is aiming at. How much more intelligible is the Latin of Ficinus—"Nam cum multi sermones de laude vituperationeque nonnullorum, partim carminibus, partim soluta oratione, tum scripti circumferantur, tum quotidie in coronis, seu contendendo sive falso assentiendo, habeantur." With regard to *ἄλλαις πάσαις συνουσίαις*, which could not be thus opposed to *γράμμασιν*, the author wrote, I suspect, *λαλίας πά-*

would be the clearest touchstone; which it behoves a good juryman to possess in himself, the remedies, as it were, against the poison of other discourses; and by putting himself and the state in a straight course, [1] to furnish to the good an abiding and an increase in justice; [1] but to the bad a change, to the best of his power, from ignorance and intemperance, and timidity, and in one word, from all injustice; to such at least of the bad as have opinions that can be cured; but to such as have (their opinions) really [2] woven by fate, [2] the jurymen and leaders of the jurymen would be deserving of praise from the whole state, by assigning, what would be frequently said justly, death as the cure for minds so disposed. After the lawsuits, that occur yearly, have been decided upon, and come to an end, it is necessary for carrying out the proceedings after the verdict, [3] that these laws should hold good. Let the magistrate, who tried the cause, hand over to the victor all the monies of the defeated party, except what is required for necessaries, immediately after each verdict has been proclaimed by the cryer and in the hearing of the jury. And when a month, next upon those, when lawsuits are tried, shall have arrived, unless a party has willingly sent the victor willingly away, [4] let the magistrate, who tried the cause, follow the victor, and deliver to him the property of the party in his debt. But if he has not the wherewithal, and there is a deficiency not less than a drachm, let him have no lawsuit against any other person, until he has paid to the full the whole of what is due to the victor; but to

σης συνουσίαις, which would be in one Greek word λέσχαις. Reasonably then did Ficinus omit ταῖς ἄλλαις πάσαις as being unintelligible.

[1]—[1] In lieu of the words in the text, here translated literally, Ficinus has most strangely, "bonos confirmabit atque extollet—" which Taylor has followed in his "confirming and praising—"

[2]—[2] Ast explains ἐπικεκλωσμέναι by "fato quasi destinatæ, ut immutari non possint." Ficinus however, justly despairing of being able to make any sense out of the Greek, as it stands at present, has followed the train of thought, and translated "nam si sanari non possunt," adopted by Taylor. Unless I am greatly mistaken, Plato wrote ἀποκεκλαυσμέναι, in the sense of the Latin, "conclamatæ—" which would be a proper antithesis to ἰάσιμοι.

[3] Such is the meaning here of πράξεσιν, which would be rather, in correct Greek, ἐκπράξεσιν.

[4] Ast correctly explains ἀπαλλάττηται by "creditori satisfaciat debito solvendo;" and aptly refers to Demosth. p. 914, 4, R.; 1189, 13; and 249, 28. The phrase in English would be, "satisfy the plaintiff."

others let there be lawsuits decisively.[1] And if any one when condemned [2](unjustly) takes (any thing)[2] from the condemning magistrate, let the parties unjustly despoiled bring him before the tribunal of the guardians of the laws; and if he is cast in this suit, let him be punished with death, as one who is destroying the whole state and the laws.

[9.] To a man [3]after this,[3] who has been born and brought up, and has begotten children and brought them up, and has been mixed up with contracts in a moderate manner, and has made restitution, if he has done any one an injury, and [4]on the other hand received[4] (when injured)[5] what is just in law,[6] [7](and) in turn[7] has grown old, his end would take place according to nature.

With respect then to the dead, whether a person be male or female, let the interpreters (of the gods) have full powers to [8]detail the laws of the gods under the earth, and of those here[9] relating to things divine[10] (and) what it is proper to be done. But let the receptacles be in such spots as are not cultivated at all; nor let the monument be either great or small; but such spots, as being useless, possess[11] a nature fitted for

[1] Ficinus omits *κυρίως*, for I presume he could not understand it, nor can I.

[2]—[2] Ficinus has "læserit aut quicquam eorum injuste abstulerit," thus supplying *τι*, which Ast correctly says *ἀφῃρῆται* requires.

[3]—[3] Ficinus, unable, like myself, to understand *τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο*, has omitted those words, and inserted in their place, apparently out of his own head—"sub his legibus"—adopted tacitly by Taylor.

[4]—[4] The Greek is *ἐκλαβόντι*. But in the phrase *λαμβάνειν δίκας*, the preposition *ἐκ* is never, I believe, added. I have therefore translated as if the Greek were *αὖ λαβόντι*—

[5] I have inserted, what the very balance of the sentence requires, which would be in Greek *καὶ ἠδικημένῳ*—

[6] Instead of *λαβόντι σὺν*, I suspect Plato wrote, as I have translated, *λαβόντι τὸ ἴσον ἐν*—

[7]—[7] The Greek is at present *ἐν μοίρᾳ*. But as *μοῖρα* would be more correctly applied to *τελευτὴ* than *γηράσαντι*, I have translated as if the Greek were *ἐν μέρει*—

[8] I have adopted the splendid emendation of Valckenaer on Herodot. vii. 106, *κυρίους φράζειν· τὰς θήκας δὲ*, in lieu of *κυρίους φράζοντας· θήκας δὲ*—Ficinus, followed by Taylor, has "secundum responsa interpretum fiant."

[9] In lieu of *τῶν τῇδε* Ficinus found in his MS. *τῶν ἄνω*, as shown by his version—"sive superos," adopted by Taylor.

[10] To avoid the strange expression *περὶ τὰ θεῖα*, Ficinus has "parentationes," as if he had found in his MS. *περὶ τὰ ἐντάφια*—

[11] The Greek is—*ἃ δὲ ἡ χώρα δεχομένη κρύπτειν*, which Stephens would

that alone, and which easily receive and conceal the bodies of the dead in the least painful manner to the living, these (it is meet) to fill up. [1]For whatever the earth, being a mother, naturally wishes to bear as food for man, of this[1] let no one alive or dead deprive any of us still living. And heap up no mound higher than what would be the completed work of five men in five days. And make not the upright tomb-stones greater than what may contain the praises of the deceased in not more than four heroic verses. And let the laying out of the corpse within (the house), be [2]for not a shorter or longer[2] time than to show[3] that the person is in a death-like trance, or really dead. But the carrying out to the tomb would, as human affairs are, be for a moderate period on the third day nearly. It is meet likewise to be persuaded by the legislator on other points, namely, when he says that soul is altogether superior to body; and that there is nothing, but the soul, which causes each of us to be [4]in this life the very thing we are;[4] and that the body, like an image, follows each of us; and that, when we are dead, the bodies of the deceased are beautifully said to be image-like forms; and that each of us, being in reality immortal,[5] but called

correct by reading either *ἃ δὲ τῆς χώρας*, or *ἃ δὲ ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ*: but Ast, *ἡ δὲ δὴ χώρα*, of which Stalbaum approves. Ficinus has—"ad cætera inutilis," which has led me to *ἃ δὲ δύσχωρα—δεχόμενα εὖ κρύπτειν*— From Cicero de Legg. ii. 27, 76, who seems to have quoted the passage from memory, nothing is to be obtained.

[1]—[1] Ficinus, unable, no doubt, to make out the syntax in the Greek, has given merely an abridgment of the general sense, adopted to the letter by Taylor—"nec enim a vivis neque a mortuis terræ matris fœcunditas impedienda est." To meet all the difficulty, I have translated as if *πρὸς ταῦτα* were a corruption of *τις ταῦτα*, to be placed after *μήτε ζῶν*—for thus *ζῶν τις ταῦτα* would balance *τις ἀποθανὼν*, and *ταῦτα—τὸν ζῶντα* be, as usual, the two accusatives after *στερείτω*.

[2]—[2] The Greek is in five MSS. *πρῶτον*, in lieu of *πρότερον* in one. But as Ficinus has "non breviori vel longiori tempore," I suspect he found in his MS. *μὴ μακρότερον μὲν ἢ μικρότερον*— At least all the MSS. read *μὲν μικρότερον* for *μὴ μακρότερον*.

[3] Although *τοῦ δηλοῦντος* might perhaps stand, yet correct Greek would require the infinitive *τοῦ δηλοῦν*—

[4]—[4] The Greek is at present *ἐν αὐτῷ τε τῷ βίῳ—τοῦτ' εἶναι*. But Ficinus has—"in hac vita—hoc ipsum sit quod sumus." He therefore found in his MS. *ἐν τούτῳ τε τῷ βίῳ—ὅ ἐσμεν, αὐτὸ τοῦτ' εἶναι*—

[5] In the Greek *εἶναι* follows here *ἀθάνατον*, which cannot, as remarked by Stephens, be united to *ὄντα ὄντως*, nor to *ἐπονομαζομενον*. We might indeed read *μεῖναι*; but then we must insert *τε* after *παρὰ*, similar to "eamque" in Ficinus.

by the name of soul, depart to other[1] gods, to render an account, as the law of our country asserts, full of confidence to the good, but very fearful to the bad; and that to this (last) one there is no great assistance when dead. For it behoved all the relatives to aid the living man, so that he might have lived, when living, most just and holy, and when dead, have been punished for his wicked sins, during the life after this. Since then such is the case, there is no need to ruin a family by acting in a luxurious manner,[2] through thinking that the mass of flesh, which is buried, belongs to him; [3]but not that his son, who lies dead,[3] or brother, or whomsoever he regrets the most, and conceives he is burying, has departed, after bringing to an end[4] and fulfilling his fate; and that he ought [5]to do the best with present events,[5] by expending a moderate sum upon, as it were, [6]the lifeless altar of those in the earth.[6] Now the legislature would divine what this moderate (expense) would be in not the most unseemly manner. Let this then be the law. By him in the highest census of property let there be expended not more than five minæ on the whole funeral; by him of the second class, three minæ; and two, by him of the third; and let one mina be the measure of expense to him of the fourth.[7] And it is necessary for the guardians of the laws [8]to do many other things,[8] and to take care of many things, and especially of this, that they may

[1] The word *ἄλλους* is added because the soul, as being immortal, is considered itself a god.

[2] As Wyttenbach on the Phædo, p. 325, correctly saw that the sense is here "sepultura sumptuosa," it is strange he did not see likewise that Plato wrote *διατρυφώντως*, as I have translated, not *διαφερόντως*.

[3—3] The Greek is at present *ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνον*— But *ἐκεῖνον* has no meaning here, while the antithesis requires the negative. Hence I have translated as if the Greek were originally—*ἀλλ' οὐ κείμενον*—

[4] Ficinus, in lieu of *περαίνοντα καὶ*, which he omits, has "alio"—and so after him has Taylor.

[5—5] The proverb *τὸ παρὸν εὖ ποιεῖν* is found again in Gorg. p. 499, C. Sometimes in lieu of *ποιεῖν* we meet with *τιθέναι*, or even *θεραπεύειν*, as in Soph. Philoct. 149.

[6—6] The Greek is *εἰς ἄψυχον χθονίων βωμόν*. Ficinus has—"ad manium aram, anima carentem—" But as every altar is *ἄψυχος*, one would have expected here *ἀψύχων τῶν χθονίων βωμόν*.

[7] Ficinus, followed by Taylor to the letter, inserts here—"atque ita singulorum moderata erit impensa—"

[8—8] The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor.

live attending to boys and men, and [1]persons of every age.[1] And moreover, at the end (of the life) of all, let one of the guardians of the laws, whom the relations of the deceased shall [2]take as a superintendent,[2] act as president,[3] [4]to whom let whatever takes place in a proper and moderate manner be an honour; but what in not a proper manner, a disgrace.[4] And let the laying out, and (carrying out),[5] and all the rest relating to such matters, take place according to this law. But things of this kind it is meet to give up to the legislator, who lays down a political law.[6] It would be a thing unseemly to order, or not, persons to weep for the dead; but it is necessary[7] to forbid them to lament loudly, and to send the voice like that of a messenger[8] out of the house, and to bring forth[9] the corpse into the open part of the roads,[10] and to talk[11] while going along the paths, and to go[12] out of the city before day. Let such laws then be thus laid down on these points; and let him, who is obedient, be exempt from punishment; but let him, who disobeys one of the guardians of the laws, be punished by a punishment that appears fit to all in common. What other burials, or non-burials, in the case of persons guilty of parricide and sacrilege, and all acts of such a kind,

[1]—[1] Ficinus, followed in part by Taylor, has—"et, ut summatim dicam cujuscunque sexus vel ætatis homines—"

[2]—[2] Ficinus has—"conjuncti elegerint, funus totum observet."

[3] The Greek is ἐπιστατεῖ. But two MSS. ἐπιστατηι—which leads to ἐπιστατοίη ἂν—

[4]—[4] Ficinus, followed by Taylor, has—"provideatque, ut bene moderateque omnia, non contra gerantur; et illud sibi honori, hoc dedecori sit."

[5] I have adopted "elationes," found in Ficinus, but neglected by Taylor.

[6] Ast was the first to approve of πολιτικὸν νόμον, found in the MS. of Ficinus, in lieu of πολιτικῷ νόμῳ, as shown by his version, "civilis autem legislatori concedatur ista."

[7] The best MS. has εἰ ἀπογορεύειν: where evidently lies hid δεῖ ἀπαγορεύειν—as I have translated.

[8] In ἐξαγγέλλειν is an allusion to the tragic stage; where an Ἐξάγγελος was frequently introduced to tell of any terrible event, that had happened in a house.

[9] Ficinus has "efferre:" from which, or from Stobæus cxxi. p. 613, Stephens suggested προάγειν in lieu of προσάγειν.

[10] Ficinus, followed by Taylor, has "vias—frequentiores—"

[11] Ficinus renders φθέγγεσθαι "ejulare," a meaning that verb never has.

[12] The Greek is εἶναι. I have translated as if it were originally ἴέναι—Ficinus has "se afflictare non liceat;" where "non liceat" confirms my δεῖ ἀπαγορεύειν just above.

take place of the dead, these have been spoken of in our previous discourse and laid down by law; so that our legislation would now have nearly arrived at the end. But the end is not in having on each occasion done of nearly all matters something, nor in possessing and in settling, [1] but in having discovered a preservation for what has been produced, and in thinking that all, which ought to have been done, has been then done completely; but previously, that the whole is incomplete.[1]

Clin. You speak well, O guest. But tell me still more clearly, for what purpose has been said, what has just now been said?

[10.] *Athen.* Much, Clinias, of former (sayings) have been hymned beautifully, and nearly not the least so are the appellations of the Fates.

Clin. What are these?

Athen. In Lachesis being the first, Clotho the second, and Atropos the third, [2] the saviour of what has been asserted, things assimilated by that of those woven by fire, of working out a power not to be turned aside;[2] which in a city and polity ought not only to furnish health and safety to bodies, but a good state of law in souls, or rather the preservation of laws. But it appears to me that this is yet wanting to laws, how it is needful[3] for a power to exist in them to be according to nature not turned.

Clin. You speak of no small affair, if it is possible to find how a thing of this kind may exist in every possession.

Athen. But this is possible, as it appears to me, in every respect at present.

Clin. Let us then by all means not separate until we

[1]—[1] Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus, followed by Taylor, has—"sed in eo potius, quod, sicut recte sunt facta, ita et firmiter stabilita sint; in hujusmodi enim conservatione putandum est, quantum oportuit, factum esse; aliter minime." With regard to the sentiment, Juvenal seems to have had a recollection of it, when he wrote—"Nil actum censet, dum quid superesset agendum—"

[2]—[2] Such is the literal translation of the unintelligible Greek—*σώτειραν τῶν λεχθέντων ἀπεικασμένα τῇ τῶν κλωσθέντων τῷ πυρὶ, τὴν ἀμετάστροφον ἀπεργαζομένων δύναμιν*: where in lieu of *λεχθέντων* Bekker suggests *ληχθέντων*, and so does Sydenham. Ast, *λαχόντων*. Cornarius proposed *φύσει* for *πυρὶ*: but Ast, *πιλώσει* or *πιλήσει*: Winckelmann, *τῷ συσπειρᾷν*: and Baiter, *τολύπῃ*— What Plato wrote might perhaps be recovered by a bold conjectural scholar.

[3] Ficinus has, what is preferable, "possit—"

have supplied this very thing to the laws already mentioned. For it is ridiculous to labour at any thing in vain, and not to lay down something stable.

Megil. You correctly exhort me: and you will find me to be such another person.

Clin. You speak indeed well. What then, say you, would this preservation be, and after what fashion for our polity and laws?

Athen. Have we not said that an assembly ought to be held in our city of this kind—That ten of the oldest guardians of the laws and those, who have received the prizes for good conduct, ought ever to be gathered together at the same spot [with them]?[1] and further, that those, who had gone abroad[2] to make a search, if perchance it has happened to them to hear of any thing opportune for guarding the laws, (ought),[3] on arriving safe at home, to be voted, [4]after having been tested by these very doings, worthy to become partakers of the assembly?[4] and in addition to this, that each ought to take as an ally one of the young men, not less than thirty years of age, [5]and that he himself, after deciding that the young man was a worthy character both by nature and nurture, should introduce him to the others; and, if it should seem good to the others, that he should take him as an ally; but if not, that the judgment, which may have taken place, should be kept secret from the rest, and especially the party rejected;[5] and that the assembly ought to be at day-break, when there is leisure for the most part to every one from all other business, both public and private? Something of this kind was stated by us in the preceding discourse.

Clin. It was.

Athen. Resuming then the subject relating to this very as-

[1] This τούτοις at the end of the paragraph seems perfectly useless.

[2] Ficinus adds here "multas urbes—" Taylor, "many regions—"

[3] Although Ast saw that καὶ had no meaning here, yet he did not see that perhaps it was an error for δια—

[4]—[4] Ficinus, followed to the letter by Taylor, has "sed hi ad cœtum hujusmodi non recipiantur, nisi ex ea peregrinatione incorrupti et integri rediisse, et cœtu digni esse probentur."

[5]—[5] Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus, whom Taylor has followed closely, has most strangely only "qui natura educationeque digni esse asciscenti primum, deinde et universo cœtui, videantur: quod si quis indignus adhibeatur, nullius momenti sententia sit."

sembly, I would say something of this kind. I assert then that if any one throws out this, as an anchor[1] for the whole city, that it has in itself every thing requisite to preserve all we wish.

Clin. How so?

Athen. [2]On what comes after this an opportunity will occur for our speaking correctly, and to omit nothing of our readiness (to act).[2]

Clin. You speak exceedingly well; and do as you intend.

Athen. It is meet therefore, Clinias, to understand that with respect to every thing there is a saviour suited to each kind of work; as in an animal, the soul and the head are naturally the greatest.

Clin. How again say you?

Athen. The power of these two, doubtless, affords safety to the whole animal.

Clin. How?

Athen. In soul there is, besides other things, intellect implanted; and in the head, besides other things, sight and hearing. And, in short, intellect being mingled with the most beautiful senses, and becoming one, it would justly be called the preservation of each.

Clin. It appears so at least.

Athen. So indeed it appears. But would not intellect, when conversant about something, and mingled with the senses, become the safety of vessels, both in storms and fair weather? Do not, in the case of a ship, the pilot and the sailors, by mingling their senses with the intellect of the pilot, preserve both themselves and what relates to the ship?

Clin. How not?

Athen. But there is no need of many examples relating to things of this kind; but let us consider, as in the case of armies, and (diseases),[3] after laying down what mark would both generals and all the ministering of physicians direct their aim (for the sake) of preservation.

[1] On this metaphor Ast refers to Wyttenbach Plutarch, S. N. V. p. 104.

[2—2] Ficinus has again most strangely—"Opportune modo dicemus totisque viribus incumbemus."

[3] I have adopted Baiter's *νόσων*, which might easily have dropt out before *νοήσωμεν*. Ficinus has "in exercitu et medicina," as if he had found in his MS. *ἰατρικῆς*, what Cornarius was the first to remark.

[1] *Clin.* Very right.[1]

Athen. Does not the former (aim at) victory, and the power over the enemy? and the latter [2] [of physicians and their assistants,][2] at a preparation for the health of the body?

Clin. How not?

Athen. But if the physician is ignorant of that relating to the body, which we now call health, or the general of that relating to victory, or of the other things we have mentioned, would either appear to possess intellect relating to any of these matters?

Clin. How could they?

Athen. But what with respect to a city? If any one is ignorant of the mark, at which a statesman ought to look, could he in the first place be justly denominated a ruler? And in the next, would he be able to preserve that, of the scope of which he knows nothing at all?

Clin. How could he?

[11.] *Athen.* It is necessary therefore now, as it seems, if the settlement of this our country is to have an end, that there should be something in it, that knows, in the first place, what we call the mark, [3] whatever that may happen to be in a statesman's view;[3] next, after what manner it is requisite to partake of it; and which of the laws first, and, afterwards, who among men, will properly or improperly consult with a view to it. But if there shall be any state devoid of a thing of this kind, it will not be wonderful, if, by being mindless and senseless, it should on each occasion perform in each of its doings whatever presents itself by chance.

Clin. You speak the truth.

Athen. Now then, in what part of our state, or pursuits, is there any sufficient guard whatever prepared of such a kind? Have it we in our power to tell?

Clin. Not I indeed, guest, clearly. But, if I must make a guess, this discourse seems to me to tend to that assembly, which you said ought to come together at night.

Athen. You have rightly understood me, Clinias; and, as

[1]—[1] This answer of Clinias seems very strange. Unless I am mistaken, ὀρθῶς belongs to the speech of the Athenian.

[2]—[2] The words between the brackets are correctly omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor.

[3]—[3] Taylor omits entirely the words between the numerals. Ficinus has—"quisnam civilis sit finis."

the present reasoning indicates, this (assembly) ought to possess every virtue; the beginning of which is not to be wandering, by guessing at many things, but by looking to one thing, always to direct every thought, like arrows, to this.

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. Now then we shall learn that it is not a wonderful thing for the legal institutions of cities to wander; because the system of laws in each city looks, one to one thing, and another to another. And for [1]the most part it is no wonder that[1] to some the limit is that of what is just, in order that certain persons, whether they happen to be better or worse, may have dominion over the state; to others, that they may be wealthy, whether they are slaves of certain persons, or not; the attention of others again is urged on to a life forsooth of liberty; but others are regulated by laws, [2]like two united,[2] looking to both, that they may be free (themselves),[3] and the lords of other states. But the wisest, as they think themselves, (look) to these, and to all such points as these together, and not to any one (singly),[4] as they are unable to mention any one thing held in pre-eminent honour, to which it is needful for them to direct[5] the rest.

Clin. Would not then, O guest, our assertion formerly laid down be right; for we said that the whole of our laws ought always to look to one point; and we conceded that this might be called very correctly virtue.

Athen. Yes.

Clin. And we laid down surely that virtue is fourfold.

Athen. Entirely so.

Clin. And that of all these, intellect was the leader, to which all other things, and three of the virtues, ought to look.

Athen. You have followed me in a most beautiful manner,

[1]—[1] The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor.

[2]—[2] So Ast explains *ξύνδυο*— But Ficinus "ad duo"—omitting *πρὸς ἄμφω βλέποντες*, whom Taylor follows, as usual.

[3] Ficinus has correctly "ipsi," in Greek *αὐτοὶ*, to balance *ἄλλων*— By comparing iii. p. 694, A. § 11, *αὐτοὶ ἐλεύθεροι ἐγένοντο, ἔπειτα δὲ ἄλλων πολλῶν δεσπόται*, Stephens would read *πολλῶν* for *πόλεων*.

[4] I have adopted the reading suggested by Stephens, *εἰς ἓν δὲ οὔ· οὐδ' ἓν* —For *οὔ· οὐδ'*—are thus constantly united in Plato. See at The Banquet, § 8, n. 83.

[5] Ficinus has "ad quod cætera dirigant"—as if his MS. read *τρέπειν*, not *βλέπειν*.

Clinias; and follow me too in what remains. For we have said, that the intellect of the pilot, and of the physician, and of the general, looks to that one point, [1] to which it ought to look ;[1] but examining the intellect of the statesman, we are at that point now; and interrogating it, as if it were a person, we will say—O wonderful creature, to what point are you looking? What is that one thing, of which the intellect of the physician can speak in a clear manner? but of which you, who are forsooth [2] superior, as you would say, to all clever persons, will not have it in your power to speak? Or can you, Megillus and Clinias, define and speak for him, and tell me what it is, as I have defined to you in behalf of many other matters?

Clin. By no means, guest.

Athen. But what, [3] ought we not to be desirous of knowing well [3] what it is, and in what it is?

Clin. [4] In what, for example, do you mean? [4]

Athen. For example, when we said that there are four species of virtue, it is evidently necessary to say that each is one, since they are four.

Clin. How not?

Athen. And yet we call all these one. For we say that fortitude is a virtue, and that prudence is a virtue, and the two others (likewise), as if this virtue was not in reality many things, but only one.

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. So far, then, as these two differ from each other, and have received two names, and the other two (likewise), there is no difficulty in speaking of them; but so far as we apply to both one (name) of virtue, and to the others (likewise), it is not easy to speak of them.

Clin. How say you?

[1]—[1] The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, who perhaps could not understand *οἳ δὴ βλέπειν*: where Ast was the first to edit *οἳ δεῖ βλέπειν*, found subsequently in two MSS. And so too Sydenham after Stephens.

[2] Although Stephens saw that *ὢν-διαφέρων* is scarcely correct, yet he did not see that Plato wrote *ὡς δὴ*—used here ironically, as elsewhere.

[3]—[3] I have translated as if the Greek were *οὗ τι δεῖ προθυμεῖσθαί γ' εὖ ξυνιδεῖν*— not *ὅτι δεῖ προθυμεῖσθαί τε ξυνιδεῖν*—where *ὅτι* and *τε* are equally unintelligible. Ficinus has "An non quærendum putatis—"

[4]—[4] Ficinus, apparently unable to understand *οἷον ἐν τίσι λέγεις*, has "Dic plane."

Athen. It is not difficult to explain what I mean. For let us distribute among ourselves the (business of) interrogating and answering.

Clin. How again are you speaking?

Athen. Ask me why, when speaking of virtue as one thing, we have given this appellation to two things, one of which is fortitude, and the other prudence? for I will tell you the reason. Because one of these is conversant with fear, from whence[1] both wild beasts participate in fortitude, and so do the habits of children very young. For the soul may be brave without reason and from nature; but on the other hand, without reason it never has been prudent and possessed of intellect, nor is it so now, nor will it ever be, since this is a different thing.[2]

Clin. You speak truly.

Athen. In what way then these are different and two, you have received from me through the reasoning; but in what way they are one and the same, do you on the other hand tell me. But bear in mind that you are going to tell me in what way, being four, they are one; and require of me (to tell),[3] after you have shown that they are one, in what way they are again four. And after this, let us consider whether for him,[4] who would know sufficiently respecting any thing whatever, to which there is both a name and a definition, it is meet to know only the name, but to be ignorant of the definition; or whether it is disgraceful for him, who knows[5] something of what excels in magnitude and beauty, to be ignorant of all such matters as these.

Clin. It appears so.

Athen. But is there any thing of greater consequence for a legislator and a guardian of the laws, and for him, who is

[1] In lieu of *οὗ* Ficinus found, as remarked by Stephens, *ὅθεν*, as shown by his version "unde—"

[2] Ficinus has more intelligibly, "aliud ergo hæc est quam illa," i. e. that prudence is a different thing from fortitude. Of this Shakspeare was well aware, when he made Falstaff say that "Discretion is the better part of Valour."

[3] After *τέτταρα* Ast says that *ἐρεῖν* is to be supplied. I suspect it has dropt out by accident.

[4] Ficinus has "intellecturus," as if his MS. read *εἰδέναι μέλλοντα* instead of *εἰδότα*, which, if preserved, would require *οὐχ ἱκανῶς*, to the detriment of the sense.

[5] I have adopted with Ast *γνόντα*, for *γε ὄντα*, as suggested by Cornarius.

thought to excel all others in virtue, and who has received the rewards of victory in these very points, than fortitude, temperance, justice, and prudence?

Clin. How can there be?

Athen. On these points then ought not holy interpreters, and teachers, and legislators, and the guardians of others, to (speak)[1] to him, who requests to know and to perceive, or who requests to be punished and reproved[2] when erring, by teaching him what power virtue and vice possess, and by showing that they (themselves) excel the rest in every respect? Or must some poet come[3] to the city, or an instructor of youth, and assert that he is seen to be better than him, who has been the victor in every virtue? And then will it appear wonderful in a state like this, where both in word and deed the guardians would be incompetent through their[4] not having correctly[4] a knowledge of virtue, that such a state, by being without a guard, should suffer what the majority of existing states suffer?

Clin. Not at all (wonderful), as it seems.

[12.] *Athen.* What then, must we do what we just now said? Or how must we make the guardians more exact with respect to virtue, in deed and word, than the masses? Or after what manner will our state be assimilated to the head and senses of the prudent, through possessing in itself a guard of this kind?

Clin. How then, O guest, and after what manner, shall we speak, assimilating it to a thing of this kind?

Athen. It is evident[5] that, while the state itself is (the resemblance) of a cavity,[5] the young of the guards, who are

[1] I have translated, as if λέγειν or αὐδᾶν had dropt out between δεῖ and διδάσκοντας. For otherwise the dative τῷ δεομένῳ would be without regimen. I have adopted likewise διδάσκοντας and δηλοῦντας, in lieu of the singular, which Ast vainly endeavours to defend.

[2] I cannot understand how the active ἐπιπλῆξαι can here follow the passive κολάζεσθαι. I have therefore translated as if the Greek were ἐπιπλήσσεσθαι—

[3] Ficinus has "urbem nuper ingressus," as if his MS. read ἐλθόντα νεωστὶ τὴν πόλιν—

[4—4] To avoid the incongruity of the assertion that guardians would be incompetent, who had a competent knowledge of virtue, I have translated, as if the Greek were οὐ καλῶς, not ἱκανῶς.

[5—5] I must leave for the others to make out the sense and syntax in the words—ὡς αὐτῆς μὲν τῆς πόλεως οὔσης τοῦ κύτους— I could have understood—ὡς αὐτῆς μὲν τῆς πόλεως ἡ οὐσία ἐστί του κύτους εἰκὼν— i. e.

selected, as it were,[1] for the top of the head, as being of the best disposition, and possess a quickness of perception in their whole soul, survey the whole state in a circle; and, while guarding it, they deliver up the senses to memory, and become the announcers to the elders of every thing in the state; and that these [the elders],[2] being assimilated to intellect, through considering pre-eminently many matters and those worthy of regard, enter into consultations, and employ the young, as agents, in their joint deliberations; and thus both truly preserve the whole state in common. Whether then shall we say that they are to be established in this manner, or how otherwise? Or that they all possess all things equally,[3] and that some of them have been brought up and educated in not the most exact manner?[4]

Clin. But this, O wonderful man, is impossible.

Athen. Let us then proceed to a more accurate education than the former.

Clin. By all means.

Athen. Would not that, which we almost touched just now, happen to be the very one, of which we have a want?

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. Did we not say then, that of each trade the tip-top handicraftsman and guardian ought to be able not only to look to the majority of things, but to hasten onwards to one thing, and to know it, and, after knowing it by looking at it, to arrange every thing in order?

Clin. Correctly so.

Athen. Would there be then to any person whatever a speculation or a sight more accurate, respecting any thing whatever, than to be able to look to one form out of many and dissimilar?

"that the substance of the city itself is the resemblance to some receptacle—" Ficinus has, what is at least intelligible, "quia civitas capitis quædam capacitas erit."

[1] I have adopted *ἀπειλεγμένους*, found in four MSS., in lieu of *ἀπειλημμένους*, which Ast translates "seorsim collocatos—"

[2] The words *τοὺς γέροντας* are evidently an interpolation.

[3] The Greek is *ὁμοίους πάντας κεκτημένους*. Ficinus has "æquales omnes habendas esse censemus." But *κεκτημένους* is never found in a passive sense. I have translated as if Plato had written *ὁμοίως πάντα πάντας κεκτημένους*—

[4] I have, with Ast and Stalbaum, adopted *διηκριβωμένως*, for *διηκριβωμένους*, as suggested by Stephens from "exacte" in Ficinus.

Clin. Perhaps (not).

Athen. Not perhaps, but in reality, O thou godlike man, there is not any method more clear than this to any one.

Clin. Trusting to you, O guest, I admit it; and in this way let us proceed in our discourse.

Athen. We must compel, then, as it seems, even the guardians of our divine polity to see accurately, in the first place, what happens amongst all the four virtues to be the same; and which, being one thing in fortitude, and temperance, and prudence, and justice, we assert would be properly called by one name, virtue. This, my friends, if we are willing, let us for the present, as it were [1] squeezing violently, not let go, before we state sufficiently what it is that we must look at, whether as one thing, or as a whole, or as both, or in whatever way it exists naturally. Or, if this escapes us, think we that we shall ever sufficiently possess the things relating to virtue, of which we shall be unable to say, whether it is many things, or four, or one thing? If, then, we follow ourselves as fellow-counsellors, we shall by some means devise a plan for this to take place in our state. But if it seems good to you [2] to dismiss the subject altogether, it is necessary to dismiss it.[2]

Clin. By the god, who presides over hospitality, we must, O guest, dismiss a subject of this kind the least of all, since you appear to us to speak correctly. But how can any one devise this plan?

Athen. Let us not at present speak of the how we can devise it; but let us first establish firmly by agreement amongst ourselves, whether it is requisite or not.

Clin. It is doubtless requisite, if possible.

[13.] *Athen.* But what, with respect to the beautiful and the good, [3]do we think the same on this point?[3] Must our guardians know only that each of these is many? Or that it is one, and how it is so?

[1] The Greek is *οἷόν περ*—But Plato wrote, I suspect, *οἷον Πρωτέα*—"like Proteus," or rather *οἷον χερὶ Πρωτέα*— For it was necessary to lay hold of Proteus with a firm grasp, before he would open his lips, as a prophet, as we learn from Homer *Οδ.* Δ. 414 and 454.

[2]—[2] I have adopted the reading proposed by Baiter, *δοκεῖ ἐᾷν, ἐᾶν δὴ χρεών*. So we say in English—"If I must, I must."

[3]—[3] The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor.

Clin. It seems almost necessary for them to understand how (each of these) is one.

Athen. But what, (ought they) to understand, but be unable to show by arguments [1](what they understand)?[1]

Clin. How so? For you are speaking of a certain habit belonging to a slave.[2]

Athen. But what, with respect to all serious pursuits, is there the same reasoning, that it behoves those, who are to be really guardians of the laws, to know really the matters relating to the truth, and to be competent to interpret them in a discourse, and follow them out in deeds, deciding upon the things that exist beautifully according to nature, or do not exist?

Clin. How not?

Athen. Is not then one of the most beautiful things that relating to the gods, which we went through with seriousness, how that they exist, and of how great a power they seem to be the lords; and that man, as far as he can, ought to know this; and, that we ought to pardon the greatest number of those in the state, if they will only follow the voice of the laws; but that we ought not to commit to persons a share in the guardianship, who have not laboured to acquire every faith in the existence[3] of the gods; and that there should be [4]this one object of care,[4] namely, never to choose any one for a guardian of the laws, who is not a divine man, and has not laboured for them,[5] nor (permit him)[6] to become one of those selected for his virtue.

[1]—[1] Ficinus, followed by Taylor, adds, what the sense requires, "quod intelligunt."

[2] This is said, because slaves were either foreigners, or uneducated.

[3] I have translated, as if the Greek were *οὐσιῶν*, not *οὐσῶν*—which has nothing to which it can be referred. Compare shortly afterwards *οὐσίαν ἐπόρισεν*.

[4]—[4] The Greek is *τὴν δὲ μὴν ἐπιτροπὴν*—where Ast would read *τὴν δὲ μὴ ἐπιτροπὴν*—adopted by Bekker and others; which, I confess, I cannot understand. I have translated therefore, as if the Greek were *τήνδε δὲ μίαν ἐπιτροπὴν*—

[5] Stephens was the first to object to *αὐτὰ* thus placed by itself; although he says that *τὰ θεῖα* is to be got out of *τὸν θεῖον*: and so too does Ast. But Plato would in that case have written *τοιαῦτα*— Ficinus has, what is far more elegant and intelligible—"nisi divinus sit divinisque studiis operam dederit."

[6] The Greek is at present *αὖ*—It was formerly *ἐᾷν*—as I have translated.

Clin. It is just then, as you say, for him, who is inactive on matters of this kind, or unable to give a reply,[1] (to be)[2] at a distance from honourable affairs.

Athen. Do we then not know, that there are two things relating to the gods, which lead to a belief in what we have gone through in our previous discourse?

Clin. What are they?

Athen. One is that, which we asserted respecting the soul, that it is the oldest and most divine of all things, of which a motion, by receiving the generation, imparts an [3]ever-flowing existence;[3] and one too is that, concerning the movement, how orderly it is, of the stars and such other things with which [4]mind has, by its power over them, adorned the universe.[4] For he, who views these matters in neither a mean manner nor like a common individual, has never been an atheistical person, so as not to be affected in a manner the contrary to what would be expected by the many. For they imagine that those, who take in hand subjects of this kind through astronomy and other necessary[5] arts in conjunction with it, become atheists from having seen that it is possible for things to exist by necessity and not from the [6]intellect of a divine plan[6] relating to good things to be brought to pass.

Clin. How then would it exist?

Athen. All things,[7] as I have said, are in a contrary state

[1] Ficinus avoids the difficulty in *ἀποκρίνεσθαι* by omitting the word entirely, and translating—" et ineptus sit—" Did Plato write *ὑποκρίνεσθαι*, " to act the part " of a divine person—or rather *ἢ, ἃ δεῖ, ἀδύνατον ὑποκρίνεσθαι*—" unable to act the part he ought."

[2] After *τῶν καλῶν* there has evidently dropt out *εἶναι*, as I have translated.

[3]—[3] Ast conceives that Plato had in his mind the doctrine of Heracleitus, which he has developed more at length in the Cratylus and Parmenides, that all things are in a state of flowing.

[4]—[4] This was the doctrine of Anaxagoras, to which Euripides alludes in Tro. 890, where I should have supported the conjecture of Bouhier, *νοῦς κρατῶν* for *νοῦς βροτῶν*, by referring to *νοῦς ἐγκρατὴς* in this passage.

[5] Such as Geometry and Arithmetic.

[6]—[6] The Greek is *διανοίαις βουλήσεως*, which I confess I cannot understand; nor could, I think, Ficinus, who has " voluntate divina." I have translated therefore, as if the Greek were *διανοίαις βουλῆς θείας*—remembering the *Διὸς δε τελείετο βουλὴ* in Homer, Il. A. 5.

[7] I have translated, as if the Greek were *πάντα*— If *πᾶν* is to be preserved here, we must prefix *τὸ* and read *ἄψυχον αὐτὸ*-- But the other

now to what they were, when those, who thought upon them, conceived them to be without soul. [1]A feeling of wonder crept even then upon the mind respecting them; and what is now really determined upon, was suspected then by such as touched upon accuracy, how that things without soul would never have made use of reasonings wonderful for their accuracy, had they not possessed intellect.[1] And some indeed dared to hazard this very doctrine even at that period, by saying that [2]it was Mind, which put into order every thing in heaven.[2] [3]But the same persons erred again[3] about the nature of the soul, (by not knowing)[4] that it is older than body; but conceiving it to be younger,[5] they did, so to say, overturn all things, and themselves much more.[6] For [7]all things, that were before their eyes, while carried along the heavens, appeared to them to be full of stones and earth, and many other soulless bodies, that furnished reasons for the existence of the whole world.[7] [8]These doctrines it was that caused much of atheism and disgust to flit about amongst such persons.[8] Moreover revilings

is the preferable method. Hence at the end of the speech we must read likewise *πάντα τοὐναντίον ἔχει* in lieu of *πᾶν*—

[1]—[1] Such is the literal version of the Greek, which Ficinus, followed almost to the letter by Taylor, has thus abridged and remodelled—"quamvis etiam tunc, quicunque diligentius aliis illa perscrutabantur, mire veritatem tangebant, quod videlicet nunquam, si anima carerent, tam exquisita ratione uterentur mentis expertia."

[2]—[2] Here again is an allusion to Anaxagoras, whose Κόσμος began with this sentence—*Ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματα ἦν· νόος δε αὐτὰ διήρεε καὶ διεκόσμεε.*

[3]—[3] The Greek is at present, *οἱ δὲ αὐτοὶ πάλιν ἁμαρτάνοντες*— But unless I am mistaken, it was formerly *οἵ γε ἔτι πλέον ἁμαρτάνοντες*— i. e. "who erring still more about the nature of the soul."

[4] Ficinus alone has, what the sense requires, "nescientes—"

[5] The same doctrine, that the soul is younger than the body, is advocated by Locke and the other Materialists of modern times.

[6] How Anaxagoras overturned his own theory may be seen in Phædo, p. 98, B.

[7]—[7] Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus, followed to the letter by Taylor, has "Nam quæ ante oculos sunt, hæc et in cœlo esse crediderunt. Itaque terra lapidibus aliisque inanimatis corporibus referta esse cœlestia credentes his causas totius mundi dederunt." With regard to the notion of the heavenly bodies being full of stones, this has been partially confirmed in modern times. For it has been said that the Earl of Rosse's telescope shows that the Moon is a mass of granite.

[8]—[8] The Greek is *ἅπτεσθαι*, where Ficinus felt himself so much at a loss as to give merely the general sense of the whole passage, "his igitur

have come from the poets, (so that,) while likening philosophers to dogs that make use of vain howlings, they said, [1]on the other hand, other senseless things.[1] But now, as I have said, all the contrary takes place.

Clin. How could this be?

[14.] *Athen.* It is not possible for any mortal man ever to become firmly pious, who does not receive these two things, that the soul is the oldest of all things, which share in generation and is immortal; and that it rules over all bodies. And in addition to this, what has been said very often, who shall receive [2]the mind said of beings in the stars,[2] and the necessary learning before[3] these subjects, [4]and after beholding the communion in these according to the Muse,[4] shall make use (of it) in a manner fitting to the pursuits of morals and legal institutions; and shall be able to give a reason for such things as admit of a reason, [5]and do not.[5] Now he, who is not able to acquire these in addition to public virtues, will scarcely ever become a competent ruler over a whole state; but he would be a minister to other rulers. It is then, Clinias and Megillus, re-

factum est, ut, qui hæc tractant, philosophi tanquam impii vulgo circumferuntur." I have therefore altered *ἅπτεσθαι* into *ᾄττεσθαι*. On the loss and corruption of *ᾄττειν*, and its use in an astronomic sense, I could say not a little; suffice it to quote at present Plutarch De Fortun. Roman. t. ii. p. 326, *ἄστρου φερομένου καὶ διάττοντος ἐπὶ δυσμὰς ἐξ ἀνατολῶν*.

[1]—[1] Such is the version of Bekker's text adopted by Stalbaum; who should have suggested *πολλὰ καὶ ἀνόητα*—

[2]—[2] Such is the literal translation of the Greek—*τόν τε εἰρημένον ἐν τοῖς ἄστροις τῶν ὄντων*, which Ast endeavours to explain by his version and paraphrase, "the reason of all things in the stars," that is, "dwelling there and most conspicuous." Ficinus has "veram esse mentem in astris," as if his MS. read *τόν τε ἐν τοῖς ἄστροις ὄντα ὄντως*, without *εἰρημένον*, omitted in another MS. Perhaps Plato wrote *τόν τε, αἰωρούμενον ἐν τοῖς ἄστροις, νοῦν ὄντα ὄντως*—i. e. "the mind, really existing, and suspended amongst the stars," or rather something to this effect, *τόν τ' αἰωρούμενον ἐν ἄστροις ⊙ ἐνιαυτῶν μόνον ἄνακτα*, "the Sun suspended amongst the stars, the only ruler of years"—where ⊙ is (*ἥλιον*). See myself on Æsch. Eum. 2.

[3] In lieu of *πρὸ*, "before," I should prefer *περὶ*, "respecting—"

[4]—[4] Here again I am quite at a loss; and so, I think, was Ficinus; whose version is "Musæ etiam his convenientis non ignarus ad mores componendos legesque servandas ipsa utatur."

[5]—[5] Bekker, followed by Stalbaum, considers *ὅσα τε καὶ μή*, omitted by Ficinus, as an interpolation. But who would have inserted those words, or why, we are not told.

quisite to see [1] in addition to all the laws already detailed, which we have gone through,[1] whether we can bring this nocturnal meeting of the rulers to be a guard,[2] according to law, for the sake of preservation, after becoming a sharer in the education, such as we have gone through. Or how shall we act?

Clin. But how, O thou best of men, should we not bring it, if perchance we are able, even for a little?

Athen. Let us then enter altogether into a contest for a thing of this kind at least. For I will readily be your helper in this; and in addition to myself perhaps, through my skill in things of this kind, and my thinking upon them very frequently, I shall find others likewise.

Clin. Let us, O guest, proceed in this path, rather than any other, in which even a god is almost leading us. But what is the method, which, if it took place, would take place correctly, this let us now speak of and seek out.

Athen. Laws about things of this kind, Megillus and Clinias, it is not possible to lay down, until (the whole state)[3] is orderly arranged; [4]for then (one can) lay down, over what it is meet for them to have an authority.[4] [5]But the furnishing such things at present would be, if it were done correctly, an act of instruction combined with much intercourse.[5]

Clin. How so? Why do we say that this is mentioned again?

Athen. In the first place, a list should be drawn out of those, who would be fitted for the nature of a guard by the power of their time of life, and instruction, and by their morals and manners. But after this, it is neither easy to find (oneself),[6] what one ought to learn, nor to become the disciple

[1]—[1] In lieu of this unmeaning verbiage Ficinus has merely "prædictis legibus."

[2] Ficinus has "ut apicem custodemque," as if his MS. read *κορυφὴν καὶ φυλακὴν*—

[3] Ficinus alone has, what the sense seems to require, "civitas universa—"

[4]—[4] Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus has "tunc enim debita cum auctoritate constituendæ videntur."

[5]—[5] Here again Ficinus has swerved not a little from the Greek in his version, "sed eo non aliter recte, quam doctrina multa et longo disputationis examine, probabuntur."

[6] I have inserted "oneself," for *αὐτὸν* might easily have dropt out

of another, who has found it out. In addition to this, it is a vain thing to state in writing the times [1]which and[1] in which it is requisite to obtain each particular. For not even to the learners themselves would it be manifest, what is learnt opportunely, before the science of the instruction is generated in the soul of each. Hence, all, that relates to these matters, being spoken of, would not be said to be properly secrets ; [2]but they (might be said to be) not previously spoken, through nothing of what has been spoken indicating what has been previously spoken.[2]

Clin. Since then this is the case, what, O guest, must we do ?

Athen. According to the proverb, friends, it appears [3]we are lying in a common and middle ground.[3] And if we are willing to run a risk respecting the whole polity, we must do all things, by throwing, as they say, either thrice six, or thrice ace.[4] I will, however, undergo the danger with you in stating and explaining, what appears to me respecting the education and nurture, which has been agitated in our conversations. The hazard is, indeed, neither small, nor similar to any others. But I exhort you, Clinias, to have a care of this. For you will obtain the greatest renown by establishing

after *οὔτε*—for the sake of the balance in *ἄλλου*, on which see my Poppo's Prolegom. p. 254. In vi. p. 772, D. § 16, *αὐτὸς* is however omitted in the words *σκοπῶν καὶ σκοπούμενος ὑπ' ἄλλων*—

[1]—[1] Ficinus, with the approbation of Stephens, omits *οὓς καὶ*—

[2]—[2] The Greek is — *οὕτω δὴ πάντα τὰ περὶ ταῦτα ἀπόρρητα μὲν λεχθέντα οὐκ ἂν ὀρθῶς λέγοιτο, ἀπόρρητα δὲ διὰ τὸ μηδὲν προρρηθέντα δηλοῦν τῶν λεγομένων* : which, I confess, I cannot understand ; nor could Ficinus ; for his version is " quæ igitur in his palam dici non possunt, non recte tentantur ; dici autem non posse inquam, quoniam, si dicantur, nihil planius explicant." Nor could Stephens, who wished to expunge the second *ἀπόρρητα*. Nor could Faehse, who would read *ἐλεγχθέντα* with one MS., or *δειχθέντα* from conjecture ; nor, lastly, could Ast, who proposed *ἀπρόρρητα*, adopted by Bekker and the subsequent editors. But what we gain by the alteration, I am yet to learn ; although I have so translated it.

[3]—[3] The proverb is *ἐν μέσῳ κεῖσθαι*, not, as here, *ἐν κοινῷ κεῖσθαι*. See Bergler on Alciphron. ii. 3, n. 75. It was applied to neutral ground lying between two contending parties.

[4] On the expression *τρὶς ἓξ*, applied to a lucky throw with three dice, see Blomfield on Agam. 33, and on *τρεῖς κύβους*, an unlucky one, Hemsterhuis on Jul. Pollux ix. 95, *ἡ μονὰς—ὄνομα εἶχε κύβος καλεῖσθαι, καθάπερ καὶ ὁ παροιμιώδης λόγος μηνύειν ἔοικεν Ἢ τρὶς ἓξ ἢ τρεῖς κύβους*— The corresponding phrase for the latter in English hazard is " crabs."

correctly the city of the Magnesians, or after what other event a god shall give it a name ; or you will at least not escape the seeming to be [1]the bravest of all born afterwards.[1] If then this divine assembly shall be established by us, O friends and companions, the city must be delivered to its care ; [2]nor will there be any dispute amongst any one, so to say, of the legislators at present respecting[3] these institutions ;[2] but there will be completed almost [4]a day-dream in a matter, which we touched upon in our discourse a little before as a night dream,[4] when we mingled together a certain image of the agreement of the head with intellect; if indeed these men are accurately mingled together by us, and properly instructed, and when instructed, reside in the acropolis of the country, and become guardians, such as we have never seen in our previous life, as regards the power of preservation.

Megil. O friend Clinias, from all that has been now said by us, we must either give up the city, as regards[5] its settlement, or not dismiss this our guest, but by entreaties and all kinds of devices make him a partner with us in settling the city.

Clin. You speak with the greatest truth, Megillus; and both myself will act thus, and do you also co-operate.

Megil. I will co-operate.

[1]—[1] With the phrase *ἀνδρειότατος τῶν ὕστερον*, compare *ἀξιολογώτατον τῶν προγεγενημένων* in Thucyd. § 1 ; otherwise one would prefer *ἀνδρειότερος*, found in a good MS.

[2]—[2] Such is the literal version of the Greek, which differs not a little from the version of Ficinus—"neque his reliqui legumlatores tanquam minus sufficientes adversabuntur."

[3] I have translated as if the Greek were *περὶ*, not *παρὰ*—

[4]—[4] On the difference between *ὕπαρ*, "a day-dream," i. e. a reality ; and *ὄναρ*, "a night-dream," i. e. a non-reality, see at vii. 8.

[5] I have translated as if *πέρι* had dropt out after *κατοικίσεως*—

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